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Abstract.	  	   Human	  Papillomavirus	  (HPV)	  is	  a	  sexually	  transmitted	  virus,	  recognized	  to	   be	   the	   necessary,	   yet	   not	   sufficient,	   cause	   of	   cervical	   cancer.	   Vaccines	   for	  individual	  administration	  targeting	  HPV	  are	  available	  today.	  In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  undertake	  a	  normative	  analysis	  of	  existing	  HPV	  vaccination	  programmes	  and	  evaluate	   how	   current	   policy	   alternatives	   put	   in	   balance	   competing	   moral	  concerns	  at	  stake.	  To	   this	  aim,	   I	  explore	   the	  ethical	  dimension	  of	   the	  different	  policy	  models,	  with	  respect	  to	  issues	  of	  respect	  for	  individual	  choice,	  expected	  coverage	  rates,	  and	  population	  health	  goals.	  	  
My	   goal	   is	   thus	   to	   show	   how	   the	   different	   policies	   -­‐	   ranging	   from	   a	   hotly	  contested	   mandatory	   model	   to	   prima	   facie	   more	   justifiable	   voluntary	  approaches	  –	   fare	  with	  respect	  to	  the	   interests	  of	   individuals	  targeted	  by	  HPV	  vaccination	   campaigns.	  Differently	   from	   standard	   approaches	   in	   public	   health	  ethics,	   however,	   I	   show	   that	   concerns	   for	   individual	   choice	   in	   HPV	   contexts	  cannot	  be	  severed	  by	  equally	  important	  concerns	  for	  social	  justice.	  In	  particular,	  I	  show	  that	  an	  insistence	  on	  the	  least	  restrictive	  alternative	  alone	  leaves	  out	  of	  focus	  important	  concerns	  for	  social	  justice	  and	  the	  need	  to	  avoid	  the	  worsening	  of	   existing	   inequalities.	  Moreover,	   I	   argue	   that	   standard	   approaches	   in	   public	  health	  ethics	  should	  be	  widened	  to	  consider	  the	  legitimate	  interests	  of	  specific	  social	   groups,	   namely	   those	   belonging	   to	   socio-­‐economically	   disadvantaged	  strata	   of	   society,	   and	   fair	   consideration	   of	   the	   health	   interests	   of	   minority	  groups.	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In	   this	   dissertation	   I	   therefore	   present	   a	   rationale	   for	   adopting	   a	  capability-­‐based	  approach	  to	  HPV	  immunization	  in	  order	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  most	  pressing	  ethical	  issues	  at	  stake	  in	  this	  field.	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Introduction.	  HPV	  at	  the	  crossroads	  of	  
cancer	  research	  and	  prevention	  
	   Cancer	  is	  one	  of	  the	  major	  causes	  of	  death	  worldwide,	  the	  second	  behind	  only	  cardiovascular	  diseases.	  More	  than	  7	  million	  people	  died	  of	  cancer	  in	  2008,	  and	   around	   12.5	   million	   individuals	   were	   diagnosed	   with	   the	   disease,	  accounting	  for	  nearly	  14%	  of	  all	  deaths	   in	  that	  year	  (Ferlay	  et	  al.	  2010).	  More	  than	  7	  million	  of	  the	  new	  cases	  occur	  in	  low	  and	  middle-­‐income	  countries	  of	  the	  world,	  and	   these	   figures	  are	  expected	   to	  grow	   in	   the	  next	   few	  decades	   (Boyle	  and	  Levin	  2008).	  Cancer	  is	  certainly	  a	  burden	  also	  in	  high-­‐income	  countries.	  In	  Northern	  America	  and	  Western	  Europe,	  for	  instance,	  incidence	  rates	  of	  cancers	  at	  all	  sites	  are	  the	  highest	  both	  for	  men	  (334	  per	  100,000	  and	  335	  per	  100,000	  respectively)	  and	  women	  (274	  per	  100,000	  and	  250	  per	  100.000	  respectively)1.	  	  
As	   impressive	   as	   those	   figures	  may	  be,	   they	   certainly	   do	  not	   fully	   convey	   the	  emotional	  and	  psychological	   toll	  of	   cancer	  on	   the	   life	  of	  many	   individuals	  and	  their	   families.	  One	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  a	  sociologist	   to	  be	  aware	  that	  much	  of	  these	   fears	   are	   accompanied	   by	   high	   societal	   expectation	   for	   new	   cures	   and	  treatments	   to	  come	  from	  biomedical	  research.	  The	  public	  attention	  on	  cancer,	  moreover,	   is	  not	  only	  apparent	   in	   the	  anxieties	  and	  hopes	  of	  citizens,	  but	   it	   is	  also	   manifest	   in	   the	   concerted	   political	   action	   and	   economic	   investments	   it	  attracts	  worldwide.	  Ever	  since	  the	  United	  States	  president	  Richard	  Nixon	  signed	  the	   National	   Cancer	   Act	   in	   1971,	   a	   flood	   of	   economic	   investments	   and	  intellectual	   efforts	   has	   been	   directed	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   biological	  roots	  as	  well	  as	  treatment	  options	  for	  cancer.	  Four	  decades	  after	  this	  war	  –as	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Incidence	   is	   the	   number	   of	   new	   cases	   arising	   in	   a	   given	   period	   in	   a	   specified	  population.	  It	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  an	  absolute	  number	  of	  cases	  per	  year	  or	  as	  a	  rate	  per	  100,000	  persons	  per	  year	  (Ferlay	  et	  al.	  2010).	  Throughout	   this	  work	   I	  will	  be	  mainly	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is	  often	  described	  -­‐	  was	  launched,	  the	  scientific	  community	  has	  made	  enormous	  progress	   at	   unravelling	   cancer’s	   biology,	   delineating	   its	   fundamental	  architecture,	   and	   describing	   some	   of	   the	   finest	   details	   of	   its	   progression.	   The	  race	   to	   find	   new	   treatments	   and,	   possibly	   a	   cure	   for	   cancers,	   however,	  continues	  and	  more	  investment	  on	  research	  and	  prevention	  are	  still	  needed.	  As	  an	   example	   of	   this	   never	   decreasing	   effort,	   the	   Obama’s	   administration	  presented	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘Obama-­‐Biden	  plan	  to	  combat	  cancer’.	  In	  his	  address	  to	  congress,	   in	   February	   25th	   2009,	   the	   President	   of	   the	   US	   claimed:	   “We	   will	  launch	   a	   new	   effort	   to	   conquer	   a	   disease	   that	   has	   touched	   the	   life	   of	   nearly	  every	  American,	  including	  me,	  by	  seeking	  a	  cure	  for	  cancer	  in	  our	  time…	  and	  it	  makes	  the	  largest	  investment	  ever	  in	  preventive	  care	  because	  that’s	  one	  of	  the	  best	  ways	  to	  keep	  our	  people	  healthy	  and	  our	  costs	  under	  control”2.	  	  
Cancer	   is	   a	   cellular	   disease	   consisting	   in	   uncontrolled	   cell	   growth	   and	  whose	  progression	   is	   organized	   stepwise.	   Major	   moments	   are:	   cancer	   initiation	   or	  formation	  (from	  normal	  cells	  to	  neoplasm),	  development	  (from	  a	  few	  neoplastic	  cells	   to	   a	   full	   blown	   tumour),	   and	  progression	   (invasion	   and	  metastasis).	   The	  term	   ‘cancer’	   is	   a	   shortcut	   to	   refer	   to	   more	   than	   one	   hundred	   forms	   of	   the	  disease.	   Each	   tissue	   of	   our	   bodies	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   give	   rise	   to	   neoplastic	  malignancies.	  Each	  cancer,	  moreover,	  has	  unique	  features	  and	  calls	  for	  separate	  scientific	   investigation.	   Despite	   variation,	   however,	   it	   is	   now	   established	   in	  molecular	   oncology	   that	   every	   tumour	   pathogenesis	   can	   be	   conceptualized	  under	  a	  number	  of	  ‘hallmarks	  of	  cancer’,	  that	  is	  the	  shared	  organizing	  principles	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 	  The	   plan	   can	   be	   found	   here:	  http://obama.3cdn.net/f8a8d6b8b4b370d888_24lmvygeu.pdf	   (last	   accessed:	  November	   11th,	   2011).	   Obama’s	   speech	   can	   instead	   be	   found	   here:	  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3hXSzBOolLo	  (last	  accessed:	  November	  11th,2011)	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explaining	   neoplastic	   diseases	   progression.	   In	   a	   nutshell,	   the	   fundamental	  hallmarks	  are	  (Hanahan	  and	  Weinberg	  2000;	  Hanahan	  and	  Weinberg	  2011):	  
-­‐ the	  self-­‐sufficiency	  in	  growth	  signals	  (cancer	  cells	  generate	  their	  growth	  hormones)	  
-­‐ the	   insensitivity	  to	   inhibition	  signals	  (cancer	  cells	  are	  deaf	   to	  signals	  of	  quiescence)	  
-­‐ the	  evasion	  of	   apoptosis	   (cancer	   cells	  do	  not	  die	  or	  go	   into	   senescence	  when	  they	  should)	  
-­‐ immortality	  (cancer	  cells	  replicate	  indefinitely)	  
-­‐ angiogenesis	  (creation	  of	  new	  blood	  vessels	  to	  bring	  more	  nutrients	  and	  oxygen	  to	  the	  tumour)	  
-­‐ invasion	   and	   metastasis	   (the	   cells	   invade	   the	   surrounding	   tissue	   and	  then	  spread	  to	  other	  body	  sites)	  
The	   increasing	   understanding	   of	   the	   biology	   of	   cancer,	   despite	   occasional	  scepticism,	   has	   helped	   improving	   survival	   rates	   of	   many	   patients	   in	   the	   last	  decades,	   and	   still	   offers	   enormous	   potential	   for	   the	   development	   of	   novel	  treatments	   and	   tools	   for	   early	   diagnosis.	   Detractors	   of	   cancer	   research	  sometimes	  question	  the	  practical	  success	  of	  these	  attempts,	  observing	  how	  little	  is	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  total	  burden	  of	  cancers,	  both	  in	  the	  US	  and	  worldwide,	  as	  compared	   to	   the	   terrific	   intellectual	   and	   financial	   resources	   so	   far	   devoted	   to	  this	   crusade	   (Leaf	   2004).	   In	   fairness,	   although	   it	   is	   true	   that	   the	   decline	   in	  incidence	   and	   mortalities	   for	   cancer	   in	   the	   US,	   and	   other	   economically	  developed	   countries,	   has	   not	   been	   as	   decisive	   as	   it	  was	   expected	   in	   the	   early	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70’s	  (nearly	  10%	  decline	  in	  mortality	  from	  1978	  to	  2005)	  it	  is	  also	  the	  case	  that	  our	  current	  understanding	  of	  the	  biology	  of	  cancer	  has	  increased	  exponentially,	  and	  with	   it	   the	  array	  of	  ways	   in	  which	  progress	   in	   therapies,	   identification	  of	  markers	  for	  disease	  early	  detection,	  and	  standards	  of	  care	  can	  potentially	  arise.	  In	   some	   cases,	   such	   as	   chronic	  myeloid	   leukaemia	   (CML),	   detailed	  molecular	  knowledge	  of	  tumour	  progression	  has	  been	  sufficient	  to	  help	  the	  development	  of	   effective	   treatments	   (Druker	  2009;	   Lydon	  2009).	   In	   others,	   however,	  more	  efforts	  are	  needed	  and	  the	  scientific	  community	  is	  currently	  engaged	  in	  finding	  ways	   to	   bring	   knowledge	   from	   the	   bench	   to	   the	   bedside,	   so	   to	   bridge	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘gap’	   observed	   between	   basic	   and	   clinical	   research.	   The	   problem	   is	  certainly	  complex,	  and	  cancer	  scientists	  are	  actively	  engaged	  in	  identifying	  the	  main	   conceptual	   and	   regulative	   issues	   that	   may	   function	   as	   hindrances	   for	  progress	   (for	  a	  nice	   review	  about	   this	  problem	  see	   for	   instance:	  Moran	  2007;	  Miller	  and	  Larionov	  2011).	  
The	   increasing	  understanding	  of	   cancer,	  moreover,	   helped	   also	   to	   realize,	   not	  which	  much	  surprise	  however,	  that	  one	  of	  the	  best	  ways	  to	  combat	  this	  disease	  is	   by	   preventing	   it	   to	   occur	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   The	  World	  Health	  Organization	  (WHO),	   for	   instance,	   estimates	   that	   nearly	   one	   third	   of	   all	   cancers	   could	   be	  prevented	   by	   appropriate	   policy	   actions,	   and	   some	   argue	   for	   a	   public	   health	  approach	  to	  win	  the	  war	  on	  cancer	  (Frieden	  et	  al.	  2008).	  For	  instance,	  cigarette	  smoking	   is	   now	   recognized	   to	   cause	   nearly	   70%	   of	   lung	   cancers,	   and	   it	   is	  involved	   in	   the	   etiology	   of	   nearly	   30%	   of	   all	   cancers	   (Vineis	   et	   al.	   2004).	  Epidemiological	  evidence,	  moreover,	   is	   showing	  also	  how	  other	   life-­‐styles	   can	  have	  a	  huge	  impact	  on	  cancer	  rates	  worldwide.	  Obesity,	  for	  instance,	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  correlated	  not	  only	  with	  diabetes	  and	  coronary	  diseases,	  but	  also	  with	  a	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number	   of	   cancers	   of	   the	   endometrium,	   kidney,	   breast,	   and	   esophagus.	   It	   has	  been	  estimated	  that	  in	  the	  US,	  if	  the	  prevalence	  of	  overweight	  and	  obesity	  were	  reduced,	  about	  90,000	  deaths	  per	  year	  could	  be	  prevented	  (Calle	  et	  al.	  2003).	  Healthy	  diets	  and	  physical	  exercise,	  moreover,	  are	  also	  associated	  with	  positive	  outcomes	   in	   terms	   of	   cancer	   prevention.	   The	   WHO	   (2004)	   reports	   that	   a	  suitable	  increase	  in	  fruit	  and	  vegetables	  consumption	  could	  prevent	  world	  wide	  5-­‐12%	   of	   the	   total	   cancer	   burden.	   Besides	   numbers,	   however,	   the	   focus	   on	  prevention	   does	   not	   only	   require	   a	   shift	   in	   individual	   behaviour,	   but	   also	  dedicated	   patterns	   of	   policies	   and	   regulations	   that	   can	   create	   suitable	  environments	   for	  correct	  preventive	  practices	   to	   take	  place.	  Bans	  on	  cigarette	  smoking	   in	   public	   spaces,	   as	   adopted	   in	   several	   countries,	   are	   but	   one	   of	  possible	  policy	  options	   that	  can	  make	  a	  difference	   in	   the	  prevention	  of	  cancer	  and	   other	   diseases.	   Being	   cancer	   a	   global	   burden,	   the	   WHO	   has	   launched	   a	  number	  of	  initiatives	  to	  urge	  governments	  to	  adopt	  policies	  that:	  	  
a) monitor	   tobacco	  use,	   protect	  people	   from	   tobacco	   smoke,	   offer	  help	   to	  quit	   tobacco	   use,	   warn	   about	   the	   dangers	   of	   tobacco,	   enforce	   bans	   on	  tobacco	  advertising,	  promotion	  and	  sponsorship,	  raise	  taxes	  on	  tobacco	  (WHO	  2011)	  
b) foster	   a	   favourable	   environment	   for	   the	   exercise	   of	   individual	  responsibility	  for	  health	  through	  the	  adoption	  of	  lifestyles	  that	  include	  a	  healthy	  diet	  and	  physical	  activity	  (WHO	  2004)	  
Research	   and	   prevention	   need	   not	   to	   be	   put	   in	   opposition.	   Both	   have	   their	  merits	   and	   promises	   benefits.	   None	   of	   them,	   however,	   is	   unproblematic.	  Research,	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  promises	  benefits	   in	   terms	  of	  new	  treatments	  and	  therapies,	  which	   should	   improve	   prognosis	   of	   patients	   once	   they	   get	   ill.	   It	   is,	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however,	   a	   painstaking	   activity	   with	   no	   negligible	   intellectual	   and	   financial	  costs	   for	   the	   community.	   Prevention,	   on	   the	   other,	   is	   economically	   less	  expensive,	  but	  less	  so	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  policy	  action	  it	  requires	  in	  order	  to	  build	  the	  right	  social	  architecture,	  and	  bring	  about	  changes	  in	  individual	  behaviour.	  
Though	  not	  adversarial	   the	   two	  perspectives	   indicate	  how	  the	  global	  effort	   to	  defeat	   cancer	   is	   set	   with	   major	   complications	   requiring	   a	   plethora	   of	  intellectual,	   financial	   and,	   not	   less	   importantly,	   cultural	   actions,	   none	  of	   them	  being	   unproblematic.	   At	   times,	   however,	   scientific	   ingenuity	   fully	   justifies	  decades	   of	   research	   efforts	   and	   provides	   biomedical	   innovations	   that	   add	   a	  significant	  piece	  in	  the	  complex	  puzzle	  of	  cancer	  control	  also	  at	  the	  clinical	  level.	  From	  2000	   to	   2009	   the	   Food	   and	  Drug	  Administration,	   the	  US	   authority	   that	  approves	  drugs	  for	  introduction	  on	  the	  medical	  market,	  licenced	  62	  oncological	  drugs3,	   each	   with	   significant	   prospects	   for	   the	   treatment	   of	   cancer	   patients	  (Simon	  2010).	  Among	  them,	  two	  products	  posses	  the	  features	  of	  truly	  medical	  breakthroughs	   for	   the	   impact	   they	   may	   have	   on	   individuals’	   and	   population	  health:	  Gardasil	  (2006)	  and	  Cervarix	  (2009).	  Also	  authorised	  by	  the	  European	  Medicines	   Agency	   (2006	   and	   2007	   respectively),	   Gardasil	   and	   Cervarix	   are	  vaccines	   for	   individual	   administration	   targeting	   those	   types	   of	   the	   Human	  Papillomavirus,	   a	   sexually	   transmitted	   virus,	  which	   are	   now	   recognized	   to	   be	  the	   necessary,	   yet	   not	   sufficient,	   cause	   of	   about	   70%	   of	   cervical	   cancers	  worldwide	  (Walboomers	  et	  al.	  1999).	  HPV,	  as	  it	  will	  be	  shown	  more	  extensively	  below,	   is	   causally	   connected	   not	   only	   with	   cervical	   cancers	   but,	   as	   it	   is	  progressively	   appearing	   from	  recent	   epidemiological	   studies	  with	  other	  kinds	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Drugs	  approved	  by	  the	  FDA	  can	  be	  searched	  at	  the	  agency’s	  website,	  more	  specifically,	  through	  the	  search	  of	  the	  database	  to	  be	  found	  at:	  http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Reports.ReportsMenu	  (last	  access:	  September	  1st,	  2011)	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of	  neoplastic	  malignancies	  and	  other	  morbidities.	  The	  burden	  of	  cervical	  cancer,	  however,	   is	   the	  most	   significant	   in	   terms	  of	   annual	   incidence	   and	  mortalities,	  among	  all	  the	  HPV-­‐related	  diseases.	  	  
Cervical	  cancer,	  is	  a	  neoplastic	  malignancy	  arising	  in	  the	  cervix	  uteri,	  and	  is	  the	  third	  most	  common	  cancer	  in	  women	  worldwide.	  The	  International	  Agency	  for	  
Research	  on	  Cancer	  (IARC)	  estimates	  show	  that	  in	  2008	  about	  530,000	  women	  were	  diagnosed	  with	  this	  disease,	  and	  about	  275,000	  women	  died	  in	  the	  same	  year	   (Ferlay	   et	   al.	   2010)4.	   The	   burden	   of	   cervical	   cancer	   is	  most	   apparent	   in	  developing	   countries,	  where	  about	  85%	  of	   the	  new	  cases	  occur.	   In	  developed	  countries,	  instead,	  decades	  of	  preventive	  methods,	  like	  screening	  of	  the	  women	  population	   for	   cytological	   abnormalities	   that	   precede	   cancer	   (the	   so-­‐called	  Papanicolau	  test),	   led	  to	  a	  decline	  of	  the	   incidence	  of	  new	  cases.	  Nevertheless,	  cervical	  cancer	  remains	  among	  the	  most	  common	  cancer	  of	  women	  also	  in	  these	  areas.	  For	  instance,	  IARC’s	  Globocan	  research	  identified	  about	  83,000	  new	  cases	  occurring	   in	   the	   most	   economically	   advanced	   areas	   of	   the	   globe	   every	   year.	  Cervical	  cancer	  thus	  is	  the	  seventh	  women	  cancer	  by	  incidence	  in	  these	  areas.	  Although	   the	   striking	  difference	   existing	   between	  most	   and	   less	   economically	  developed	  areas	  of	  the	  world,	  cervical	  cancer	  is	  still	  a	  major	  problem	  for	  women	  in	   the	   higher-­‐income	   countries	   too.	   The	   burden	   of	   this	   disease	   for	   society	   is	  accentuated	  even	   further	   if	  we	   take	   into	  account	   the	  average	  age	  at	  diagnosis	  and	   death.	   In	   this	   case,	   cervical	   cancer	   is	   the	   second	   most	   common	   cancer	  among	   women	   aged	   15-­‐44	   in	   Europe.	   Cervical	   cancer	   is	   hence	   among	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Throughout	  this	  chapter,	  and	  wherever	  I	  cite	  cancer	  related	  statistics	  I	  would	  refer	  to	  the	  estimates	  provided	  by	  GLOBOCAN	  project.	  GLOBOCAN	  is	  a	  WHO	  and	  IARC	  joint	  software	  that	  provides	  facts	  and	  figures	  about	  cancer	  incidence	  and	  mortality	  worldwide.	  It	  can	  be	  find	  at:	  http://globocan.iarc.fr/.	  Where	  different	  sources	  will	  be	  used	  I	  would	  cite	  them	  accordingly.	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tumours	  that	  mostly	  impact	  on	  younger	  women	  in	  a	  stage	  of	  life	  in	  which	  much	  of	  their	  familial	  and	  personal	  projects	  are	  still	  developing.	  
At	   a	   glance,	   HPV	   vaccines	   offer	   the	   reassuring	   features	   that	   arguably	   anyone	  expects	  from	  biomedical	  innovations.	  With	  three	  injections,	  to	  be	  administered	  over	   six	   months	   prior	   to	   sexual	   debut	   in	   young	   girls,	   HPV	   vaccines	   confer	  protection	   against	   those	   infective	   agents	   that,	   if	   encountered,	   could	   lead	   to	  development	   of	   such	   a	   terrible	   disease.	   If	   one,	   moreover,	   thinks	   about	   the	  health	  impact	  that	  these	  innovations	  may	  have	  if	  administered	  on	  a	  population	  scale,	  claims	  for	  significant	  public	  health	  progress	  would	  be	  more	  than	  justified.	  Clearly,	   it	   can	   also	   be	   admitted,	   this	   advancement	   constitutes	   only	   one	   small	  battlefield	  victory	  in	  the	  war	  against	  what	  it	  has	  been	  defined	  the	  emperor	  of	  all	  maladies	  (Mukherjee	  2010).	  Nonetheless,	  HPV	  vaccines	  seemingly	  vindicate	  the	  promises	  of	  decades	  of	  scientific	  research	  efforts,	  and	  they	  do	  so	  by	  tackling	  the	  disease	   before	   it	   occurs.	   ‘One	   ounce	   of	   prevention	   is	   worth	   a	   pound	   of	   cure’	  popular	  wisdom	  says.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  HPV	  vaccines,	  it	  could	  be	  thought,	  that	  very	  ‘ounce’	   appears	  even	   lighter	   if	   compared	   to	  other	   cancer	  preventive	  methods.	  HPV	   immunization,	   in	   fact,	   offers	   the	   simplicity	   of	   all	   vaccines;	   it	   prevents	  disease	  without	  the	  need	  to	  change	  much	  about	  one’s	  lifestyle.	  Having	  this	  seemingly	  enthusiastic	  words	  been	  said,	  one	  could	  wonder	  what	  it	  is	   then	  problematic	   about	  HPV	  vaccination.	   Isn’t	   it	   a	  paradigmatic	   example	  of	  how	   the	   outcomes	   of	   scientific	   progress	   should	   look	   like?	   Isn’t	   it	   a	   great	  achievement	   in	   cancer	   prevention?	   Although	   HPV	   vaccination	   offers	   great	  medical	   benefits,	   its	   implementation	   is	   not	   devoid	  of	   complexities	   and	   ethical	  problems.	   Namely,	   the	   achievement	   of	   sensible	   population	   health	   goals	   with	  respect	   to	   immunity	  generates	  problems	  of	  autonomous	   individual	  choice	  and	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distributive	   justice.	   It	   has	   indeed	   to	   be	   noticed	   that	   the	   choice	   of	   distributive	  strategies	  may	  attain	  different	  coverage	  ratios	  among	  differently	  situated	  social	  groups,	   as	   I	   will	   show	   throughout	   the	   thesis.	   In	   particular	   I	   will	   argue	   that	  problems	   of	   autonomy	   and	   distributive	   justice	   are	   particularly	   thorny	   with	  respect	   to	   three	   axes:	   individual	   choice	   versus	   population	   health;	   individual	  choice	   versus	   justice;	   gender	   equity	   versus	   efficiency.	   Addressing	   these	  problems,	  I	  argue,	  is	  of	  paramount	  importance	  to	  build	  up	  this	  innovation	  as	  a	  socially	   robust	   advancement.	   The	   problems	   that	   I	   will	   highlight,	   it	   must	   be	  noticed,	  are	  not	  technical	  but	  moral.	  In	  other	  terms,	  for	  a	  new	  technology	  to	  be	  proper	   advancement	   it	   has	   not	   only	   to	   overcome	   those	   obstacles	   that	  sometimes	  may	   slow	  down	  or	   impede	   its	   implementation.	   The	   latter	  may	  be:	  problems	   of	   budgeting,	   problems	   pertaining	   to	   the	   delivery	   of	   the	   new	  products,	   problems	   of	   communication	   with	   all	   stakeholders,	   problems	   in	  creating	  new	  expertise,	   and	   the	   like.	  All	   these	   are	   certainly	   interesting	   issues,	  but	  all	  are	  more	  properly	  addressed	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  public	  health	  policy	  science	  (Hunter	  2003;	  Buse	  et	  al.	  2005).	   I	  will	   instead	  address	  from	  an	  ethical	  perspective	   the	   conditions,	   if	   any,	  which	  make	  HPV	  vaccination	  desirable	   and	  the	   ethical	   trade-­‐offs,	   if	   any,	   that	   need	   to	   be	   put	   in	   balance	   for	   its	   policy	  implementation.	  In	  other	  words,	  although	  it	  can	  be	  easily	  conceded	  that	  putting	  in	   place	   public	  HPV	   vaccination	   policies	  may	   be	   ethically	   justifiable	   given	   the	  burden	  and	  severity	  of	  the	  disease	  they	  can	  contribute	  to	  control,	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  what	  the	  appropriate	  means	  for	  achieving	  that	  goal	  are.	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This	  thesis	  is	  thus	  devoted	  to	  the	  ethical	  examination	  of	  public	  HPV	  vaccination	  policies	  as	   recently	   implemented	   in	  several	  developed	  countries5.	  Taking	  HPV	  vaccination	   policies	   as	   a	   case	   study	   allows	   me	   to	   discuss	   what	   I	   consider	  important	  issues	  in	  public	  health	  ethics	  in	  general.	  The	  basic	  problem	  I	  will	  face	  is	   that	   of	   finding	   a	   balance,	   though	   provisional,	   among	   equity	   concerns,	  efficiency	  and	   individual	   choice.	  All	   these	   three	  aspects	  have	   important	  moral	  weight	   that	  needs	   to	  be	  balanced	  according	   to	  different	   contextual	  needs	   and	  depending	  on	  the	  case	  at	  hand.	  Connected	  to	  these	  issues	  there	  is	  the	  problem	  of	   the	   role	   that	   the	   state	   has	   to	   play	   in	   funding	   and	   promoting	   the	   different	  programmes	  and	  how	  it	  deals	  with	  the	  abovementioned	  values.	  	  For	  reasons	  of	  methodological	  clarity	  this	  thesis	  is	  divided	  in	  two	  parts.	  In	  the	  first	  part	  I	  will	  provide	  the	  theoretical	  background	  that	  will	  inform	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  study	  in	  the	  second	  part.	  In	   chapter	   1	   I	   will	   start	   with	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   discipline	   of	   public	   health	  ethics.	  I	  will	   first	  present	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  the	  received	  view	  of	  the	  discipline,	  what	   I	   call	   the	   beneficence	  model	   of	   public	   health	   ethics	   and	   then	   challenge	  some	  of	   its	  assumptions	  by	  the	  means	  of	  some	  concepts	  of	  republicanism	  as	  a	  political	  philosophy.	  In	  particular,	  I	  will	  contrast	  their	  conceptions	  of	  ‘freedom’	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  it	  with	  populational	  concerns.	  	  In	  chapter	  2	  I	  will	  enlarge	  the	  scope	  of	  my	  analysis	  to	  issues	  of	  distributive	  and	  social	   justice	   and	   see	   how	   they	   can	   be	   framed	   in	   public	   health	   ethics.	   I	   will	  specify,	   in	   that	   context,	   that	   socially	   determined	   health	   inequalities	   are	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	   choice	   of	   developed	   countries	   does	   not	   derive	   from	   a	   lack	   of	   interest	   towards	  issues	   of	   global	   justice,	   but	   are	   motivated	   but	   is	   motivated	   by	   my	   background	  theoretical	  interests	  in	  analysing	  the	  moral	  relationship	  existing	  between	  the	  state	  and	  its	  citizens.	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particular	   moral	   importance.	   For	   this	   reason,	   I	   will	   provide	   a	   minimal	  requirement	   of	   justice	   that	   public	   health	   policies	   need	   to	   satisfy.	   I	   call	   it	   the	  negative	  aim	  of	   justice,	  and	   it	   is	  an	   injunction	   for	  public	  health	  policies	  not	   to	  worsen	  existing	  inequalities.	  This	  point	  will	  become	  important	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  normative	  comparative	  analysis	   in	  chapter	  4.	  In	  chapter	  2	  I	  will	  also	  show	  that	  public	  health	  ethics	  should	  not	  be	  blind	  as	  to	  the	  elaboration	  of	  what	  public	  health	  policies	  should	  aim	  at.	  I	  will	  thus	  present	  Sen’s	  capability	  approach	  as	  a	  good	  candidate	  at	  elucidating	  this	   task.	  The	  presentation	  of	   this	  approach	  will	  become	   important	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   concluding	   chapter	   of	   this	   thesis	  (chapter	  6),	  where	  I	  will	  show	  that	  the	  focus	  in	  HPV	  vaccination	  policies	  should	  be	   on	   maximising	   capabilities	   rather	   than	   merely	   aiming	   at	   achieving	   high	  coverage	  rates.	  In	   chapter	   3	   I	   will	   present	   the	   biological	   and	   epidemiological	   background	   of	  HPV	   and	   related	   disease	   burden	   and	   how	   an	   emerging	   political	   debate	   is	  highlighting	   the	  morally	   and	   socially	   relevant	   dimensions	   of	   HPV	   vaccination	  campaigns.	  In	   chapter	   4,	   I	  will	   present	   a	   normative	   comparative	   analysis	   of	   current	  HPV	  policy	  proposals.	  This	  analysis	  will	  draw	  on	  the	  conclusions	  of	  chapters	  1	  and	  2	  and	  will	  further	  expand	  them	  to	  show	  that	  the	  concerns	  of	  justice	  and	  individual	  freedom	  are	  not	  appropriately	   captured	  by	   the	   received	  view	   in	  public	  health	  ethics.	  	  In	  chapter	  5,	  I	  will	   introduce	  moral	  reasons	  to	  expand	  the	  vaccination	  policies	  to	  the	  male	  population	  despite	  such	  an	  option	  is	  not	  usually	  deemed	  to	  be	  cost-­‐effective	  from	  an	  health	  economic	  point	  of	  view.	  	  In	  chapter	  6,	   finally,	   I	  will	  argue	  that	  our	  ethical	  gaze	  can	  be	  expanded	   if	  HPV	  vaccination	   takes	   the	   capability-­‐distribution	   approach	   at	   face	   value.	   In	   this	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respect,	   I	  will	  maintain	  that	  by	  adopting	  a	  capability-­‐oriented	  approach	  to	   the	  design	   of	   HPV	   vaccination	   policies	   is	   of	   substantial	   advantage	   to	   tackle	  problems	  of	  justice,	  fairness	  and	  inclusion.	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Part	  1:	  Theoretical	  
framework	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Chapter	  one:	  Individual	  choice	  and	  the	  
common	  good.	  The	  ethical	  dimension	  of	  
public	  health	  
	  
1.	  Introduction:	  the	  discipline	  of	  public	  health	  ethics	  
The	   aim	   of	   this	   and	   the	   following	   chapter	   is	   to	   set	   the	   stage	   for	   the	  normative	  analysis	  of	  Human	  Papillomavirus	  (HPV)	  vaccination	  programmes	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  work.	  I	  will	  introduce	  the	  main	  ethical	  issues	  arising	  from	  public	   health	   activities	   and	   different	   attempts	   at	   their	   solution	   recently	  proposed.	  The	  outline	  I	  propose	  is	  functional	  to	  the	  discussion	  I	  will	  set	  out	  in	  the	   remainder	   of	   the	   work	   and	   it	   is	   focused	   on	   those	   problems	   that	   are	   of	  particular	   importance	  from	  an	  ethical	  perspective	  and	  that	   lend	  themselves	  to	  treatment	   by	   the	  means	   of	   theories	   or	   approaches	   in	   philosophical	   ethics	   or	  political	  philosophy.	  Since	  the	  remaining	  part	  of	  this	  work	  will	  be	  devoted	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  a	  case	  study,	  the	  themes	  of	  this	  and	  the	  subsequent	  chapter	  will	  be	  discussed	   in	  an	  abstract	  way,	   and	  examples	  of	   specific	  public	  health	  activities	  will	  be	  kept	   to	  a	  minimum.	   It	  may	  be	  worth	  underlining	  though	  that	   they	  will	  not	   arise	   in	   this	   general	   form	   but	   will	   be	   embedded	   in	   specific	   substantive	  questions	  about	  what	  to	  do	  in	  a	  specific	  circumstance.	  
Public	  health	  ethics,	  as	  a	  disciplinary	  endeavour,	  stems	  out	  of	  the	  broad	  field	   of	   bioethics	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   broaden	   the	   scope	   of	   its	   agenda	   (Verweij	  2000;	   Cribb	   2005).	   If	   the	   focus	   of	   traditional	   approaches	   in	   medical	   and	  research	   ethics	   is	   the	   analysis	   of	  morally	   problematic	   issues	   occurring	   in	   the	  clinic	  or	  in	  specific	  research	  settings,	  public	  health	  ethics	  turns	  its	  attention	  to	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those	   activities	   aimed	   at	   preventing	   morbidity	   and	   promoting	   health	   at	   the	  population	  level.	  	  
Bioethics	   has	   long	   been	   concerned	   with	   issues	   arising	   from	   the	  interaction	   between	   individual	   patients	   and	   health	   care	   professionals.	   The	  much	   praised,	   as	   well	   as	   hotly	   contested,	   Principles	   of	   Biomedical	   Ethics	  (Beauchamp	  and	  Childress	  2009)	  are	  probably	  the	  most	  representative,	  but	  by	  no	   means	   unique,	   outcomes	   of	   decades	   of	   philosophical	   engagement	   with	  morally	  sensitive	  problems	  arising	  from	  doctor-­‐patient	  encounters.	  Although	  it	  is	  not	  my	  intention	  here	  to	  give	  a	  detailed	  historical	  analysis	  of	  bioethics	  in	  all	  its	  forms,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  remind	  how	  it	  grew	  out	  of	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  legal	  theory	   in	   reaction	   to	   the	  paternalistic	  models	  of	   clinical	  encounters	   that	  were	  dominant	   at	   least	   until	   the	   late	   1950s.	   This	   collaboration,	   fuelled	   by	   broader	  social	   concerns	   about	   individual	   liberty	   and	   social	   equality	   -­‐	   demanding	   also	  more	  appropriate	  standards	  of	   respect	   in	  health	  care	   -­‐	  has	  given	  shape	   to	   the	  legal	   theory	   of	   informed	   consent	   and	   an	   extensive	   elaboration	   of	   its	  philosophical	   underpinnings,	   epitomized	   in	   the	   principle	   of	   respect	   for	  autonomy	  (Faden,	  Beauchamp,	  and	  King	  1986,	  p.87).	  Arguably,	  the	  principle	  of	  respect	   for	   autonomy	   is	   not	   only	   an	   abstract	   guide	   to	   professional	   ethical	  thinking,	   but	   also	   a	   fundamental	   value	   of	   democratic	   societies.	   In	   this	   vein,	  bioethics,	   in	   both	   its	   research	   and	   medical	   ethics	   forms,	   has	   hence	   focused	  primarily,	   though	   not	   exclusively,	   on	   respect	   for	   autonomy,	   its	   conceptual	  clarification	   and	   the	   contextual	   challenges	   to	   its	   implementation	   arising	   in	  specific	   clinical	   and	   research	   settings.	   Whether	   this	   conception	   fully	  encapsulates	   the	   ethics	   of	   clinical	   encounters	   is	   disputable	   (Gert,	   Culver,	   and	  Clouser	  1997);	  it	  is	  general	  consensus	  though	  that	  it	  fails	  to	  capture	  the	  ethical	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dimension	  of	  public	  health	  activities	   (Holland	  2007a;	  Wikler	  and	  Brock	  2007;	  Dawson	  2010)	  
The	   initial	   thrust	   of	   public	   health	   ethics	   consists	   in	   identifying	   what	  issues,	  if	  any,	  are	  specific	  to	  public	  health,	  and	  whether	  the	  classic	  vocabulary	  of	  bioethics	  is	  adequate	  for	  them.	  For	  instance,	  some	  argue	  that	  bioethics	  has	  been	  the	  victim	  of	  an	  obsession	  with	  autonomy,	  and	  an	  appropriate	  ethical	  analysis	  of	   public	   health	   policy	   should	   be	   able	   to	   go	   beyond	   autonomy	   and	   explore	  different	  values,	  like	  solidarity,	  responsibility,	  and	  equity	  to	  mention	  a	  few	  (for	  one	  example	  see:	  Dawson	  2010).	  Others	  insist	  that	  public	  health	  ethics	  should	  be	  mainly	  a	   justificatory	  activity,	  and	  it	  should	  provide	  consistent	  frameworks	  of	  principles	   that	  serve	  as	  a	  guide	   for	  a	  morally	  acceptable	   implementation	  of	  specific	  policies	  (Upshur	  2002).	  Overall,	  it	  is	  generally	  agreed	  that	  public	  health	  is	  most	  clearly	   justified	  when	   it	  produces	  shared	  goods	   that	  cannot	  be	  shared	  out	   that	   is	   -­‐	   in	   the	   language	   of	   classical	   welfare	   economics	   -­‐	   when	   it	   brings	  about	  public	  goods	  (Verweij	  and	  Dawson	  2007;	  Gostin	  2008;	  Anomaly	  2011).	  
The	  sometimes	  conflicting	  needs	  of	  individuals	  and	  populations,	   is	  said,	  call	   for	   an	   opening	   up	   of	   the	   bioethical	   agenda,	   the	   latter	   being	   often	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  dyadic	  relationship	  between	  health	  care	  professionals	  and	  individual	  patients	  implying	  specific	  duties	  and	  rights	  on	  the	  two	  sides.	  One	  way	   of	   presenting	   ethical	   issues	   in	   public	   health,	   instead,	   is	   in	   terms	   of	   a	  problematic	   triad	   (Holland	   2010).	   The	   entities	   composing	   this	   triad	   are	   the	  government	   proposing	   a	   public	   health	   initiative,	   the	   individuals	   who	   have	   to	  comply	  with	  the	  initiative,	  and	  the	  population	  to	  whose	  benefit	  the	  intervention	  is	   originally	   proposed.	   A	   scrutiny	   of	   the	   ethical	   dimension	   of	   public	   health	  activities	  requires	  a	  conceptual	  shift	   from	  the	  domain	  of	  health	  care	  to	  that	  of	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health	   broadly	   conceived,	   from	   single	   medical	   interventions	   on	   identifiable	  individuals	   to	   a	   set	   of	   policies	   targeting	   populations	   (Cribb	   2005).	   In	   this	  context,	   a	   shift	   is	  needed	  also	   in	   the	   language	  and	   in	   the	   sensitivity	  of	   ethical	  analysis.	  To	  describe	   this	  shift	   in	   figurative	   talk,	  Wikler	  and	  Brock	  (2008)	  call	  for	  a	  new	  bioethics	  adopting	  a	  bird’s	  eye	  view	  that	  looks	  at	  populations	  rather	  than	   solely	   at	   individuals.	   The	   bird’s	   eye	   perspective	   nicely	   illustrates	   the	  concerns	   of	   population-­‐level	   bioethics.	   The	   latter	   should	   investigate	   not	   only	  health	  care	  and	  its	  delivery,	  but	  also	  broader	  social	  determinants	  of	  health,	  like	  socio-­‐economic	   status,	   working	   and	   environmental	   conditions,	   and	   social	  exclusion.	   	   Arising	   from	   these	   considerations	   it	   becomes	   clear	   how	   the	  normative	   sources	   of	   bioethics	   and	   public	   health	   ethics	   differ.	   The	   former	  draws	  on	  moral	  philosophy	  and	  other	  sources	  of	  reflection	  on	  values,	  the	  latter	  relies	  chiefly	  on	  theories	  of	  social	   justice	  and	  political	  philosophy	  (Wikler	  and	  Brock	   2008,	   p.15).	   This	   specification,	   however,	   does	   not	   simplify	   the	  matter.	  Already	  in	  the	  1990s	  novel	  perspectives	  in	  medical	  ethics	  emerged	  challenging	  the	  mainstream	   principlist	   framework	   (Davis	   1995).	   These	   included	   feminist	  care	   ethics	   (Tong	  1998),	   social	   science	  perspectives	   (Weisz	   1989;	  Hoffmaster	  1992;	  J.	  H.	  Evans	  2000)	  casuistry	  and	  historical	  critiques	  (Cooter	  1995),	  as	  well	  as	  broader	  perplexities	  about	  its	  technicization	  (J.	  H.	  Evans	  2002).	  The	  diversity	  of	   these	   approaches	   shows	   us	   that	   medical	   ethics	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   one	  single	   framework,	   despite	   its	   success	   and	   usefulness	   in	   some	   contexts.	   In	   the	  same	   vein,	   public	   health	   ethics	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   one	   single	   framework,	  theory	  or	  approach	  in	  political	  philosophy.	  Different	  approaches,	  in	  fact,	  would	  licence	   or	   censor	   different	   policies	   by	   emphasizing	   the	   priority	   of	   different	  values.	   In	   the	  remaining	  paragraphs,	   I	  will	   survey	   this	   complexity	  by	  showing	  the	  scope	  of	  some	  key	  concepts	  in	  public	  health	  ethics.	  To	  do	  this	  I	  will	  explore	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how	   analysts	   from	   two	   different	   theoretical	   persuasions	   would	   address	  fundamental	   issues	   in	  public	  health	   like:	   ‘what	  are	   the	  aims	  of	  public	  health?’,	  ‘What	  kind	  of	  good	  is	  public	  health	  distributing?’,	   ‘Is	  there	  a	  trade-­‐off	  between	  liberty	  and	  public	  health?’.	  By	  doing	  this	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  adjudicate	  among	  any	  of	  them	  at	  this	  stage,	  and	  hence	  –	  although	  I	  will	  express	  my	  preference	  for	  one	  approach	  -­‐	  adversarial	   language	  will	  be	  kept	  to	  a	  minimum.	  Nevertheless,	   this	  effort	   is	   useful	   to	   provide	   a	   repertoire	   of	   frameworks	   and	   concepts	   for	   the	  ethical	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  study.	  
Before	  starting	  to	  explore	  the	  ethical	  dimension	  of	  public	  health	  ethics	  it	  is	  necessary,	  for	  reasons	  of	  methodological	  clarity,	  to	  distinguish	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘public	  health’	  and	  ‘population	  health’.	  Clearly,	  this	  is	  not	  easy	  task.	  Nor	  it	  is	  specific	  goal	  of	  this	  work	  to	  provide	  a	  definite	  and	  uncontroversial	  conceptual	  analysis	  of	  these	  terms	  and	  expressions.	  I	  will,	  however,	  attempt	  to	  disambiguate	  those	  terms	  and	  show	  how	  I	  will	  use	  them	  throughout	  this	  work.	  
Let	  us	  start	  first	  with	  a	  clarification	  of	  the	  way	  I	  intend	  to	  use	  the	  cognate	  expressions	  ‘public	  health’	  and	  ‘population	  health’.	  Throughout	  this	  work	  I	  will	  use	   the	   former	   by	   and	   large	   following	   the	   Institute	   of	   Medicine	   (IOM)’s	  (Institute	  of	  Medicine	  1988)	  landmark	  definition:	  “Public	  health	  is	  what	  we,	  as	  a	  society,	  do	  collectively	  to	  assure	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  people	  can	  be	  healthy.”	  This	  definition	  advocates	  the	  need	  for	  cooperative	  behaviour	  and	  assumes	  the	  existence	   of	   relationships	   established	   on	   overlapping	   values	   among	   different	  social	  actors.	  In	  this	  sense,	  ‘public	  health’	  is	  not	  a	  purportedly	  objective	  state	  of	  supra-­‐individual	   health,	   but	   a	   set	   of	   activities,	   policies	   and	   interventions	  performed	  by:	  a	  range	  of	  governmental,	  private	  and	  non-­‐profits	  organizations,	  professionals	   from	   different	   fields,	   and	   citizens.	   The	   IOM’s	   definition,	   clearly,	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does	  not	  specify	  who	  is	  the	  ‘we’	  that	  should	  guarantee	  the	  conditions	  for	  health.	  I	  assume	  that	  the	  social	  actors	  just	  identified	  are	  good	  candidates	  for	  the	  task.	  Accordingly,	   the	   role	   of	   public	   health	   ethics	   is	   to	   identify	   whether	   there	   are	  special	  obligations	  among	   those	  different	  entities.	   I	  will	   expand	  on	   this	  below	  where	  I	  will	  tackle	  directly	  the	  question	  about	  the	  aims	  of	  public	  health.	  For	  the	  moment	  let	  us	  proceed	  with	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  terms	  I	  am	  using.	  With	   ‘population	   health’	   I	   will	   refer	   to	   accepted,	   revisable,	   contested	   claims	  about	  the	  health	  of	  a	  given	  population.	  These	  claims	  are	  generally	  provided	  as	  answers	  to	  questions	  such	  as:	  What	  is	  the	  incidence	  of	  disease	  X	  in	  population	  Y?	   According	   to	   how	   ‘health’	   is	   understood	   or	   measured,	   the	   status	   of	  population	  health	  may	  differ.	  For	  my	  current	  purposes,	  however,	  it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  say	  that	  population	  health	  is	  what	  public	  health	  policies	  aim	  at.	  Public	  health	  ethics	  is	  thus	  a	  normative	  analysis	  of	  policies	  and	  initiatives	  with	  a	  population	  perspective.	  Saying	  this	  by	  no	  means	  imply	  that	  the	  way	  populations,	  or	  target	  groups,	   are	  picked	  up	  as	  objects	  of	  public	  health	   interventions	   is	  normatively	  neutral;	   nor	   that	   there	   is	   an	   objective	   status	   of	   population	   health	  unambiguously	   calling	   for	   public	   health	   intervention.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   these	  choices	  carry	  with	   them	  value	  assumptions	  and	  ethical	   implications.	   It	   is	   thus	  the	  role	  of	  public	  health	  ethics	  to	  identify	  what	  they	  are	  and	  provide	  guidance,	  within	  the	  limits	  proper	  of	  philosophical	  theories,	  as	  to	  their	  analysis.	  
2.	  The	  beneficence	  model	  of	  public	  health	  ethics	  
These	  clarifications	  having	  been	  made,	   let	  us	  now	  think	  about	  how	  one	  should	   conceive	   of	   the	   aims	   of	   public	   health	   initiatives.	   In	   this	   section,	   I	   will	  present	  what	  I	  call,	  following	  (Powers	  and	  Faden	  2006),	  the	  benefice	  model	  of	  public	  health	  ethics.	  As	  Powers	  and	  Faden	  notice,	  the	  ethical	  analysis	  of	  public	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health	   activities	   is,	  most	   of	   the	   times,	   thin	   (2006,	   p.	   9).	   The	   standard	   view	   in	  public	   health	   ethics	   sees	   public	   health	   as	   the	   social	   institution	   aiming	   at	   the	  advancement	  of	  human	  welfare	  by	  bringing	  about	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  human	  good,	  the	  good	  of	  health.	  The	  moral	  underpinning	  for	  public	  health	  is	  thus	  a	  general	  obligation	   in	   beneficence	   to	   advance	   welfare.	   Interpretations	   may	   then	   vary,	  and	  public	  health	  may	  have	  a	  further	  utilitarian	  commitment	  to	  bring	  about	  as	  much	   health	   as	   possible.	   This	   general	   formulation	   is	   epitomised	   in	   several	  passages	   in	   a	   seminal	   paper	   in	   the	   field:	   “Several	   […]	  moral	   considerations	   –	  especially	   benefiting	   others,	   preventing	   and	   removing	   harms	   and	   utility	   -­‐	  provide	  a	  prima	  facie	  warrant	  for	  many	  activities	  in	  pursuit	  of	  the	  goal	  of	  public	  health”	  (Childress	  et	  al.	  2002).	  In	  the	  beneficence	  model,	  concerns	  about	  justice	  and	   respect	   for	   individual	   liberties	   are	   thus	   understood	   as	   exterior	   to	   the	  practice	   and	   commitments	  of	   public	   health,	   and	   they	   “serve	   to	  balance	  public	  health’s	  single	  minded	  function	  to	  produce	  the	  good	  of	  health	  with	  other,	  right	  making	  concerns”	  (Powers	  and	  Faden	  2006,	  p.	  81).	  	  
This	  model	  emphasizes	  that	  the	  primary	  goal	  of	  public	  health	  is	  devising	  and	   implementing	   programmes	   to	  maintain	   or	   improve	   population	   health	   by	  preventing	  disease	  and	  disability	  and	  promoting	  health.	  Although	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  is	  to	  save	  real	  lives	  and	  help	  real	  people,	  its	  success	  is	  measured	  in	  terms	  of	  statistical	  lives	  and	  decrease	  in	  the	  incidence	  of	  disease.	  Specific	  types	  of	  public	  health	   initiatives	   include	   mass	   immunization	   campaigns,	   screening	  programmes	  and	  the	  various	  interventions	  loosely	  aimed	  at	  health	  promotion.	  Public	  health	  promises	  benefits	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  health	  of	  target	  populations,	  at	  a	  cost	   to	   individuals.	   The	   cost	   varies	   from	   context	   to	   context,	   and	  may	   include:	  participation	   to	   a	   mass	   immunization	   campaign,	   to	   join	   in	   a	   screening	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programme,	   or	   adopting	   healthy	   life-­‐styles.	   The	   population	   perspective	  typically	   adopted	   in	   public	   health	   initiatives	   requires	   a,	   more	   or	   less,	   strong	  governmental	  intervention	  as	  to	  ensure	  widespread	  public	  participation	  to	  the	  specific	  programme	  at	  hand.	  High	  compliance	  with	  public	  health	  initiatives	  is,	  in	  fact,	  fundamental	  to	  observe	  significant	  results	  in	  terms	  of	  disease	  reduction	  at	  the	  population	  level.	   	  The	  extent	  of	  governmental,	  or	  state,	   involvement	  in	  the	  promotion	  of	  public	  health	  campaigns	  may	  also	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  context;	  it	   ranges	   from	   promotion	   of	   so-­‐called	   healthy	   behaviours	   through	   public	  educational	  campaigns	  (such	  as	  those	  encouraging	  people	  to	  exercise),	  through	  more	  intrusive	  initiatives	  aimed	  at	  avoiding	  unhealthy	  habits	  (such	  as	  cigarette	  smoke	   or	   fat-­‐rich	   diets),	   up	   to	   coercive	   measure	   requiring,	   for	   instance,	  mandatory	   vaccination	   for	   children	   upon	   school	   entrance.	   Moreover,	   social	  epidemiology	   is	   progressively	   ascertaining	   how	   diverse	   social	   and	   economic	  circumstances	   play	   a	   role	   at	   determining	   one’s	   health	   status	   (Marmot	   2004).	  These	  findings	  drastically	  enlarge	  the	  scope	  of	  possible	  government’s	  activities	  as	   to	   preserve	   health	   up	   to	   broader	   interventions	   aimed	   at	   ameliorating	   the	  social	  environment	   in	  which	  unhealthy	  behaviours	  are	   found	   to	   take	  place	  or,	  more	   profoundly,	   at	   a	   more	   equal	   redistribution	   of	   primary	   social	   goods	  (Daniels	  2008,	  especially	  pp.	  79-­‐102)	  .	  
The	  beneficence	  model	  of	  public	  health	  ethics	  recognizes	   that	  attention	  for	   population	   health	   is	   important.	   Nevertheless,	   it	   also	   acknowledges	   that	  public	  health	  activities	  may	  be	  problematic	  from	  an	  ethical	  perspective	  in	  that	  they	   potentially	   interfere	   with	   individual	   liberties	   and	   ways	   of	   living.	   One	  standard	   argument	   for	   the	   justification	   of	   interference	   on	   the	   liberty	   of	  individuals,	   one	   accepted	   by	   many	   political	   philosophers,	   including	   those	   of	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libertarian	  persuasion,	   is	   the	   famous	  and	  often	   cited	  harm	   to	  others	  principle	  proposed	  in	  1859	  by	  John	  Stuart	  Mill	  in	  his	  On	  Liberty,	  where	  he	  says:	  
That	  the	  only	  purpose	  for	  which	  power	  can	  be	  rightfully	  exercised	  over	  any	  member	  of	  a	   civilized	   community	   against	   his	   will	   is	   to	   prevent	   harm	   to	   others.	   His	   own	   good,	  either	  physical	  or	  moral,	  is	  not	  a	  sufficient	  warrant.	  He	  cannot	  be	  rightfully	  compelled	  to	  do	  or	   forbear	  because	   it	  will	   be	  better	   for	  him	   to	  do	   so,	   because	   it	  will	  make	  him	  happier,	  because,	   in	  the	  opinion	  of	  others	  to	  do	  so	  would	  be	  wise,	  or	  even	  right.	  (Mill	  2003)	  
The	  harm	  to	  others	  principle	  can	  be	  used	  to	  justify	  some	  liberty	  limiting	  public	  health	  policies	  –	  like	  bans	  smoking	  bans	  in	  public	  places	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  the	  harmful	  effects	  of	  passive	  smoking	  –	  but	  not	   to	  all.	  Although	   the	  harm-­‐to-­‐others	   principle	   enjoys	   widespread	   acceptance,	   its	   application	   is	   not	   wholly	  uncontroversial,	   in	   that	   it	   is	   not	   easy	   to	   provide	   definite	   criteria	   as	   to	   what	  counts	   as	   a	   harmful	   action.	   For	   one,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   whether	   harmful	   actions	  necessarily	   involve	   forms	   of	   physical	   damage,	   or	   that	   the	   harmed	   subject	   is	  made	  worse	  off	  by	   them	   (Feinberg	  1987).	   In	   some	  accounts,	   one	   is	   genuinely	  harmed	   also	   when	   he	   is	   prevented	   to	   get	   what	   he	   deserves	   or	   improve	   his	  condition	   (Raz	   1986).	   The	   applicability	   of	   the	   harm	   principle	   is	   thus	   not	  straightforward;	  I	  will	  give	  an	  account	  of	  this	  intricacy	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  case	  study	  of	  this	  work	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  
This	   complexity	   notwithstanding,	   problematic	   trade-­‐offs	   in	   the	  beneficence	   model	   of	   public	   health	   also	   arise	   from	   the	   clash	   between	   the	  utilitarian	   call	   for	   maximization	   of	   benefits	   and	   the	   liberal	   emphasis	   on	  individual	   liberties	   or,	   in	   other	   words,	   between	   public	   good	   and	   private	  interests.	  In	  the	  beneficence	  model,	  individual	  rights	  to	  freedom,	  understood	  in	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the	   form	   of	   non-­‐interference	   from	   powerful	   institutions,	   can	   be	   sometimes	  overridden	  when	  they	  further	  the	  public	  interest	  defined	  in	  at	  least	  two	  forms:	  maximization	   of	   utility	   (in	   the	   public	   health	   case	   of	   health	   outcomes),	   and	  public	   goods	   strictu	  sensu.	   For	   a	  better	   appreciation	  of	   the	   latter	  notion	   some	  specifications	  are	  in	  order.	  	  
Public	  goods,	  in	  the	  technical	  sense	  elaborated	  by	  welfare	  economists	  of	  the	   1950s,	   are	   those	   goods	   that	   are	   non-­‐rival	   and	   non-­‐excludable.	   The	   non-­‐rivalry	   property	   indicates	   that	   the	   consumption	   of	   the	   good	   by	   an	   individual	  does	   not	   subtract	   from	   any	   other	   individual’s	   consumption	   of	   the	   same	   good	  (Samuelson	  1954);	   the	  non-­‐excludability	   property	   implies	   that	   no	   one	   can	  be	  excluded	  by	  the	  consumption	  of	  the	  good.	  Typical	  examples	  of	  public	  goods	  are	  clean	  air,	  national	  defence,	  and	  public	  education.	  All	  the	  listed	  goods	  are	  for	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  all,	  and	   it	   is	  not	  possible	   to	  rightfully	  exclude	  anyone	   from	  their	  benefits.	  Some	  public	  goods,	  moreover,	  enjoy	  a	  third	  fundamental	  feature;	  they	  are	  dependent	  upon	  cooperation	  in	  that	  their	  provision	  would	  be	  threatened	  if	  left	   to	   private	   initiative.	   In	   the	   beneficence	  model	   of	   public	   health	   ethics,	   the	  creation	  of	  public	  goods	  is	  what	  most	  clearly	  justifies	  public	  interventions	  and	  interference	  on	  the	  private	  lives	  of	  citizens,	  at	  least	  so	  under	  certain	  conditions	  that	   I	  will	   specify	  below.	  One	  notable	  example	  of	  public	  good,	   especially	   from	  the	   perspective	   of	   this	   work,	   is	   herd	   immunity	   as	   provided	   by	   vaccination	  programmes.	   Herd	   immunity	   is	   the	   epidemiological	   phenomenon	   that	   occurs	  when	   a	   high	   proportion	   of	   individuals	   within	   a	   population	   are	   immunized	  against	   an	   infective	   contagious	   agent	   so	   that	   the	   transmission	   of	   that	   agent	  effectively	   stops	   (Fox	   et	   al.	   1971).	   Mass	   immunization	   programmes	   have	   the	  potential	  to	  bring	  about	  herd	  immunity	  by	  raising	  the	  general	  level	  of	  immunity	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in	  the	  population	  and	  rendering	  less	  likely	  an	  epidemic	  outbreak.	  The	  number	  of	   people	   needed	   to	   reach	   herd	   immunity	   thresholds	   varies	   according	   to	   the	  infectivity	  of	  the	  agent,	  its	  incubation	  period	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  population	  (ibid.).	   In	  general,	   the	  highest	   the	   infectivity	   the	  highest	   is	  also	   the	  number	  of	  people	   that	  need	   to	  be	   immunized	   to	   generate	  herd	  effects.	   For	   instance,	   it	   is	  calculated	  that	  herd	  immunity	  for	  measles	  obtains	  when	  90-­‐95%	  of	  the	  relevant	  population	  gets	  vaccinated	  (Fine	  1993)	  Herd	  immunity,	  once	  created,	  protects	  the	   population	   as	   a	   whole	   also	   those	   that,	   for	   any	   reason,	   couldn’t	   be	  immunized	   or	   were	   immunized	   but	   did	   not	   develop	   appropriate	   immune	  response.	   In	   this	   respect,	   herd	   immunity	   has	   been	   defined	   as	   a	   public	   good	  (Dawson	  2007).	   Indeed,	   it	  possesses	  all	   the	   features	  outlined	  above.	   It	   is	  non-­‐rival	  -­‐	  my	  ‘consumption	  of	  herd	  immunity’	  does	  not	  subtract	  from	  yours	  -­‐	  and	  it	  is	   non-­‐excludable	   –	   once	   in	   place,	   no	   one	   can	   be	   excluded	   from	   its	   benefits.	  Moreover,	  herd	   immunity	  requires	  collective	  action	   for	   its	  creation.	  A	  number	  of	   ethical	   problems	   have	   been	   raised	   with	   respect	   to	   herd	   immunity.	   For	  instance,	   if	   there	   is	   an	   individual	   obligation	   in	   participating	   in	   those	  programmes	  aiming	  at	  its	  achievement	  (Dawson	  2007)	  or	  if,	  once	  it	  is	  in	  place,	  those	  who	  are	  not	  contributing	  at	  maintaining	   it	  are	  morally	  blameworthy	  on	  the	   grounds	   that	   they	   are	   free-­‐riding	   on	   a	   public	   good	   (Dare	   1998).	   More	  generally,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  questions	  in	  public	  health	  ethics	  –	  and	  in	  this	  work	  -­‐	  is	  the	  following:	  how	  do	  we	  determine	  whether	  the	  achievement	  of	  a	  particular	  public	  good	  can	  justify	  infringing	  upon	  individual	  liberties? 	  
In	   order	   to	   answer	   to	   this	   question,	   many	   scholars	   have	   developed	  detailed	   frameworks	   that	   are	   supposed	   to	   capture	   both	   the	   goals	   and	   the	  general	   moral	   considerations	   informing	   public	   health	   practice	   and	   the	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conditions	   the	   latter	   should	  meet	   in	   order	   to	   respect	   competing	   concerns	   for	  individual	  liberties.	  In	  this	  approach	  the	  role	  of	  analysts	  in	  public	  health	  ethics	  is	   a	   kind	  of	  balancing	  activity	  between	   the	  demands	  of	  population	  health	   and	  individual	   interests.	   According	   to	   the	   circumstances,	   then,	   the	   applied	  philosopher	   should	   assess	   whether	   in	   a	   given	   public	   health	   intervention	  priority	  should	  be	  given	  to	  the	  rights	  and	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  individuals,	  or	  to	  the	  benefits	   the	   intervention	   would	   bring	   about	   to	   the	   community.	   In	   general,	   a	  public	  health	  intervention	  is	  more	  easily	  justified	  when	  the	  population	  benefits	  are	  great	  and	  the	  infringement	  of	  individual	  liberties	  minimal.	  	  
One	  important	  requirement	  mentioned	  in	  the	  various	  frameworks	  is	  the	  effectiveness	   of	   the	   intervention	   (Kass	   2001;	   Childress	   et	   al.	   2002;	   Upshur	  2002;	   Gostin	   2008).	   Accordingly,	   the	   justification	   of	   a	   given	   a	   public	   health	  initiative	  requires	  evidence	  that	  the	  initiative	  is	  both	  necessary	  and	  effective	  at	  tackling	   the	   population	   health	   problem	   identified.	   In	   the	  words	   of	   one	   of	   the	  proponents	  of	   this	   requirement:	   “[Since]	  proposed	  regulation	  entails	  personal	  burdens	   and	   economic	   costs,	   governments	   should	   affirmatively	   demonstrate	  through	   scientific	   data	   that	   the	   methods	   adopted	   are	   reasonably	   likely	   to	  achieve	  the	  public	  health	  objective”	  (Gostin	  2008,	  p.	  63).	  A	  further	  condition	  in	  the	  beneficence	  model	  -­‐	  one	  that	  is	  of	  paramount	  importance	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  work	  -­‐	  and	  that	  is	  present	  in	  all	  the	  accounts	  cited	  above,	  is	  variously	  called	  the	  least	  restrictive	  alternative,	  least	  coercive	  means	  or	  least	  infringement.	  The	  idea	   behind	   the	   ‘least	   restrictive	   means’	   condition	   is	   that	   in	   today’s	   affluent	  societies	  the	  array	  of	  public	  health	  measures	  and	  preventive	  options	  offered	  to	  individuals	   is	   steadily	   increasing	   as	   epidemiological	   findings	   about	   disease	  specific	   risk	   factors	   pile	   up	   and	   new	   biomedical	   technologies	   (new	   drugs,	   or	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new	   diagnostic	   tools)	   are	   introduced	   into	   the	  market	   and	   healthcare	   system.	  The	   latter,	   besides	   creating	   a	   prima	   facie	   opportunity	   for	   all	   those	  willing	   to	  preserve	  their	  health,	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  worries	  related	  to	  the	  progressive	  erosion	  of	   individual	   liberties	   once	   governments	   increasingly	   try	   to	   stir	   people’s	  preference	   towards	   the	   adoption	   of	   healthy	   life-­‐styles,	   or	   encourage	   them	   to	  join	  preventive	  campaigns	  with	   the	  aim	  of	  maximizing	  population	  health.	   In	  a	  nutshell,	   those	   who	   are	   concerned	   with	   individual	   liberty	   as	   a	   fundamental	  value	   of	   liberal	   democratic	   societies	   can	   look	  with	   suspicion	   at	   public	   health	  interventions	  taken	  singularly,	  as	  for	  instance	  bans	  on	  smoking	  in	  public	  spaces,	  or	  as	  a	  whole,	   in	  terms	  of	  a	  progressive	  identification	  of	  the	  good	  life	  with	  the	  healthy	  life.	  The	  more	  extreme	  among	  these	  formulations	  is	  probably	  one	  by	  the	  late	  Jonathan	  Mann	  who,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  AIDS	  epidemics,	  wrote:	  “For	  the	  present,	  it	  may	  be	  useful	  to	  adopt	  the	  maxim	  that	  health	  policies	  and	  programs	  should	   be	   considered	   discriminatory	   and	   burdensome	   on	   human	   rights	   until	  proven	  otherwise.”	  (Mann	  et	  al.	  1994)	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  beneficence	  model,	  this	   means	   that	   public	   health	   agencies	   should	   adopt	   the	   policy	   that	   is	   most	  likely	  to	  prevent	  disease	  as	  effectively	  as	  other	  alternatives,	  while	  incurring	  the	  fewest	  possible	  personal	  burdens.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  my	  analysis	  of	  the	  HPV	  case	  I	   will	   show	   that	   insisting	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   ‘least	   coercive	   means’	   or	   ‘least	  coercive	   alternative’	   does	   not	   fully	   encapsulates	   the	   ethical	   dimensions	   of	  public	   health	   policies	   and,	   in	   particular,	   of	   HPV	   policies.	   I	   will	   show,	   more	  specifically	   that	  concerns	   for	   justice	  may	  challenge	   this	   idea.	  For	   the	  moment,	  however,	  we	  can	  conclude	  this	  section	  by	  saying	  that	  the	  limiting	  conditions	  of	  public	  health	  activities	   just	  outlined	  serve,	   in	  the	  beneficence	  liberal	  model,	  as	  an	  ethical	  safeguard	  to	  keep	  to	  a	  minimum	  public	  invasion	  of	  the	  private	  sphere.	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3.	  Common	  health	  goods	  in	  a	  republic	  
The	   beneficence	   model	   so	   far	   described	   epitomizes	   the	   effort	   of	  constructing	   a	   revised	   liberal	   framework	   for	   public	   health.	   The	   limiting	  conditions	  of	   the	  various	   frameworks,	  of	  which	   I	  have	  cited	   the	  most	  present,	  are	   an	   attempt	   at	   this	   direction.	   Nevertheless,	   other	   traditions	   critical	   of	  distinctly	  liberal	  approach,	  especially	  in	  its	  libertarian	  form,	  have	  been	  put	  forth	  as	   particularly	   fit	   to	   the	   exploration	   of	   the	   ethical	   dimension	   of	   public	   health	  activities.	   Of	   relevance	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   my	   analysis	   are	   those	   critiques	  coming	   from	   republican	   philosophical	   tradition.	   In	   this	   section,	   after	   a	   brief	  outline	  of	  the	  central	  tenets	  of	  this	  political	  philosophy,	  I	  will	  concentrate	  on	  the	  republican	   formulation	   of	   ‘common	   good’	   and	   assess	   whether	   it	   is	   a	   good	  candidate	  for	  enlarging	  the	  scope	  of	  public	  health’s	  aims.	  	  
Although	   philosophical	   republicanism	   -­‐	   to	   not	   be	   confounded	  with	   the	  political	  party	  in	  the	  US	  with	  the	  same	  name	  -­‐	  has	  a	  long	  history,	  for	  large	  part	  of	  the	  last	  century	  was	  sitting	  at	  the	  margins	  of	  political	  philosophers’	  attention.	  By	  the	  1990s,	  however,	  it	  had	  a	  revival	  (Pettit	  1999;	  Skinner	  1998),	  and	  it	  has	  been	  recently	  proposed	  as	  particularly	   fitting	   to	   the	  purposes	  of	  public	  health	  (Callahan	  and	   Jennings	  2002).	  Recent	   republican	  political	  philosophy	  arose	   in	  opposition	  to	  liberal	  conceptions	  of	  freedom	  and	  individual	  rights	  intended	  as	  a	  form	  of	  protection	  from	  political	  interference.	  To	  philosophical	  republicans	  the	  notion	  of	   liberty	  most	   suited,	   both	  descriptively	   and	  normatively,	   for	  political	  life	   is	   freedom	   as	   non-­‐domination	   or,	   in	   other	   terms,	   freedom	   as	   absence	   of	  arbitrary	  interference	  in	  the	  free	  choices	  of	  the	  free	  person	  (Pettit	  1997,	  p.	  271).	  Domination,	   on	   this	   account,	   is	   the	   imposition	   of	   one’s	   will	   on	   another.	  Domination	  can	  emerge	  not	  only	  from	  governmental	  institutions,	  but	  also	  from	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other	   groups	   in	   society.	   Arbitrary	   interference	   is	   key	   in	   this	   context.	   To	  republicans	  a	  non-­‐interfered	  agent	   is	  not	  necessarily	   free,	   the	  classic	  example	  being	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  slave	  and	  his	  benevolent	  master.	  At	  some	  time	  point	   the	   slave	   can	   actually	   be	   free	   from	   interference,	   but	   his	   status	   is	  dependent	   on	   the	   caprices	   of	   the	   master.	   Interference	   is	   thus	   not	   morally	  dubious	  as	  such,	  but	  only	  when	  it	  is	  exercised	  as	  a	  form	  of	  domination.	  Effective	  freedom	   only	   exists,	   for	   republicans,	   when	   to	   each	   individual	   belonging	   to	   a	  community	   is	   recognized	   equal	   membership,	   standing	   and	   respect,	   and	   in	  absence	  of	  influences	  from	  arbitrary	  power.	  Rights	  claims	  in	  republican	  thought	  thus	  are	  not	  claims	  of	  freedom	  from	  interference	  but,	  more	  extensively,	  claims	  for	   full	  and	  equal	  civic	  membership.	   In	  this	  respect,	  public	  health	  policies	  that	  may	   sound	   as	  morally	   suspicious	   for	   liberals,	   for	   instance	   policies	   restricting	  unhealthy	  behaviours	  such	  as	  smoking,	  are	  not	  necessarily	  so	  to	  republicans;	  at	  least	   as	   long	   as	   these	   policies	   track	   individuals	   recognizable	   interests	   and	  emerge	  from	  vibrant	  civic	  engagement	   in	  the	  definition	  of	  common	  goods	  and	  shared	  interests.	  	  
The	   common	   good,	   on	   this	   account,	   shares	   some	   features	   with	   public	  goods	   as	   defined	   above,	   but	   it	   is	  more	   far-­‐reaching	   than	   them.	   The	   notion	   of	  common	   good	   as	   it	   comes	   out	   from	   republican	   tradition,	   in	   fact,	   does	   not	  necessitate	  instantiating	  those	  formal	  properties	  that	  are	  typical	  of	  public	  goods	  in	   the	   welfare	   economists’	   sense.	   The	   non-­‐rivalry	   and	   non-­‐excludability	  properties	   of	   public	   goods	   indicate	   that	   those	   goods	   are	   provided	   to	   the	  collective	  and,	  once	   in	  place,	  no	  one	  can	  prevent	  others	  benefiting	   from	  them.	  Although	   most	   of	   the	   times	   ‘public	   goods’	   are	   publicly	   produced,	   it	   is	   not	  necessarily	   the	   case.	   We	   can	   imagine,	   for	   instance,	   a	   group	   of	   citizens	  
	   38	  
collaborating	  to	  ameliorate	   the	  streets	  of	   their	  neighbourhood.	  Once	  renewed,	  everyone	  -­‐	  also	  those	  who	  did	  not	  contribute	  to	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  project	  -­‐	  will	  be	  able	   to	  drive	   through	   the	  streets,	   in	   this	   sense	  a	  public	  good	  has	  been	  produced	   through	   private	   means.	   Most	   of	   the	   times,	   however,	   public	   health	  goods,	  like	  infectious	  disease	  control,	  need	  public	  intervention	  to	  be	  effective	  at	  a	  population	  level.	  In	  these	  special	  cases,	  hence,	  public	  goods	  are	  so	  both	  for	  the	  non-­‐rivalry	   and	  non-­‐excludability	  properties,	   and	   for	  being	  produced	   through	  public	  efforts.	  
	  If	   we	   come	   back	   to	   the	   comparison	   with	   common	   good,	   though,	   we	  realize	  that	  the	  value	  of	  public	  goods	  does	  not	  depend	  so	  much	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  have	  them	  in	  common,	  but	  that,	  when	  produced	  either	  by	  private	  initiative	  or	  concerted	  action,	  they	  benefit	  all.	  One	  can	  imagine	  of	  public	  goods	  as	  goods	  that,	   although	   sometimes	   collectively	   provided	   or	   protected,	   can	   be	  decomposed	  in	  discrete	  units	  of	  consumption.	  It	  is	  the	  latter,	  at	  least	  on	  a	  liberal	  understanding,	  which	  gives	  value	  to	  them.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  common	  good	  is	  inextricable	  from	  what	  makes	  it	  common.	  As	  exemplified	  by	  Alexander	  (2010,	  18),	  an	  analogy	  with	  the	   idea	  of	  common	  good	   is	   friendship.	  What	   it	   is	  important	   about	   friendship	   is	   not	   the	   fact	   that	   involves	   more	   than	   one	  individual;	   in	   this	   sense,	   many	   non-­‐common	   goods	   require	   more	   than	   one	  person	  for	  their	  enjoyment.	  What	  makes	  it	  valuable	  is	  its	  intrinsic	  commonality,	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  decomposed	  to	  individual	  occurrences	  for	  private	  consumption.	   The	   notion	   of	   common	   good,	   to	   be	   precise,	   is	   conceptually	  separated	  from	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  consumption.	  It	  is,	  instead,	  a	  different	  framing	  of	  the	  relationships	  occurring	  among	  individuals,	  pointing	  towards	  their	  social	  embeddedness	   and	   to	   the	   irreducibly	   social	   character	   of	   goods	   arising	   from	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some	  of	  these	  interactions	  (Taylor	  1995).	  To	  elaborate	  a	  little	  bit	  further	  on	  this	  point,	  let	  us	  see	  in	  what	  other	  ways	  the	  approach	  so	  far	  described	  differs	  from	  the	  beneficence	  model.	  	  
The	  language	  of	  the	  beneficence	  model	  is	  one	  of	  interests	  and	  utilities,	  in	  its	   utilitarian	   side,	   and	   of	   rights	   and	   liberties	   in	   its	   liberal	   underpinnings.	  Potentially	  liberty-­‐limiting	  state	  actions	  are	  subject	  to	  an	  assessment	  of	  means-­‐ends	   rationality,	   risk-­‐benefit	   ratios,	   and	   the	   balancing	   of	   individual	   rights	   of	  self-­‐determination	   with	   obligations	   of	   self-­‐restraint.	   The	   limiting	   conditions	  outlined	  above	  perform	  exactly	  this	  balancing	  role	  between	  the	  free-­‐choices	  of	  individuals	   on	   the	   one	   side,	   and	   harm-­‐prevention,	   to	   self	   and	   others,	   on	   the	  other.	   The	   public	   interest,	   in	   its	   form	   of	   public	   good	   or	   maximization	   of	  population	   outcomes,	   serve	   as	   an	   instrumental	   objective	   of	   public	   policy	   and	  individuals	  are	  imagined	  to	  have	  only	  external	  relationships	  to	  those	  interests.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  for	  scholars	  of	  republican	  orientation,	  the	  common	  good	  is	  not	  instrumental	  in	  any	  meaningful	  sense,	  for	  it	  is	  nothing	  but	  the	  good	  internal	  to	  the	   exercise	   of	   civic	   virtues.	   As	   Jennings	   claims:	   “The	   common	   good	   is	  constituted	  by	  the	  proper	  institutionalization	  and	  functioning	  of	  citizenship	  and	  by	  the	  proper	  embedding	  of	  civic	  virtue	  in	  the	  life	  world.”	  (2007,	  47)	  As	  Pettit	  specifies,	   a	   common	   good	   can	   be	   identified	   when	   it	   can	   be	   determined	   as	  people’s	  ‘common	  avowable	  interests’.	  The	  common	  good	  is	  hence	  equivalent	  to	  the	   common	   interests	   that	   people	   have	   qua	   citizens	   of	   a	   given	   polity.	   Those	  interests	   are,	   ‘avowable’	   if	   are	   either	   conscious	   or	   if	   can	   be	   easily	   brought	   to	  consciousness	   upon	   reflection.	   They	   are,	   moreover,	   common	   insofar	   as	  cooperatively	   admissible	   considerations	   support	   their	   collective	   provision	  (Alexander	  2010,	  18).	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  In	   the	   context	   of	   public	   health,	   for	   instance,	   one	   could	   say	   that	  we	   all	  have	  a	  common	  interest	  in	  living	  in	  a	  society	  that	  regulates	  risks	  that	  are	  shared	  by	  all.	  Moreover,	  we	  all	  benefit	   in	  living	  in	  healthy	  and	  safe	  communities.	  This	  would	  amount,	  among	  other	   things,	   to	  put	   in	  place	  a	  stronger	  community	   life,	  enhanced	   social	   relationships	   and	   a	   more	   productive	   workforce.	   These	  elements	  constitute	  an	  advantage	  for	  any	  member	  of	  the	  society	  beyond	  his	  or	  her	  narrow	  interests	  in	  the	  public	  health	  intervention	  itself.	   In	  some	  instances	  hence,	   curtailing	   individual	   choice	   would	   not	   be	   seen	   as	   problematic	   in	   this	  approach.	  	  
The	   problem	  with	   such	   a	   normatively	   resonant	   notion	   of	   the	   common	  good	   is	   that	   its	   implications	   for	  health	  policy	  analysis	  cannot	  be	  easily	  cashed	  out.	  Bayer	  and	  Fairchild,	  for	  instance,	  write:	  
We	  begin	  with	  the	  conviction	  that	  at	  the	  core	  of	  public	  health	  practice	  is	  the	  charge	  to	  protect	   the	  common	  good,	   to	   intervene	   for	  such	  ends	  even	   in	   the	   face	  of	  uncertainty.	  This	  stance	  may,	  we	  believe,	  necessitate	  limits	  on	  the	  choice	  of	  individuals	  on	  grounds	  of	   communal	   protection	   against	   both	   hazard	   and	   paternalism.	   (Bayer	   and	   Fairchild	  2004,	  488)	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	   the	  protection	   from	  common	  threat	  has	  an	   important	  ethical	  dimension	   in	  that	   it	  benefits	  every	  member	  of	  a	  given	  community.	  The	  possibility	   to	   achieve	   a	   state	   of	   affairs	   to	   the	   benefit	   of	   all	   alerts	   us	   that	  individual	  autonomy	  is	  not	  necessary	  a	  trumping	  card	  against	  all	  other	  values	  –	  requiring	   instead	   accurate	   balancing.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   exactly	   because	   the	  common	   good	   is	   such	   a	   powerful	   concept,	   one	  must	   be	  wary	   as	   to	   how	   it	   is	  employed	  and	  whether	  the	  interventions	  that	  are,	  from	  time	  to	  time,	  proposed	  as	   priorities	   by	   public	   health	   departments	   are	   actually	   understood	   and	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subscribed	  as	   such	  by	   the	  people	  who	  will	   be	   affected	  by	   the	   intervention.	   In	  other	  words,	  one	  should	  also	  be	  wary	  of	  committing	  the	  opposite	  mistake	  and	  make	  of	   the	  common	  good,	  without	   further	  specification,	   the	  mantra	  of	  public	  health	   ethics.	   In	   other	   terms,	   not	   every	   public	   health	   activity	   is	   immediately	  justified	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	   public	   and	   aims	   at	   population	   health.	   Nor,	   the	  achievement	   of	   common	   good	   identified	   as	   population	   health	   should	  necessarily	   imply	   that	   moral	   interests	   of	   the	   individuals	   who	   are	   asked	   to	  comply	   with	   public	   health	   interventions	   do	   not	   deserve	   due	   attention	   and	  respect.	  
Nevertheless,	   the	  notion	  of	  common	  good	  may	  prove	  useful	   in	  terms	  of	  how	  public	  health	  policies	  should	  or	  can	  be	  framed.	  Jennings,	  for	  instance,	  urges	  us	   that	   the	  more	   issues	  are	   framed	   in	   terms	  of	  a	   contrast	  between	   two	  poles,	  population	  on	  one	  side	  and	  individuals	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  more	  public	  health	  will	  be	  experiences	  of	  suspicious	  competitive	  egoism	  and	  cynicism.	  In	  this	  respect,	  public	   health	   interventions	   would	   prove	   ineffective	   if	   left	   to	   voluntary	  participation	   or	   too	   costly	   and	   repressive	   if	   instantiated	   through	   coercive	  means.	   Arguments	   to	   support	   public	   health	   should	   instead	   “appeal	   more	  concretely	  and	  specifically	   to	   ideals	  and	   feelings	  engendered	  by	  people’s	   lived	  experience	   in	   various	   social	   practices.”	   (Jennings	   2007,	   57)	   The	   trade-­‐off	  between	  individual	  rights	  and	  population	  needs	  would	  perhaps	  persist,	  but	  it	  is	  only	   through	   the	  creation	  of	  a	  political	   space	  and	  a	  political	   imaginary,	   that	   it	  would	  be	  possible	  to	  constitute	  a	  common	  good.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  public	  health,	  it	  would	  then	  be	  necessary	  to	  create	  a	  space	  for	  a	  shared	  perception	  of	  what	  is	  a	  common	  benefit	  or	  threat.	  	  
	   42	  
Much	   of	   the	   work	   in	   public	   health	   ethics,	   however,	   appears	   to	   have	  misinterpreted	   the	   idea	   of	   common	   good	   as	   it	   comes	   out	   of	   the	   republican	  tradition.	   In	  the	  latter,	   the	  common	  good	  is	  the	  regulative	  ideal	  constitutive	  of	  the	  practice	  of	   free	  citizenship	   in	  a	   free	  republic.	   It	   is	   the	  absence	  of	  arbitrary	  power	  relationships,	  not	  an	  instrumental	  objective	  for	  public	  policies.	  Once	  the	  potential	   for	   arbitrary	   influence	   is	   eliminated,	   then	   interference	  on	   individual	  choices	   for	   protecting	   common	   avowable	   interests	   would	   not	   be	   morally	  problematic	  nor	  liberty	  diminishing	  per	  se.	  Few,	  if	  any,	  contemporary	  societies	  closely	  resemble	  the	  republican	  ideal.	  The	  call	  for	  the	  common	  good	  thus	  should	  not	   necessarily	   be	   conflated	   with	   a	   call	   for	   the	   moral	   priority	   of	   population	  interests	   over	   individual	   allegedly	   narrow	   ones	   –	   as	   it	   is	   apparent	   in	   the	  quotation	  above	  by	  Bayer	  and	  Fairchild.	  The	  latter,	  indeed,	  may	  run	  counter	  the	  republican	  ethos	  if	  it	  becomes	  a	  domination	  of	  the	  common	  good	  equated	  with	  population	   health	   over	   the	   individual.	   The	   common	   good,	   in	   other	   words,	   is	  only	  realized	  when	  effective	  civic	  membership	  is	  granted	  to	  all	  morally	  relevant	  interests	   of	   citizens	   qua	   members	   of	   the	   polity.	   This	   means	   that	   particular	  attention	   should	   be	   paid	   to	   conditions	   of	   domination	   and	   systematic	  disadvantage	  that	  exist	  in	  society	  and	  make	  sure	  that	  all	  voices	  and	  needs	  have	  surfaced	   in	   the	   deliberation	   and	   properly	   acknowledged.	   The	   latter	   could	   be	  interpreted	   as	   a	   plea	   for	   enhanced	   public	   participation	   in	   the	   definition,	  framing,	   and	   eventually	   the	   pursuit	   of	   the	   common	   good.	   Participation	   may	  come	  in	  many	  degrees,	  from	  the	  establishment	  of	  deliberative	  public	  forums	  or	  through	  the	  consultation	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	   ‘public	  opinion’,	  what	  is	   important	  in	  the	   context	   of	   republicanism,	   however,	   is	   not	   participation	   as	   such.	   It	   is	  important,	   instead,	   that	  all	  morally	  relevant	   interests	   inform	  deliberation,	  and	  that	  none	  of	   them	  is	   left	  out	   from	  the	  public	  purview	  because	  those	  who	  hold	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them	  are	  a	  minority	  or,	  I	  would	  add,	  live	  in	  conditions	  of	  disadvantage	  that	  does	  not	  allow	  their	  voices	  to	  be	  heard	  or	  their	   interests	  to	  emerge.	  If	  we	  leave	  the	  language	   of	   political	   philosophy	   and	   come	   back	   to	   applied	   ethics,	   this	  means	  that	   the	   role	   of	   public	   health	   ethics	   is	   to	   specify	   the	   sources	   of	   normative	  concern	  in	  specific	  policies,	  and	  identify	  what	  are	  the	  places	  and	  spaces	  –	  both	  conceptual	  and	  physical	  -­‐	  in	  which	  the	  exercise	  of	  public	  engagement	  is	  mostly	  due.	   In	   this	   vein,	  we	   can	   add	   another	   condition	   for	   the	   justification	   of	   public	  health	   interventions:	   inclusion	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   of	   the	   moral	  interests	  of	  all	  the	  parties	  that	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  an	  intervention.	  	  
To	  be	  sure,	  the	  necessity	  of	  including	  affected	  parties	  in	  the	  context	  of	  decision	  is	   not	   exclusively	   coming	   from	   the	   republican	   tradition.	   Indeed,	   also	   authors	  that	   do	   not	   explicitly	   subscribe	   to	   republicanism	   as	   a	   political	   philosophy	  underscore	  the	  necessity	  of	  public	  involvement	  in	  the	  deliberative	  process	  as	  to	  ensure	  the	  accountability	  of	  a	  public	  health	  decision.	  For	  instance,	  Childress	  et	  al.	  (2002,	  172),	  note	  that:	  “When	  public	  health	  agents	  believe	  that	  one	  of	  their	  actions,	   practices	   or	   policies	   infringes	   one	   or	   more	   general	   moral	  considerations,	   they	   also	   have	   the	   responsibility,	   in	   our	   judgment,	   to	   explain	  and	  justify	  the	  infringement,	  whenever	  possible,	  to	  the	  relevant	  parties.”	  What	  they	   claim,	   basically,	   is	   that	   ethical	   principles	   alone	   cannot	   eliminate	   the	   fact	  that	  individual	  interests	  may	  sometimes	  collide	  with	  collective	  needs.	  A	  process	  of	  public	  justification,	  though,	  makes	  sure	  that	  such	  trade-­‐offs	  are	  made	  openly	  and	  with	   recognition	   of	   all	   interests.	   Similarly,	  Nancy	  Kass	   (2002)	   recognizes	  that,	  within	  a	  pluralistic	  society,	  how	  benefits	  and	  burdens	  are	  balanced,	  would	  lead	   to	   disagreement.	   This	   fact	   requires,	   in	   her	   view,	   the	   establishment	   of	  procedures,	   such	   as	   public	   hearings,	   so	   that	   minority	   views	   are	   taken	   into	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account.	  The	  difference	  with	  the	  republican	  model,	  however,	  exists	  if	  not	  in	  the	  practical	   outcomes	   at	   least	   in	   the	   general	   substantive	   motivation	   requiring	  public	   justification.	   In	   the	   republican	   tradition,	   indeed,	   the	   call	   for	   a	   broader	  inclusion	   should	   not	   be	   motivated	   solely	   by	   the	   need	   to	   justify	   liberty	  infringement	  when	  it	  occurs,	  but	  also	  to	  show	  that	  the	  infringement	  required	  is	  of	  a	  non-­‐dominating	  kind.	  That	  is,	  that	  the	  policy	  under	  consideration	  correctly	  tracks	  common	  shared	   interests	  and	  not	  only	  the	  aggregative	  outcomes	  of	   the	  interests	  that	  some	  groups	  have	  in	  common.	  	  
4.	  Conclusions	  
From	  the	  analysis	  of	   the	  beneficence-­‐based	  model	  of	  public	  health,	  and	  the	  exploration	  of	   the	  central	   tenets	  of	   republicanism	   in	  political	  philosophy	   I	  draw	   two	   conclusions	   important	   for	   the	   present	   work	   and	   the	   following	  analysis.	   The	   first	   alerts	   us	   that	   the	   pursuit	   of	   population	   health	   can,	   at	   least	  sometimes,	  bring	  about	  conflicts	  with	  individual	  interests.	  Recognizing	  both	  as	  important	  the	  beneficence	  model	  seeks	  to	  establish	  some	  limiting	  conditions	  for	  the	   implementation	   of	   public	   health	   policies	   that	   also	   respect	   individual	  liberties.	  Among	  them	  the	  most	  important	  –	  at	  least	  for	  my	  purposes	  –	  are	  the	  harm	  principle	  and	  the	   ‘least	  restrictive	  means’	   limiting	  condition.	  The	  second	  makes	  us	  aware	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  freedom	  is	  indeed	  broader,	  and	  urges	  us	  to	  think	  of	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  absence	  of	  arbitrary	  interference,	  rather	  than	  interference	  as	  such.	  In	  my	  interpretation,	  the	  republican	  tradition	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  that	  there	  are	  some	  predetermined	  substantive	  goods	  -­‐	  i.e.	  population	  health	  as	  common	  good	   -­‐	   that	   should	   take	   priority	   over	   individual	   narrow	   interests.	   It	   rather	  suggests	   that	   a	   policy	   is	   for	   the	   common	   good	  when	   it	   responds	   better	   than	  alternatives	  to	  shared	  common	  interests.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  justificatory	  space	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of	   public	   health	   activities	   cannot	   be	   limited	   to	   interests	   of	   non-­‐interference	  versus	  population	  health	  interests	  only,	  but	  it	  requires	  an	  exploration	  of	  all	  the	  morally	  relevant	  interests	  that	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  a	  policy.	  The	  latter,	  I	  submit,	  can	  sometimes	  arise	  from	  engagement	  with	  the	  public.	   	   Insisting	  on	  the	  needs	  for	  major	  public	  engagement	  in	  the	  identification	  of	  public	  health	  goals,	  I	  claim,	  is	   a	   plausible	   condition	   for	   vindicating	   public	   health	   activities,	   escaping	  unjustified	   paternalism,	   and	   for	   paying	   due	   respect	   to	   individual	   preferences	  and	  population	  needs.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  There	   is	   a	   sense	   in	   which	   broader	   spaces	   of	   participation	   in	   decisions	  affecting	   the	   public	   as	   a	   whole	   are	   worthwhile,	   one	   should	   not,	   however,	  commit	   the	  mistake	  of	   thinking	   that	  participation	   is	   all	   that	  matters.	   In	  many	  situations,	  participation	  is	  not	  possible	  for	  some	  individuals	  and	  groups	  in	  that	  they	  live	  in	  conditions	  of	  social	  disadvantage	  so	  profound	  that	  the,	  still	  valuable,	  opportunity	  of	  joining	  in	  a	  public	  forum	  for	  the	  deliberation	  of,	  for	  instance,	  the	  best	  way	  to	  implement	  a	  vaccination	  programme	  would	  rank	  at	  the	  bottom	  end	  of	   their	   personal	   priorities.	   In	   other	   words,	   social	   disadvantage	   can	   be	   seen	  itself	   as	   a	   form	  of	  domination	   and,	   its	   redress,	  may	  acquire	  moral	  priority.	   In	  this	   sense,	   the	   republican	   appeal	   to	   enhancing	   rights	   of	   civic	  membership,	   as	  opposed	   to	   the	   right	   of	   freedom	   from	   interference	   alone,	   needs	   to	   be	  accompanied	  with	  equally	   important	   issues	  explaining	  why	   it	   is	   important	   for	  society	  to	  protect	  health	  and	  see	  whether	  conditions	  of	  disadvantage	  map	  onto	  health	  outcomes.	  	  
In	   conclusion,	   the	   beneficence	  model	   address	   the	   question	   of	   how	   to	   balance	  individual	  and	  public	  interests,	  the	  republican	  approach	  emphasizes	  the	  notions	  of	   freedom	   as	   non-­‐domination	   and	   common	   good	   as	   particularly	   fit	   to	   public	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health.	  Both	  of	  them,	  however,	  do	  not	  sufficiently	  problematize	  why	  health	  is	  of	  specific	   moral	   importance.	   This	   is	   so	   either	   because	   the	   latter	   is	   taken	   as	  uncontroversial,	   or	   because	   it	   is	   subsumed	   -­‐	   in	   some	  quick	   interpretations	   of	  the	  republican	  thought	  (see	  Bayer	  and	  Fairchild	  above	  for	  one	  example)	  -­‐	  under	  the	   grand	  notion	  of	   population	  health.	   It	   is	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   this	   point	   that	   I	  now	  turn.	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Chapter	  two:	  Justice	  in	  public	  health.	  Fair	  
equality	  of	  opportunity,	  capabilities	  and	  the	  
negative	  aim	  of	  justice	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  
The	   two	   approaches	   presented	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   illustrate	   two	  different	   threads	   in	   the	   political	   and	   ethical	   interpretation	   of	   public	   health	  activities.	   Both	   accounts,	   despite	   the	   differences,	   recognize	   the	   moral	  importance	   of	   public	   health	   interventions	   and	   provide	   the	   theoretical	  background	   for	   their	   ethical	   evaluation.	   The	   debate	   rests,	   more	   or	   less	  explicitly,	   on	   the	   intuition	   that	   health	   is	   valuable	   and	  worth	   pursuing.	   Health	  has	   a	   special	   role	   for	   individuals,	   a	   role	   that	   goes	   beyond	   the	   enjoyment	   of	   a	  status	  of	   good	  bodily	   and	  mental	   functioning.	  Being	  healthy	   is	   a	  pre-­‐requisite	  for	  much	  of	  the	  creativity,	  joy,	  and	  richness	  a	  person	  can	  obtain	  from	  life,	  or	  at	  least	   it	  makes	  it	  much	  more	  likely	  that	  one	  will	  be	  able	  to	  pursue	  the	  kinds	  of	  things	  one	  wants	  to	  pursue	  or	  the	  kinds	  of	  things	  one	  considers	  worth	  pursuing,	  according	   to	  one’s	  conception	  of	   the	  good.	  Meeting	  health	  needs	   is,	  moreover,	  fundamental	  to	  sustain	  equal	  opportunity	  in	  the	  access	  to	  important	  roles	  and	  offices	   in	   society.	   A	   life	   free	   from	   disease	   and	   morbidity	   is	   an	   element	   that	  facilitates	   full	   participation	   in	   the	   polity,	   and	   it	   is	   thus	   important	   for	   the	  functioning	  of	  present	  democratic	   societies.	  Public	  health	   interventions,	  when	  properly	   implemented,	   sustain	   population	   health	   thus	   enhancing	   community	  life	   and,	   possibly,	   social	   cohesion.	   Therefore,	   there	   is	   at	   least	   a	   prima	   facie	  reason	  for	  considering	  public	  health	  activities	  as	  rightly	  tracking	  on	  important	  aspects	   of	   what	   is	   valuable	   in	   people’s	   lives.	   Accordingly,	   the	   two	   different	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approaches	  recognize	  some	  sort	  of	  obligation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  governments	  to	  protect	  the	  health	  of	  their	  citizens	  and	  to	  restore	  such	  health	  when	  it	  is	  lost.	  The	  way	  protection	  is	  (or	  should	  be)	  instantiated	  in	  practice	  varies,	  as	  I	  have	  shown,	  according	  to	  their	  different	  philosophical	  and	  political	  persuasions.	  	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  wish	  to	  enlarge	  my	  critical	  overview	  to	  issues	  of	  justice	  and	   see	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   those	   issues	   can	   be	   approached	   in	   public	   health	  ethics.	  This	  presentation	  is	  intended	  to	  provide	  further	  theoretical	  background	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  study	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  thesis,	  and	  to	  provide	  justification	  for	  the	  application	  of	  the	  relevant	  concepts	  that	  will	  appear	  in	  it.	  
Issues	   of	   distributive	   justice	   have	   certainly	   been	   acknowledged	   in	  medical	   and	   research	   ethics;	   the	   beneficence	   model	   in	   public	   health	   ethics	  makes	  no	  exception	  in	  this	  respect.	  The	  way	  the	  beneficence	  model	  frames	  the	  issue	  is,	  in	  my	  view,	  incomplete.	  The	  pitfall	  of	  this	  approach	  consists,	  primarily,	  in	   a	   thin	   view	   of	   the	   good	   public	   health	   institutions	   are	   distributing	   and	   the	  moral	   relevance	   of	   the	   social	   context	   in	   which	   distribution	   takes	   place.	   The	  analysis	   of	   the	   social	   context	   of	   distribution	   is	   important	   in	   that	   recent	  epidemiological	  findings	  are	  progressively	  increasing	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  connections	   existing	   between	   socioeconomic	   and	   health	   status.	   In	   a	   nutshell,	  social	   epidemiology	   tells	   us	   that	   much	   of	   the	   health	   inequalities	   that	   we	  observe,	   to	   different	   extents,	   in	   various	   societies	   strongly	   correlate	   with	  inequalities	   in,	   among	   other	   things,	   income	   ad	   literacy.	   This	   realization	   may	  result	   in	   an	   enlargement	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   public	   health	   activities	   and,	  consequently,	   of	   ethical	   analysis	   beyond	   the	   classical	   concerns	   about	   the	   fair	  distribution	  of	  medical	  resources	  that	  typically	  occupy	  ethical	  debates	  in	  public	  health.	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To	  elaborate	  on	  this	  point,	  and	  show	  its	  connections	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  work,	  I	  will	  first	  specify	  the	  scope	  of	  my	  approach	  by	  showing	  how	  I	  intend	  to	  deal	   with	   the	   increasing	   recognition	   of	   health	   inequalities	   among	   different	  socioeconomic	  groups.	  In	  particular,	  I	  will	  explain	  that	  while	  my	  approach	  has	  a	  narrow	  scope	  in	  the	  object	  -­‐	  since	  it	  is	  oriented	  to	  the	  ethical	  analysis	  of	  specific	  policies	   rather	   than	   on	   health	   policy	   in	   general	   –	   it	   is	   attentive	   to	   broader	  problems	  of	  health	  inequalities	  and	  their	  social	  determinants.	  	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  although	  we	  cannot	  expect	  public	  health	   to	   foster	  social	   justice	   in	  general,	  we	  can	  still	  reasonably	  require	  a	  negative	  aim	  of	  social	  justice	  for	  public	  health.	  In	  this	   respect,	   public	   health	   policies	   should	   be	   devised	   as	   to	   avoid	   worsening	  existing	  health	   inequalities.	  As	   it	  will	  become	  apparent	   in	  the	  final	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	   and	   of	   this	   thesis,	   one	  way	   to	   attend	   existing	   inequalities	   comes	   also	  from	  enlarging	  our	  evaluative	  moral	   focus	   from	   the	  medical	   resources	  people	  are	   provided	   with	   to	   their	   capability	   to	   transform	   those	   resources	   in	   actual	  valuable	  outcomes.	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	   introduction	  of	   the	   so-­‐called	  capability	  approach	  will	  provide	  a	  further	  methodological	  tool	  to	  evaluate	  issues	  of	  justice	  in	  this	  work.	  
2.	  Justice	  and	  public	  health:	  narrow	  or	  broad?	  
Issues	  of	  justice	  have	  always	  occupied	  centre	  stage	  in	  bioethical	  analysis.	  In	   the	   now	   classic	   principlist	   approach,	   justice	   figures	   as	   one	   of	   the	   four	  principles	   that	   should	   inform	   an	   ethical	   approach	   to	   healthcare	   (Beauchamp	  and	  Childress	  2009,	  240-­‐281).	   In	   the	  context	  of	  healthcare	  ethics	  problems	  of	  justice	  arise	  in,	  at	  least,	  two	  forms.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  narrow	  one,	  and	  pertains	  to	  the	  just	   allocation	   of	   medical	   treatments	   in	   the	   context	   of	   scarce	   resources	  (Winslow	   1982;	   Veatch	   2000;	   Ubel	   2001;	   Truog	   et	   al.	   2006;	  Hurst	   and	  Danis	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2007;	   Persad,	   Wertheimer,	   and	   Emanuel	   2009).	   Textbook	   examples	   of	   this	  perspective	   are	   questions	   of	   rationing	   within	   the	   health	   budget	   –	   i.e.	   what	  principles	  should	  guide	  the	  allocation	  of	  resources	  to	  different	  treatments	  –	  and	  issues	  of	  rationing	  of	  scarce	  treatments	  to	  different	  patients	  who	  need	  them	  –	  i.e.	  what	  are	  the	  right	  criteria	  to	  establish	  priorities	  (Beauchamp	  and	  Childress	  2009,	   267–281).	   The	   second	   is	   broader,	   and	   attempts	   to	   integrate	  health	   and	  healthcare	   provision	   and	   the	   traditional	   concerns	   of	   the	   theories	   of	   social	  justice	   in	   political	   philosophy.	   These	   latter	   problems	   arose	   especially	   in	   the	  United	  States,	  where	  there	  is	  no	  legal	  right	  to	  health	  care.	  Central	  focus	  of	  this	  account	   is	   to	   understand	  what	   is	   the	   special	  moral	   importance	   of	   health	   and	  whether	  it	  is	  an	  obligation	  of	  justice	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  state	  to	  offer	  equal	  access	  to	   healthcare	   or,	   ultimately,	   to	   a	   decent	  minimum	   of	   health	   to	   all	   its	   citizens	  (Buchanan	   1984;	   Daniels	   1985;	   Anand,	   Peter,	   and	   Sen	   2006;	   Daniels	   2008).	  	  Issues	  of	  justice	  also	  occur	  when	  we	  change	  the	  focus	  from	  healthcare	  delivery	  to	  public	  health	  activities.	  Several	  ethical	  frameworks	  in	  the	  beneficence	  model,	  for	   instance,	   incorporate	  concerns	   for	   justice	  as	  a	  part	  of	  public	  health	  ethical	  analysis	  (Verweij	  2000;	  Kass	  2001;	  Childress	  et	  al.	  2002).	  As	  Nancy	  Kass	  (2004)	  notes,	   already	   in	   the	   1980s	   -­‐	   a	   decade	   in	   which	   the	   discussion	   about	   the	  necessity	   of	   improving	   access	   to	   healthcare	   in	   the	   United	   States	   was	   a	   hotly	  contested	   issue	   -­‐	   scholars	   in	   bioethics	   agreed	   that	   some	   typical	   public	   health	  activities	   (like	   immunization)	   where	   the	   least	   controversial	   services	   to	   be	  included	  in	  a	  basic,	  minimum	  package	  of	  health	  services.	  	  
Also	  in	  the	  context	  of	  public	  health	  activities	  concerns	  for	  justice	  can	  be	  analysed	   either	   from	  a	  narrow	  or	   a	  broader	  perspective.	   In	   the	   first	   case,	   the	  main	  issue	  to	  be	  assessed	  would	  be	  whether	  the	  benefits	  and	  burdens	  of	  a	  given	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public	   health	   interventions	   are	   fairly	   distributed	   across	   society.	   The	  beneficence	   model,	   presented	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   generally	   endorses	   a	  narrow	   strategy.	   It	   understands	   ethical	   analysis	   in	   this	   field	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	  accommodate	   the	   conflicts	   that	   may	   arise	   among	   the	   general	   moral	  considerations	   informing	   public	   health	   activities.	   A	   problematic	   trade-­‐off	   the	  beneficence	  model	  would	   recognise	   as	   ethically	   salient	  would	   arise	  when	   the	  most	   effective	   way	   of	   intervening	   against	   a	   public	   health	   problem	   does	   not	  reflect	   a	   fair	   distribution	   of	   the	   benefits	   and	   burdens	   of	   the	   intervention.	   A	  typical	   example	   of	   this	   problem	   is	   constituted	   by	   seasonal	   influenza	  immunization	   policies	   in	   Japan	   (Reichert	   et	   al.	   2001;	   R.	   Faden	   and	   Shebaya	  2010).	   Seasonal	   flu	   is,	   in	   general,	   a	   relatively	  mild	  and	   transient	  disease.	  This	  means	   that	  most	   of	   the	   times,	   otherwise	   healthy,	   individuals	   are	   able	   to	   pass	  through	  its	  symptoms	  without	  relevant	  complications.	  In	  some	  cases,	  however,	  influenza	   can	   have	   serious,	   also	   lethal,	   effects	   on	   a	   number	   of	   people:	   most	  notably,	   immunocompromised	   individuals	   and	   the	   elderly.	   Those	   people,	  because	   of	   their	   bodily	   vulnerability,	   are	   also	  more	   likely	   to	   develop	   adverse	  events	   after	   immunization.	   From	   a	   public	   health	   perspective,	   immunizing	   a	  critical	  mass	   of	   people,	   and	   thus	   trying	   to	   stop	   the	   epidemics,	   better	   controls	  seasonal	   flu	   than	   targeting	   high-­‐risk	   groups	   directly.	   The	   Japanese	   policy	  follows	  this	  reasoning	  and	  thus	  targets	  kids	  in	  primary	  schools	  -­‐	  a	  public	  space	  where	  epidemics	  of	  this	  kind	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  start	  spreading	  –	  to	  the	  major	  benefit	  of	  vulnerable	  people	  who	  may	  suffer	  the	  most	  from	  contracting	  flu.	  The	  question	  of	   fairness	   that	  would	  arise	   in	   the	  beneficence	  model	  would	   thus	  be	  the	  following:	  ‘Is	  it	  right	  to	  distribute	  differentially	  the	  benefits	  and	  burdens	  of	  a	  given	   intervention?’.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   notice	   that	   the	   goods	   provided	   by	  policies	   like	   the	   Japanese	   are	   still	   providing	   a	   public	   good	   as	   defined	   in	   the	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previous	   chapter.	   Everyone,	   indeed,	   is	   benefiting	   from	   the	   intervention.	   Not	  everyone,	   however,	   is	   benefited	   or	   burdened	   to	   the	   same	   extent.	   How	   to	  establish	   whether	   the	   proposed	   intervention	   is	   nonetheless	   ethical?	   The	  beneficence	   model	   is	   supposed	   to	   provide	   guidance	   for	   an	   answer	   to	   the	  dilemma	   along	   the	   limiting	   conditions	   previously	   outlined.	   In	   particular,	   the	  role	  of	  applied	  ethics	  would	  be	  to	  assess,	  given	  the	  specific	  details	  of	  the	  case	  at	  hand,	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  trade-­‐off	  is	  acceptable.	  This	  activity,	  clearly,	  requires	  gathering	   a	   lot	   of	   specific	   information	   about	   risk	   and	   benefits	   of	   the	  intervention,	   its	   effectiveness,	   necessity	   and,	   as	   also	   indicated	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter,	  whether	   alternative,	   less	  burdensome,	   interventions	  would	   reach	   the	  same	  objectives.	  
In	  a	  broader	  sense,	   instead,	  the	  justice	  of	  public	  health	  activities	  can	  be	  adjudicated	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  ever-­‐increasing	  recognition	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  health	   inequalities	   between	   and	   within	   countries.	   In	   the	   latter	   sense,	   the	  distribution	   of	   public	   health	   interventions	   is	   considered	   as	   only	   one	   of	   the	  societal	   factors	   determining	   health.	   A	   vast	   amount	   of	   evidence	   in	   social	  epidemiology	  is	  showing	  how	  the	  various	  health	  inequalities	  that	  we	  encounter	  both	  at	  the	  local	  and	  global	  scale	  do	  not	  depend	  solely	  on	  biological	  differences	  among	  groups	  of	   individuals,	  nor	  are	   they	  explained	  by	  reference	   to	  access	   to	  healthcare	   alone.	   Rather,	   a	   whole	   set	   of	   health	   indicators,	   like	   health	   status,	  levels	  of	  morbidity,	  and	  life	  expectancy	  vary,	  quite	  consistently,	  across	  different	  socioeconomic	   strata.	   Socioeconomic	   status	   (SES)	   hence	   is	   increasingly	  understood	   as	   an	   indicator	   of	   health	   status	   as	  well,	   and	  many	   researchers	   in	  social	  epidemiology	  are	  showing	  how	  it	  is	  not	  unreasonable	  to	  talk	  about	  social	  determinants	   of	   health.	   The	   literature	   on	   the	   social	   determinants	   of	   health	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alerts	  us	  with	  at	   least	   four	  general	   findings	   (Daniels	  and	  Sabin	  1997;	  Marmot	  2004;	   Marmot	   2005;	   Marmot,	   Wilkinson,	   and	   Brunner	   2006;	   Daniels	   2008).	  First,	   people	   belonging	   to	   the	   upper	   end	   of	   the	   socioeconomic	   ladder	   tend	   to	  have	  better	  health,	  in	  terms	  of	  life	  expectancy	  and	  premature	  death,	  than	  those	  belonging	   to	   the	   lower	   end	   of	   the	   spectrum.	   Second,	   the	   steeper	   the	   SES	  inequalities	   in	   a	   given	   society	   the	   steeper	   are	   also	   health	   inequalities.	   Third,	  these	   inequalities	   do	  not	   seem	   to	  depend	  on	   the	   level	   of	   access	   to	   healthcare	  services.	  This	  means	  that	  also	  in	  countries	  where	  universal	  access	  to	  healthcare	  is	   guaranteed,	   differences	   in	   socioeconomic	   status	   map	   onto	   differences	   in	  health	   outcomes.	   Fourth,	   the	   income/health	   gradient	   does	   not	   only	   affect	  people	   belonging	   to	   disadvantaged	   groups,	   but	   it	   operates	   along	   the	   whole	  socioeconomic	   spectrum.	   This	   means	   that	   in	   societies	   with	   high	   level	   of	  socioeconomic	   disparities,	   also	   people	   belonging	   to	   the	   less	   disadvantaged	  strata	   of	   society	   tend	   to	   have	  worse	   health	   than	   groups	   similarly	   situated	   in	  different	   societies	   with	   less	   inequalities6 .	   The	   literature	   about	   the	   social	  determinants	  of	  health,	  moreover,	   is	   increasingly	   taken	  to	  be	  one	  of	   the	  bases	  for	   state	   action	   in	   the	   reduction	   of	   health	   inequalities	   within	   countries.	   One	  notable	   example	   of	   the	   growing	   importance	   of	   this	   approach	   is	   the	   review	  commissioned	  by	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Health	  to	  Marmot	  as	  to	  inform	  the	  government	  about	  the	  most	  effective	  evidence-­‐based	  strategies	  for	  reducing	  health	  inequalities	  in	  England	  from	  2010	  (Marmot	  2010).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The epidemiological literature about the social determinants of health is vast. Although it 
has always been known that individuals’ chance of life and death are patterned with social 
class, it is only in the last decades that this recognition is corroborated by evidence. The 
seminal study in this field is Michael Marmot’s Whitehall Study I and II (1978; 1991), 
where it is shown  that among British civil servants mortality was higher among those in the 
lower grade when compared to the higher grade. Ever since that study more evidence has 
been gathered. The references in the main text provide an overview of the most up-to-date 
findings in the field. 
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The	   social	   determinants	   of	   health	   have	   caused	   major	   debates	   within	  public	   health	   and	   bioethics	   as	   to	   how	   they	   should	   reconfigure	   common	  intuitions	   about	   the	   justice	   of	   health	   care	   systems	   and,	   consequently,	   fair	  distribution	   of	   health	   resources	   (Evans	   2001;	   Kamm	  2001;	   Peter	   et	   al.	   2001;	  Ruger	  2004;	  Rogers	  2007).	  In	  fact,	  if	  health	  outcomes	  are	  determined	  only	  to	  a	  certain	   extent	   to	   the	   way	   the	   healthcare	   systems	   work	   then	   major	   concerns	  about	  health	  should	  be	  concerned	  not	  so	  much	  on	  issues	  about	  the	  distribution	  of	  given	  medical	  interventions,	  but	  on	  broader	  social	  and	  political	  aspects	  that	  are	   themselves	   highly	   contentious.	   As	   a	   supporter	   of	   the	   beneficence	   model	  would	   notice	   (see	   for	   instance:	   Anomaly	   2011),	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   social	  determinants	   of	   health	   is,	   on	   its	   own,	   not	   decisive	   as	   to	   whether	   we	   should	  count	   health	   inequalities	   unjust	   nor,	   by	   itself,	   it	   tells	   us	   how	   to	   change	   our	  theories	  of	  social	   justice	  accordingly.	  Nevertheless,	   it	  suggests	  that	   if	  we	  grant	  health	  and	  health	  equity	  special	  moral	  importance,	  then	  a	  narrow	  focus	  on	  the	  distribution	   of	   healthcare	   alone	   is	   insufficient.	   As	   Norman	  Daniels	   notes,	   few	  people,	  except	  perhaps	  radical	  egalitarians,	  oppose	  all	   forms	  of	  socioeconomic	  inequalities.	   Many	   people,	   however,	   are	   much	   more	   puzzled	   when	   come	   to	  know	   that	   socioeconomic	   inequalities	   that	   otherwise	   seem	   just	   are	   then	  conducive	  to	  health	  inequalities	  (2008,	  81).	  A	  broad	  analysis	  of	  the	  demands	  of	  justice	  with	  regards	  to	  health	  policies,	  hence,	  would	  also	  come	  into	  terms	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  health	  inequalities	  and	  assess	  when	  they	  are	  also	  unjust.	  
3.	  Justice	  in	  public	  health:	  a	  comparative	  or	  a	  transcendental	  
framework?	  
	   In	   the	  previous	  sections	   I	  have	  proposed	  a	  distinction	  between	  narrow	  and	   broad	   approaches	   to	   issues	   of	   justice	   in	   public	   health.	   The	   first	   are	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concerned	   primarily	   with	   problems	   of	   distribution	   as	   they	   arise	   in	   specific	  settings.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  social	  arrangement	  in	  which	  distribution	  takes	  place	  does	   not	   occupy	   central	   stage	   into	   the	   ethical	   analysis.	   The	   second	   approach,	  instead,	   takes	  problems	  of	   justice	  upstream,	   and	   considers	   the	  distribution	  of	  health	   services	   as	   having	   limited,	   though	   important,	   impact	   on	   the	   health	   of	  individuals	   and	   groups.	   There	   is	   a	   second	   distinction	   that	   can	   be	   drawn,	  moreover,	   as	   to	   how	   to	   approach	   problems	   of	   justice	   in	   public	   health.	   One	  approach	   is,	   institutions	   oriented	   or,	   following	   Sen’s	   (2009)	   terminology,	  arrangement-­‐focused.	   It	  seeks	  to	  analyse	  problems	  of	   justice	  by	  devising	  what	  would	  be	  the	  principles	  guiding	  a	  perfectly	  just	  society.	  In	  this	  respect,	  again	  in	  Sen’s	   terminology,	   it	   can	   be	   labelled	   transcendental	   institutionalism.	   For	   the	  purposes	   of	   this	   work,	   I	   will	   take	   Rawlsian	   theories	   of	   justice	   as	   applied	   to	  health	  policy	  as	  representative	  of	  this	  approach.	  The	   second	   approach,	   instead,	   is	   more	   interested	   in	   creating	   a	  conceptual	   and	   linguistic	   space	   for	   assessing	   individual	   well-­‐being.	   In	   this	  respect,	  while	  the	  former	  approach	  was	  arrangement	  or	  institution-­‐focused,	  the	  approaches	  of	  the	  second	  kind	  are	  realization-­‐focused	  and	  look	  at	  what	  socially	  situated	  individuals	  fare	  with	  respect	  with	  existing	  conditions	  rather	  than	  only	  on	  what	   are	   the	   principles	   that	   should	   inform	   just	   institutions.	   The	   account	   I	  will	   take	   into	   account	   as	   representative	   of	   this	   orientation	   is	   the	   capability	  approach	  by	  Sen	  (1980,	  1999,	  2009;	  Sen	  and	  Nussbaum	  1993).	  A	  word	  of	  caution	   is,	  however,	  due.	   It	  would	  be	  wrong,	   indeed,	   to	  push	  too	  far	  the	  divisive	  issues	  in	  place	  between	  a	  Rawlsian	  theory	  and	  the	  capability	  approach.	   The	   two,	   in	   fact,	   respond	   to	   different	   demands,	   and	   one	   does	   not	  exclude	   the	   other	   (Daniels	   2008,	   64–71;	   Nussbaum	   2006,	   54–69).	   To	   the	  purposes	   of	   conceptual	   disambiguation,	   however,	   it	   is	  worth	  dedicating	  more	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space	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   differences.	   The	   following	   exposition	   would	   also	  serve	  to	   justify	  when	  I	  will	  use,	   in	   the	  analysis	  of	   the	  case	  study,	   the	   language	  and	  conceptual	  tools	  of	  the	  capability	  approach	  and	  when	  those	  of	  the	  Rawlsian	  framework.	  In	  the	  following	  sections,	  hence,	  I	  elaborate	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  health,	  and	  its	   value.	   In	   particular,	   I	   ask	  whether	   health	   can	   be	   conceived	   of	   as	   a	   proper	  object	   of	   distribution	   according	   to	   principles	   of	   justice.	   The	   questions	   that	  inform	  this	  section	  can	  be	  framed	  as:	  is	  there	  a	  duty,	  beyond	  beneficence,	  on	  the	  part	   of	   the	   state	   to	  meet,	   at	   least	   basic,	   health	   needs?	   Is	   this	   an	   obligation	   of	  social	  justice?	  	  
3.1	  The	  transcendental	  route	  
The	  most	   influential	   among	   the	   approaches	   of	   the	   first	   kind	   are	   those	  inspired	  by	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice	  by	  John	  Rawls	  (1971),	  and	  recently	  extended	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  healthcare	  and	  public	  health	  by	  Norman	  Daniels	  (1985;	  2008)7.	  If,	  in	  a	  Rawlsian	  vein,	  we	  believe	  that	  a	  just	  society	  should	  leave	  open	  access	  to	  offices	   and	   incomes	   to	   the	   talents	   and	   skills	   of	   individuals,	   rather	   than	   to	  inherited	  structure	  of	   familial	  relations,	   then	  rational	   individuals	  should	  agree	  that	   the	  state	  also	  has	   the	  power	   to	   redistribute	   some	   important	  goods.	  More	  specifically,	   in	  A	  Theory	  of	   Justice,	   Rawls	   argues	   that	   justice	   demands	   the	   fair	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7 Rawls’ work is a milestone in political and moral philosophy, but it has not gone without 
critiques (for browsing the vast literature on Rawls see, among others: Wellbank, Snook, and 
Mason 1982; DiQuattro 1983; Sandel 1984; Gutmann 1985; Kukathas and Pettit 1990; 
Norman 2011 and references therein). Rawls, in response to the huge debate following his 
work, has further specified his theory in Political Liberalism (1993). Critical analyses of 
Political Liberalism, which can also serve as general references, are the works of Habermas, 
O’Neill, and Nussbaum (1995; 1997; 2011). Since this work is mainly concerned with issues 
of justice as they arise in the context of healthcare and public health, I will use Norman 
Daniels work (1983; 2008) as representative of a Rawlsian approach to health. 
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distribution	  of	  primary	  goods	  (basic	  rights	  and	  liberties,	  freedom	  of	  movement,	  free	   choice	   among	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   occupations,	   offices	   and	   positions	   of	  responsibility,	   income,	  wealth,	   and	   the	   social	   basis	   of	   self	   respect)	   defined	   as	  those	  “things	  it	  is	  rational	  to	  want	  whatever	  else	  one	  wants.	  Thus	  wanting	  them	  is	  part	  of	  being	  rational”	  (Rawls	  1971,	  223).	  	  
According	  to	  Rawls,	  rational	  people	  behind	  a	  ‘veil	  of	  ignorance’	  –	  that	  is	  people	  who	  are	  in	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  ‘original	  position’	  and	  do	  not	  know	  anything	  about	   their	   natural	   endowments	   and	   social	   circumstances	   -­‐	   would	   choose	  principles	   that	   would	   distribute	   fairly	   the	   primary	   goods.	   In	   contrast	   to	  welfarist	   theories	   that	   reduce	  well-­‐being	   to	  experiential	   states	   like	  preference	  satisfaction,	  the	  list	  of	  primary	  goods	  provided	  above	  indicates	  who	  is	  better	  off	  and	   who	   is	   worse	   off	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   justice.	   In	   particular,	   people	  behind	  the	  veil	  of	   ignorance	  would	  choose	  two	  principles	  of	   justice.	  According	  to	   the	   first	   principle:	   “each	   person	   is	   to	   have	   an	   equal	   right	   to	   the	   most	  extensive	  liberty	  compatible	  with	  a	  similar	  liberty	  for	  others.”	  (Rawls	  1971,	  60)	  The	  second	  principle,	   instead,	  has	  to	  do	  with	  social	  and	  economic	  inequalities.	  In	   Rawls’	   theory	   the	   latter	   are	   permitted	   when:	   a)	   they	   are	   to	   the	   greatest	  advantage	   of	   the	   worse	   off	   member	   of	   society	   (also	   called	   the	   difference	  principle),	  and	  b)	  offices	  and	  positions	  are	  open	  to	  all	  under	  conditions	  of	   fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  (1971,	  302–303).	  The	  principles	  of	  justice	  are	  supposed	  to	   apply	   to	   the	   basic	   structure	   of	   society;	   moreover,	   whatever	   arrangement	  distribution	   follows	   from	   the	   application	   of	   these	   principles	   is	   fair	   or	   just	  according	  to	  Rawls.	  	  
As	  Daniels	  suggests	  (2008,	  50-­‐51)	  Rawlsian	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  is	   supposed	   to	   be	   an	   improvement	   on	   the	   liberal	   political	   ideal	   of	   formal	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equality	   of	   opportunity;	   that	   is,	   the	   idea	   that	   offices	   and	   positions	   of	  responsibility	  should	  be	  open	  to	  talent	  and	  natural	  skills.	  In	  several	  societies	  a	  long	   history	   of	   race	   and	   gender	   discrimination,	   however,	   has	   led	   to	   an	  underdevelopment	   of	   these	   expectations	   that	   continues	   also	   after	  discrimination	  becomes	  illegal.	  The	  actual	  achievement	  of	  jobs	  and	  offices,	  then,	  can	  be	  subjected	  to	  the	  strong	  effects	  of	  morally	  arbitrary	  social	  contingencies.	  The	   resulting	   inequalities,	  moreover,	   can	   perpetuate	   through	   the	   channels	   of	  existing	   family	   and	   social	   structures,	   thus	   leading	   to	   unequal	   development	   of	  talents	   and	   skills.	   Rawls’	   fair	   equality	   of	   opportunity,	   hence,	   would	   serve	   to	  mitigate	   the	  morally	   arbitrary	   effects	   that	   the	   social	   lottery	  may	   have	   on	   the	  development	  of	  natural	  skills	  and	  talents.	  As	  Daniels	  notes	  (2008,	  52-­‐53),	  public	  education	   is	   extremely	   relevant	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   conception	   of	  justice	  as	  fairness	  in	  that	  it	  would	  partly	  correct	  for	  the	  moral	  arbitrariness	  of	  social	   contingencies.	   Another	   morally	   arbitrary	   lottery,	   in	   addition	   to	   social	  circumstances,	   is	   the	  natural	   lottery	   in	  the	  distribution	  of	  talents	  and	  skills.	   In	  Rawls	   view	   if	   we	   are,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   in	   part	   responsible	   for	   the	   way	   we	  develop	  our	   skills,	  we	  are	  not,	  on	   the	  other,	   in	   control	  of	  what	   talents	  we	  are	  born	  with.	   The	   combined	   action	   of	   the	   natural	   and	   social	   lottery	   thus	  makes	  classical	  appeal	  to	  formal	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  insufficient.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  the	  difference	  principle	  further	  mitigates	  their	  effects	  by	  requiring	  that	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society	  works	  to	  the	  advantage	  of	  all.	  As	  Rawls	  notes	  (1971,	  100-­‐104),	   no	   one	   deserves	   his	   starting	   place	   in	   society,	   or	   his	   natural	  endowment.	   Nevertheless,	   justice	   does	   not	   require	   the	   elimination	   of	   these	  distinctions.	  As	  he	  writes:	  
The	  natural	  distribution	  is	  neither	  just	  nor	  unjust;	  nor	  is	  it	  unjust	  that	  persons	  are	  born	  into	  society	  at	  some	  particular	  position.	  These	  are	  simply	  natural	  facts.	  What	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is	   just	   and	   unjust	   is	   the	  way	   that	   institutions	   deal	   with	   these	   facts.	   Aristocratic	   and	  caste	   societies	  are	  unjust	  because	   they	  make	   these	   contingencies	   the	  ascriptive	  basis	  for	  belonging	  to	  more	  or	  less	  enclosed	  and	  privileged	  social	  classes.	  The	  basic	  structure	  of	  these	  societies	  incorporates	  the	  arbitrariness	  found	  in	  nature.	  [In	  justice	  as	  fairness	  instead]	   men	   agree	   to	   share	   one	   another’s	   fate.	   In	   designing	   institutions	   they	  undertake	  to	  avail	  themselves	  of	  the	  accidents	  of	  nature	  and	  social	  circumstance	  only	  when	  doing	  so	  is	  for	  the	  common	  benefit.	  The	  two	  principles	  are	  a	  fair	  way	  of	  meeting	  the	   arbitrariness	   of	   fortune;	   and	   while	   no	   doubt	   imperfect	   in	   other	   ways,	   the	  institutions	  which	  satisfy	  these	  principles	  are	  just.	  (1971,	  102)	  
	  In	   Rawls	   original	   theory	   meeting	   health	   needs	   was	   not	   taken	   into	  account	  as	  one	  of	  the	  major	  issues	  of	  justice.	  In	  the	  original	  position,	  indeed,	  the	  contractors	   are	   assumed	   to	   be	   fully	   functional	   individuals.	   Although	   Rawls	  himself	   has	   partially	   redressed	   this	   unbalance	   in	   his	   later	  works	   (2001,	   173–175),	   the	  most	  elaborated	   inclusion	  of	  health	   issues	   into	  a	  Rawlsian	   theory	  of	  justice	   is	   due	   to	  Norman	  Daniels.	   In	  Daniels’	   system,	  meeting	   health	   needs	   is	  important	  for	  justice	  in	  that	  it	  serves	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity.	  Clearly,	  one	  of	  the	  major	  problems	  Daniels’	   account	  has	   to	  meet	  pertains	   to	   the	  definition	  of	  what	   counts	   as	   a	   legitimate	   health	   need.	   Daniels	   derives	   the	   biostatistical	  conception	   of	   health	   from	   Boorse	   (1975;	   1977;1997),	   and	   argues	   that	  legitimate	  health	  claims,	  are	  claims	  to	  normal	  species	  functioning,	  and	  health	  is,	  derivatively,	   absence	   of	   disease	   (2008,	   36-­‐42).	   The	   conception	   of	   health	   as	  normal	  species	  functioning	  is	  contested	  in	  the	  specific	  literature8.	  It	  is	  however	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The notion of health Daniels  decides to adopt as a starting point for his analysis of the 
connections between health and justice does not go without critiques in the philosophy of 
medicine literature (Reznek 1987; Wakefield 1992; Amundson 2000). For instance, 
Boorse’s naturalistic account has been attacked by those who attach normativity to the 
notion of disease. In the latter accounts ‘health’ and ‘disease’ depend, for most part, on 
valued judgments: disease is hence an unwanted condition. What counts as a disease, 
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acceptable,	  according	  to	  Daniels,	  as	  a	  reference	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  justice,	  in	  that	  it	  is	  publicly	  checkable	  through	  the	  methods	  of	  biomedical	  sciences	  and	  provides,	  at	   least,	   clear	   cut	   cases	   of	   what	   counts	   as	   normal	   and	   pathological.	   Meeting	  health	  needs	   so	  defined,	  hence,	   is	   important	   to	  provide	   to	   everyone	  a	  normal	  range	  of	  opportunities	  as	  they	  are	  present	  in	  that	  society.	  The	  normal	  range	  of	  opportunity	  represents	  the	  range	  of	  life	  plans	  a	  person	  may	  reasonably	  want	  to	  pursue	  given	  her	  talents	  and	  skills.	  
Health,	   hence,	   is	   not	   only	   important	   on	   its	   own,	   but	   also	   because	   it	   is	  instrumental	   for	   assuring	   to	   individuals	   a	   normal	   opportunity	   range	   within	  society.	  Disease	  and	  disability,	  in	  this	  context,	  are	  seen	  as	  barriers	  that	  severely	  limit	   the	   range	   of	   opportunities	   that	   are	   available	   to	   us.	   In	   his	   recent	  works,	  moreover,	  Daniels	   includes	  concerns	  for	  the	  social	  determinants	  of	  health	  and	  argues	   that	   health	   inequalities	   are	   also	   inequities	   when	   follow	   from	   unjust	  social	  circumstances.	  In	  his	  elaborated	  revision	  of	  Rawls	  theory	  (Daniels	  2008,	  chapter	   3),	   Daniels	   argues	   that	   health	   inequalities	   are	   not	   always	   unjust,	   but	  only	  when	   the	  determinants	  of	  health	  are	  not	  distributed	  according	   to	  Rawls’	  (and	  hence	  his	  own	  as	  applied	  to	  health	  and	  healthcare)	  principles	  of	  justice.	  In	  more	   practical	   terms,	   Daniels’	   approach	   calls,	   as	   a	   requirement	   of	   justice,	   for	  policy	   actions	   in	   all	   those	   areas	   that	   can	   have	   an	   impact	   in	   those	   fields.	   In	  particular	   he	   cites:	   investments	   in	   early	   childhood	   development,	   nutrition	  programmes,	   public	   health,	   primary	   healthcare,	   measures	   to	   protect	   income,	  and	   improvements	   in	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   work	   environment	   (2008,	   95-­‐97).	  Preventive	  measures,	  moreover,	  are	  specifically	  required	  by	  a	   theory	  of	  social	  justice.	   As	   he	   claims,	   when	   the	   risk	   of	   getting	   ill	   falls	   unequally	   on	   different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
furthermore, depends on spcific historical and cultural circumstances (Margolis 1976; 
Engelhardt 1986). For a recent critical analysis on the debate about the definition of health 
see (Ereshefsky 2009). 
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groups,	  and	  do	  so	  systematically	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  avoidable,	  specific	  policy	  action	  is	   required	   as	   to	   avoid	   also	   differentials	   in	   equality	   of	   opportunities.	   As	   one	  commentator	   notes,	   the	   force	   of	   Daniels’	   arguments	   is	   to	   show	   that	   social	  inequalities	   “are	   unacceptable	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   produce	   health	  impairments	  that	  impede	  people’s	  capacity	  to	  pursue	  the	  life	  plans	  that	  it	  would	  be	   reasonable	   for	   them	   to	   pursue	   if	   they	   were	   not	   so	   impaired”	   (Buchanan	  2008,	  19).	  	  	  
This	  point,	  however,	  needs	  clarification.	  What	  matters	   is	  not	   to	  achieve	  equality	  as	  such.	  After	  all,	  equality	  in	  health	  status	  may	  be	  reached	  also	  through	  a	  levelling	  down	  move.	  In	  other	  terms,	  we	  could	  equalize	  risk	  to	  get	  ill	  equally	  across	  the	  whole	  social	  spectrum	  by	  worsening	  the	  prospective	  health	  status	  of	  the	  better-­‐off.	   Clearly	   this	  move	  would	  be	  unsatisfactory.	   For	   related	   reasons,	  some	  inequalities	  may	  not	  be	  unjust	  either	  because	  they	  are	  unavoidable	  –	  i.e.	  think	   for	   instance	   at	   differences	   in	   life	   expectancy	   between	  women	   and	  men	  that	  seem	  to	  be	  due	  to	  biological	  differences	  –	  or	  because	  they	  are	  necessary.	  As	  to	  this	  last	  issue,	  suppose	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  difference	  in	  life	  expectancy	  among	  truck	  drivers	  and	  clerks	  due	  to	  the	  different	  environments	  in	  which	  they	  work,	  and	   the	   former	   having	   on	   average	   decreased	   life	   expectancy.	   We	   would	  probably	   be	   concerned	   by	   this	   inequality	   and	   put	   in	   place	   a	   series	   of	  interventions	  so	  to	  make	  truck	  driving	  as	  safe	  as	  possible.	  Suppose	  further	  that	  there	   remains	   a	   high	   mortality	   rate	   that,	   given	   the	   importance	   of	   trucking,	  seems	   unavoidable	   or	   necessary	   (Daniels	   2008,	   90).	   In	   this	   case,	   we	   would	  perhaps	  moved	  to	  think	  that	  the	  inequality	  does	  not	  also	  constitute	  an	  inequity.	  The	  discussion	  about	  whether	  health	  inequalities	  are	  also	  unjust	  may	  continue.	  In	   particular,	   it	  may	  be	   raised	   the	  point	   as	   to	  whether	   those	   inequalities	   that	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would	  persist	  after	  a	  fair	  distribution	  in	  Rawlsian	  terms	  -­‐	  the	  so-­‐called	  residual	  inequalities	  -­‐	  would	  be	  unjust.	  As	  shown	  by	  Rawls’	  quotation	  above,	  they	  will	  be	  perhaps	   unfortunate	   but	   they	   will	   be	   not	   be	   the	   result	   of	   an	   unjust	   social	  arrangement	  and	  thus	  morally	  permissible.	  Nonetheless,	  as	  the	  example	  of	  the	  truck	  drivers	  suggests,	  a	  just	  society	  has	  the	  duty	  to	  put	  in	  place	  measures	  that	  are	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  all.	  More	  precisely,	  the	  Rawlsian	  theory	  calls	  for	  public	  health	   policies	   that	   equalize	   risk	   in	   that	   they	   are	   functional	   to	   provide	   fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  to	  all.	  As	  Daniels	  claims:	  “Public	  health	  services	  promote	  the	  conditions	  that	  reduce	  certain	  risks	  of	  disease	  or	  disability.	  They	  reduce	  risk	  by	   assuring	   clean,	   safe	   living	   and	   working	   environments	   and	   by	   protecting	  against	   infectious	  diseases.	  These	   services	   should	   attend	   to	   the	   risks	   faced	  by	  the	   entire	   population	   and	   aim	   to	   reduce	   these	   risks	   in	   an	   equitable	   fashion”	  (Daniels	  2008,	  143).	  Moreover,	   the	  difference	  principle	   indicated	  above	  –	   that	  is,	  inequalities	  are	  permitted	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  to	  the	  greatest	  advantage	  of	  the	  worse	   off	   -­‐	   should	   not	   be	   intended,	  Daniels	   suggests,	   as	   a	   sheer	   trickle-­‐down	  principle	   requiring	   only	   that	   the	   poorest	   gradually	   benefit	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	  increasing	  wealth	  of	  the	  richest,	  rather	  as	  implying	  maximal	  flow	  to	  the	  worst-­‐off	  groups	  (ibid.	  93).	  	  
In	   this	   section	   I	   have	   illustrated	   that	   public	   health	   interventions	   find	   a	  justification	  in	  justice	  in	  that	  they	  serve	  to	  foster	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity.	  I	  have	  moreover	   indicated	  how	   justice,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   view	  presented,	   requires	  maximal	  flow	  towards	  the	  disadvantaged	  strata	  of	  society.	  Clearly,	  the	  approach	  here	  presented	  only	  provides	  the	  theoretical	  basis	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  basic	  structures	  of	  society	  should	  be	  organized	  to	  be	  just.	  It	  tells	  us	  that	  public	  health	  is	  one	  of	  those	  activities	  that	  a	  just	  society	  supports.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  approach	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does	   not	   tell	   much	   how	   to	   assess	   whether	   a	   given	   policy	   is	   just	   in	   specific	  circumstances.	   In	  virtually	  all	  cases,	  public	  health	  policy	   is	  done	  in	  contexts	   in	  which	  already	  exist	  health	  inequalities	  and	  some	  of	  them	  would	  perhaps	  persist	  also	  after	  policy	  action.	  It	  is	  thus	  important	  also	  to	  specify	  what	  justice	  requires	  in	  specific	  policy	  contexts.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  transcendental	  route	  does	  not	  offer	  much	  guidance.	  
3.2	  The	  comparative	  route	  Institutionally-­‐focused	   approaches	   do	   not	   tell	   us	   how	   different	   public	  policies	  fare	  with	  respect	  to	  one	  another,	  or	  can	  ameliorate	  social	  circumstances	  in	  real	  world	  settings.	  Rather,	  they	  provide	  the	  transcendental	  conditions	  of	  an	  ideally	   just	   society.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   comparative	   approach	   takes	   into	   account	  human	   diversity	   and	   individuals’	   socially	   situated	   circumstances.	   In	   this	  approach,	  what	  people	  can	  do	  and	  be	  with	  the	  resources	  they	  are	  provided	  with	  is	  another	  important	  focus	  for	  approaching	  the	  demands	  of	  justice.	  This	  account	  arises	   from	   key	   insights	   by	   Nobel-­‐Prize	   winning	   economist	   and	   political	  philosopher	   Amartya	   Sen	   (1980),	   and	   has	   been	   progressively	   refined,	   among	  others,	  by	  Sen	  himself	  and	  Martha	  Nussbaum	  (Nussbaum	  1992;	  Nussbaum	  and	  Sen	  1993;	  Sen	  1993;	  Sen	  1995;	  Sen	  1999;	  Nussbaum	  2006).	  Initially	  conceived	  as	  an	  approach	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  human	  development	  and	  global	  inequalities,	  the	  capability	  approach	  (as	  it	  is	  generally	  labelled)	  has	  been	  extended	  as	  fit	  also	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  public	  health	  in	  affluent	  countries	  (among	  others	  see:	  Powers	  and	  Faden	  2006;	  Ruger	  2010).	  The	  core	  distinction	  in	  in	  the	  capability	  approach	  is	   the	   one	  between	   the	  means	   and	   the	   ends	   of	  well-­‐being.	  Only	   the	   latter	   are	  intrinsically	  valuable,	  whereas	  means	  are	  only	  instrumental	  to	  reach	  the	  goal	  of	  expanding	  well-­‐being.	  According	  to	   the	  capability	  approach,	  well-­‐being	  should	  be	   discussed	   in	   terms	   of	   people’s	   capabilities	   to	   function,	   that	   is,	   on	   their	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effective	   opportunities	   to	   undertake	   the	   actions	   and	   activities	   that	   they	   have	  reasons	   to	   engage	   in.	   These	   beings	   and	   doings,	   called	   achieved	   functionings,	  together	   constitute	   what	   gives	   value	   to	   life.	   Functionings	   include	   working,	  resting,	   being	   literate,	   being	   healthy,	   being	   part	   of	   a	   community,	   being	  respected,	   and	   so	   forth9.	   The	   distinction	   between	   achieved	   functionings	   and	  capabilities	  is	  between	  the	  realised	  and	  the	  effectively	  possible,	  in	  other	  words,	  between	   achievements	   and	   freedoms.	   What	   is	   ultimately	   important	   is	   that	  people	  have	   the	   capabilities	   (freedoms)	   to	   lead	   the	  kind	  of	   lives	   they	  want	   to	  lead,	  to	  do	  what	  they	  want	  to	  do	  and	  be	  the	  person	  they	  want	  to	  be.	  Once	  they	  effectively	  have	  these	  capabilities,	   they	  can	  choose	  to	  act	  on	  them	  in	   line	  with	  their	  own	  ideas	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  life	  they	  want	  to	  live.	  Whereas	  Rawlsian	  theories	  of	   justice	  provide	  us	  with	  distributive	  principles	  that	  are	  supposed	  to	  define	  a	  just	  social	  structure,	  and	  in	  this	  respect	  they	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  ideal	  theories,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Whether	   the	   capability	   approach	   requires	   a	   definite	   list	   of	   sets	   of	   capabilities	   and	  functionings	   is	   controversial	   (Robeyns	   2005).	   Nussbaum	   (2006,	   76–78)	   provides	   us	  with	  a	   list	  of	  what	  she	  calls	   ‘central	  human	  capabilities’	  and	  are:	  1.	  Life.	  Being	  able	  to	  live	  the	  end	  of	  a	  human	  life	  of	  normal	  length.	  2.	  Bodily	  Health.	  being	  able	  to	  have	  good	  health,	   including	   reproductive	   health;	   to	   be	   adequately	   nourished;	   to	   have	   adequate	  shelter.	   3.	   Bodily	   Integrity.	   Being	   able	   to	  be	   secure	   against	   violent	   assault,	   including	  sexual	   assault.	   4.	   Senses,	   Imagination	   and	   Thought.	   Being	   able	   to	   use	   the	   senses,	   to	  imagine,	   think	   and	   reason.	   Being	   able	   to	   use	   one’s	   mind	   in	   ways	   protected	   by	  guarantees	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  with	  respect	  to	  both	  political	  and	  artistic	  speech,	  and	  freedom	  of	  religious	  exercise.	  5.	  Emotions.	  Being	  able	  to	  have	  attachments	  to	  things	  and	  people	  outside	  ourselves.	  6.	  Practical	  Reason.	  Being	  able	   to	   form	  a	   conception	  of	  the	   good	   and	   to	   engage	   in	   critical	   reflection	   about	   the	   planning	   of	   one’s	   life.	   7.	  
Affiliation.	  Being	   able	   to	   live	  with	   and	   towards	   others,	   to	   engage	   in	   various	   forms	   of	  social	  interactions.	  8.	  Other	  Species.	  Being	  able	  to	  live	  with	  concern	  for	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  animals	  plants	  and	  the	  world	  of	  nature.	  9.	  Play.	  Being	  able	  to	  laugh,	  to	  play,	  to	  enjoy	  recreational	   activities.	   10.	   Control	   over	   One’s	   Environment.	   Being	   able	   to	   participate	  effectively	   in	   political	   choices	   that	   govern	   one’s	   life;	   having	   the	   right	   of	   political	  participation.	   Similarly,	   Powers	   and	   Faden	   (2006,	   16–29)	   provide	   a	   list	   of	   six	  capabilities	   or,	   as	   they	   call	   them,	   essential	   elements	   of	   well-­‐being,	   that	   are:	   Health,	  Personal	   Security,	   Reasoning,	   Respect,	   Attachment,	   Self-­‐determination.	   For	   the	  purposes	  of	   this	  work	   I	   am	  not	  providing,	  nor	   subscribing	   to,	   any	  of	   these	   lists.	   I	   am	  interested	   solely	   on	   the	   difference	   between	   functionings	   and	   capabilities	   and	  why	   a	  focus	  on	  the	  latter	  can	  enrich	  moral	  analysis	  more	  than	  an	  insistence	  on	  functionings	  or	  achieved	   outcomes	   alone.	   For	   a	   discussion	   as	   to	   whether	   the	   listed	   capabilities	   are	  essential	   human	   entitlements	   and	  whether	   they	   hold	   irrespectively	   of	   cross-­‐cultural	  variations	  see:	  (Nussbaum	  1997;	  Sen	  2004;	  Sen	  2005).	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second	  approach	  is	  intended	  to	  offer	  guidance	  in	  practical	  world	  problems	  and,	  in	  particular,	  on	  what	  inequalities	  matter	  most	  when	  ideal	  just	  institutions	  are	  not	   in	  place.	   In	   this	  respect,	  approaches	  of	   the	  second	  kind	  can	  be	  called	  non-­‐ideal	  theories.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Powers	  and	  Faden:	  
[Non-­‐ideal	   theories]	   view	   facts	   about	   inequality	   as	   essential	   context	  information,	  necessary	  to	  the	  task	  of	  understanding	  when	  inequalities	  of	  any	  sort	  merit	  heightened	  moral	   scrutiny.	   Real	   but	   socially	   contingent	   inequalities	   such	   as	   poverty,	  inequalities	   in	   power	   and	   social	   standing,	   and	   ethnic	   and	   gender	   discrimination	  therefore	  matter	   for	  our	  very	  different	   theoretical	   task.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  non-­‐ideal	   theory,	   only	   when	   such	   facts	   about	   concrete	   human	   condition	   figure	   into	   the	  analysis	   is	   the	   task	   of	   saying	  which	   inequalities	  matter	  most	   comprehensible.	   (2006,	  31)	  
The	  capability	  approach	  thus	  departs	  from	  those	  theories	  of	   justice	  like	  Rawls’,	  which	  seek	  the	  transcendental	  conditions	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  just	  society,	  and	  judge	  the	  justice	  of	  actual	  societies	  according	  to	  their	  distance	  from	  the	   theoretically	   developed	   idea.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   capability	   approach	   is	  realization-­‐focused	  rather	  than	  arrangement-­‐focused	  (A.	  Sen	  2009,	  5–19).	  The	  capability	   approach,	   moreover,	   should	   not	   be	   intended	   as	   a	   grand	   metrics	  telling	   us	   how	   a	   society	   should	   be	   organized	   and	   inequalities	   redressed,	   but	  rather	   as	   a	   focal	   variable	   for	   the	   assessment	   of	   individuals’	   disparities	   with	  regards	  to	  the	  capabilities	  they	  possess.	  In	  this	  account	  more	  importance	  has	  to	  be	  attached	  on	  questions	  like	  ‘how	  justice	  would	  be	  advanced	  in	  this	  particular	  situation?’,	   rather	   than	   on	   issues	   like	   ‘what	   would	   be	   perfectly	   just	  institutions?’.	   In	   this	   vein,	   the	   capability	   approach	   takes	   a	   comparative	   route	  and	  focuses	  on	  actual	  realizations	  in	  the	  societies	  involved,	  and	  the	  actual	  lives	  people	  can	  effectively	  lead.	  In	  this	  respect	  Sen	  claims:	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The	  importance	  of	  human	  lives,	  experiences	  and	  realizations	  cannot	  be	  supplanted	  by	  information	   about	   institutions	   that	   exist	   and	   the	   rules	   that	   operate.	   Institutions	   and	  rules	  are,	  of	  course,	  very	  important	  in	  influencing	  what	  happens,	  and	  they	  are	  part	  and	  parcel	   of	   the	   actual	   world	   as	   well,	   but	   the	   realized	   actuality	   goes	   well	   beyond	   the	  organizational	  picture,	  and	  includes	  the	  lives	  that	  people	  manage	  –	  or	  do	  not	  manage	  –	  to	  live.	  (A.	  Sen	  2009,	  9)	  
In	   this	   sense,	   the	   capability	   approach	   is	   a	   ductile	   tool	   for	   the	   evaluation	   of	  public	  health	  performances,	  and	  in	  this	  way	  I	  will	  use	  it.	  The	  specific	  questions	  of	  justice	  that	  I	  will	  ask	  will	  thus	  change	  slightly,	  but	  I	  argue	  importantly,	  from	  those	  usually	  pursued	  within	   the	  beneficence	  model.	  The	  capability	  approach,	  hence,	   should	   not	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   comprehensive	   theory	   of	   social	   justice,	  but	   rather	   as	   a	   tool	   for:	   a)	   assessing	   individual	   well-­‐being;	   and	   b)	   the	  comparison	  of	  social	  arrangements	  and	  social	  policies.	  The	  particular	  advantage	  of	   such	   an	   account	   stems	   from	   its	   being	   inspirational	   rather	   than	   strictly	  prescriptive.	  As	  Sen	   (2009,	  232)	  has	   recently	  noted:	   “The	  capability	  approach	  points	   to	   an	   informational	   focus	   in	   judging	   and	   comparing	   overall	   individual	  advantages,	  and	  does	  not,	  on	  its	  own,	  propose	  any	  specific	  formula	  about	  how	  that	  information	  may	  be	  used.	  Indeed,	  different	  uses	  may	  emerge	  depending	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  questions	  that	  are	  being	  addressed”.	  	  In	  the	  course	  of	  the	  last	  chapter	  of	  this	  work,	  I	  will	  use	  this	  tool	  to	  enlarge	  the	  scope	  of	  previously	  made	  analysis.	  
3.3	  Public	  health,	  capabilities	  and	  well-­‐being.	  What	  matters	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	  work	   is	   that,	   once	   the	   capability	  language	  enters	  the	  stage	  of	  ethical	  analysis,	  problems	  of	  distributive	  justice	  can	  be	   framed	  in	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  way	  than	  the	  beneficence	  model	  permits.	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  latter	  a	  standard	  problem	  of	  distributive	  justice	  would	  amount	  to	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the	   fair	  distribution	  of	  public	  health	   resources	   irrespective	  of	  morally	  neutral	  categories	   like	   income,	   race	   ethnicity,	   or	   sexual	   preferences.	   When	  supplemented	   with	   the	   tools	   of	   the	   Rawlsian	   approach,	   moreover,	   the	  beneficence	   model	   can	   also	   provide	   criteria	   for	   just	   distribution	   (i.e.	   the	  difference	   principle)	   of	   medical	   resources.	   The	   capability	   approach	   easily	  accommodates	   those	   concerns,	   but	   licences	  more	   than	   that.	   Remarkably,	   it	   is	  also	   able	   to	   indicate	   how	  differently	   situated	   individuals	   can	   actually	   convert	  resources	   into	   functionings	   (medical	   resources	   into	  health	   functionings	   in	   the	  case	   of	   this	   work)	   they	   have	   reason	   to	   value.	   If	   the	   focal	   variable	   for	   public	  health	   policy	   evaluation	   is,	   as	   I	   maintain	   it	   should	   be,	   capabilities	   to	   health	  rather	  than	  distribution	  of	  public	  health	  goods	  only,	  then	  we	  are	  well	  positioned	  for	   a	  more	   fine-­‐grained	   ethical	   analysis	   also	   along	   the	   lines	   developed	   in	   the	  previous	  sections.	   In	  other	  words,	  adopting	  the	  perspective,	  and	  the	   language,	  of	   the	   capability	   approach	   allows	   us	   to	   understand	   differently	   what	   are	   the	  reciprocal	   obligations	   among	   the	   entities	   of	   the	   triad	   (state,	   individuals,	  communities)	   discussed	   above.	   Accordingly,	   the	   government’s	   duty	   towards	  citizens	   does	   not	   consist	   in	   reducing,	   and	   preventing	   harm	   as	   such	   (although	  sometimes,	  depending	  on	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  situation	  at	  hand,	  this	  may	  be	  the	  thing	  the	  government	  has	  to	  do),	  but	  rather	  to	  provide	  enabling	  conditions	  for	  citizens,	   in	   their	   different	   economic	   and	   social	   circumstances,	   to	   achieve	  valuable	   health	   functionings	   if	   they	   so	   wish.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   capability	  approach	   enlarges	   the	   scope	   of	   how	   freedom	   should	   be	   understood	   –	   i.e.	  freedom	  to	  achieve	  valuable	  functionings	  and	  individual	  well	  being	  versus	  mere	  freedom	  from	  interference	  –	  and,	  consequently,	  of	  what	  social	  justice	  implies	  –	  i.e.	  ensuring	  that	  individuals	  can	  achieve	  effective	  freedom	  so	  defined.	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Clearly,	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   capability	   perspective	   does	   not,	   by	   itself,	  dissolve	  all	   the	  ethical	  problems	  as	   they	  arise	   from	   the	  beneficence	  model.	   In	  some	  contexts	  the	  clash	  between	  individual	  liberties	  and	  population	  outcomes	  will	  be	  inevitable	  as,	  for	  instance,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  dangerous	  epidemic	  outbreaks.	  In	  those	  contexts,	  hence,	  ethically	  problematic	  decisions	  have	  to	  be	  taken	  as	  to	  which	   of	   the	   two	   has	   to	   be	   privileged.	   Accordingly,	   the	   limiting	   conditions	   of	  public	   health	   activities	   as	   devised	   by	   the	   beneficence	   model	   would,	   by	   and	  large,	  be	  the	  right	  tools	  for	  deciding	  appropriately	  in	  those	  circumstances.	  The	  capability	   approach	   therefore	   has	   not	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   completely	   replacing	   all	  other	  kinds	  of	  ethical	  analysis,	  nor	   it	  necessarily	  pushes	  to	  the	  background	  all	  the	   ethically	   problematic	   issues	   as	   they	   arise	   from	   the	   latter.	   Quite	   on	   the	  contrary,	   the	   capability	   approach	   serves	   to	   enlarge	   the	   scope	   of	   ethically	  sensitive	  issues	  in	  public	  health	  and	  to	  supplement	  them	  with	  a	  further	  layer	  of	  analysis.	  	  
Extending	  the	  focal	  variable	  of	  policy	  evaluation	  from	  the	  distribution	  of	  health	   resources	   to	   health	   capabilities,	   moreover,	   allows	   us	   to	   assess	   public	  health	   interventions	   also	   against	   the	   broader	   effects	   they	   may	   have	   on	  dimensions	   of	   human	   well-­‐being	   other	   than	   health.	   An	   example	   drawn	   from	  Faden	  and	  Powers	  (2006,	  17)	  is	  illuminating	  in	  this	  respect.	  They	  observe	  how	  policies	  against	  female	  genital	  mutilations	  certainly	  rest	  on	  concerns	  for	  health.	  These	  policies,	   however,	   have	   also	   impacts	   on	   considerations	   for	   the	  physical	  and	   psychological	   inviolability	   comprised	   by	   the	   dimensions	   of	   personal	  security	  and	  self-­‐determination.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  moral	  foundation	  in	  justice	  for	  these	  interventions	  does	  not	  rest	  solely	  on	  one	  dimension	  of	  well-­‐being,	  namely	  health.	   It	   rather	  draws	  upon	  three	  dimensions,	  each	  of	  which	  being	  a	  genuine	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source	   for	  moral	  concern.	  The	  moral	   foundation	  of	  public	  health	  policies	  does	  not	  depend	  solely	  on	  how	  medical	  services	  are	  distributed,	  or	  ethical	  evaluation	  need	   to	   be	   confined	   on	   how	   policies	   affect	   health	   as	   one	   dimension	   of	   well-­‐being.	   It	   also	   depends,	   and	   thus	  would	   be	   the	   approach	   I	  will	   endorse	   in	   the	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  study,	  on	  how	  the	  policy	  impacts	  on	  the	  other	  dimensions	  of	  well-­‐being.	  	  
For	  these	  reasons	  mentioned,	   I	  would	   like	  to	  conclude	  this	  chapter	  by	  making	  explicit	  how	  I	  will	  evaluate	  the	  policies	  of	  my	  case	  study	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  justice.	   The	   next	   two	   sections	   are	   hence	   dedicated	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   these	  points.	  
4.	  Conclusion:	  the	  negative	  aim	  of	  justice	  
The	  issues	  above	  presented,	  especially	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  role	  played	  by	   the	   social	   determinants	   of	   health,	   indicate	   how	   problematic	   it	   is	   to	   assess	  public	   health	   policies	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   justice.	   More	   specifically	   it	   is	  important	  to	  clarify	  whether	  it	  is	  more	  appropriate	  to	  address	  these	  issues	  from	  a	  narrow	  or	   a	   broad	  perspective.	   If	   one	   follows	   the	  narrow	  perspective	   –	   the	  one	   adopted	   in	   the	   beneficence	   model	   –	   the	   advantage	   for	   ethical	   analysis	  would	  be	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  practical	  manageability.	  Given	  a	  public	  health	  initiative,	  for	   instance,	   the	   role	   of	   applied	   ethics	   would	   be	   to	   scrutinize	   whether	   the	  intervention	   is	   distributed	   so	   to	   include	   all	   the	   people	   who	   may	   need	   it	  irrespective	   of	   morally	   neutral	   categories	   like	   gender,	   ethnicity,	   and	  socioeconomic	   status.	   In	   the	   narrow	   perspective	   the	   only	   legitimate	   goal	   of	  public	   health	   is	   the	   provision	   of	   public	   goods	   as	   defined	   in	   the	   previous	  chapters.	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  If	   one	   adopts	   the	   broad	   perspective	   –	   along	   the	   lines	   suggested	   by	  Daniels	   and	   Sen	   -­‐	   a	   whole	   new	   set	   of	   state	   interventions	   would	   open	   up	   to	  ethical	   analysis.	   The	   advantage	   for	   this	   kind	   of	   analysis	  would	   be	   in	   terms	   of	  breadth.	   Incorporating	   the	   problem	   of	   health	   inequalities,	   and	   their	  multifaceted	   determinants,	   would,	   at	   least	   in	   principle,	   allow	   the	   analyst	   to	  understand	   what	   are	   the	   socioeconomic	   circumstances	   that	   negatively	   affect	  health.	   Consequently,	   this	   realization	   would	   provide	   the	   space	   to	   call	   for	  intervention	   also	   on	   those	   contexts	   rather	   than	   on	   medical	   provision	   alone.	  What	  this	  kind	  of	  analysis	  would	  earn	  in	  breadth,	  however,	  it	  may	  lose	  in	  terms	  of	   focus.	  This	   loss	  may	  result	  both	  practically	  and	  conceptually	  problematic.	   It	  would	  be	  so	  practically,	  in	  that	  it	  would	  potentially	  transform	  every	  policy	  in	  a	  health	  policy	  and,	  consequently,	  every	  problem	  of	  justice	  in	  society	  in	  a	  problem	  of	   health	   justice.	   This	   conflation,	   if	   occurred,	   would	   probably	   obscure	   the	  reason	  why	  some	  injustices	  in	  certain	  contexts	  are	  so	  irrespective	  of	  the	  health	  outcomes	  they	  may	  give	  rise	  to.	  Perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  this	  can	  also	  result	  in	   an	   undue	   expansion	   of	   the	   goals	   of	   public	   health.	   As	   Gostin	   argues:	   ‘Just	  because	  war,	  crime	  poverty,	   illiteracy,	  homelessness	  and	  human	  rights	  abuses	  interfere	   with	   the	   health	   of	   individuals	   and	   populations	   does	   not	   mean	   that	  eliminating	   these	   conditions	   is	   part	   of	   the	   mission	   of	   public	   health”	   (Gostin	  2001,	  72).	  The	  loss	  of	   focus	  proves	  conceptually	  problematic	  too.	  Some	  would	  maintain,	  along	  Walzerian	  lines,	   that	  this	  perspective	   is	   faulty	   in	  that	  different	  social	  goods	  (income,	  wealth,	  work,	  health)	  have	  different	  social	  meanings	  and	  so	  they	  are	  better	  divided	  up	  into	  different	  ‘spheres	  of	  justice’,	  each	  with	  its	  own	  distributive	   principles	   (Walzer	   1983).	   In	   this	   view	   inequalities	   in	   different	  spheres	  are	  acceptable	  as	  long	  as	  there	  is	  not	  one	  sphere	  dominating	  over	  the	  others.	   In	   this	   respect,	   since	   the	   social	   determinants	   of	   health	   literature	   has	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been	  able	  to	  show	  only	  correlations,	  and	  not	  causation,	  between	  socioeconomic	  status	  and	  health	  outcomes,	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  draw	  far	  reaching	  ethical	  and	  political	  consequences	  from	  it.	  	  	  
Both	  intuitions	  have	  their	  own	  merits.	  This	  work,	  however,	  does	  not	  try	  to	   adjudicate	   between	   them.	   This	   does	   not	   mean,	   however,	   that	   it	   floats	  between	   the	   two.	  This	   is	   so	   for	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   thesis.	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   the	  ethical	   analysis	   of	   a	   specific	   public	   health	   initiative	   –	   namely	   Human	  Papillomavirus	   vaccination	   programmes	   –	   and	   not	   in	   providing	   a	   complete	  theory	   of	   social	   justice,	   or	   a	   foundational	   of	   empirical	   work	   about	   the	   social	  determinants	  of	  health.	  My	  analysis	  is	  thus	  both	  narrow	  and	  broad.	  It	  is	  narrow	  in	   that	   I	   analyse	   the	   ethical	   implications	   of	   a	   set	   of	   policies	   as	   recently	  instantiated	   in	  several	  countries	  worldwide.	   In	   this	  sense,	   I	  am	  not	  concerned	  with	  establishing	  whether	  health	  inequalities	  are	  primarily	  socially	  determined	  or	  not.	  Although	  I	  think	  the	  literature	  cited	  has	  certainly	  shown	  evidence	  as	  to	  this	  correlation,	   I	  also	  agree,	  along	   the	   lines	  of	   the	  above	  quotation	  by	  Gostin,	  that	  the	  specific	  role	  of	  public	  health	  policy	  makers	  is	  not	  to	  devise	  policies	  in	  areas	  that	  go	  beyond	  their	  professional	  competences.	  This	  claim,	  however,	  need	  not	   to	   be	   confounded	  with	   another	   one,	  which	   seems	   to	   be	   implied	   by	   some	  supporters	  of	  the	  beneficence	  model.	  Anomaly	  (2011),	  for	  instance,	  argues	  that	  public	  health	  should	  only	  aim	  at	  the	  provision	  of	  health-­‐related	  public	  goods.	  All	  other	   health-­‐related	   issues	   such	   income,	   housing,	   and	   illiteracy,	   so	   the	  argument	  goes,	  pertain	  to	  ‘tangentially	  related	  endeavours,	  such	  as	  social	  work,	  charity,	  and	  human	  rights	  campaigns’	  (ibid.,	  1).	   If	   this	  claim	  is	  understandable	  as	   to	   the	   goal	   that	   should	   inform	   professional	   practice	   for	   public	   health	  workers,	   it	   is	   certainly	   not	   extendable	   to	   public	   health	   ethicists.	   Indeed,	   if	   an	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argument	   is	   provided	   as	   to	   the	   special	   moral	   importance	   of	   the	   health	   of	  individuals	  within	  particularly	  disadvantaged	  populations	  or	   social	   groups	  or,	  alternatively,	   if	   the	   idea	   of	   population	   health	   is	   taken	   to	   have	   specific	   moral	  significance,	   then	  attention	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  many	  health	  outcomes	  are	  socially	  determined	  becomes	   a	   legitimate	   source	   of	  morally	   relevant	   information	   also	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  moral	  and	  political	  philosophy.	  In	  this	  vein,	  although	  it	  is	   acceptable	   to	   say	   that	   public	   health	   policies	   should	   be	   restricted	   to	   the	  provision	   of	   medical	   goods	   –	   and	   not	   advocate	   for	   broader	   redistribution	   of	  income	   -­‐	   it	   is	   not	   likewise	   acceptable	   to	   conclude	   that	   moral	   and	   political	  analysis	  should	  be	  blind	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  multidimensional	  sources	  of	  health	  determinants	  and	  how	  they	  impact	  on	  what	  individuals	  can	  do	  and	  be	  with	  the	  goods	  they	  are	  formally	  provided	  with.	  	  
Despite	   disagreement	   as	   to	   how	   intervening	   on	   health	   inequalities	   -­‐	  whether	   intervention	   on	   the	   social	   determinants	   themselves	   is	   desirable	   –	   a	  point	  of	  agreement	  could	  be	  found	  in	  the	  specification	  of,	  at	  least,	  a	  negative	  aim	  of	   justice	   for	   public	   health.	   The	   negative	   aim	   of	   justice	   requires	   that	   public	  health	  policy	  give	  special	  moral	  importance	  to	  those	  health	  inequalities	  that	  are	  attached	   to	   existing	   patterns	   of	   systematic	   disadvantage	   across	   several	  dimensions	   of	   well-­‐being	   and	   individuals’	   different	   socioeconomic	   status.	  Powers	   and	   Faden	   argue	   (Powers	   and	   Faden	   2006,	   87-­‐95)	   that	   health	  inequalities	   that	   overlap	   with	   other	   dimensions	   of	   disadvantage	   in	   different	  spheres	   are	   among	   the	   most	   invidious.	   Accordingly,	   public	   health	   policies	  should,	  at	  least,	  be	  devised	  as	  to	  prevent	  the	  worsening	  of	  the	  inequalities	  that	  present	  those	  connections.	  Of	  particular	  moral	  urgency,	  for	  instance,	  are	  those	  health	   inequalities	   that	   identify	   differences	   between	   socially	   dominant	   and	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socially	  disadvantaged	  groups.	  They	  cite	  classical	  example	  of	  group	  domination	  in	  its	  various	  forms	  of	  race,	  gender	  or	  sexual	  orientation	  discrimination.	  These	  kinds	  of	  disadvantage	  often	  compound	  with	  one	  another,	  giving	  rise	  to	  clusters	  of	  disadvantage	  with	  negative	  effects	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  dimensions	  of	  well-­‐being.	  For	   instance,	   it	   is	   not	   only	   true,	   as	   observed	   by	   the	   literature	   on	   the	   social	  determinants	   of	   health,	   that	   disadvantage	   in	   socioeconomic	   status	   correlates	  with	  disadvantage	  on	  health	  status.	  It	  is	  also	  true	  that	  a	  diminished	  capacity	  of	  avoiding	  premature	  mortality	  or	  invalidating	  morbidity	  may	  in	  turn	  have	  effects	  on	   the	  socioeconomic	  status,	   in	   terms	  of	   less	  opportunities	   to	  access	   jobs	  and	  offices	   that	   are	   relevant	  within	   a	   society.	  Moreover,	   disadvantage	   in	   terms	   of	  socioeconomic	   status	   can	   have	   effects	   on	   the	   extent	   of	   effective	   political	  participation	   of	   people	   so	   situated.	   Policies	   taking	   into	   account	   these	   aspects,	  then,	  would	  not	  only	  have	  beneficial	  effects	  on	  health,	  they	  also	  have	  a	  positive	  role	  in	  that	  they	  are	  public	  manifestation	  of	  respect	  of	  the	  needs	  of	  everyone,	  no	  matter	   their	   social	   position.	   Public	   policies	   that	   seriously	   take	   into	   account	  those	  issues	  are	  public	  manifestation	  of	  the	  value	  of	  each	  and	  every	  individual,	  and	   would	   have,	   besides	   favourable	   health	   outcomes,	   also	   positive	   effects	   in	  terms	  of	  enhanced	  public	  trust	  and	  social	  cohesion.	  	  
If	   we	   take	   the	   negative	   aim	   of	   justice	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   overlapping	  consensus	   among	   people	   holding	   different	   comprehensive	   views	   about	   what	  social	  justice	  would	  require	  in	  general	  terms,	  then	  how	  policies	  serve	  this	  scope	  becomes	   an	   important	   aspects	   under	   which	   public	   health	   policies	   can	   be	  ethically	  evaluated.	  Clearly	  public	  health	  policies	  can	   fulfil	   the	  negative	  aim	  of	  justice	   in	   different	   ways.	   For	   instance,	   by	   devising	   specific	   actions	   as	   to	  effectively	  reach	  all	  the	  strata	  of	  the	  population.	  For	  example,	  one	  can	  think	  at	  
	   74	  
community	   based	   interventions,	   like	   educational	   and	   promotional	   campaigns,	  in	  those	  areas	  where	  is	  most	  needed.	  A	  vast	  number	  of	  these	  policies	  currently	  exist,	  and	  they	  are	  certainly	  admirable.	  I	  would	  rather	  argue	  that	  a	  further	  way	  for	   understanding	   justice	   in	   public	   health	   policies	   requires	   also	   a	   prior	  understanding,	  and	  possibly	  a	  clarification,	  of	  what	  goods	  public	  health	  policies	  should	  distribute.	   I	  will	  provide	  an	  answer	  to	  this	   latter	  point	   in	  the	  course	  of	  the	   last	  chapter	  of	   this	  work,	  where	   I	  will	   show	  what	   the	  HPV	  policies	  should	  attempt	   to	  maximize	   and	   equally	   distribute	   capabilities	   to	   health	   rather	   than	  vaccines	  only.	  
5.	  Concluding	  remarks	  on	  thesis	  part	  1	  
The	   critical	   analysis	   of	   the	   arguments	   presented	   in	   this	   chapter	   and	   the	  previous	  one	  serve	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  clarifying	  the	  theoretical	  means	  I	  will	  use	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  study.	  Problems	  of	  distributive	  and	  social	  justice	  hence	  are	  not	  conceived,	  in	  this	  work,	  as	  solely	  dependent	  on	  institutional	  arrangements	  and	  how	  the	   latter	  are	  able	   to	  allocate	  medical	  goods	  proficiently.	  Nor,	   I	  have	  argued,	   the	   right	   focal	   variable	   for	   policy	   assessment	   can	   be	   functionings,	   or	  achieved	  outcomes,	   alone.	  The	  problem	   is	   certainly	   vast,	   and	   this	  work	   is	  not	  aimed	   at	   covering	   it	   in	   its	   full	   complexity.	   I	   will	   thus	   confine	   myself	   on	   the	  assessment	  of	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  various	  HPV	  vaccination	  policies	  and	  what	  are	  the	   criteria	   that	   may	   led	   us	   to	   prefer	   one	   over	   the	   others.	   In	   this	   evaluative	  exercise	   I	   make	   use	   of	   the	   ethically	   problematic	   issues	   highlighted	   in	   the	  previous	  sections.	  In	  this	  respect,	  how	  the	  different	  policies	  impact	  on	  people’s	  liberties,	  whether	   the	   collective	   goods	   they	   are	   pursuing	   (public	   or	   common)	  are	  proportional	  with	  the	  goals	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  achieve,	  and	  whether	  they	  provide	   sufficient	   space	   for	   the	   exercise	   of	   civic	   membership	   by	   the	   people	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affected	   by	   the	   interventions,	   are	   all	   questions	   relevant	   for	   the	   purpose.	   Also	  relevant	  for	  my	  purposes,	  however,	  is	  to	  investigate	  whether	  the	  policies	  I	  will	  analyse	   are	   contributing	   to	   fulfil	   the	   negative	   aim	  of	   justice	   or,	   instead,	   if	   the	  way	   they	   are	   implemented	   may	   contribute	   to	   the	   worsening	   of	   existing	  inequalities.	  In	  assessing	  the	  performance	  of	  those	  initiatives	  in	  terms	  of	  justice	  I	  am	  not	  confined	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  justice	  is	  served	  by	  a	  fair	  distribution	  of	  the	  intervention	   itself	   (i.e.	   if	   it	   is	   formally	   available	   to	   all	   who	   need	   it).	   I	   would	  rather	  argue	  that	   looking	  upstream	  to	  overall	  health	   inequalities,	  and	  to	  those	  specific	   to	   the	   context,	   would	   prove	   useful	   for	   a	   better	   appreciation	   of	   the	  demands	   of	   justice.	  More	   precisely,	   I	   assess	   public	   health	   policy	   performance	  also	  from	  a	  broad	  perspective	  in	  which	  what	  counts	  as	  ethically	  relevant	  is	  not	  only	  what	  resources	  are	  formally	  provided	  to	  people,	  but	  also	  what	  people	  can	  do	   with	   that	   resources.	   	   For	   instance,	   whether	   they	   are	   able,	   given	   specific	  circumstances,	   to	   convert	   those	   resources	   that	   are	   formally	   available	   to	   them	  into	   valuable	   health	   outcomes.	  All	   these	   questions	   -­‐	   and	  here	   is	  where	   issues	  about	   health	   inequalities	   become	   pertinent	   -­‐	   become	   visible	   only	   when	  knowledge	   about	   the	   diverse	   social	   positions	   (and	   possible	   patterns	   of	  systematic	  disadvantage)	  different	  individuals	  find	  themselves	  into	  is	  taken	  into	  account.	   In	   this	   respect	   the	   introduction	   on	   the	   capability	   approach	   has	  provided	  the	  conceptual	  tools	  to	  assess	  how	  individuals’	  level	  of	  advantage	  and	  well-­‐being	  can	  be	  understood.	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Part	  2:	  Case	  Study	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Chapter	  three.	  Cervical	  Cancer	  prevention	  
and	  its	  ethical	  dimensions.	  The	  Human	  
Papillomavirus	  (HPV)	  vaccination	  case	   	  
1.	  Introduction	  	  In	   the	   introduction	   to	   this	   work	   I	   have	   shown	   how	   the	   problem	   of	   cancer	  control	   depends	   on	   several	   factors	   that	   I	   have	   briefly	   illustrated	   in	   their	  complexity.	  I	  have	  shown	  how	  the	  quest	  for	  new	  cures	  and	  treatments	  is	  beset	  with	   promises	   and	   problems,	   and	   how	   preventive	   actions	   are	   currently	  recognized	  to	  be	  an	  appropriate	  complement	  for	  reducing	  the	  incidence	  of	  the	  disease.	   Moreover,	   I	   have	   indicated	   HPV	   vaccines	   among	   those	   biomedical	  innovations	   with	   a	   huge	   potential	   for	   cancer	   preventive	   practice.	   In	   the	  previous	   two	  chapters,	  moreover,	   I	  have	  provided	   the	   theoretical	  background	  and	   relative	   terminology	   that	  will	   prove	   useful	   for	   the	   remaining	   part	   of	   this	  work	   that	  will	   be	  dedicated	   to	   the	   close	   ethical	   scrutiny	  of	  HPV	  public	   health	  policies.	  	  The	   present	   chapter	   is	   divided	   in	   two	   parts.	   In	   the	   first	   part	   I	  will	   provide	   a	  picture	  of	  the	  biological	  and	  medical	  features	  characterizing	  HPV	  infections,	  and	  how	  immunization	  can	  contribute	  at	  reducing	  the	  burden	  of	  cervical	  cancer	  and	  other	  HPV	  related	  morbidities.	  The	   first	  part	  of	   the	  present	   chapter	   therefore	  provides	  the	  necessary	  empirical	  background	  for	  the	  ethical	  analysis	  that	  would	  be	  developed	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  this	  work.	  
	  In	   the	   second	   part,	   instead,	   I	   will	   embed	   HPV	   vaccination	   into	   the	   broader	  context	  of	  vaccination	  and	  show	  how	  HPV	  reshapes	  some	  of	  the	  ‘old’	  problems	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that	  mass	  immunization	  campaigns	  have	  encountered.	  From	  the	  illustration	  of	  the	   public	   debate	   that	   has	   accompanied	   HPV	   introduction	   in	   several	   public	  health	   systems	   I	   will	   let	   emerge	   competing	   values	   or,	   as	   I	   call	   them,	  morally	  grounded	   interests	   that	   call	   for	   normative	   resolution.	   I	   will	   conclude	   the	  chapter	  by	  showing	  how	  some	  of	  them	  are	  of	  particular	  relevance	  for	  informing	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  following	  chapters.	  	  
Before	  proceeding	  to	  the	  ethical	  analysis,	  however,	  we	  need	  more	  acquaintance	  with	   the	   biological	   and	   epidemiological	   features	   of	   the	   virus	   itself	   as	   well	   as	  with	  the	  disease	  burden	  it	  brings	  about.	  To	  this	  point	  I	  now	  turn.	  	  
Part	  1.	  Immune	  from	  cervical	  cancer:	  the	  promises	  of	  
HPV	  vaccination	   	  
	  
2.	  The	  etiology	  of	  cervical	  cancer	  in	  historical	  perspective	  	  In	  2008	   the	  Nobel	  Prize	   in	  Physiology	  or	  Medicine	  was	  awarded	   to	  Françoise	  Barré-­‐Sinoussi	  and	  Luc	  Montagnier.	  Barré-­‐Sinoussi	  and	  Montaigner’s	  work	  was	  fundamental	  in	  the	  identification,	  in	  1984,	  of	  a	  virus	  that	  undoubtedly	  resonates	  terrific	  to	  the	  general	  public:	  the	  human	  immunodeficiency	  virus	  (HIV).	  HIV	  and	  its	  link	  with	  AIDS	  hardly	  need	  introduction,	  nor	  will	  I	  dare	  reconstructing	  how	  its	   discovery	   mobilized	   the	   scientific	   community,	   public	   opinion,	   health	  activists,	  and	  public	  health	  practitioner	  in	  the	  1980’s	  (for	  such	  a	  description	  see,	  among	   others:	  Mann	   and	   Tarantola	   1996;	   Epstein	   1998).	   That	   day,	   however,	  HIV	   and	   its	   discoverers	   had	   to	   share	   the	   stage	   of	   the	   Karolinska	   Institute	   in	  Stockholm	  with	  another,	   less	  known,	  virus	  and	  another	  brilliant	   scientist.	  The	  Nobel	   Foundation,	   indeed,	   decided	   to	   award	   the	   prize	   also	   to	   Harald	   zur	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Hausen,	  from	  the	  German	  Cancer	  Research	  Centre	  in	  Heidelberg	  (Germany),	  for	  having	   established	   the	   causal	   link	   between	   HPV	   and	   cervical	   cancer.	   As	   the	  statement	   explaining	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	   award	   says:	   “Dr.	   zur	   Hausen	   went	  against	  current	  dogma	  by	  postulating	  that	  the	  virus	  caused	  cervical	  cancer”10.	  	  
The	   history	   of	   HPV	   is	   one	   of	   long,	   labour-­‐staking	   scientific	   efforts	   followed	   -­‐	  after	  much	   of	   its	   biology	  was	   elucidated,	   the	   sexual	   route	   of	   its	   transmission	  clarified,	   and	   its	   link	   to	   cervical	   cancer	   established	   -­‐	   by	   a	   fuss	   of	   emotional	  responses	   at	   the	   political	   level	   after	   prophylactic	   means	   for	   its	   control	   were	  introduced	  in	  various	  public	  health	  systems.	  Before	  entering	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	   ethical	   and	  political	   dimension	  of	  HPV	  vaccination	   campaigns,	   however,	   a	  glimpse	  into	  the	  earlier	  understandings	  of	  cervical	  cancer	  causality	  is	  worth.	  	  
Although	   cervical	   cancer	   has	   been	   described	   since	   ancient	   times,	   the	   first	  systematic	   study	   of	   its	   causal	   roots	   is	   due	   to	   an	   Italian	   surgeon,	   Domenico	  Antonio	  Rigoni-­‐Stern,	  who	   in	   1842	   published	   a	   study	   “Fatti	   stastistici	   relativi	  alle	   malattie	   cancerose”11	  where	   some	   interesting	   epidemiological	   notions	   of	  cervical	   cancer	   were	   described	   (Rigoni-­‐Stern	   1842).	   Rigoni-­‐Stern	   was	   a	  provincial	   surgeon	   of	   the	   city	   of	   Padua	   and,	   in	   his	   review	   of	   the	   mortality	  records	  from	  the	  town	  of	  Verona	  between	  1760	  and	  1839,	  noticed	  that	  higher	  deaths	  of	  this	  cancer	  occurred	  among	  old	  married	  women	  and	  relatively	  young	  prostitutes,	   while	   the	   disease	   was	   practically	   absent	   in	   nuns.	   As	   noticed	   by	  some	  scholars,	  at	  those	  times	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  sexually	  transmitted	  agent	  was	  still	  not	   elaborated.	   Etiologic	   theories	   were,	   instead,	   concentrating	   more	   on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  The	  info	  reported	  can	  be	  found	  at:	  http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/2008/press.html	  (Last	  access:	  16th	  November,	  2011)	  11	  The	  English	  translation	  of	  Rigoni-­‐Stern’s	  work	  reads:	  “Statistical	  facts	  about	  cancer”,	  and	  can	  be	  found	  in:	  (Scotto	  and	  Bailar	  1969).	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moralizing	   notions	   about	   the	   women’s	   body	   and	   their	   aberrant	   behaviours.	  Although	  cellular	  theories	  replaced	  such	  moralizing	  discourse	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	   century	   (see	   Nolte	   2008;	   moreover,	   see	   Braun	   and	   Phoun	   2010	   for	  sociological	   implications	   of	   those	   theories),	   it	   was	   not	   until	   the	   1970s	   that	  etiological	  theories	  became	  more	  specific.	  In	  those	  years	  several	  causative	  agent	  were	   postulated	   as	   initiators	   of	   cervical	   cancers.	   Among	   them	   were	   cited:	  infectious	   and	   non-­‐infectious	   transmissible	   agents,	   such	   a	   syphilis,	   smegma	  from	  uncircumcised	  males,	  spermatozoa	  (Jeffcoate	  1975),	  and	  later	  the	  herpes	  simplex	  type	  2	  virus	  (HSV2)	  (Frenkel	  et	  al.	  1972;	  Kessler	  1981).	  The	  connection	  between	   cervical	   cancer	   and	   a	   sexually	   transmitted	   virus	  was	   reported	   in	   an	  influential	   review	   by	   Rotkin	   (1973).	   He	   observed	   that:	   “	   the	   act	   of	   coitus	  effectively	   launched	  risk,	  and	  an	  agent	  of	  some	  kind	  was	  passed	   from	  male	   to	  female	   during	   this	   time	   of	   life	   when	   cervical	   epithelium	   was	   most	   readily	  available	  for	  transformation.	  There	  were	  and	  are	  a	  number	  of	  candidate	  agents.	  […]	   The	   speculation	   now	   is	   that	   one	   of	   these	   carcinogenic	   influences	  may	   be	  herpesvirus	  type	  2”	  (ibid.	  1354-­‐55).	  
In	  1976,	  however,	  zur	  Hausen	  published	  a	  short	  note	  in	  Cancer	  Review	  in	  which	  he	   challenged	   the	   received	   view	   and	   proposed	   a	   role	   for	   what	   he	   called	   the	  “condyloma	  agent”	  (zur	  Hausen	  1976).	  Zur	  Hausen	  observed	  that	  genital	  warts,	  or	  condylomata	  acuminata	  in	  medical	  parlance,	  contained	  papillomaviruses	  and	  had	   the	   same	   epidemiological	   profile	   of	   several	   anogenital	   cancers,	   most	  notably	   cervical	   cancers.	   Given	   the	   high	   presence	   of	   genital	  warts	   in	  what	   he	  calls	  “populations	  of	  high	  sexual	  promiscuity”	  (ibid.	  794),	  he	  suggested	  that	  the	  virus	  could	  be	  sexually	  transmitted	  and	  turn	  malignant	  in	  some	  occasions.	  We	  now	  know	  that	  zur	  Hausen	  did	  not	  get	  the	  details	  quite	  right	  at	  the	  time,	  since	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the	  HPV	  causing	  genital	  warts	  are	  of	  a	  different	  type	  than	  that	  causing	  cervical	  cancer.	   Nevertheless,	   this	   intervention	   shifted	   causal	   thinking	   about	   cervical	  cancer	  from	  HSV2	  to	  HPV,	  an	  entirely	  different	  family	  of	  viruses.	  	  
In	  subsequent	  years	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  by	  the	  group	  of	  zur	  Hausen	  followed.	  In	   1983,	   the	   use	   of	   molecular	   hybridization	   techniques	   proved	   the	   most	  definitive	   in	   identifying	   specific	   HPV	   types	   in	   cervical	   cancer	   biopsies	   thus	  strongly	   supporting	   causal	   relation.	   The	   etiologic	   link	   remained,	   nonetheless,	  controversial	   until	   1986	   when	   the	   publication	   of	   Viral	   Etiology	   of	   Cervical	  
Cancer	  closed	  the	  debate	  about	  etiology	  and	  signalled	  scientific	  consensus	  (Peto	  and	  zur	  Hausen	  1986).	  After	  some	  years,	  also	  the	  epidemiological	  validity	  of	  the	  link	   between	   HPV	   and	   cervical	   cancers	   was	   demonstrated:	   in	   1995	   the	   IARC	  declared	  two	  HPV	  types	  (16	  and	  18)	  to	  be	  carcinogens	  in	  humans	  (Walboomers	  et	  al.	  1999;	  Muñoz	  et	  al.	  2003;	  Muñoz	  et	  al.	  2006).	  
3.	  HPV:	  classification	  and	  epidemiology	  	  Since	   the	  pioneering	   studies	  of	   zur	  Hausen	  and	  colleagues,	   a	   lot	   about	  HPV	   is	  now	   known:	   its	   mechanisms	   of	   action,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   infection	   in	   the	  development	   of	   cancer	   at	   the	   cervical	   and	   other	   sites,	   as	   well	   as	   its	  epidemiology.	   	  At	  present,	  nearly	  130	   types	  of	  HPV	  have	  been	   identified	  after	  cloning	   from	   clinical	   biopsies.	   They	   can	   be	   broadly	   grouped	   into	   cutaneous	  types	  and	  mucosal	  types	  according	  to	  their	  preferred	  tissue	  tropism.	  HPVs	  are	  quite	  similar	  in	  their	  structure	  and	  genome	  organization.	  HPVs	  are	  small	  (8000	  base	   pair),	   non-­‐enveloped,	   double-­‐stranded	   DNA	   viruses	   enclosed	   in	   an	  icosahedral	  capsid	  that,	  in	  turn,	  is	  composed	  of	  two	  molecules	  (L1	  and	  L2).	  The	  HPV	  genome,	  moreover,	  encodes,	  six	  early	  proteins	  (E1,	  E2,	  E4,	  E5,	  E6	  and	  E7)	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that	  are	  necessary	  for	  viral	  DNA	  replication	  and	  for	  the	  production	  of	  new	  virus	  particles	  within	  the	  infected	  cells	  (Muñoz	  et	  al.	  2006).	  Lastly,	  the	  HPV	  genome	  contains	   a	   non-­‐coding	   region,	   called	   long	   control	   region	   (LCR),	   which	   is	  necessary	  for	  activities	  like	  regulation	  of	  gene	  expression	  and	  the	  replication	  of	  the	   genome	   (Scheurer,	   Tortolero-­‐Luna,	   and	   Adler-­‐Storthz	   2005;	   IARC	   2007;	  Stanley	  2010).	  
The	   cutaneous	   types	   are	   typically	   found	   in	   the	   general	   population	   and	   cause	  common	  warts.	  The	  mucosal	  HPVs	  are	  further	  classified	  into	  low-­‐risk	  and	  high-­‐risk	   types,	   referring	   to	   their	  oncogenic	  potential.	  The	  main	   low	  risk	   types	  are	  twelve	  (6,	  11,	  40,	  42,	  43,	  44,	  54,	  61,	  70,	  72,	  81,	  108)	  (Muñoz	  et	  al.	  2006).	  Among	  them,	   the	  most	   common	   are	  HPV	  6	   and	   11,	   detected	   in	   about	   90%	  of	   benign	  anogenital	   warts.	   The	   HPV	   types	   most	   frequently	   giving	   rise	   to	   persistent	  infection	  in	  the	  host	  and	  involved	  in	  the	  etiology	  of	  cervical	  (and	  other)	  cancers	  are	  defined	  high	  risk,	  and	  are	  fifteen	  (16,	  18,	  31,	  33,	  35,	  39,	  45,	  51,	  52,	  56,	  58,	  59,	   68,	   73,	   82).	  Among	   the	  high-­‐risk	   types	   the	  predominant	   ones	   are	  HPV	  16	  and	  18,	   and	   together	   they	  account	   for	  70.7%	  of	   cervical	   cancers.	  All	  high-­‐risk	  types	  account	  for	  99.7%	  of	  all	  cervical	  cancers	  worldwide	  (Muñoz	  et	  al.	  2003).	  	  
	  
	   Low-­‐risk	  HPVs	   High-­‐risk	  HPVs	  
Strains	   6,	   11,	   40,	   42,	   43,	   44,	   54,	  61,	  70,	  72,	  81,	  108	   16,	   18,	  31,	  33,	  35,	  39,	  45,	  51,	  52,	  56,	  58,	  59,	  68,	  73,	  82	  
Pathology	   Genital	  warts,	  	  Recurrent	  Respiratory	  papillomatosis	  
Cancers:	  cervical,	  vulvar,	  penile,	  perianal,	  vaginal,	  anal,	  head	  and	  neck	  Table	  1:	  This	  table	  categorizes	  low	  and	  high-­‐risk	  HPV	  types	  and	  related	  pathologies.	  The	  types	  in	  bold	  are	  those	  targeted	  by	  currently	  available	  vaccines	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HPV,	   as	   said,	   is	   a	   sexually	   transmitted	   virus.	   Transmission	   occurs	   mainly	  through	   skin-­‐skin	   contact	   at	   the	   genital	   site.	   This	   means	   that	   a	   complete	  penetrative	  sexual	  intercourse	  is	  not	  needed	  for	  person-­‐to-­‐person	  transmission	  of	   the	   virus,	   although	   it	   renders	   it	   more	   likely	   to	   occur.	   Numerous	  epidemiological	  researches	  done	  in	  the	  last	  fifteen	  years	  have	  shown	  that	  HPV	  is	   the	   most	   common	   sexually	   transmitted	   infection	   worldwide	   (Trottier	   and	  Franco	  2006).	  For	  instance,	  the	  American	  Cancer	  Society	  estimates	  that	  around	  5.5	  millions	  Americans	  newly	  acquire	  the	  infection	  every	  year	  (2.4%	  of	  the	  total	  population),	  and	  that	  20	  millions	  are	  currently	  infected	  by	  at	   least	  one	  type	  of	  HPV	  (15%	  of	  the	  population).	  It	  is	  further	  calculated	  that	  there	  is	  a	  75%	  chance	  for	  an	  individual	  to	  get	  HPV	  in	  his	  or	  her	  lifetime	  (Baseman	  and	  Koutsky	  2005).	  A	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  194	  studies	  published	  from	  1995	  to	  2009	  that	  included	  more	  than	  1	  million	  women	   found	  11.7%	  of	   them	   infected	  with	  at	   least	  one	   type	  of	  HPV.	   The	   study	   shows	   highest	   numbers	   of	   infections	   in	   Sub-­‐Saharian	   Africa	  (24%),	  Eastern	  Europe	  (21.4%),	  and	  Latin	  America	  (16.1%).	  Among	  them,	  the	  most	  risky	  oncogenic	  types	  (HPV16	  and	  18)	  were	  also	  the	  most	  common	  (Bruni	  et	   al.	   2010).	  The	   age-­‐specific	   distribution	  of	  HPV	   infections	   seems	   to	   follow	  a	  common	  path	  in	  many	  areas.	  It	  has	  been	  observed,	  in	  particular,	  a	  first	  peak	  of	  infections	   at	   younger	   ages	   (<25	   years)	   after	   sexual	   initiation.	   After	   the	   first	  peak,	   numerous	   epidemiological	   studies	   document	   a	   consistent	   age	   related	  decline	   followed	   by	   a	   second	   peak	   among	   individuals	   45	   years	   or	   older	  (reviewed	  in	  Tota	  et	  al.	  2011).	  
	  A	   number	   of	   studies	   also	   calculate	   the	   prevalence	   of	   the	   virus	   in	   the	   male	  population.	  A	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  12	  studies	  done	  between	  1991	  and	  2005	  shows	  that	   percentage	   of	   infections	   in	   the	   various	   cohorts	   tested	   varied	   between	   a	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minimum	  of	  2.3%	  up	  to	  a	  maximum	  of	  34.8%	  (Partridge	  and	  Koutsky	  2006).	  A	  two-­‐year	   study,	   done	  by	  Partridge’s	   group	   in	   a	   cohort	   of	   240	  male	  university	  students	  in	  Washington,	  found	  62.4%	  of	  the	  participants	  infected	  with	  at	   least	  one	  HPV	   type.	  Moreover,	   47.9%	  of	   the	   total	   participants	  were	   found	   infected	  with	  a	  high	  risk	  HPV	  type	  (Partridge	  et	  al.	  2007).	  The	  study	  has	  some	  limitation,	  indeed	  the	  number	  of	  people	  tested	  and	  the	  specificity	  of	  their	  background	  does	  not	   allow	   for	  broad	   extrapolation	   about	   the	  prevalence	  of	  HPV	   in	   the	   general	  male	  population.	  It	   is,	  however,	  remarkable	  that	  these	  numbers	  almost	  double	  those	   found	   in	   a	   similar	   population	   of	   girl	   university	   students.	   These	   data,	  together,	   suggests	   that	   rates	   of	   infections	   in	  men	   are	   at	   leas	   as	   high	   as	   those	  observed	  in	  women	  (Tota	  et	  al.	  2011)	  and,	  more	  generally,	  that	  HPV	  infection	  is	  very	  common	  in	  sexually	  active	  individuals.	  
	   4.	  Natural	  history	  of	  HPV	  infections	  and	  cervical	  cancer	  
pathogenesis	  	  	   To	   understand	   HPV	   infection	   and	   its	   link	   to	   cervical	   cancer,	   it	   is	  important	  to	  briefly	  illustrate	  the	  main	  steps	  in	  cervical	  cancer	  progression.	  In	  1973	  Richart	   introduced	  a	   three	   level	  system	  of	  classification	   for	   the	  different	  stages	  of	  progression	  of	  this	  cancer,	  called	  the	  cervical	  intraepithelial	  neoplasia	  (CIN)	  system.	  The	  CIN	  categories	  are	  (Richart	  1973):	  
-­‐ CIN1:	  mild	  dysplasia	  in	  which	  abnormal	  cells	  only	  occupy	  the	  basal	  half	  of	  the	  epithelium	  of	  the	  cervix	  
-­‐ CIN2:	  moderate	   dysplasia,	   the	   abnormal	   cells	   occupy	   two	   thirds	   of	   the	  epithelium	  
-­‐ CIN3:	   severe	   dysplasia,	   almost	   full	   thickness	   involvement	   of	   the	  
	   85	  
epithelium	  by	  abnormal	  cells.	  	  
The	   final	   stage	   of	   progression	   is	   the	   tumour	   itself,	   called	   invasive	   cervical	  cancer.	  Cervical	  cancer	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  further	  stages	  depending	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  localized	  in	  the	  cervix	  or	  it	  extends	  to	  adjacent	  or	  distal	  organs	  (metastasis).	  	  
As	  said	  above,	  HPV	   is	  a	  necessary,	   still	  not	  sufficient,	   cause	  of	  cervical	  cancer.	  This	  means	  that,	  although	  nearly	  the	  totality	  of	  cervical	  cancers	  is	  triggered	  by	  a	  persistent	   infection	  with	  oncogenic	   types	  of	  HPV,	  not	   all	   infections	  eventually	  undergo	  malignant	  transformation.	  In	  most	  circumstances,	  indeed,	  the	  immune	  system	   of	   the	   host	   is	   able	   to	   clear	   the	   lesion	   within	   three	   years,	   and	   this	   is	  estimated	  to	  happen	   in	  the	  90%	  of	   the	  cases	  of	   infection	  (Cooper	  et	  al.	  2003).	  However,	  in	  a	  proportion	  of	  women	  it	  will	  persist	  and	  progress.	  High	  risk	  HPV	  infection	  that	  persist	  for	  more	  than	  three	  years	  are	  unlikely	  to	  resolve	  naturally	  and	   convey	   significant	   risk	   of	   development	   into	   high-­‐grade	   intraepithelial	  dysplasia	   (CIN2	   and	   CIN3).	   The	   latter,	   if	   left	   untreated,	   are	   very	   likely	   to	  progress	   into	   cancer	   (Moscicki	   et	   al.	   2006).	   	   In	   their	   review	   of	   the	   published	  literature	   about	   the	   natural	   history	   of	   HPV	   infections	   Wright	   and	   colleagues	  (2003)	  show	  the	  proportion	  of	  infections	  that	  go	  through	  the	  different	  stages.	  In	  particular	  they	  propose	  that:	  
-­‐ 43%	   of	   CIN2	   regresses,	   35%	   persists	   as	   CIN2	   and	   22%	   progresses	   to	  CIN3	  or	  invasive	  cancer	  
-­‐ 32%	  of	  CIN3	  regresses,	  56%	  persists	  as	  CIN3	  and	  14%	  progresses	  from	  CIN3	  to	  cancer	  
These	  numbers	  suggest	  clearly	  that	  HPV,	  though	  necessary,	  is	  only	  one	  factor	  in	  the	   development	   of	   cervical	   cancer.	  Multiple	   studies	   have	   identified	   different	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host	   factors	  and	  behavioural	   factors	  that	  play	  a	  role	   in	  the	  persistence	  of	  HPV	  and	  the	  risk	  of	  progression	  to	  precancerous	  lesions.	  The	  immune	  status	  of	  the	  host,	   for	   instance,	   has	   been	   cited	   as	   particularly	   relevant.	   As	   an	   indication	   of	  this,	  it	  has	  been	  observed	  that	  women	  who	  are	  immunosuppressed	  have	  two	  to	  three	  times	  the	  rate	  of	  HPV	  and	  high	  grade	  CIN	  compared	  with	  women	  who	  are	  not	   immune	   compromised	   (Cox	  2005).	   Further	   evidence	   of	   this	   connection	   is	  provided	  by	   the	  high	   rate	  of	  HPV	  persistence	  and	  progression	   in	  HIV	  positive	  patient	   (Wiley	   and	   Masongsong	   2006).	   Among	   the	   behavioural	   co-­‐factors,	  instead,	   it	   is	  often	  cited	  smoking,	  use	  of	  oral	  contraceptive,	  and	  other	  sexually	  transmitted	  diseases	  such	  as	  Chlamydia	  trachomatis	  (reviewed	  in	  Moscicki	  et	  al.	  2006).	  	  Cervical	  cancer	  pathogenesis	  is	  thus	  a	  very	  complex	  process	  that	  needs	  HPV	  to	  initiate	  and	  other,	  less	  specified,	  factors	  to	  progress.	  Cervical	  cancer,	  in	  synthesis	  is	  a	  rare	  consequence	  of	  a	  common	  infection.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Cervical	  cancer	  pathogenesis.	  (Stanley	  2010)	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5.	  HPV	  vaccines:	  efficacy	  and	  safety	  data	  In	  1992	  Kirnbauer	  and	  colleagues,	  from	  the	  National	  Cancer	  Institute,	  published	  a	   study	   in	   the	  Proceedings	  of	   the	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	   that	   paved	   the	  way	   for	   the	  development	  of	  HPV	  vaccines.	  They	  observed	   that	   the	  proteins	  of	  the	  HPV	  capsid	  (especially	  L1)	  were	  able	  to	  self-­‐assembly	  in	  vitro	  in	  what	  they	  called	  Virus	  Like	  Particles	   (VLP).	  VLP	  were	  in	  all	  respects	   identical	  to	  HPV,	  but	  they	   lacked	   the	   genetic	   material	   necessary	   for	   viral	   replication.	   They	   also	  observed	  that	  such	  VLP	  induced	  neutralizing	  antibodies,	  so	  they	  claimed:	  “This	  type	  of	  L1	  preparation	  might	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  candidate	  for	  a	  serological	  test	  to	  measure	   antibodies	   to	   conformational	   virion	   epitopes	   and	   for	   a	   vaccine	   to	  prevent	  papillomavirus	  infection”	  (Kirnbauer	  et	  al.	  1992,	  12180).	  
Since	   then,	   pharmaceutical	   industry	   efforts	   have	   been	   concentrated	   in	   the	  clinical	   testing	   of	   a	   prophylactic	   vaccine	   against	   HPV.	   So	   far,	   two	   VLP	   HPV	  vaccines	   have	   been	   produced	   and	   later	   licensed	   by	  many	   regulatory	   agencies	  worldwide,	  such	  as	  FDA	  and	  EMA,	  between	  2006	  and	  2009:	  
-­‐ A	   quadrivalent	   vaccine	   (called	   Gardasil,	   produced	   by	   Merck).	   In	   this	  vaccine	   the	   L1	   protein	   of	   the	   capsid	   are	   produced	   in	   recombinant	  
Saccharomyces	  cerevisiae	  and	  generate	  VLP	  of	  HPV	  6,	  11,	  16,	  and	  18.	  	  
-­‐ A	  bivalent	  vaccine	   (called	  Cervarix,	  produced	  by	  Glaxo-­‐SmithKline).	   	   In	  this	  vaccine	  the	  L1	  proteins	  of	  the	  capsid	  are	  produced	  with	  the	  system	  of	  expression	  of	  the	  vector	  Baculovirus	  and	  mimic	  HPV	  16	  and	  18.	  	  
Both	  vaccines	  offer	  some	  cross-­‐protection	  against	  other	  high-­‐risk	  strains	  of	  HPV	  and	   are	   given	   in	   a	   series	   of	   three	   shots	   over	   six	   months.	   Both	   vaccines,	  moreover,	  have	  shown	  high	  profiles	  of	  safety	  and	  efficacy	  in	  randomized	  clinical	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trials.	  Some	  studies	  need	  to	  be	  mentioned.	  As	  for	  Cervarix	  the	  phase	  III	  clinical	  trial	  that	  proved	  its	  efficacy	  was:	  
-­‐ PATRICIA	   study	   by	   Paavonen	   (Paavonen	   et	   al.	   2007;	   Paavonen	   et	   al.	  2009).	   This	   study	  was	   conducted	   in	  Australia,	   Belgium,	   Brasil,	   Canada,	  Finland,	   Spain,	   Germany,	   Italy,	   Mexico,	   Philippines,	   Taiwan,	   Thailand,	  USA,	  and	  UK	  and	  involved	  more	  than	  19,000	  thousands	  women	  aged	  15-­‐25.	  Criteria	  for	  enrolment	  in	  the	  clinical	  trial	  were:	  general	  good	  health	  status,	   no	   prior	   history	   of	  HPV	   infection	   and	   no	   cervical	   lesions	   at	   the	  moment	  of	  enrolment.	  Of	  these	  women,	  only	  15,626	  completed	  the	  trial	  and	  were	  followed	  up	  for	  six	  years.	  7788	  women	  were	  given	  the	  vaccine	  and	   the	   remaining	   a	   placebo.	   Endpoints	   for	   evaluating	   efficacy	   were	  CIN2	   or	   CIN3	   associated	   with	   HPV	   16	   and	   18.	   After	   six	   years	   only	  2/7788	   women	   in	   the	   vaccine	   group	   versus	   21/7838	   in	   the	   placebo	  group	   developed	   intraepithelial	   lesions	   associated	   with	   the	   HPV	   viral	  types	   covered	   by	   the	   vaccine.	   In	   the	   language	   of	   clinical	   research	   the	  vaccine	  thus	  showed	  an	  efficacy	  of	  90.4%12.	  
As	  for	  Gardasil,	  the	  phase	  III	  clinical	  trial	  that	  proved	  efficacy	  was:	  
-­‐ FUTURE-­‐2	   (Garland	   et	   al.	   2007).	   This	   study	  was	   conducted	   in	   thirteen	  countries	   and	   enrolled	  more	   than	  12,000	  women	   aged	  16-­‐26	   (6087	   in	  the	   vaccine	   group	   and	   6080	   in	   the	   placebo	   group)	   followed	   up	   for	   six	  years.	   Criteria	   for	   enrolment	   were	   like	   above:	   good	   health	   status,	   no	  prior	   history	   of	   infection	   and	   no	   cervical	   lesions	   at	   the	   moment	   of	  enrolment.	  Endpoints	  for	  evaluating	  efficacy	  were	  CIN2	  and	  CIN3	  related	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  An	  efficacy	  of	  90.4%	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  vaccine	  is	  effective	  in	  roughly	  9	  out	  of	  10	  women.	  It	  means	  that	  9	  out	  of	  10	  of	  the	  clinical	  endpoints	  (CIN2	  and	  CIN3)	  where	  observed	  in	  the	  placebo	  group.	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with	   the	   types	   covered	   by	   the	   vaccine.	   In	   the	   vaccine	   group	   5306	  participants	   completed	   the	   trial	   and,	   among	   them,	   only	   2	   were	   found	  with	  HPV	  16	  or	  18	  associated	   intraepithelial	   lesions	  versus	  63/5262	  in	  the	  placebo	  group.	  The	  vaccine’s	  efficacy	  was	  thus	  96.9%.	  
The	  quadrivalent	  vaccine,	  moreover,	  has	  proved	   to	  be	  efficacious	  with	  similar	  results	   also	   for	   the	   prevention	   of	   anogenital	   lesions	   in	   men	   (Giuliano	   and	  Palefsky	   2008;	   Giuliano	   et	   al.	   2011).	   Both	   vaccines	   have	   hence	   high	   efficacy	  scores.	   There	   are	   no	   efficacy	   data	   in	   the	   age	   group	   9-­‐14.	   Indeed,	   to	  measure	  vaccine	  efficacy	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  perform	  invasive	  examinations	  of	  the	  cervix	  to	  observe	  whether	  there	  are	  CIN2	  or	  CIN3	  lesions.	  These	  procedures	  were	  clearly	  unethical	   for	   such	   young	   girls.	   Although	   there	   are	   no	   such	   data,	   the	   trials	  showed	   that	   in	   the	   age	   group	   9-­‐14	   vaccine-­‐induced	   immunity	   was	   actually	  higher	   than	   in	   older	  women.	   This	   fact	   allowed	   the	   inference	   that	   the	   vaccine	  would	   have	   high	   efficacy	   scores	   also	   in	   this	   age	   group	   that	   is	   also	   the	   one	  identified	  by	  the	  WHO	  as	  the	  preferential	  target	  for	  vaccination	  (World	  Health	  Organization	  2009).	  
Another	   unknown	   about	   the	   vaccination	   is	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   acquired	  immunity.	  In	  fact,	  the	  follow	  up	  in	  clinical	  trials	  was	  only	  of	  6-­‐7	  years.	  However,	  no	   reduction	   in	   the	   specific	   antibodies	   was	   observed.	   Also	   in	   this	   case	   the	  inference	  was	  that	   immunity	  can	  be	  long	  lasting,	  but	  no	  direct	  proof	  exists	  for	  that.	  
As	  with	  every	  drug,	  however,	  both	  vaccines	  might	  give	  rise	  to	  adverse	  reactions	  after	  injection.	  In	  the	  clinical	  trials	  mentioned,	  both	  vaccines	  have	  shown	  to	  be	  well	  tolerated.	  The	  most	  frequently	  reported	  adverse	  event,	  in	  the	  vaccine	  and	  placebo	   group,	   was	   pain	   at	   the	   injection	   site.	   The	   rate	   of	   systemic	   adverse	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events	  was	  also	  comparable	  in	  the	  two	  groups,	  it	  being	  below	  0,1%	  (Harper	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Harper	  et	  al.	  2006;	  Reisinger	  et	  al.	  2007).	  
	  Post-­‐marketing	   surveillance	  by	  The	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  Prevention	  (CDC)	  shows	  that,	  as	  of	  September	  2011,	  more	  than	  40	  million	  doses	  of	  Gardasil	  have	  been	  distributed	  in	  the	  US	  and	  that	  only	  in	  about	  0.05%	  of	  cases	  adverse	  reactions	   have	   been	   reported	   to	   VAERS	   (Vaccine	   Adverse	   Events	   Reporting	  System).	  Of	  this	  0.05%,	  92%	  were	  non-­‐serious	  events,	  such	  as	  pain	  and	  swelling	  at	   the	   injection	   site,	   headache,	   nausea	   and	   fever.	   The	   remaining	   8%	   were	  serious.	   In	   particular,	   a	   number	   of	   cases	   of	   Guillain-­‐Barré	   syndrome	   (a	   rare	  neurological	   disorder	   that	   causes	  muscle	  weakness)	  were	   reported.	  However,	  the	  incidence	  of	  such	  a	  syndrome	  in	  the	  vaccinated	  population	  does	  not	  exceed	  that	   in	   the	   general	   population,	   thus	   excluding	   a	   direct	   causal	   link	   with	  Gardasil13.	  	  
6.	  HPV-­‐related	  disease	  burden	  	  I	  have	  already	  mentioned	  above	  that	  cervical	  cancers	  account	  for	  the	  majority	  of	   the	   HPV-­‐related	   disease	   burden.	   As	   said,	   the	   HPV	   types	   covered	   by	   both	  vaccines,	   that	   is	   HPV	   16	   and	   18,	   account	   for	   70.1%	   of	   cervical	   cancers	  worldwide,	   the	   other	   high-­‐risk	   types	   are	   instead	   responsible	   for	   all	   the	   other	  cases.	  Using	  the	  web	  database	  of	  the	  WHO	  HPV	  Information	  Centre14,	  I	  will	  now	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  These	  are	  the	  official	  data	  reported	  by	  The	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  
Prevention.	  They	  are	  publicly	  available	  at:	  http://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/vaccines/hpv/gardasil.html	  (Last	  access:	  30th	  October,	  2011).	  14	  The	  WHO	  database	  aggregates	  data	  from	  official	  reports	  by	  WHO,	  United	  Nations,	  the	  World	  Bank,	  and	  IARC	  Globocan	  2008.	  These	  data	  sometime	  diverge	  from	  others	  provided	  by	  different	  institutions.	  I	  will	  cite	  the	  relevant	  sources	  accordingly.	  The	  WHO	  database	  	  is	  publicly	  searcheable	  at:	  http://apps.who.int/hpvcentre/statistics/dynamic/ico/DataQuerySelect.cfm	  (Last	  access:	  November	  2nd,	  2011).	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provide	   data	   on	   cervical	   cancers	   on	   those	   countries	   that	   will	   be	   part	   of	   the	  ethical	   analysis	   in	   the	   remaining	   part	   of	   the	   thesis:	   that	   is	   US,	   UK,	   and	   Italy.	  These	  data	  are	  updated	  to	  2010.	  
In	   the	   US	   current	   estimates	   indicate	   that	   every	   year	   11069	   women	   are	  diagnosed	  with	  cervical	  cancer	  and	  3869	  die	  from	  the	  disease.	  Of	  these	  cancers,	  76.6%	   are	   caused	   by	   the	   HPV	   16	   and	   18,	   the	   types	   covered	   by	   the	   vaccine.	  Cervical	  cancer	  ranks	  as	  the	  13th	  most	  frequent	  cancer	  among	  women	  and	  the	  4th	   among	   women	   aged	   15-­‐44.	   According	   to	   the	   same	   source,	   the	   annual	  incidence	  of	  cervical	  cancer	  is	  of	  7	  per	  100,000	  women.	  
In	  the	  UK	  every	  year	  2890	  women	  are	  diagnosed	  with	  cervical	  cancer	  and	  1111	  die	  from	  the	  disease.	  79.1%	  of	  these	  cancers	  are	  attributed	  to	  HPV	  16	  and	  18.	  Cervical	   cancer	   ranks	   as	   the	   11th	  most	   frequent	   cancer	   among	  women	   in	  UK,	  and	   the	   2nd	   most	   frequent	   cancer	   among	   women	   aged	   15-­‐44.	   The	   annual	  incidence	  is	  of	  9.3	  per	  100,000	  women.	  
In	  Italy,	  finally,	  every	  year	  2880	  women	  are	  diagnosed	  with	  cervical	  cancer	  and	  906	  die	  from	  the	  disease.	  71.8%	  of	  these	  cancers	  are	  caused	  by	  HPV	  16	  and	  18.	  Cervical	   cancer	   is	   the	   16th	   most	   frequent	   cancer	   among	   women,	   and	   the	   4th	  among	  women	  aged	  15-­‐44.	  The	  annual	  incidence	  is	  of	  9.4	  per	  100,00	  women.	  
HPV	  16	  and	  18,	  moreover,	  are	  now	  recognized	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  aetiology	  of	  several	  cancers	  other	  than	  cervical	  ones.	  Some	  of	  these	  are	  female-­‐only	  cancers:	  the	   strains	   are	   believed	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   40%	  of	   vulvar	   cancers	   and	   90%	  of	  vaginal	   cancers.	   But	   some	   of	   them	   are	   not:	   the	   strains	   are	   believed	   to	   be	  involved	   in	  50%	  of	   the	  male-­‐only	  cancer	  of	   the	  penis,	   in	  85%	  of	  anal	  cancers,	  33-­‐72%	   of	   oropharyngeal	   cancers	   and	   10%	   of	   cancers	   of	   the	   larynx	   (Zur	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Hausen	  2002)15.	  As	  said	  above,	  HPV	  6	  and	  11	  cause	  90%	  of	  genital	  warts	  in	  both	  females	  and	  males.	  Although	  benign,	   these	   lesions	  require	  repeated	  treatment	  and	  their	  incidence	  is	  far	  higher	  than	  any	  of	  the	  abovementioned	  cancers	  (in	  the	  US,	   it	   is	   calculated	   to	   be	   around	   250	   per	   100,000	   per	   year	   and	   to	   be	   most	  common	  in	  men)	  (Giuliano	  2007).	  	  
All	   the	   data	   presented	   in	   the	   last	   sections	   provided	   the	   evidence	   for	   several	  countries	  to	  take	  action	  against	  HPV.	  Like	  all	  vaccines	  HPV	  is	  more	  efficacious	  when	  administered	  before	   the	  subject	  encounters	   the	   infective	  agent.	  For	   this	  reason	   all	   those	   countries	   that	   have	   devised	   HPV	   immunization	   policies	   as	   a	  means	   to	   prevent	   cervical	   cancer	   have	   identified	   11-­‐13	   year	   old	   girls	   as	   the	  preferential	   target	   group	   for	   the	   immunization.	   Indeed	   a	   population	   wide	  administration	  of	  the	  vaccine,	  combined	  with	  current	  cervical	  cancer	  preventive	  strategies,	  has	   the	  potential,	   if	   successfully	   implemented,	   to	  drastically	   reduce	  the	   incidence	   of	   (and	   perhaps	   eliminate)	   cervical	   cancer.	   I	   will	   discuss	   the	  ethical	  dimension	  of	  some	  of	  these	  policies	  models	  more	  extensively	  in	  chapter	  four.	   Before	   doing	   that,	   however,	   I	   need	   to	   provide	   more	   background	   about	  vaccination,	   its	   political	   context,	   and	   the	   ethically	   sensitive	   issues	   it	   touches	  upon.	   The	   second	   part	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   therefore	   dedicated	   to	   unpack	   these	  issues.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  I	  will	  give	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  of	  these	  cancers	  below	  (infra	  chapter	  5).	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Part	  2.	  Preventing	  infection	  for	  avoiding	  cancer:	  the	  
ethical	  dimensions	  of	  HPV	  immunization.	  	  
7.	  HPV	  a	  new	  tool	  for	  an	  old	  preventive	  job:	  vaccination	  as	  an	  
ethical	  problem	  	  So	   far	   I	   have	   discussed	   of	   HPV	   vaccination	   as	   of	   its	   potential	   benefits	   with	  regard	  to	  cervical	  cancer	  prevention.	  The	  way	  for	  its	  policy	  implementation	  and	  its	  full	  effects	  on	  women’s	  health	  be	  appreciated,	  however,	  is	  not	  as	  smooth	  as	  one	  may	  suppose.	  As	  with	  arguably	  all	  innovations,	  HPV	  vaccination	  encounters	  appraisal	  but	  also	  political	  hostility	  as	  well	  as	  ethical	  and	  legal	  issues	  that	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  for	  correct	  policy	  implementation.	  Moreover,	  although	  HPV	  vaccines	  are	  extremely	  innovative	  as	  technological	  artefacts,	  they	  are	  less	  so	  as	  public	  health	   technologies.	  Vaccination	   indeed	   is	  a	  public	  health	  activity	  well	  entrench	  in	  several	  health	  systems,	  with	  its	  own	  dedicated	  infrastructures,	  professional	   competences,	   policy	   requirements	   accompanied,	   of	   course,	   by	  ethical	  problems	  and	  political	  obstacles.	  	  
The	   history	   of	   vaccination	   is	   long.	   It	   is	   characterized	   both	   of	   remarkable	  successes	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  health	  and	  welfare	  benefits	  accrued	  at	  the	  individual	  and	   collective	   level,	   and	   of	   stark	   oppositions	   at	   the	   political	   level.	   A	   brief	  overview	  of	  these	  aspects	  is	  important	  in	  that	  it	  will	  permit	  to	  elucidate,	  along	  the	   lines	   of	   this	   work,	   in	   what	   respects	   current	   policies	   encounter	   similar	  problems	   and	   to	  what	   extent,	   instead,	   they	   put	   forward	   novel	   specific	   issues.	  	  Therefore,	  before	  starting	  with	  the	  peculiarities	  of	  the	  case	  under	  consideration,	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it	  is	  important	  to	  give	  an	  overview	  also	  of	  the	  analogous	  problems	  that	  previous	  vaccination	  policies	  have	  encountered	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  last	  century.	  	  
As	   the	  historical	   record	  shows,	  vaccination	   is	  one	  of	   those	  medical	  and	  public	  health	   technologies	   that	   have	  most	   ameliorated	   population	   health	   in	   the	   last	  two	  centuries.	  As	  the	  authors	  of	  a	  leading	  textbook	  in	  vaccinology	  write:	  “With	  the	   exception	   of	   safe	  water,	   no	  modality,	   not	   even	   antibiotics	   has	   had	   such	   a	  major	   effect	   on	   mortality	   reduction	   and	   population	   growth”	   (Plotkin	   and	  Plotkin,	   1994).	   The	   great	   impact	   vaccines	   had	   in	   public	   health	   is	   easily	  ascertainable.	   Small	   pox,	   once	   a	   terrible	   scourge	   for	   humanity,	   has	   been	  eradicated	  by	  concerted	  international	  efforts	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s.	  Thanks	  to	  these	   coordinated	   efforts,	  WHO	  was	   able	   to	   announce	   in	   the	   August	   of	   1980,	  that	   small	   pox	   was	   finally	   eliminated	   from	   the	   globe.	   The	   sharp	   decline	   of	  poliomyelitis,	  a	  poliovirus	  induced	  disease	  that	  caused	  as	  much	  as	  20,000	  cases	  of	  paralyses	  each	  year	   in	   the	  US	  until	   the	  mid	  1950s,	   is	  another	  case	   in	  point.	  After	  vaccine	  introduction	  in	  1955,	   indeed,	  polio	  has	  been	  virtually	  eliminated	  in	  several	  industrialized	  countries	  and	  is	  now	  endemic	  only	  in	  a	  few	  areas	  of	  the	  world.	  Similar	  stories	  can	  be	  told	  about	  diphtheria	  -­‐whose	   incidence	  has	  been	  drastically	  reduced	  since	  the	  1960s	  –	  and,	  with	  differences	  observed	  in	  various	  countries,	  tetanus,	  pertussis,	  tuberculosis,	  measles,	  mumps	  and	  rubella.	  	  
Although	   all	   these	   diseases	   are	   different	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   epidemiological	  profiles,	   pathogenesis,	   and	   severity,	   all,	   except	   tetanus,	   share	   an	   important	  feature:	   they	   are	   transmissible	   from	   person	   to	   person	   through	   casual	   routes	  (such	   as	   airborne	   droplets,	   saliva,	   etc.).	   This	   very	   simple	   fact	   permits	   the	  establishment	   of	   another,	   equally	   simple,	   epidemiological	   phenomenon:	   if	  enough	  people	  acquire	  immunity	  against	  the	  infective	  agent,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  an	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epidemic	   falls	   down	   to	   the	   vanishing	   point.	   Humans	   can	   acquire	   immunity	  against	  these	  infective	  agents	  either	  naturally,	  by	  developing	  specific	  antibodies	  after	   having	   encountered	   the	   disease,	   or	   by	   induction,	   through	   vaccination.	  Vaccination	  thus	  offers	  a	  dual	  benefit:	  one	  at	  the	  individual	  level,	  by	  conferring	  immunity	   without	   the	   harmful	   complications	   that	   the	   naturally	   acquired	  disease	  may	  give	  rise	  to;	  another	  at	  the	  population	  level,	  when	  enough	  people	  are	  vaccinated	  so	  to	  reach	  the	  herd	  immunity	  threshold.	  How	  large	  a	  proportion	  of	   individuals	   need	   to	   be	   vaccinated	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   the	   herd	   immunity	  threshold	  varies	  depending	  on	  several	  factors:	  the	  infectivity	  of	  the	  agent	  (that	  is,	  how	  many	  contagions	  occur	  for	  every	  infected	  individual),	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  vaccine,	   and	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   population.	   No	   matter	   the	   specific	  epidemiological	   details,	   however,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   underscore	   that	   it	   is	   the	  possibility	   of	   creating	   herd	   immunity	   effects	   that	   drove	   the	   establishment	   of	  mass	   vaccination	   policies	   in	   several	   countries	   in	   the	   last	   century.	   Herd	  immunity	  provides	  a	  good	  that	  extends	  well	  beyond	   individual’s	  enjoyment	  of	  personal	   protection.	   It	   is	   a	   good	   that	   protects	   the	   whole	   community,	   no	   one	  excluded.	  A	  second	   feature	   that	  called	   in	   favour	  of	   state-­‐backed	  vaccination	   is	  the	  attractive	  cost-­‐benefits	  profile	  immunization	  policies	  have.	  Since	  the	  1970s,	  health	  economists	  have	  justified	  vaccination	  through	  cost	  benefit	  analysis.	  Cost-­‐benefit	   analysis	   is	   a	   technique	   for	  quantifying	   the	  value	  of	   an	   intervention	  by	  weighing	   its	   costs	   –	   even	   included	   the	   costs	   of	   possible	   adverse	   reactions	   –	  against	   the	   positive	   outcomes.	   It	   resulted	   that	  many	   vaccination	   programmes	  were	   a	   good	   investment	   for	   money.	   Vaccination	   programmes,	   hence,	   do	   not	  only	   offer	   the	   opportunity	   to	   avoid	   human	   suffering	   and	   death,	   both	   at	   the	  individual	  and	  at	  the	  collective	  level,	  but	  they	  do	  so	  without	  huge	  spending	  for	  society.	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The	   possibility	   of	   establishing	   herd	   immunity	   so	   to	   have	   population	   wide	  benefits	   in	   terms	  of	  health	  has	   long	   justified	   the	  devise	  of	   state	  backed	  policy	  actions.	  The	  state,	   indeed,	   is	   the	  best-­‐positioned	  actor	   to	  coordinate	  collective	  endeavours	  properly,	  and	  it	  is	  one	  of	  its	  recognized	  functions	  that	  of	  providing	  benefits	   and	   reducing	   harm	   to	   its	   citizens.	  What	   is	   the	   right	   way	   to	   do	   that,	  however,	   is	   an	   open	   question	   and	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   whether	   coercion	   is	   ever	  justified.	   In	   infectious	   diseases	   control	   coercion	  has	   taken	  many	   forms.	   It	   has	  involved:	   the	   deprivation	   of	   liberty,	   like	   in	   the	   case	   of	   forced	   quarantine;	   the	  imposition	  of	  pecuniary	   sanctions,	   like	   in	   Italy	  where	  until	  2001	  parents	  who	  refused	  to	  immunise	  their	  children	  were	  fined	  with	  sanctions	  up	  to	  €150;	  and	  the	  refusal	  of	  enrolment	  in	  nurseries	  and	  schools,	  both	  in	  Italy	  (Moran,	  Gainotti,	  and	  Petrini	  2008)	  and	  the	  US	  (Gostin	  2008,	  383).	  Coercion,	  moreover,	  has	  been	  exercised	   through	   the	   formal	  mechanisms	  of	   law,	   as	  well	   as	   through	   informal	  means,	   like	   pressure	   from	   authoritative	   figures	   like	   paediatricians	   or	   from	  health	   promotion	   messages	   stigmatizing	   the	   failure	   to	   vaccinate.	   These	  measures	   have	   sometimes	   been	   contested	   as	   being	   too	   far-­‐reaching	   into	   a	  sphere,	   such	  as	   that	  pertaining	   to	  medical	  matters,	  which,	   to	   some,	   should	  be	  left	   instead	   to	   the	   conscience	   of	   individuals	   and	   their	   autonomous	   choices.	  Arguably,	  coercion	  may	  be	  appealed	  in	  many	  contexts	  to	  protect	  the	  community	  and	  its	  members,	  it	  is	  not	  clear,	  however,	  when	  it	  is	  ethically	  acceptable,	  nor	  a	  consensus	   about	   this	   issue	   is	   found	   in	   moral	   or	   political	   philosophy	   (see	  Dworkin	   1978	   and	   Gaylin	   and	   Jennings	   2003	   for	   two	   different	   views	   on	   this	  general	   issue.	  See	  also	   infra	   chapter	  1).	  No	  matter,	   for	  now,	  how	  one	  resolves	  the	  philosophical	  issue,	  coercion	  in	  its	  various	  forms	  has	  long	  been	  contested	  as	  an	  appropriate	  tool	  in	  the	  vaccination	  contexts.	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The	  historian	  of	  medicine	  John	  Colgrove	  (2006,	  1)	  reports	  a	  case	  of	  a	  Brooklyn	  citizen	   who,	   in	   1931,	   appealed	   to	   the	   New	   York	   City’s	   health	   commissioner	  lamenting	   for	   the	   exclusion	   of	   his	   son	   from	   school	   because	   he	   was	   not	  immunized	  against	  small	  pox	  as	  required	  by	  law.	  As	  he	  claimed	  “It	  is	  revolting,	  to	  say	  the	  least,	  that	  I	  must	  have	  diseased	  animal	  matters	  injected	  into	  the	  blood	  of	  my	  son	  before	  he	  can	  receive	  an	  education.”	  	  The	  opposition	  against	  vaccines,	  it	  must	  be	  said,	  was	  not	  so	  much	  guided	  by	  feeling	  of	  disgust	  for	  foreign	  matters	  to	   be	   injected	   into	   the	   ‘blood’,	   but	   perhaps	   more	   by	   a	   strong	   cultural	   ethos	  against	   state	   paternalism	  present	   in	   consistent	   segments	   of	   the	   population	   in	  many	   western	   countries.	   Anti	   vaccination	   activists	   in	   the	   United	   States	   have	  sometimes	  reported	  John	  Stuart	  Mill’s	  argument	  in	  support	  of	  their	  thesis	  that	  parents	  should	  let	  be	  free	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  vaccinate	  their	  children.	  In	  one	  of	  the	  opening	  passages	  of	  On	  Liberty	  (1859),	  the	  English	  utilitarian	  philosopher	  and	  one	  of	  the	  main	  voices	  of	  liberal	  political	  philosophy,	  says:	  	  
That	  the	  only	  purpose	  for	  which	  power	  can	  be	  rightfully	  exercised	  over	  any	  member	  of	  a	   civilized	   community,	   against	   his	   will,	   is	   to	   prevent	   harm	   to	   others.	   His	   own	   good,	  either	  physical	  or	  moral	  is	  not	  a	  sufficient	  warrant.	  He	  cannot	  be	  rightfully	  compelled	  to	  do	  or	   forbear	  because	   it	  will	   be	  better	   for	  him	   to	  do	   so,	   because	   it	  will	  make	  him	  happier,	  because,	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  others,	  to	  do	  so	  would	  be	  wise,	  or	  even	  right.	  (Mill	  2003)16	  
The	   argument	   against	   vaccination	   was	   thus	   that	   non-­‐vaccinators	   are	   only	  putting	  themselves	  at	  risk,	  and	  not	  others.	  Moreover,	  it	  can	  be	  claimed,	  the	  ones	  who	  are	  at	   risk	  would	  be	   those	   that	  are	  not	   immunized	   themselves.	  Although	  these	   remarks	   may	   sound	   reasonable,	   the	   harm	   principle	   also	   supports	   the	  legitimate	  use	  of	   state	  power	   in	   immunization	   contexts.	   In	   fact,	   vaccination	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  This	  quotation	  was	  already	  given	  in	  chapter	  1	  of	  this	  work.	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not	  always	  one	  hundred	  per	  cent	  effective.	  This	  means	  that	  there	  will	  always	  be	  people	   that,	   despite	   vaccinated,	   will	   not	   develop	   the	   required	   immunity	   and	  thus	   will	   be	   at	   risk	   of	   contracting	   the	   disease.	   Moreover,	   for	   some	   people	  vaccination	  is	  contraindicated	  on	  medical	  grounds;	  either	  because	  of	  their	  weak	  immune	   systems	   or	   because	   they	   have	   proven	   allergies	   against	   one	   of	   the	  components	   of	   the	   vaccine.	   Finally,	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   vaccinations	   occur	  during	   childhood,	   and	   so	  most	   of	   the	   unvaccinated	  people	   are	   kids	  who	  have	  certainly	   not	   decided	   to	   be	   unimmunized.	   Failing	   to	   provide	   herd	   immunity,	  hence,	  would	  amount	  to	  an	  increased	  risk	  of	  harm	  in	  those	  categories	  of	  people.	  It	   appears,	   hence,	   that	   the	   harm	   principle	   also	   justifies	   strong	   collective	  commitments	  towards	  herd	  immunity.	  In	  some	  instances,	  therefore,	  also	  liberal	  political	   philosophy	   provides	   the	   conceptual	   tools	   for	   legitimate	   use	   of	   state	  power	  as	  to	  limit	  the	  boundaries	  of	  individual	  liberties.	  
	  The	   legitimacy	   of,	   sometimes	   forceful,	   state	   intervention	   for	   controlling	  infectious	  diseases	   is	  not	  only	  supported	  by	  abstract	  philosophical	  arguments,	  although	   one	   can	   speculate	   that	   they	   inform	  public	   reasoning,	   but	   by	   various	  jurisprudences	  too.	  The	  landmark	  case	  in	  the	  US	  is	  a	  1905	  ruling	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	   upholding	   compulsory	   vaccination	   in	   the	   state	   of	   Massachusetts	  contested	  by	  Mr	  Jacobson.	  In	  Jacobson	  v.	  Massachusetts	  the	  Court	  states:	  
	  “There	   are	   manifold	   restraints	   to	   which	   every	   person	   is	   necessarily	   subject	   for	   the	  common	  good.	   […]	  a	  community	  has	   the	  right	   to	  protect	   itself	  against	  an	  epidemic	  of	  disease	  which	  threatens	  the	  safety	  of	  its	  members”17	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  The	  full	  text	  of	  the	  ruling	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in:	  (Gostin	  2002,	  206–212)	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As	  the	  legal	  scholar	  Lawrence	  Gostin	  notes,	  these	  rulings	  have	  permitted,	  in	  the	  US	  context,	  to	  achieve	  rates	  of	  immunization	  (more	  than	  95%)	  as	  high	  or	  higher	  than	  other	  developed	  countries	  (Gostin	  2008,	  376)	  thus	  creating	  herd	  immunity	  against	   several	   contagious	   diseases	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   all.	   The	   use	   of	   state	  mandates,	   however,	   is	   not	   exclusive	   of	   US,	   also	   in	   Italy	   some	   childhood	  vaccination	   were	   required	   by	   law	   (polio,	   hepatitis	   B	   (HVB),	   diphtheria,	   and	  tetanus)	   until	   2001	   (Decreto	   del	   Presidente	   della	   Repubblica	   22	   Dicembre	  1967,	  n.	  1518	  1968;	  Parlamento	  Italiano	  2001),	  and	  also	  in	  this	  case	  the	  use	  of	  this	  measure	  has	  allowed	  to	  achieve	  high	  levels	  of	  population	  protection.	  Italy,	  for	   instance,	   was	   one	   of	   the	   first	   European	   countries	   in	   which	   polio	   was	  eliminated	  (1982),	  well	  before	  that	  the	  same	  result	  was	  achieved	  in	  the	  whole	  European	  region	  (2002)18.	  
Another	  argument	  in	  favour	  of	  strong	  state-­‐backed	  intervention	  for	  the	  control	  of	   infectious	   diseases	   comes	   from	   concerns	   about	   social	   justice.	   The	   use	   of	  mandates	  may	  be	  better	  suited	  to	  reach	  all	   those	  people	  that	  are	  underserved	  by	  state	  preventive	  services.	  As	  John	  Colgrove	  notes	  (ibid.	  11-­‐13),	  while	  at	  the	  beginning	   of	   the	   20th	   century	   decisions	   not	   to	   immunize	  were	   seen	   solely	   as	  expression	   of	   sheer	   laziness,	   ignorance	   or	   apathy,	   in	   the	   mid	   1950s	   these	  behavioural	   explanations	   began	   to	   be	   supplanted	   by	   considerations	   of	   equity	  and	   justice.	   Surveys	   found	   a	   gradient	   in	   vaccine	   uptake	   along	   the	   lines	   of	  income	  and	  education,	  with	  those	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  scale	  much	  less	  likely	  to	  be	   protected	   than	   those	   at	   the	   top.	   This	   wide	   gap	   in	   vaccination	   coverage	  justified	  the	  introduction	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  a	  ‘second	  generation	  of	  laws’	  in	  the	  US	  (ibid.	   149-­‐185).	   A	   number	   of	   states	   began	   to	   condition	   school	   entrance	   upon	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Data	   drawn	   from	   the	   Italian	   Ministry	   of	   Health	   (Ministero	   della	   Salute)	   website:	  http://www.salute.gov.it/malattieInfettive/paginaInternaMenuMalattieInfettive.jsp?id=645&lingua=italiano&menu=vaccinazioni	  	  (Last	  access:	  23rd	  October,	  2011).	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immunization	  to	  remedy	  health	  disparities	  with	  the	  tools	  of	  the	  administrative	  state.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  schoolhouse	  for	  controlling	  diseases,	  also	  adopted	  in	  Italy	  and	  France	   for	   the	  vaccination	  against	  Hepatitis	  B	  and	   in	  Australia	   for	  several	  childhood	   immunizations,	   has	   another	   attractive	   feature	   beyond	   equity.	   The	  schoolhouse,	   indeed,	   is	   a	   public	   space	   in	  which	   infections	   can	   be	   transmitted	  easily	  and	  epidemics	  take	  place.	  It	  is	  thus	  an	  attractive	  locus	  for	  prevention	  too.	  	  Demands	  for	  group	  protection	  have	  therefore	  enmeshed	  in	  policy	  practice	  with	  broader	  concerns	  for	  an	  equitable	  distribution	  of	  public	  health	  benefits	  in	  areas	  at	  risk	  of	  social	  deprivation.	  	  
The	  history	  of	   vaccination	   can	  be	   continued	   for	   long,	  perhaps	  with	  numerous	  ramification	   as	   we	   start	   to	   make	   more	   precise	   distinctions	   among	   different	  diseases,	   different	   legislations	   and	   broader	   cultural	   aspects	   that	   characterize	  each	  country	  and	  each	  historical	  context.	  What	  it	  is	  important	  to	  notice	  for	  the	  purposes	   of	   this	   work	   is	   that,	   by	   and	   large,	   vaccination	   as	   a	   public	   health	  strategy	  has	  reached	  in	  many	  countries	  political	  stabilization	  and	  robust	  social	  acceptance.	  Clearly,	  this	  claim	  needs	  to	  be	  taken	  with	  due	  caution.	  From	  time	  to	  time,	   contestations	   emerge	   alleging	   severe	   adverse	   reactions	   some	   vaccines	  supposedly	   bring	   about.	   Sometimes	   these	   claims	   are	   proven	   false	   by	   public	  health	  authorities	  and	  painstaking	  activities	  are	   then	  required	   to	  reassure	   the	  public.	  Sometimes,	   instead,	  severe	  adverse	  reactions	  are	  confirmed,	  such	  as	   in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  oral	  polio	  vaccine	  (OPV)	  and	  a	  vaccine	  induced	  form	  of	  paralytic	  poliomyelitis,	   and	   the	   use	   of	   a	   certain	   vaccine	   is	   discontinued.	   Despite	   these	  complexities,	  however,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  vaccination	  against	  some	  contagious	  diseases	  (like	  polio,	  measles,	  diphtheria)	  is	  now	  an	  accepted	  social	  norm	  as	  high	  vaccination	  coverage,	  also	  in	  countries	  in	  which	  there	  are	  no	  mandates,	  shows.	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Indeed,	  high	  uptakes	  also	  permit	  several	  states	  to	  rely	  on	  voluntary	  policies,	  like	  in	  the	  UK,	  to	  relax	  vaccination	  requirements	  by	  allowing	  liberal	  exemptions	  for	  religious	  reasons	  or	  deeply	  held	  moral	  convictions,	  like	  in	  the	  US	  (Salmon	  et	  al.	  2006),	   or	   to	   devise	   national	   plans	   for	   repealing	   mandates	   and	   promote	  voluntary	  participation,	  like	  in	  Italy	  (Parlamento	  Italiano	  2001).	  
The	   stabilization	   of	   vaccination	   as	   a	   social	   practice	   indicates	   an	   achieved	  equilibrium	   between	   individual	   concerns	   for	   autonomous	   choice	   in	   medical	  matters	   and	   the	   obligation	   of	   the	   state	   to	   protect	   collective	   goods.	   Currently	  high	   immunization	   coverage	   allows	   protection	   to	   all	   and	   also	   permits	   the	  toleration	   of	   “a	   small	   rump	   of	   voluntary	   non-­‐immunizers”	   (Dare	   1998,	   147).	  Vaccination	  policies	  actively	  promoted	  by	  the	  state,	  moreover,	  do	  generally	  also	  support	   equitable	   access	   to	   public	   health	   benefits	   across	   the	   socioeconomic	  gradient	  and,	  perhaps,	  this	  is	  another	  reason	  why	  many	  find	  these	  endeavours	  morally	   justified.	  Social	   stabilization	   in	  practice,	  however,	  does	  not	   imply	   that	  the	   tension	  between	   individual	  and	  group	   interests	   is	  also	   resolved	   in	   theory,	  nor	  that	  coercion,	  in	  various	  forms,	  could	  not	  be	  reconsidered	  a	  viable	  options	  should	  the	  collective	  good	  be	  under	  threat.	  Moreover,	  appeals	   to	  social	   justice	  may	   not	   always	   be	   considered	   sufficient	   for	   justifying	   strong	   state-­‐backed	  interventions	  in	  other	  vaccination	  contexts.	  	  
Otherwise	  stated,	  the	  deep-­‐seated	  problems	  with	  vaccination	  do	  not	  disappear	  after	  collective	  goods	  are	  stable	  enough,	   they	  may	  be	  reignited	   in	  novel	   forms	  when	   a	   new	   vaccination	   technology	   enters	   the	   public	   health	   scene	   with	   its	  prospective,	  and	  yet	  unknown,	  outcomes.	  HPV	  vaccination	  fits	  nicely	  with	  this	  description,	  and	  to	  the	  exploration	  of	  its	  peculiarities	  I	  now	  turn.	  
	  
	   102	  
8.	  HPV	  vaccination:	  	  the	  political	  context	  	  
In	   the	   previous	   section	   I	   have	   noticed	   how	   vaccination	   as	   a	   public	   health	  technology	   has	   reached,	   not	   without	   obstacles,	   robust	   acceptance	   that	  guarantees	   equilibrium	   between	   demands	   for	   respect	   of	   autonomy	   and	  individual	  liberties,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  group	  protection,	  on	  the	  other.	  I	  have	  also	   noted	   how,	   despite	   differences	   to	   be	   observed	   in	   the	   political	   culture	   of	  each	   country,	   this	   process	   of	   stabilization	   has	   relied	   on	   a	   host	   of	   legal	   and	  philosophical	   means	   justifying	   liberty	   limiting	   state	   interventions	   for	  community	  protection	  in	  some	  cases.	  Moreover,	  I	  have	  indicated	  how	  the	  ‘harm	  principle’,	  at	  least	  under	  some	  interpretations,	  justifies	  these	  interventions	  also	  within	   the	  boundaries	   of	   classical	   liberal	   thinking.	  A	   further	   element	   that	   has	  supported	   the	   moral	   legitimacy	   of	   state-­‐backed	   interventions	   in	   infectious	  disease	  control	  have	  been	  concerns	  for	  social	  justice;	  that	  is,	  the	  realization	  that	  concerted	   state	   action,	   also	   through	   the	   use	   of	   various	   forms	   of	   coercive	  strategies,	  were	  necessary	  to	  reach	  the	  population	  equally.	  
In	   what	   follows	   I	   show	   how	   HPV	   immunization	   reopens,	   in	   both	   old	   and	  unprecedented	   forms,	   the	   question	   as	   to	   how	   rightly	   balancing	   individual	  concerns	   and	   public	   interest	   in	   the	   vaccination	   context.	   I	   first	   describe	   how	  those	  tensions	  played	  out	  at	  the	  level	  of	  public	  debate.	  To	  do	  this,	  I	  show	  how	  the	   demands	   for	   respecting	   parental	   autonomous	   choice	   with	   regards	   to	  medical	  decisions	  were	  put	  forward	  vis	  à	  vis	  the	  population	  benefits	  that	  HPV	  vaccination	   could	   bring	   about.	   This	   contrast	   emphasizes	  worries	   about	   safety	  and	   long-­‐term	  duration	   of	   the	   vaccine	   and,	  more	   generally,	   issues	   of	   citizen’s	  trust	   towards	   the	   public	   health	   system.	   In	   the	   face	   of	   it	   stands	   the	  disproportionate	  burden	  of	  cervical	  cancers	  carried	  by	  women	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	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the	   socioeconomic	   gradient	   and	   the	   need	   to	   ensure	   equitable	   access	   to	   the	  intervention.	   Clearly,	   the	   framing	   of	   public	   debates	   is	   always	   specific	   to	   the	  contingencies	  of	  the	  social	  context	  and	  political	  cultural	  in	  which	  it	  arises.	  Since	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  the	  nebulous	  boundaries	  of	  public	  discourses	  though,	  I	  will	  only	  focus	   on	   those	   themes	   that	   provide	   background	   for	   the	   identification	   of	   the	  morally	  sensitive	  issues	  that	  will	  inform	  my	  ethical	  analysis.	  After	  that,	  I	  will	  put	  analytical	  order	  into	  the	  issue	  by	  specifying	  what	  are	  the	  core	  values	  at	  stake	  in	  this	  context,	  and	  how	  they	  contrast.	  	  
HPV	   vaccination	   introduces	   into	   a	   morally	   sensitive	   context	   such	   as	   girl’s	  health,	   their	   sexuality,	   and	   claims	   for	   respecting	   the	   autonomous	   choice	   of	  parents	   in	   the	   decision	   of	   such	   issues	   without	   governmental	   intrusions.	   This	  issue	   has	   ignited	   a	   debate,	   especially	   in	   the	   US	   and	   Canada,	   as	   to	  whether	   is	  right	  use	  of	  state’s	  power	  to	  endorse	  for	  widespread	  distribution	  a	  vaccination	  for	  sexually	   transmitted	  diseases	   in	  such	  young	  age	  groups.	   In	  both	  countries,	  indeed,	   several	   bills	   were	   issued	   after	   vaccine	   approval	   for	   mandating	  immunization	   to	   11-­‐12	   year	   old	   girls	   as	   a	   condition	   for	   school	   entrance.	   The	  issue,	  generally	  put	  forward	  by	  religious	  conservatives,	  centred	  on	  the	  fear	  that	  the	  vaccine	  could	  have	  sent	  a	  wrong	  message	  to	  girls	  by	  giving	  a	  false	  sense	  of	  security	   that,	   in	   turn,	   could	  have	   led	   them	   to	  engage	   into	  promiscuous	   sexual	  lives.	  To	  some,	  such	  a	  vaccination,	  especially	  if	  forcefully	  endorsed	  by	  the	  state,	  could	  have	  undermined	  abstinence	  based	  prevention	  messages	  and	  condoning	  pre-­‐marital	  sex.	  As	   it	  appears,	  once	   the	  whole	  debate	  was	  stripped	  a	  bit	  of	   its	  emotional	  charge,	  the	  official	  positions	  of	  religious	  conservatives	  became	  more	  nuanced	  and	  informed.	  As	  we	  read	  in	  the	  official	  statements	  issued	  by	  the	  main	  religious	   organizations	   that	   had	   initially	   cast	   some	   doubt	   on	   the	   vaccination,	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what	   they	  opposed	  was	  not	  vaccination	  as	  such,	  but	   the	  use	  of	   legal	  means	   to	  ensure	  its	  wide	  acceptance.	  For	  instance,	  Focus	  on	  the	  Family,	  a	  Colorado	  based	  organization	   providing	   Christian	   guiding	   about	   issues	   pertaining	   marriage,	  parenting	   and	   the	   family,	   states:	   “Focus	   on	   the	   Family	   supports	   widespread	  (universal)	   availability	   of	   HPV	   vaccines	   but	   opposes	   mandatory	   HPV	  vaccinations	   for	   entry	   to	   public	   school.	   The	   decision	   whether	   to	   vaccinate	   a	  minor	  against	  this	  or	  other	  sexually	  transmitted	  infections	  should	  remain	  with	  the	   child’s	   parent	   or	   guardian”	   (Focus	   on	   the	   Family	   2006).	   A	   similar	  organization	   based	   in	   Idaho,	   Family	   Research	   Council,	   after	   emphasizing	   that	  “media	   reports	   suggesting	   that	   [the	  organization]	  opposes	  all	  development	  or	  distribution	   of	   such	   vaccines	   are	   false”	   states	   that	   “parents	   have	   an	   inherent	  right	  to	  be	  the	  primary	  educator	  and	  decision	  maker	  regarding	  their	  children’s	  health”	   and	   thus	   they	   oppose	   any	   measure	   that	   would	   legally	   require	  vaccination	   (Gaul	   2006).	   Both	   organizations,	   moreover,	   claim	   that	   both	  healthcare	  providers	  and	  parents	  have	  the	  duty	  to	  show	  that	  the	  most	  effective	  preventive	  measure	  against	  all	  sexually	  transmitted	  infections	  is	  sexual	  activity	  in	   the	   context	   of	   one	   faithful	   and	  monogamous	   long-­‐	   term	   relationship	   inside	  marriage.	   Similar	   arguments,	   although	   the	   debate	   never	   reached	   the	   same	  intensity	   it	   had	   in	   the	   US,	   have	   been	   observed	   in	   the	   UK.	   As	   reported	   by	   the	  health	  editor	  of	  The	  Guardian	  commenting	  on	  the	  reasons	  for	  parental	  vaccine	  refusal:	   “some	   may	   have	   concerns	   that	   allowing	   vaccination	   may	   promote	  promiscuity,	  because	  the	  cancer-­‐causing	  virus	  which	  the	  vaccination	  targets	   is	  passed	   on	   in	   sexual	   intercourse.” 19 Religious	   conservatives,	   moreover,	  emphasized,	   this	   time	   in	   tune	  with	   a	   large	   group	   of	   people	   of	   heterogeneous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2008/apr/25/health.cancer	  (last	  access:	  April	  26th,	  2010)	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political	   and	   philosophical	   persuasions,	   that	   requiring	   vaccination	   as	   a	  condition	   for	   school	   entrance,	   as	   it	   is	   the	   case	   for	   several	   childhood	  vaccinations,	   does	   not	   meet	   the	   historical	   justification	   for	   mandating	  immunization	   in	   the	   US	   (Gostin	   and	   DeAngelis	   2007;	   Javitt,	   Berkowitz,	   and	  Gostin	   2008).	   As	   I	   explained	   above,	   two	   major	   justifications	   for	   mandating	  immunization	  and	  conditioning	  school	  entrance	  upon	  it	  had	  to	  do	  respectively	  with	   the	   right	   of	   the	   community	   to	   defend	   itself	   in	   case	   of	   a	   public	   health	  necessity,	  and	  in	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  schoolhouse	  as	  space	  in	  which	  disease	  transmission	   can	   occur.	   Differently	   from	   the	   historical	   cases	   that	   justified	  mandates	  for	  small	  pox	  and	  polio,	  hence,	  school	  attendance	  does	  not	  constitute,	  per	  se,	  an	  increased	  risk	  of	  HPV	  infection.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  while	  polio	  and	  measles	  spread	  casually,	  HPV	  infection	  requires	  intimate	  sexual	  contact	  to	  occur	  and	  can	  thus	  be	  prevented	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  means.	  	  
In	   the	   HPV	   vaccination	   case,	   concerns	   for	   parental	   autonomy,	   demands	   for	  improving	  population	  health	  and	  ensuring	  equitable	  access	  to	  preventive	  health	  services	   have	   also	   enmeshed	   with	   a	   climate	   of	   suspicion	   about	   the	   real	  motivations	   of	   the	   campaign.	   In	   2007,	   shortly	   after	   FDA	   approval,	   the	   former	  Governor	   of	   Texas	   Rick	   Perry	   issued	   an	   executive	   order,	   thus	   bypassing	  legislation,	   to	   mandate	   HPV	   vaccination	   to	   girls	   entering	   sixth	   grade.	   Hot	  contestations	  ensued	  this	  unusual	  institutional	  move.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  Perry,	  now	  running	  for	  the	  2012	  Republican	  Presidential	  Primaries,	  had	  to	  repeal	  the	  executive	  order	  and	  leave	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  Texas	  House	  of	  Parliament.	  Amid	  a	  political	  firestorm,	  critics	  charged	  that	  a	  Merck	  lobbyist,	  who	  was	  former	  chief	  of	   his	   staff,	   influenced	   the	   president’s	   decision.	   Almost	   contemporarily,	  newspapers’	   reports	   divulged	   that	   the	   same	   vaccine’s	  manufacturer	   company	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had	  given	  heavily	   to	  Women’s	  in	  Government	   -­‐	  an	  advocacy	  organization	  made	  up	  of	  women	  legislators	  who	  support	  bills	  aimed	  at	  advancing	  women’s	  issue	  –	  who	   made	   a	   priority	   to	   introduce	   HPV-­‐related	   legislation	   (Colgrove	   2010).	  Coupled	  with	  the	  high	  price	  of	  the	  vaccines,	  which	  in	  Europe	  is	  €	  515,92	  for	  the	  full	  series	  of	  three	  shots,	  these	  critics	  alleged	  the	  campaigns	  were	  responding	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  Big	  Pharma,	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  health	  needs	  of	  the	  population.	  These	   concerns	   crossed	   the	   ocean	   and	   reached	   also	   Europe.	   In	   Italy,	   for	  instance,	   some	   anti-­‐vaccination	   activists	   labelled	   the	   introduction	   of	   HPV	  vaccination	  a	  “stupro	  sanitario”	  (public	  health	  rape)20,	  and	  two	  anti-­‐vaccination	  paediatricians	   supporters	   of	   homeopathic	   alternatives	   alleged	   suspicious	  conflict	  of	  interests	  in	  a	  monograph21.	  	  
In	  a	  less	  suspicious	  vein	  some	  have	  questioned	  the	  necessity	  of	  HPV	  vaccination	  campaigns.	   Indeed,	   cervical	   cancer	   is	   one	   of	   those	   few	   cancers	   in	   which	  prevention	   is	   possible	   through	   screening,	   the	   so-­‐called	   PAP	   smear.	   The	   latter	  has	  contributed	  to	  a	  sharp	  decline	   in	  rates	  of	  cervical	  cancers	   in	   the	   last	   forty	  years	  from	  32	  cases	  per	  100,000	  women	  in	  the	  1940s	  to	  8.1	  cases	  per	  100,000	  women	   in	   current	   days	   in	   much	   developed	   countries	   (Peto	   et	   al.	   2004;	  Howlader,	  Noone,	  and	  Krapcho	  2011).	  Thus	  some	  have	  claimed	   that	  spending	  public	  money	  on	  the	  vaccine	   is	  not	  a	  public	  health	  necessity,	  and	   it	  could	  also	  avert	   individual	  attention	  and	  public	  resources	   from	  cervical	  cancer	  screening	  programmes	  (Lippman	  2008).	  This	   issue	  should	  require	  even	  more	  caution,	   if	  data	   about	   long-­‐term	   duration	   of	   the	   vaccine	   are	   taken	   into	   account.	   As	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Document	  to	  be	  found	  at:	  http://www.newmediaexplorer.org/rinaldo_lampis/2008/04/08/vaccino_antipapilloma_hpv_stupro_sanitario.htm	  (Last	  access:	  November	  1st,	  2011)	  21	  The	  title	  of	  the	  book	  reads:	  Vaccinare	  contro	  il	  papillomavirus?	  Cosa	  dobbiamo	  sapere	  
prima	  di	  decidere	  (Vaccinating	  against	  papillomavirus?	  What	  we	  should	  now	  before	  deciding)	  (Gava	  and	  Serravalle,	  2008)	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anticipated	  above,	  HPV	  vaccines	  clinical	  trials	  have	  only	  followed	  up	  women	  in	  the	  protocols	  for	  6-­‐7	  years.	  Although	  the	  studies	  show	  no	  reduction	  in	  vaccine-­‐induced	   immunity	   after	   that	   time	   frame	   (Paavonen	   et	   al.	   2009;	   Garland	   et	   al.	  2007),	   it	   cannot	   be	   excluded	   that	   immunity	   can,	   at	   some	   point,	   wane	   thus	  rendering	  early	  vaccination	  less	  attractive.	  
HPV	   vaccination	   programmes	   as	   put	   into	   their	   political	   context	   underscore	   a	  bag	   of	   different	   intuitions	   and	   concerns	   sometimes	   pulling	   to	   opposite	  directions.	   	   A	   look	   at	   all	   these	   complexities	   may	   give	   the	   impression	   that	   a	  balance	  will	  not	  be	  easily	  found,	  and	  that	  social	  stabilization	  will	  occur	  through	  unpredictable	  chains	  of	  negotiations	  among	  different	  interests.	  Although	  I	  agree	  that	   the	   trajectory	   of	   political	   processes	   leading	   to	   the	   stabilization	   of	   vast	  social	   phenomena	   like	   vaccination	   does	   not	   lend	   itself	   to	   ready	   made	  predictions,	  I	  propose	  that	  framing	  the	  issue	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  moral	  values	  at	  play	  can	  help	  social	  reflexivity	  and	  foster	  ethically	  sound	  public	  discourses.	  In	  what	  follows	   I	   will	   thus	   begin	   such	   an	   attempt,	   and	   present	   the	   core	   values	   that	  emerge	   from	   the	   HPV	   context.	   A	   deeper	   exploration	   of	   how	   different	   policy	  models	   can	   best	   be	   put	   in	   balance	   those	   values	   will	   instead	   be	   part	   of	   the	  remaining	  parts	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  
9.	  HPV	  vaccination:	  morally	  relevant	  interests	  and	  ethical	  
trade-­‐offs	  	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  preceding	  pages	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  vaccination,	  in	  general,	  and	   of	   HPV	   vaccination,	   in	   particular	   is	   complex.	   Despite	   complexity,	   four	  sources	  of	  moral	  concern	  surface	  the	  debates,	  all	  with	  prima	  facie	  validity.	  They	  are:	   the	   interest	  of	  parents	  to	  autonomously	  decide	  about	   issues	  pertaining	  to	  the	  healthcare	  and	  preventive	  education	  of	  their	  children,	  the	  interest	  of	  public	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health	   institutions	   to	   fulfil	   their	   duties	   of	   beneficence	   at	   population	   level,	   the	  interest	  in	  implementing	  equitable	  vaccination	  programmes,	  and	  an	  interest	  in	  the	   efficiency	   of	   the	   intervention	   in	   achieving	   the	   goals	   and	   doing	   it	   without	  waste	  of	   resources.	  On	   top	  of	   these	   sit	  demands	   for	  better	  health,	  both	  at	   the	  individual	   and	   population	   level.	   In	   this	   section	   I	   analyse	   the	   scope	   of	   these	  interests	  and	  why	  they	  are	  all	  morally	  relevant.	  That	  is	  what	  they	  consist	  of	  and	  why	   are	   they	   important.	   After	   this	   characterization,	   I	  will	   indicate	   how	   these	  interests	  may	  come	  into	  contrast	  in	  the	  HPV	  vaccination	  context.	  	  
Autonomous	  choice.	  Concerns	  about	  vaccination	  centre,	  primarily,	  on	  an	  interest	  that	  parents	  have	  in	  making	  free	  and	  autonomous	  choices	  about	  their	  children’s	  care	   and	   education.	   The	   traditional	   understanding	   of	   autonomy	   in	   bioethics	  conceives	   of	   it	   as	   comprised	   of,	   at	   least,	   two	   elements:	   freedom	   and	   agency.	  Freedom	   means,	   at	   a	   minimum,	   absence	   of	   external	   interference	   and	  limitations.	  Agency,	  instead,	  refers	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  comprehend	  the	  action	  to	  be	  taken,	   its	   alternatives,	   and	   consequences	   as	   well	   as	   competence	   to	   make	   a	  decision	   (Beauchamp	   and	   Childress	   2009,	   100).	   The	   first	   element,	   in	   our	  context,	  involves	  the	  idea	  that	  parents,	  or	  guardians,	  are	  well-­‐positioned	  actors	  to	   understand	   what	   is	   best	   for	   their	   children	   without	   interference.	   Parents,	  hence,	   have	   a	  morally	   grounded	   interest	   in	   vaccinating	   their	   kids	   if	   they	   are	  convinced	   that	   intervention	   is	   what	   is	   best	   for	   them.	   Although	   population	  concerns	   may	   sometimes	   inform	   their	   choice,	   it	   is	   fair	   to	   assume	   that	   their	  primary	  concern	  is	  directed	  to	  their	  children	  overall	  welfare.	  For	  a	  decision	  to	  be	  really	  autonomous,	  however,	  parents	  also	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  being	  provided	  with	  all	  the	  relevant	  information	  needed	  so	  that	  their	  consent	  is	  truly	  informed	  and	   voluntary	   (Faden	   and	  Beauchamp	   1986).	   In	   the	   case	   of	  HPV	   vaccination,	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moreover,	   another	   interest	   emerged	   as	   particularly	   relevant.	   That	   is,	   the	  interest	   parents	   have	   in	   providing	   their	   children	   with	   the	   moral	   and	   sexual	  education	   they	   see	   fit	   without	   outer	   interference.	   This	   involves	   freedom	   of	  decision	  as	   to	  whether,	  when,	   and	  by	  what	  means	   to	   expose	   their	   children	   to	  sexual	   education.	   Some	  parents	  may	  value	  premarital	   abstinence	  and	  want	   to	  educate	  their	  children	  as	  to	  understand	  its	   importance.	  Some	  parents	  may	  not	  value	   abstinence	   as	   such,	   but	   still	   want	   to	   introduce	   their	   children	   to	   these	  issues	  gradually	  and	   in	   the	   family	  private	   sphere.	  Other	  parents,	   instead,	  may	  want	   their	   daughters	   and	   sons	   to	   experience	   freely	   their	   sexual	   lives	  without	  any	   parental	   interference	   whatsoever.	   Parental	   autonomy,	   however,	   also	  requires	  that	  parents	  are	  put	  in	  the	  position	  to	  understand	  the	  context	  in	  which	  they	  are	  asked	  to	  decide,	  and	  so	  that	  accurate	  information	  is	  presented	  to	  them.	  As	  we	  can	  read	  from	  a	  classical	  account	  of	  autonomy:	  “autonomy	  is	  conceived	  of	  as	  a	  second-­‐order	  capacity	  of	  persons	  to	  reflect	  critically	  upon	  their	  first-­‐order	  preferences,	  desires,	  wishes	  and	  so	   forth	  and	  the	  capacity	  to	  accept	  or	  change	  these	   in	   light	   of	   higher-­‐order	  preferences	   and	  values”	   (Dworkin	  1988,	   20).	   In	  our	   context	   the	   above	   quotation	   suggests	   that	   for	   parents	   to	   exercise	   their	  autonomy	  properly	  –	  this	  is	  the	  agency	  aspect	  -­‐	  then	  they	  need	  to	  be	  given	  also	  the	  tools	  to	  critically	  reflect	  upon	  the	  specific	  decision-­‐making	  context	  in	  which	  they	  are	  operating.	  In	  practical	  terms,	  for	  parents	  to	  decide	  autonomously	  about	  the	  vaccine	  they	  need	  also	  to	  be	  correctly	  informed	  about	  the	  intervention	  and	  whether	  it	  really	  challenges	  their	  values.	  
Beneficence.	  If	  it	  is	  conceded	  that	  parents	  are,	  at	  least	  at	  first	  approximation,	  the	  best-­‐positioned	   actors	   to	   decide	   as	   to	   what	   is	   in	   the	   best	   interest	   of	   their	  children,	   it	   can	   also	   be	   conceded	   that	   public	   health	   institutions	   are	   the	   best-­‐
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positioned	   social	   actors	   to	  understand	  how	   to	  best	   address	  population	  health	  needs.	   Clearly,	   there	   can	   be	   bad	   parents	   who	   do	   not	   take	   care	   of	   their	   kids.	  Similarly,	   there	   can	   be	   public	   health	   institutions	   that	   badly	   respond	   to	  population	  health	  needs.	   In	  general	   terms,	  however,	  public	  health	   institutions	  have	   both	   the	   power	   and	   knowledge	   to	   intervene	   on	   population	   health	   as	   to	  provide	  benefits	  and	  minimize	  harms	  as	  well	  as	  a	  duty	  of	  beneficence	  to	  do	   it	  (Childress	  et	  al.	  2002).	  In	  general	  terms,	  beneficence	  is	  the	  moral	  imperative	  to	  act	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   others.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   bioethics,	   beneficence	   suggests	  that	  one	  of	  the	  main	  medicine’s	  obligations	  is	  that	  of	  providing	  benefits	  to	  the	  patients	   and	   to	   support	   their	   health	   and	   welfare.	   Generally	   at	   home	   in	   the	  context	   of	   clinical	  medicine,	   beneficence	   has	   also	   its	   bearing	   in	   public	   health	  activities.	   Public	   health	   practitioners,	   indeed,	   are	   provided	   with	   specific	  professional	  competences	  to	  bring	  about	  or	  to	  ameliorate	  human	  health	  at	  the	  population	  level.	  Sometimes,	  like	  in	  the	  case	  of	  this	  work,	  new	  technologies	  are	  produced	   by	   scientific	   research	   that	   suggest	   the	   possibility	   to,	   if	   correctly	  implemented,	   radically	   change	   the	   epidemiological	   profile	   of	   a	   disease	   with	  relevant	  consequences	  at	  the	  population	  and	  at	  the	  individual	  level.	  It	  can	  hence	  be	   easily	   conceded	   that	   public	   health	   practitioner,	   and	   in	   general	   all	   the	  institutions	  that	  operate	  in	  the	  public	  health	  sector,	  have	  a	  duty	  of	  beneficence	  towards	   the	   general	   public	   to	   implement	   policies	   that	   are	   for	   the	   interest	   of	  population	  health.	  	  	  
Adolescent	  girls.	  Even	  if	  we	  grant	  that	  parents	  are	  the	  best-­‐positioned	  actors	  to	  determine	   the	   interests	   of	   their	   adolescent	   daughters,	   it	   should	   not	   be	   put	   in	  one	  side	  the	  fact	  that	  also	  the	  latters	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  this	  issue.	  HPV	  vaccination	  touches	  upon	  very	  important	  aspect	  of	  every	  individual’s	  life	  like	  sexual	  health,	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sexual	   identity,	  and	  cancer	  prevention.	  In	  this	  context,	  HPV	  vaccination	  can	  be	  seen	   as	   one	   among	   the	   tools	   that	  may	   serve	   to	   prevent	  morbidity	   and	   avoid	  premature	   death.	  More	   precisely,	   adolescent	   girls	   have	   an	   interest	   in	   living	   a	  healthy	   life,	   avoiding	   premature	   morbidity,	   and	   being	   able	   to	   develop	   and	  pursue	   their	   life	   plans.	   HPV	   vaccination	   can	   be	   hence	   seen	   as	   one,	   certainly	  among	  many,	  intervention	  that	  supports	  the	  actionability	  of	  those	  plans.	  	  
Justice.	  The	  third	  set	  of	  interests	  in	  public	  health	  policies	  is	  directed	  towards	  a	  just	   distribution	   of	   their	   benefits	   and	   burdens.	   Although	   several	   theories	   of	  justice	   exist,	   all	   agree	  with	   a	  minimal	   formal	   requirement.	   As	   exemplified	   by	  Beauchamp	  and	  Childress	  (2009,	  242),	   the	   formal	  principle	  of	   justice	  requires	  that	   equals	   must	   be	   treaded	   equally,	   whereas	   unequals	   must	   be	   treated	  unequally.	   A	   chief	   moral	   consideration	   that	   has	   long	   supported	   mass	  vaccination	   programmes	   is	   that	   they	   have	   strived	   to	   equally	   distribute	   the	  intervention	   to	   all	   citizens,	   no	   matter	   their	   socioeconomic	   background.	   The	  most	  relevant	  consideration,	  in	  the	  vaccination	  context,	  is	  that	  everyone	  who	  is	  exposed	  at	  the	  risks	  of	  infection	  should	  be	  protected.	  A	  policy	  that	  it	  is	  equally	  accessible	  to	  all,	  hence,	  would	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  everybody	  to	  the	  maximum	  benefit	  of	  those	  that	  stand	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  socioeconomic	  ladder.	  Moreover,	  public	  health	  programmes	  are,	   at	   least	   in	   general,	   among	   those	   activities	   that	  are	   needed	   in	   a	   just	   society	   to	   foster	   fair	   equality	   opportunity	   (see	   infra:	  chapter	  2).	  	  
Efficiency.	   Society	   places	   a	   high	   moral	   value	   in	   health	   and	   healthcare.	   This	  realization	   does	   not	   come	   only	   from	   an	   intuition	   we	   all	   share,	   but	   is	   also	  epitomised	   by	   the	   percentage	   of	   GDP	   that	   industrialized	   countries	   invest	   in	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healthcare.	   Despite	   it,	   resources	   to	   improve	   health	   are	   not	   unlimited.	   Health	  must	   compete	   with	   other	   desirable	   social	   goals,	   like	   personal	   security	   and	  education,	  for	  resources.	  As	  Brock	  notes	  (Brock	  2004,	  201),	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  provide	   all	   resources	   to	   healthcare	   or	   preventive	   medicine	   without	  unacceptable	   sacrifices	   in	   other	   important	   social	   areas.	   Problems	  of	   rationing	  also	  occur	  within	  the	  health	  budget	  (Beauchamp	  and	  Childress	  2009,	  267-­‐268).	  Although	   preventive	   services	   are	   generally	   less	   funded	   than	   healthcare	   and	  biomedical	   research,	   this	   is	  no	   licence	   to	  use	  resources	   improperly.	  Therefore	  legitimate	   demands	  may	   arise	   such	   that	   any	   proposed	   preventive	  measure	   is	  efficient	   and	   that	   it	   uses	   resources	   properly.	   One	   measure	   for	   identifying	  efficiency	   of	   an	   intervention	   is	   its	   cost-­‐effectiveness.	   The	   latter	   is	   defined	   in	  health	  economics	  as:	  “the	  additional	  cost	  required	  per	  additional	  unit	  of	  health	  benefit	  produced	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  next-­‐most-­‐effective	  alternative”	  (J.	   J.	  Kim	  2011,	   1760).	   	   Whether	   efficiency	   should	   be	   measured	   only	   in	   terms	   of	   cost-­‐effectiveness	   is	  open	   to	  debate,	  here	   I	  want	  only	   to	  underscore	   that	  efficiency	  has	  not	  only	  an	  instrumental	  value	  but	  also	  a	  moral	  one.	  Indeed,	  an	  inefficient	  health	   policy	   diverts	   resources	   from	  other	   health	   contexts	   in	  which	   the	   same	  resources	   could	   be	   better	   employed.	   As	   Gostin	   (2008,	   67)	   puts	   it,	   if	   public	  health	  regulations	  impose	  disproportionate	  expense	  with	  modest	  benefits	  they	  forego	   opportunities	   for	   other	   interventions	   that	   may	   improve	   community	  health.	  So,	  there	  might	  be	  some	  individuals	  raising	  a	  legitimate	  claim	  as	  to	  their	  interests	  having	  been	  neglected.	  	  	  
Inclusion.	   As	   I	   have	   shown	   in	   the	   theoretical	   part	   of	   this	  work,	   and	   as	   it	   also	  emerged	  from	  the	  analysis	  of	   the	  political	  context	  of	   the	  HPV	  vaccination,	   it	   is	  important	   to	  mention	  the	  growing	   interest	  on	  the	  part	  of	   the	  citizens	   in	  being	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included,	  in	  some	  ways,	  in	  the	  decision	  of	  public	  health	  policies.	  The	  climate	  of	  suspicion	  towards	  vaccination	  in	  general,	  but	  as	  they	  have	  also	  emerged	  in	  the	  HPV	   context,	   indeed,	   can	   be	   read	   in	   two	   ways:	   either	   as	   an	   expression	   of	  ignorance	  and	  unwarranted	  distrust	  towards	  governments,	  or	  as	  a	  call	  for	  civic	  membership.	  There	  are	   two	   reasons	  why	   the	   first	  option	  does	  not	  hold.	  First,	  following	   that	   view	   would	   probably	   give	   rise	   unintended	   consequences	   and	  radicalize	  dissent	  rather	  than	  normalize	  it.	  Second,	   if	  we	  claim	  that	  the	  people	  opposing	   vaccination,	   or	   that	   contest	   the	   way	   in	   which	   a	   particular	   policy	   is	  implemented,	   are	   illiterate	   in	   science,	   we	   would	   also	   be	   bound	   to	   claim	   that	  those	   who	   instead	   comply	   do	   that	   because	   of	   their	   fine	   knowledge	   of	   public	  health	  science	  matters.	  If	  we	  conceive	  of	  dissent,	  instead,	  as	  a	  legitimate	  claim	  of	  inclusion	   into	  public	   health	  matters,	   the	   social	   normalization	   of	   new	  vaccines	  would	  perhaps	  be	  improved.	  The	  call	  for	  civic	  membership,	  however,	  needs	  not	  to	  be	  confounded	  with	  populism	  or	  with	  a	  sheer	  adherence	  to	  public	  opinion.	  As	  I	   have	   indicated	   in	   the	   theoretical	   part	   of	   this	  work,	   part	   of	   the	   job	   of	   public	  health	  ethics	  is	  to	  found	  those	  spaces	  in	  which	  to	  exercise	  civic	  membership	  in	  a	  constructive	  manner.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  underscore	  that	  the	  interest	  towards	  inclusion	  should	  not	  be	  supposed	  to	  exist	  only	  in	  the	  most	  vociferous	  groups	  that,	  from	  time	  to	  time,	  protest	  against	  this	  or	  that	  policy.	  All	  those	  who	  are	  affected	  by	  a	  policy	  -­‐	  also	  those	  that	  normally	  have	  less	  political	  power	  and	  chance	   to	   be	   heard	   –	   have	   an	   interest	   in	   inclusion.	   Therefore,	   the	   scope	   of	  inclusion	  enlarges	  also	  to	  those	  that	  have	  generally	  less	  power	  and	  less	  chance	  to	  be	  heard.	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10.	  Conclusion	  
The	  morally	  grounded	   interests	   I	  have	  so	   far	  presented	  hold	  only	  prima	  facie.	  This	  means	   that	   sometimes	   they	   can	   be	   overruled.	   As	   the	   explanation	   of	   the	  vaccination	   context	   showed,	   indeed,	   these	   morally	   grounded	   interests	   may	  sometimes	   contrast	  with	  one	  another	  giving	   rise	   to	  ethical	   trade-­‐offs.	   I	  define	  ethical	  trade-­‐off	  as	  a	  morally	  sensitive	  opposition	  between	  competing	  interests	  calling	   for	   normative	   resolution.	   Such	   trade-­‐offs	   do	   not	   need	   to	   arise	  necessarily,	   but	   they	  may	   to.	   For	   instance,	  most	   of	   the	   times	   the	   interests	   of	  parents	   as	   to	   the	   healthcare	   of	   their	   children	   may	   coincide	   with	   population	  health	   interests	   as	   put	   forward	   by	   public	   health	   authorities.	   In	   other	   words,	  parents	  may	  very	  well	  welcome	  a	  vaccination	  programme	  and,	  indeed,	  in	  many	  cases	   they	   do.	   At	   other	   times,	   however,	   the	   morally	   grounded	   interests	   may	  collide,	   and	   decisions	   must	   be	   taken	   as	   to	   which	   of	   them	   should	   take	  precedence.	   It	   is	   in	   such	   situations,	   that	   an	   ethical	   problem	   arises.	   	   I	  will	   not	  explore	   all	   the	   possible	   trade-­‐offs	   that	   arise	   among	   the	   different	   morally	  relevant	  interests	  in	  the	  HPV	  context,	  but	  only	  some	  of	  them.	  	  In	  particular,	   I	   identify	  three	  ethical	  trade-­‐offs	  as	  particularly	  urgent,	  and	  only	  on	  them	  I	  will	  focus.	  They	  are:	  	   1. Individual	  choice	  versus	  beneficence	  and	  population	  health	  2. Individual	  choice	  versus	  justice	  3. Justice	  versus	  efficiency	  	  Let	  us	  explain	  the	  content	  of	  these	  trade-­‐offs	  in	  order.	  	  The	   first	   trade-­‐off	   arises	   because,	   as	   we	   saw,	   there	   are	   some	   parents	   that	  oppose	  HPV	  vaccination	   as	   going	   against	   their	   deeply	  held	  moral	   convictions.	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They	   are	   afraid	   that	   a	   vaccination	   policy	   strongly	   supported	   by	   the	   state,	  perhaps	   even	   mandated	   by	   the	   law,	   can	   undermine	   abstinence	   based	  preventive	  messages.	  Other	  parents,	   instead,	  oppose	  vaccination	  because	   they	  do	  not	   see	   it	   as	  necessary	   to	   their	  daughters,	  or	  perhaps	  because	   they	  do	  not	  think	   that	   is	   a	   public	   health	   necessity.	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   public	   health	  institutions,	   however,	   high	   vaccination	   uptakes	   are	   needed	   as	   to	   achieve	  tangible	   population	   results.	   Indeed,	   from	   an	   epidemiological	   point	   of	   view,	   it	  would	  have	   little	  sense	   if	  very	   few	  people	  vaccinated.	  Differently	   from	  clinical	  medicine,	  where	  an	  intervention	  is	  successful	  when	  it	  brings	  about	  the	  desired	  result	  in	  the	  individual	  patient,	  public	  health	  measures	  are	  successful	  when	  the	  interventions	  bring	  about	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  incidence	  of	  the	  relevant	  pathology	  they	  are	  directed	  to.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  while	  an	  individual’s	  health	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  benefited	   from	  a	  medical	   intervention	  when	  she	  has	  been	  healed	   from	  a	  certain	   condition,	   population	   health	   can	   be	   said	   ameliorated	   in	   a	   purely	  aggregative	   sense:	   when	   life	   expectancy	   increases	   on	   average,	   when	   infant	  mortality	  and	  death	  rates	  decrease,	  when	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  of	  indigent	  patients	  improves	  or,	  again	  in	  our	  case,	  when	  the	  incidence	  of	  disease	  falls	  down.	  	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  high-­‐uptake,	  hence,	  the	  policy	  means	  that	  may	  prove	  more	  effective	  are	  not	  necessarily	  those	  that	  would	  also	  ensure	  maximum	  respect	  of	  individuals’	  liberties,	  at	  least	  in	  a	  non-­‐interference	  sense.	  How	  to	  balance	  hence	  autonomous	  choice	  and	  the	  population	  oriented	  duty	  of	  beneficence	  that	  public	  health	  institutions	  have?	  	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  brief	  historical	  reconstruction	  of	  immunization	  policies,	  state	  endorsed	  campaigns	  have	  the	  advantage	  of	  being	  able	  to	  offer	  the	  opportunity	  of	   vaccination	   to	   all,	   no	   matter	   their	   social	   background.	   They	   can	   do	   so,	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however,	  by	   somewhat	   limiting	  absolute	   freedom	  of	   choice	   for	   the	   individual.	  Clearly,	   this	   limitation	   can	   come	   in	   different	   forms.	   It	   may	   imply	   a	   state	  mandate	  or	   softer	   forms	  of	   coercion.	   For	   instance	  parents	   can	  be	  granted	   the	  final	  choice,	  but	  they	  can	  be	  required	  to	  consider	  vaccination	  and	  be	  informed	  about	   its	  benefits	   (Dare,	  1998).	   Sometimes,	   like	   in	   the	  US,	   schools	  admittance	  may	  be	  conditioned	  on	  immunization.	  This	  policy	  has	  proven	  highly	  efficient	  at	  the	  cost,	  however,	  of	   limiting	  a	   little	  bit	   individuals’	   freedoms.	  As	   for	   the	  case	  study	  of	  this	  work,	  moreover,	  issues	  of	  social	  justice	  come	  back	  again	  in	  that	  an	  unequal	   epidemiological	   burden	   of	   HPV-­‐related	   morbidities	   exists	   between	  different	  socioeconomic	  groups.	  	  The	   question	   to	   be	   asked	   as	   to	   the	   ethical	   trade-­‐off	   hence	   is:	   is	   it	   right	   to	  diminish,	   in	   some	   way,	   individuals’	   choice	   for	   ensure	   equal	   distribution	   and	  reducing	  disparities	  in	  vaccine	  uptakes?	  And	  if	  it	  is	  so,	  up	  to	  what	  extent?	  	  Finally	   the	   third	   trade-­‐off	   pertains	   to	   a	   specific	   policy	   question	   in	   the	   HPV	  context.	  As	  I	  have	  shown,	  HPV	  is	  a	  sexually	  transmitted	  virus.	  Although	  the	  most	  burdensome	  effects	  of	  HPV	  infections	  are	  on	  women,	  men	  are	  still	  vectors	  of	  the	  infection.	  An	  issue	  of	  gender	  equity	  hence	  arises	  as	  to	  whether	  it	  is	  fair	  that	  only	  girls	  carry	  the	  burden	  of	  prevention	  and	  vaccination.	  Moreover,	  epidemiological	  studies	   are	   ascertaining	   that,	   although	   less	   frequently,	   HPV-­‐related	   cancers	  affect	   men	   too.	   This	   consideration	   would	   suggest	   that	   there	   are	   reasons	   for	  vaccinating	   also	   men.	   As	   some	   studies	   show,	   however,	   vaccinating	   also	   men	  may	   not	   be	   cost-­‐effective.	   Therefore,	   issues	   of	   gender	   equity	   -­‐	   if	   considered	  valuable	  -­‐	  should	  be	  traded-­‐off	  against	  other	  important	  efficiency	  concerns.	  The	  ethical	   issue	   thus	   become:	   should	   society	   spend	   more	   for	   fostering	   and	  preserving	  equality	  among	  sexes?	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These	  questions	  will	  inform	  the	  remaining	  part	  of	  this	  work.	  In	  particular,	  in	  the	  following	  chapter	  I	  will	  assess	  how	  present	  policies	  accommodates	  the	  first	  two	  trade-­‐offs	  and	  how	  they	  try	  to	  put	  them	  in	  balance	  together	  with	  all	   the	  other	  morally	  relevant	  interests.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  that	  chapter	  I	  will	  be	  able	  to	  tell	  what	  are	  the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  each	  policy	  scheme,	  and	  whether	  there	  is	  one	  that	  is	  able	  to	  achieve	  a	  better	  equilibrium.	  In	  the	  fifth	  chapter,	  instead,	  I	  will	  tackle	  the	  third	  trade-­‐off.	  In	  the	  sixth	  chapter	  I	  recollect	  the	  problems	  faced	  and	   provide	   a	   further	   layer	   of	   analysis	   as	   to	   their	   solution.	   In	   each	   chapter,	  however,	  I	  will	  take	  a	  normative	  stance	  as	  to	  the	  specific	  questions	  that	  arise	  in	  that	  context.	  The	  morally	  grounded	  interests	  here	  illustrated	  and	  the	  theoretical	  tools	   in	   the	   first	   chapter	   of	   this	   work	   will,	   at	   several	   points,	   emerge	   in	   the	  discussion	  sometimes	  clarifying	  and	  some	  other	  radicalizing	  the	  issues	  at	  stake.	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Chapter	  four.	  HPV	  vaccination	  programmes:	  
a	  normative	  comparative	  analysis	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  
In	  the	  previous	  chapters	  I	  have	  introduced	  HPV	  vaccination,	  I	  have	  analysed	  its	  promises	   as	  well	   as	   the	  morally	   sensitive	   issues	   that	   this	   intervention	   brings	  about.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   chapter,	   I	   have	   also	   specified	   what	   are	   the	   morally	  grounded	  interests	  at	  play	  within	  this	  intervention.	  I	  said	  that	  all	  these	  morally	  grounded	   interests	   only	   hold	   prima	   facie.	   That	   is,	   they	   can	   be	   overridden	   in	  certain	  circumstances.	  The	  beneficence	  model	  of	  public	  health	  ethics	  presented	  in	  the	   first	  chapter,	  more	  specifically,	   indicates	  what	  are	  those	  conditions	  that	  can	   justifiably	   override,	   for	   instance,	   concerns	   for	   individual	   liberty.	   The	  analysis	   put	   forward	   in	   the	   second	   chapter,	  moreover,	   has	   shown	   that	   public	  health	   activities	   are	   justified	   also	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   justice	   in	   that	   they	  provide	   fair	   equality	   of	   opportunity.	   By	   an	   exploration	   of	   the	   social	  determinants	   of	   health	   and	   health	   inequalities	   I	   have	   specified	   a	   further	  requirement	   of	   justice	   for	   public	   health	   activities.	   Although	   some	   inequalities	  may	   be	   permitted	   also	   in	   the	   Rawlsian	   framework,	   I	   have	   shown	   that	   public	  health	   policies	   should	   strive	   to	   avoid	   worsening	   existing	   health	   inequalities.	  Also	   in	   this	   case	   a	   caveat	   is	   in	   order.	   A	   policy	   that	   correctly	   addresses	   the	  problem	  of	  existing	  inequalities	  and	  puts	  in	  place	  all	  the	  necessary	  means	  as	  to	  avoid	   an	   increment	  of	   them	  acts	   justly.	   This	  means	   that	   if	   inequalities	   should	  persist	   after	   the	   intervention	   has	   been	   put	   in	   place,	   the	   latter	   would	   be	  unfortunate	  but	  not	  necessarily	  unjust.	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Having	   further	   clarified	   these	   points,	   let	   us	   now	   proceed	   to	   the	   comparative	  analysis	  of	   the	  different	  policies	  devised	   for	  HPV	  control	  and	   the	   reduction	  of	  cervical	   cancer	   cases.	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   understanding	   how	   the	   different	  policies	   fare	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   interests	   I	   have	   shown	   to	   be	   in	   place	   in	   this	  context.	  My	  final	  aim	  is	  to	  understand	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  policy	  model	  that	  best	  harmonizes	   all	   the	   morally	   relevant	   interests	   at	   stake.	   Three	   policy	   models	  seem	  to	  emerge	  so	  far	  for	  tackling	  HPV	  as	  a	  public	  health	  problem.	  The	  first	  are	  those	  policies	  that	  mandate	  vaccination.	  These	  policy	  models	  have	  been	  enacted	  in	   some	   states	   of	   the	   US,	   and	   they	   are	   still	  waiting	   for	   approval	   in	   others.	   In	  these	   states	   vaccination	   is	   obligatory	   for	   girls	   before	   admittance	   to	   the	   sixth	  grade.	   The	   second	   model,	   instead,	   leaves	   HPV	   immunization	   to	   the	   private	  initiative	  of	  individuals.	  The	  voluntary	  model	  is	  adopted	  in	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  countries	   that	  have	  decided	   to	   take	   action	   against	  HPV.	  The	  voluntary	  model,	  however,	   is	   a	   heterogeneous	   one	   and	   deserves	   further	   specification.	   I	   will	  identify	   three	   of	   them.	   In	   the	   first,	   public	   health	   authorities	   recommend	   the	  vaccine,	   but	   its	   administration	   is	   left	   to	   the	   decision	   of	   the	   parents	   and	   their	  paediatricians.	  This	  model	  is	  the	  most	  widespread	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  I	  will	  thus	  take	  them	   as	   representative	   of	   this	   mode	   of	   intervention.	   The	   second	   voluntary	  model,	   moreover,	   is	   one	   where	   although	   the	   final	   decision	   as	   to	   whether	  vaccinate	  is	  left	  to	  individual	  choice,	  the	  state	  nonetheless	  actively	  proposes	  the	  vaccine	  free	  of	  charge	  to	  everyone	  and	  by	  an	  invitation	  letter.	  I	  will	  take	  Italy	  as	  an	  exemplification	  of	  this	  way	  of	  intervening.	  Finally,	  the	  third	  voluntary	  model	  offers	  vaccination	  free	  of	  charge	  and	  delivers	  it	  through	  schools.	  I	  will	  call	  this	  third	  scheme	  the	  school-­‐based	  model.	   It	   is	  adopted	   in	   the	  UK	  and	   in	  Australia	  and,	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   simplicity,	   I	   will	   take	   the	   former	   as	   an	   example.	   As	  mentioned,	  my	  goal	  is	  to	  define	  by	  the	  end	  of	  this	  chapter	  whether	  or	  not	  there	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is	   a	   model	   that	   better	   balances	   all	   the	   morally	   relevant	   interests	   I	   have	  identified	  before.	  Nonetheless,	   I	  will	   also	  assess	  each	  model	   in	   its	  own	  merits	  and	  show	  its	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages.	  To	  proceed	  in	  an	  orderly	  fashion	  I	  will	  organize	  my	  discussion	  around	  two	  problematic	  themes.	  The	  first	  theme	  I	  identify	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  justification.	  Under	  the	  problem	  of	  justification,	  I	  will	  assess	  whether	  each	  policy	   is	  able	  to	   justify	   its	  means	  of	   intervention.	  Clearly,	  the	  more	   intrusive	   the	  means	   the	  more	  general	  and	  powerful	   the	   justification	  should	   be.	   In	   this	   context	   the	   tools	   of	   the	   beneficence	   model	   previously	  introduced	  would	  prove	  useful.	  The	  second	  theme	  I	  will	  discuss	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  justice.	  I	  would	  ask	  whether	  the	  benefits	  and	  burdens	  of	  the	  intervention	  are	  fairly	  distributed	  across	  society.	  In	  the	  second	  chapter	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  public	  health	   interventions	   are	   generally	   justified	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   justice	  because	  they	  sustain	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity.	  As	  explained	  in	  that	  chapter,	  moreover,	   I	   will	   see	   whether	   the	   different	   policies	   are	   able	   to	   meet	   the	  requirement	  of	  the	  negative	  aim	  of	  justice.	  That	  is,	  I	  will	  see	  whether	  each	  policy	  is	  acting	  in	  a	  context	  in	  which	  health	  inequalities	  exist,	  and	  whether	  the	  mode	  of	  intervention	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  worsening	  them.	  	  
2.	  HPV	  and	  public	  policy	  
Before	   proceeding	   with	   the	   ethical	   analysis,	   however,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   see	  more	   in	  detail	  what	  are	   the	  policy	  actions	   taken	  so	   far	   for	  HPV	  control	   in	   the	  different	   countries	   that	   will	   be	   part	   of	  my	   analysis.	   The	  WHO	   has	   supported	  policy	  efforts	  to	  implement	  mass	  vaccination	  programmes	  and	  issued,	  in	  2009,	  a	  position	  paper	   that,	   although	  not	  binding	   for	  member	  states,	   is	   supposed	   to	  guide	  their	  policy	  actions.	  The	  WHO	  position	  on	  HPV	  states:	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Who	   recognizes	   the	   importance	  of	   cervical	   cancer	   and	  other	  HPV-­‐related	  diseases	  as	  global	  public	  health	  problems	  and	  recommends	  that	  routine	  HPV	  vaccination	  should	  be	  included	  in	  national	  immunization	  programmes.	  […]	  HPV	  vaccines	  are	  most	  efficacious	  in	   females	  who	  are	  naïve	   to	  vaccine-­‐related	  HPV	   types;	   therefore,	   the	  primary	   target	  population	  should	  be	  selected	  based	  on	  data	  on	  age	  of	  initiation	  of	  sexual	  activity	  and	  the	  feasibility	  of	  reaching	  young	  adolescent	  girls	  through	  schools,	  health-­‐care	  facilities	  or	  community-­‐based	  settings.	  The	  primary	  target	  population	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  girls	  within	  the	  age	  range	  of	  9	  or	  10	  years	  through	  to	  13	  years	  (World	  Health	  Organization	  2009,	  128)	  
Most	   countries	   in	   the	   developed	   world,	   however,	   took	   policy	   action	   slightly	  before	  the	  WHO	  took	  an	  official	  position	  on	  the	  matter.	  Let	  us	  explore	  those	  that	  will	  be	  part	  of	  my	  analysis.	  	  
HPV	  policies	   in	   the	  United	  States.	   Vaccination	   policies	   in	   the	  US	   generally	   take	  steps	   from	   the	   recommendation	   issued	   by	   the	   Advisory	   Committee	   on	  
Immunization	  Practices	   (ACIP).	  As	  we	  read	   in	   its	  website22,	  ACIP	   is	  a	  group	  of	  experts	  in	  immunization	  appointed	  by	  the	  Secretary	  of	  the	  U.	  S.	  Department	  of	  Health	  and	  Human	  Services	  to	  provide	  advice	  and	  guidance	  to	  the	  Secretary	  and	  the	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  Prevention	   (CDC)	  on	  the	  control	  of	  vaccine-­‐preventable	  diseases.	  	  	  
ACIP	   provides	   advice	   to	   the	   federal	   government	   on	   vaccines	   related	   issues	  through	  written	  recommendations	  for	  the	  routine	  administration	  of	  vaccines	  to	  children	  and	  adults	   in	   the	  civilian	  population.	  Private	   insurers	  and	  the	   federal	  government	   to	   determine	   what	   vaccines	   they	   will	   cover	   generally	   use	   the	  recommendations	  of	  ACIP.	  Vaccines	  recommended	  by	  ACIP	  are	  included	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/acip/.	  Last	  access:	  November	  20th,	  2011.	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Vaccine	  for	  Children	  Program	  (VFC),	  a	  federal	  program	  that	  provides	  vaccine	  for	  free	   to	   children	   who	   are	   uninsured	   or	   who	   lack	   the	   resources	   for	   affording	  vaccines.	   Moreover,	   member	   states	   generally	   use	   ACIP	   vaccine	  recommendations	  to	  mandate	  immunization	  before	  entrance	  in	  public	  schools.	  The	   ACIP	   recommended	   HPV	   entered	   the	   routine	   immunization	   schedule	   in	  March	   of	   2007.	   In	   particular,	   it	   recommended	  Gardasil	   to	   be	   administered	   to	  11-­‐12	  females	  and	  to	  females	  aged	  13-­‐26	  in	  a	  catch	  up	  programme	  (Markowitz	  et	  al.	  2007).	  Later	  on,	   in	  2010,	  ACIP	  also	  recommended	  Cervarix	   for	   the	  same	  age	  group	  (CDC	  2010),	  and	  very	  recently,	  on	  October	  25th	  2011,	  extended	   the	  recommendation	  to	  boys	  in	  the	  same	  age	  group	  (ACIP,	  Resolution	  No.	  010/11-­‐1)23.	  	  
ACIP	  is	  a	  federal	  advisory	  board	  and	  when	  it	  issues	  its	  guidelines,	  physicians	  are	  asked	   to	   follow	   them	   and	   propose	   the	   vaccine	   to	   their	   patients.	   In	   this	   case,	  vaccination	  is	  left	  to	  the	  private	  initiative	  of	  physicians	  and	  parents	  alone.	  Since	  then,	   however,	   several	   states	   have	   proposed	   legislations	   to	   push	   uptake	   in	   a	  more	  centralized	  manner.	  So	   far,	  41	  states	  have	   introduced	   legislation	  related	  to	   HPV	   vaccines.	   Of	   these,	   24	   (Kentucky,	   New	   York,	   Texas,	   New	   Mexico,	  California,	  Colorado,	  Connecticut,	  District	  of	  Columbia,	  Florida,	  Georgia,	  Illinois,	  Kansas,	   Maryland,	   Massachusetts,	   Michigan,	   Missouri,	   Minnesota,	   Mississippi,	  Ohio,	   Oklahoma,	   South	   Carolina,	   Vermont,	   Virginia	   West	   Virginia)	   have	  introduced	   legislation	   that	  would	  require	  proof	  of	  HPV	   immunization	   for	  girls	  before	  enrolment	   to	   the	  sixth	  grade.	  Virginia	  and	  the	  District	  of	  Columbia	  are,	  however,	  the	  only	  two	  that	  have	  actually	  enacted	  school	  mandates.	  In	  all	  other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  This	  recommendation	  is	  very	  recent	  and	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  published	  in	  the	  Morbidity	  
and	  Mortality	  Weekly	  Report,	  the	  ‘official	  voice’	  of	  CDC.	  This	  means,	  that	  the	  recommendation	  is	  still	  not	  official.	  Nevertheless,	  CDC	  generally	  receives	  ACIP	  recommendations.	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cases	   the	   decisions	   are	   still	   pending.	  Not	   all	   states	   are	   considering	  mandates.	  Some	   of	   them,	   instead,	   have	   approved	   laws	   to	   educate	   the	   public	   (North	  Carolina,	   North	   Dakota,	   Missouri,	   Rhode	   Island,	   Utah),	   to	   distribute	   free	  vaccines	   (New	   Hampshire,	   South	   Dakota,	   Washington),	   or	   to	   require	   to	  insurance	   schemes	   to	   cover	   the	  vaccine	  price	   (California,	  Rhode	   Island,	   South	  Dakota)	  (source:	  National	  Conference	  of	  State	  Legislatures)24.	  
HPV	  policy	  in	  Italy.	  Italy	  provides	  a	  universalistic	  health	  service	  to	  all	  its	  citizens.	  It	  is	  funded	  through	  the	  tax	  system	  and	  access	  is	  guaranteed	  according	  to	  need	  and	  not	  ability	   to	  pay.	  The	   Italian	  Servizio	  Sanitario	  Nazionale	   (SSN	   -­‐	  National	  
Health	  Service)	  decides	  what	  are	  called	  the	  Livelli	  Essenziali	  di	  Assistenza	  (LEA	  –	  Minimal	  Levels	  of	  Assistance),	  that	  is,	  what	  are	  the	  minimal	  services	  provided.	  The	  objectives	  of	   the	  SSN	  are	  decided	   in	  an	  agreement	  between	   the	  Ministero	  
della	  Salute	   (Ministry	   of	  Health)	   and	   the	   twenty	   regions	   in	  what	   is	   called	   the	  
Conferenza	   Permanente	   Stato-­‐Regioni	   (CPSR).	   The	   implementation	   of	   the	  objectives,	  moreover,	   is	   left	   to	   the	   regions	   that	   provide	   the	   service	   through	   a	  number	  of	  local	  health	  units	  called	  Aziende	  Sanitarie	  Locali.	  The	  SSN	  includes	  in	  the	  LEA	  a	  number	  of	  childhood	  vaccinations.	  Among	  them,	  four	  (tetanus,	  polio,	  HiB,	  diphtheria)	  are	  obligatory	  and	  the	  others	  only	  recommended.	  All	  of	   them	  are	  offered	  free	  of	  charge.	  Also	  with	  regards	  to	  vaccinations	  the	  objectives	  are	  decided	  at	  the	  national	  level	  by	  the	  CPSR,	  that	  issues	  every	  three	  years	  what	  is	  called	  the	  Piano	  Nazionale	  Vaccinazioni	  (PNV	  –	  National	  Vaccination	  Plan),	  and	  their	  implementation	  is	  left	  to	  the	  20	  regions	  (Ministero	  della	  Salute	  2010).	  On	  December	  20th	  2007,	   the	  CPSR	  agreed	   to	   include	  HPV	  vaccination	   in	   the	  PNV.	  The	   target	   group	   of	   the	   vaccination	   are	   11-­‐12	   year-­‐old	   girls	   to	   whom	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Web	  page:	  http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14381	  (Last	  access:	  October	  30,	  2011)	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vaccine	  is	  offered	  free	  of	  charge.	  In	  the	  agreement	  we	  can	  read	  that	  the	  choice	  of	  the	   target	   group	  was	   driven	   by	   the	   following	   considerations	   (Ministero	   della	  Salute	  -­‐	  Conferenza	  Permanente	  Stato	  Regioni	  2007):	  
-­‐ the	  vaccine	  works	  best	  before	  the	  onset	  of	  sexual	  activity	  -­‐ the	  communication	  with	  families	  is	  facilitated	  -­‐ to	   maintain	   the	   vaccination	   offer	   within	   the	   established	   network	   of	  expertise	  in	  vaccination	  -­‐ to	  limit	  inequalities	  
The	  families	  are	  informed	  of	  the	  HPV	  vaccine	  offer	  by	  an	  invitation	  letter	  sent	  to	  them	   by	   local	   health	   units.	   The	   letter	   describes	   the	   link	   between	   HPV	   and	  cervical	  cancer,	  known	  duration	  of	  the	  vaccine-­‐induced	  immunity,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	   immunization	   only	   confers	   protection	   against	   two	   high-­‐risk	   HPV	   viral	  types.	   In	   the	   letter,	   moreover,	   families	   are	   informed	   that	   it	   will	   be	   anyway	  necessary	   attending	   cervical	   cancer	   screenings	   in	   the	   future.	   Parents	   who	  decide	   to	   adhere	   to	   the	   offer	   are	   then	   asked	   to	   contact	   their	   paediatrician	   or	  their	   local	   health	   unit.	   As	   we	   read	   in	   the	   PNV	   for	   the	   years	   2010-­‐2012,	   the	  national	  objective	  of	  the	  policy	  is	  to	  reach	  95%	  of	  the	  target	  population	  by	  2015	  (Ministero	  della	  Salute	  2010).	  
	  
HPV	  policy	  in	  UK.	  The	  Italian	  SSN	  is	  directly	  inspired	  to	  the	  UK	  National	  Health	  
Service	   (NHS).	   Also	   the	  NHS	   indeed	   provides	   universal	   access	   to	  medical	   and	  preventive	  services	   to	  all	   citizens	   free	  at	   the	  point	  of	  use.	  The	  NHS	   is	  publicly	  funded	   through	   the	   taxation	   system.	   Each	   of	   the	   UK	   countries	   (England,	  Scotland,	  Wales	  and	  Northern	  Ireland)	  has	  it	  own	  NHS	  that	  is	  accountable	  to	  the	  respective	  government.	  Like	  in	  the	  US,	  vaccination	  policies	  in	  the	  UK	  take	  step	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from	   the	   recommendation	   of	   an	   advisory	   board	   of	   experts	   called	   Joint	  
Committee	   on	   Vaccination	   and	   Immunization	   (JCVI).	   As	   stated	   in	   its	   website,	  JCVI’	   terms	   of	   reference	   are:	   “To	   advise	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	  Health	   and	  Welsh	   Ministers	   on	   matters	   relating	   to	   the	   provision	   of	   vaccination	   and	  immunisation	   services,	   being	   facilities	   for	   the	   prevention	   of	   illness”25.	   Upon	  request	   of	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State,	   the	   JCVI	   makes	   recommendation	   for	   the	  introduction	   of	   new	   vaccines	   based	   on	   an	   assessment	   of	   their	   public	   health	  impact,	   safety,	   efficacy	   and	   cost	   effectiveness.	   The	   committee	  may	   also	  make	  recommendations	  to	  the	  ministries	  of	  Scotland	  and	  Northern	  Ireland.	  The	  JCVI	  introduced	   the	  HPV	   vaccine	   in	   the	  UK	   in	   September	   2008	   and	   recommended	  targeting	  the	  programme	  at	  girls	  aged	  12	  and	  13,	  with	  a	  catch	  up	  campaign	  for	  girls	  aged	  up	  to	  18	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  over	  a	  three-­‐year	  time	  frame.	  To	  maximise	  uptake	   and	   public	   health	   impact,	   the	   JCVI	   decided	   to	   deliver	   the	   three-­‐dose	  schedule	   through	   schools	   as	   part	   of	   the	   publicly	   funded	   NHS.	   In	   the	  recommendation	   statement	   the	   JCVI	   underscores	   the	   importance	   of	  communicating	   to	  women	   that	   cervical	   cancer	   screening	   remains	   an	   essential	  component	  of	  the	  cancer	  prevention	  programme.	  The	  JCVI,	  moreover,	  chose	  to	  administer	   the	   bivalent	   vaccine	   (Cervarix)	   due	   to	   its	   more	   competitive	   cost	  (Departmen	   of	   Health,	   Joint	   Committee	   on	   Vaccination	   and	   Immunization	  2008).	  	  As	  with	  all	  JCVI	  recommended	  immunizations	  in	  UK,	  the	  HPV	  vaccine	  is	  offered	  free	   of	   charge	   and	   on	   a	   voluntary	   based.	   Schools,	   which	   receive	   information	  material	   from	   the	   Department	   of	   Health,	   inform	   parents	   of	   the	   opportunity	  through	  school	  nurses	  who,	  after	  receiving	  consent,	  also	  administer	  the	  vaccine.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  http://www.dh.gov.uk/ab/JCVI/index.htm	  (Last	  access	  October,	  30	  2011).	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3.	  The	  mandatory	  model	  
Using	  the	  tools	  of	  the	  administrative	  state	  to	  require	  vaccination	  compliance	  is	  an	   option	   now	   discontinued	   in	  many	   countries.	   For	   instance,	   in	   Europe	   only	  Belgium,	  Poland,	  Greece,	  Spain	  and	  Italy	  have	  still	  in	  place	  compulsory	  policies	  for	  some	  vaccinations.	  In	  cases	  like	  Italy,	  moreover,	  the	  decision	  as	  to	  whether	  continuing	  with	   these	   policies	   is	   now	   left	   to	   single	   regions	   and	   two	   of	   them,	  Piedmont	   and	   Veneto,	   have	   already	   made	   all	   vaccinations	   voluntary	   (Moran,	  Gainotti,	   and	   Petrini	   2008).	   Among	   the	   industrialized	   countries,	   also	   the	   US	  require	   some	   vaccinations	   by	   law,	   conditioning	   school	   entrance	   upon	  immunization.	  	  
Let	  us	  see,	  however,	  whether	  the	  compulsory	  model	  is	  appropriate	  for	  the	  HPV	  case,	  and	  how	  if	  fares	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  morally	  grounded	  interests	  previously	  identified.	  The	  compulsory	  model	  is	  certainly	  attractive	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	   population	   health	   interests.	   Arguably,	   mandating	   HPV	   vaccination	   would	  ensure	   widespread	   compliance,	   and	   reach	   the	   population	   target	   quite	   easily.	  Although	  HPV	  vaccines	  do	  not	  target	  all	  the	  oncogenic	  types,	  it	  is	  still	  required	  that	  a	   certain	  number	  of	  people	   in	   the	   target	  group	  get	  actually	  vaccinated	   in	  order	  to	  observe	  a	  sensible	  reduction	  of	  HPV	  related	  morbidities.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  HPV	   vaccination	   this	   number	   is	   calculated	   around	   75-­‐80%	   (Garnett	   2005),	   if	  only	  girls	  are	   to	  be	  vaccinated.	   Ideally,	   should	   the	  vaccination	  reach	  everyone	  all	   the	   HPV	   16	   and	   18	   cervical	   cancers	   would	   disappear	   thus	   drastically	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changing	   the	   epidemiological	   profile	   of	   the	   disease26 .	   In	   other	   words,	   if	  immunization	  is	  not	  widespread	  its	  potential	  public	  health	  benefit	  gets	  lost,	  and	  the	   intervention	   then	   becomes	   a	   drug	   for	   individual	   risk	   reduction	   only	  (Aronowitz	   2010).	   Clearly,	   this	   may	   not	   be	   a	   problem	   as	   such,	   it	   may	   be	   so,	  however,	  when	  public	  efforts	  and	  funds	  are	  put	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  population	  health	   goals.	   The	   use	   of	   mandates	   proves	   attractive	   not	   only	   from	   an	  epidemiological	  point	  of	  view,	  but	  also	   if	  we	  consider	   issues	  about	  equity	  and	  justice.	   These	   concerns,	   indeed,	   are	   especially	   relevant	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	  disproportionate	  epidemiological	  burden	  of	  cervical	  cancer	  in	  the	  US	  (the	  only	  country	  in	  which	  mandates	  are	  proposed)	  in	  women	  belonging	  to	  economically	  disadvantaged	   groups,	   who	   are	   also	   less	   likely	   to	   receive	   PAP	   smears	   and	  follow-­‐up	  care	  after	  abnormal	  results	  (J.	  S.	  Smith	  2008;	  Cuzick	  et	  al.	  2000).	  
Mandates	   fare	  well	  with	  respect	  to	   justice	  and	  population	   interests	  but	   less	   in	  terms	   of	   respect	   for	   the	   autonomous	   choice	   of	   individuals.	   Respect	   for	  autonomy	   is	   of	   pivotal	   importance	   in	   liberal	   societies,	   and	   even	   more	   in	  contexts	   so	   delicate	   as	   decisions	   regarding	   healthcare.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   HPV	  mandates,	  hence,	  a	  trade-­‐off	  between	  individual	  choice	  and	  population	  interests	  exists.	   It	   is	   important	   then	   to	   see	  whether	   it	   can	   be	   resolved.	   In	   this	   context,	  resolution	   requires	   the	   exploration	   of	   the	   reasons	   that	  may	   justify	   the	   use	   of	  compulsory	  means	  and	  whether	  they	  hold.	  	  
As	   I	   have	   illustrated	   at	   several	   points	   throughout	   this	  work,	   one	   of	   the	  most	  general	  justification	  for	  restricting	  liberty	  is	  the	  appeal	  to	  John	  Stuart	  Mill	  harm	  principle.	  Does	  HPV	  warrant	  the	  use	  of	  the	  harm	  principle?	  Some	  has	  claimed	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  As	  we	  will	  see	  below	  (infra	  chapter	  5)	  the	  issue	  is	  more	  complicated	  than	  that.	  Achieving	  herd	  effects	  will	  most	  likely	  require	  including	  males	  into	  the	  programmes.	  The	  point	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  here	  is	  that	  for	  population	  health	  goals	  to	  be	  observed	  is	  required	  that	  a	  high	  number	  of	  people	  gets	  immunized.	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does	   (Balog	   2009),	   in	   that	   the	   vaccine	   would	   protect	   also	   the	   spread	   of	  infections	   to	   third	   parties.	   This	   argument,	   however,	   needs	   to	   be	   spelled	   out	  more	  precisely	  since,	  as	  it	  stands,	  appears	  to	  be	  not	  decisive.	  What	  we	  need	  to	  understand,	  accordingly,	   is	  both	  who	  are	  the	  actors	  whose	  liberty	  is	  restricted	  and	   who	   are	   the	   third	   parties	   that	   could	   be	   harmed.	   On	   a	   first	   reading,	   the	  actors	   whose	   liberty	   is	   restricted	   are	   the	   receivers	   of	   the	   intervention	  themselves.	   In	   the	   HPV	   case,	   however,	   this	   justificatory	   track	   cannot	   be	  followed	   in	   that	   girls	   are	   more	   the	   victims	   of	   the	   infection	   rather	   than	   the	  vectors.	   An	   appeal	   to	   the	   harm	   principle,	   hence,	   would	   only	   be	   possible	   if	  compulsory	  policies	  were	  adopted	  on	  a	  gender-­‐neutral	  base.	  I	  will	  dwell	  more	  extensively	  with	  issues	  related	  to	  gender	  fairness	  in	  the	  following	  chapter,	  so	  let	  us	  see	  what	  are	  the	  other	  alternatives	  for	  justifying	  compulsory	  policies	  by	  the	  means	  of	  the	  harm	  principle.	  	  
The	  second,	  and	  most	  plausible,	  option	  is	  to	  conceive	  of	  girls	  as	  the	  third	  party	  that	   would	   be	   harmed	   should	   vaccination	   not	   be	   provided	   to	   them.	   In	   this	  reading,	   the	   liberty	  restricted	   is	   that	  of	  parents	  on	   the	  presumption	   that	  state	  mandates	  better	  protect	  girls	  from	  ensuing	  harm.	  States,	  in	  general,	  grant	  broad	  space	  for	  parental	  autonomy	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  protection	  of	   their	  children’s	  interests	  and	  only	  rarely	  intervene	  on	  those	  matters.	  Heather	  Harrell	  notes	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  food	  choice	  and	  consumption	  the	  state	  regulates	  infrequently	  to	  curtail	  parental	  choice,	  and	  does	  it	  only	  in	  specific	  public	  circumstances.	  For	  instance,	   states	   do	   regulate	   what	   kind	   of	   food	   is	   offered	   in	   public	   school	  cafeterias.	   Nevertheless,	   she	   argues,	   the	   regulated	   behaviour	   is	   occurring	  outside	  the	  home	  and	  the	  state	  functions	  as	  the	  parent	  in	  a	  school	  setting.	  It	  is	  only	  in	  extreme	  situations	  that	  the	  parental	  right	  is	  limited	  based	  on	  the	  health	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risks	  that	  result	  from	  the	  child’s	  diet	  (Harrell	  2009,	  136).	  Is,	  in	  the	  HPV	  case,	  the	  magnitude	  of	  harm	  girls	  are	  exposed	  to	  so	  vast	  as	  to	  justify	  state	  intervention?	  Some	   parents	   could	   argue,	   on	   their	   side,	   that	   they	   are	   not	   harming	   their	  daughters	   if	   they	   do	   not	   allow	   them	   to	   be	   immunized	   in	   that	   different	   other	  methods	  exist	  to	  avoid	  HPV	  infection	  or	  to	  control	  it	  appropriately.	  For	  instance,	  they	  could	  say	  that	  they	  will	  teach	  their	  daughters	  how	  to	  conduct	  a	  responsible	  sexual	   life	  and	   the	  kind	  of	  protection	  needed	   to	  avoid	  all	   sexually	   transmitted	  infections.	  This	  kind	  of	  reasoning	  need	  not	   to	  be	  expressed	   in	  religious	  terms,	  for	   instance	  some	  parents	  may	  very	  well	  prefer	  not	   to	   let	   their	  daughters	  run	  the	  even	  small	   risks	   that	  can	  ensue	   from	  vaccination.	  Some	  words	  of	  cautions	  are,	  however,	  in	  order.	  Several	  studies	  show	  that	  although	  condom	  use	  reduces	  the	   risk	   of	   contracting	   a	   HPV	   infection	   they	   do	   not	   eliminate	   it.	   In	   fact,	   HPV	  transmission	   to	   occur	   does	   not	   need	   a	   full	   penetrative	   sexual	   intercourse;	   a	  skin-­‐to-­‐skin	  genital	  contact	  appears	  sufficient.	  Thus	  condom	  use	  only	  partially	  protect	   from	  the	   infection	  (Manhart	  and	  Koutsky	  2002;	  Vaccarella	  et	  al.	  2006;	  Winer	  et	  al.	  2006).	  This	  fact	  notwithstanding,	  supporters	  of	  parental	  autonomy	  can	  claim	  that	  even	  admitted	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  infection	  may	  still	  be	  present,	  their	  educational	   tools	  would	   be	   enough	   to	   avoid	   serious	   harm	   to	   their	   daughters.	  They	   can,	   for	   instance,	   provide	   full	   education	   to	   their	   daughters	   as	   to	   how	  correctly	   prevent	   cervical	   cancer.	   A	   conscientious	   mother,	   for	   instance,	   can	  educate	   her	   daughter	   to	   regularly	   attend	   cervical	   cancer	   screening	   so	  drastically	  reducing	  her	  risk	  to	  get	  the	  disease.	  From	  some	  parents’	  perspective,	  hence,	  the	  risk	  of	  harm	  imposed	  to	  their	  daughters	  is	  neither	  certain	  (there	  are	  other	  ways	  to	  protect	  oneself),	  nor	   immediate	  (even	   if	  one	  gets	   infected	  there	  are	  other	  preventive	  strategies	  to	  avoid	  the	  disease).	  The	  reasons	  to	  justify	  HPV	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mandates	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   the	   harm	   principle	   seems	   thus	   to	   be	   weakly	  supported.	  
So	   far,	  we	   have	   seen	   that	   an	   appeal	   to	   the	   harm	  principle	   does	   not,	   by	   itself,	  provide	  a	  justification	  for	  mandatory	  HPV	  vaccination	  programmes.	  It	  does	  not	  so	  because	  we	  cannot	  identify	  a	  genuinely	  other-­‐regarding	  harmful	  action	  that	  individuals	   whose	   liberty	   is	   restricted	   are	   performing.	   We	   cannot	   do	   that	  neither	   if	  we	   consider	   girls	   the	   subjects	   of	   the	   restriction,	   nor	   if	  we	   consider	  their	  parents.	  Let	  us	  thus	  explore	  another	  option.	  As	  someone	  suggests,	  gender-­‐based	   vaccination	   programmes	   can	   be	   considered	   interventions	   that	   target	  behaviour	  (Harrell	  2009)	  –	  i.e.	  sexual	  activity	  –	  for	  the	  harmful	  consequences	  it	  may	  bring	  about	  to	  the	  agent	  herself.	  In	  moral	  and	  political	  philosophy,	  the	  act	  of	  benefiting	  someone	  against	  his	  or	  her	  expresses	  wishes	  is	  called	  paternalism.	  Although	  weaker,	   the	  appeal	   to	  paternalism	  is	  sometimes	  considered	  ethically	  justified	   by	   some	   scholars	   (Childress	   et	   al.	   2002;	   Beauchamp	   and	   Childress	  2009).	   This	   argument	   has	   been	   briefly	   touched	   upon	   by	   some	   authors	   in	   the	  context	   of	   HPV	   vaccination,	   but	   not	   properly	   spelled	   out	   (Malmqvist	   et	   al.	  2011).	   Let	   us	   then	   see	   whether	   an	   appeal	   to	   paternalism	   can	   be	   ethically	  justified	  in	  the	  HPV	  case.	  	  
Paternalistic	  actions	  are	  commonly	  divided	  into	  two	  groups:	  hard	  paternalistic	  interventions	   and	   soft	   paternalistic	   interventions.	   Hard	   paternalism	   occurs	  when	   the	   harmful	   action	   curtailed	   is	   voluntary	   and	   self-­‐regarding.	   Soft	  paternalism,	   instead,	   refers	   to	   those	   actions	   that	  while	   self-­‐regarding	   are	   not	  voluntary.	   Some	  authors	  argue	   that	   soft	  paternalistic	   interventions	  are	  hardly	  unjustifiable,	  and	  what	   is	  ethically	  problematic	   is	   the	  use	  of	  hard	  paternalistic	  means	   (Childress	   et	   al.	   2002).	  The	   classical	   examples	  of	  hard	  paternalism	  are	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seat-­‐belt	   legislations.	   We	   know	   that	   the	   use	   of	   seatbelts	   reduces	   the	   risk	   of	  harmful	  consequences	  for	  the	  driver	  in	  case	  of	  a	  road	  accident.	  Clearly,	  from	  the	  individual	  perspective,	  not	  wearing	  the	  seat-­‐belt	  does	  not	  put	  anyone	  at	  risk	  if	  not	   the	  agent	   that	   so	  decides.	   Is	   it	  morally	  problematic	   to	  mandate	   their	  use?	  One	   first	   line	  of	   argument	  would	   consider	   these	   laws	  morally	  dubious	   in	   that	  they	   are	   disrespecting	   the	   autonomous	   choices	   of	   competent	   individuals.	  Another	   line,	   instead,	   would	   not	   consider	   these	   laws	   paternalistic	   at	   all	   and	  would	  appeal	   to	   the	   financial	  costs	   that	  road	   fatalities	  bring	  about	   in	   terms	  of	  increased	   hospitalization	   and	   long-­‐term	   care,	   or	   the	   emotional	   costs	   to	  observers	   and	   rescue	   squads.	   For	   the	  purposes	   of	   this	  work	   I	   do	  not	  want	   to	  dwell	  on	  the	  debate	  as	  to	  whether	  seat-­‐belts	  laws	  are	  cases	  of	  hard	  paternalism	  or	  not.	  Instead,	  what	  I	  want	  to	  underscore	  is	  that	  even	  if	  we	  granted	  that	  these	  laws	   are	   an	   expression	  of	   hard	  paternalism,	   they	   can	  be	  nonetheless	   justified	  from	  a	  public	  health	  perspective.	  It	  is	  so,	  I	  propose,	  in	  that	  they	  do	  not	  threaten	  individuals’	  core	  values	  while	  protecting	  them	  against	  serious	  risks.	  	  
Having	  this	  example	  been	  made,	  it	  remains	  to	  ask	  whether	  HPV	  vaccination	  is	  a	  case	  of	  hard	  or	  strong	  paternalism.	  In	  one	  sense,	  it	  may	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  soft	  paternalism.	  Indeed,	  although	  sex	  is	  in	  general	  a	  voluntary	  act	  one	  may	  lack	  sometimes	  the	  capacity	  to	  be	  fully	  protected	  against	  all	  risks.	  For	  instance,	  one	  can	  imagine	  of	  cases	  of	  sexual	  assault	  in	  which	  the	  victim	  gets	  infected	  with	  HPV	   against	   her	   will;	   one	   can	   also	   imagine	   of	   a	   woman	   in	   a	   long-­‐term	  monogamous	  relationship	  that	  is,	  nonetheless,	  at	  risk	  because	  of	  her	  unfaithful	  husband;	  or	  one	  can	  also	  appeal	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  use	  of	   condoms	  does	  not	  eliminate	   the	   risk	   of	   infection.	   An	   argument	   for	   soft	   justifiable	   paternalism	  would	  thus	  be	  that	  the	  agent	  is	  not	  able	  to	  protect	  herself	  properly	  and	  that	  thus	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she	  is	  unknowingly	  at	  risk	  of	  harm.	  Although	  I	  can	  agree	  that	  the	  intervention	  resembles	  a	  kind	  of	  soft	  paternalism,	  I	  would	  resist	  the	  temptation	  to	  consider	  it	  an	   ethically	   justifiable	   one.	   It	   is	   so	   for	   the	   reasons	   that	   let	  me	   instead	   justify	  hard	   paternalistic	   laws	   on	   seatbelts.	  While	   in	   the	   previous	   case	  we	  were	   not	  observing	  any	  core	  value	  to	  which	  freedom	  from	  seatbelts	  may	  be	  attached,	  in	  the	  HPV	  case	  the	  regulation	  would	  enter	   into	  one	  of	   the	  most	  private	  areas	  of	  many	   individuals’	   lives.	   Moreover,	   if	   we	   acknowledge	   that	   the	   magnitude	   of	  harm	  one	  is	  at	  risk	  of	  drops	  exponentially	  when	  one	  takes	  due	  precautions	  and	  performs	  screening	  regularly,	  the	  appeal	  to	  a	  justified	  form	  of	  paternalism	  looks	  even	  less	  attractive.	  If	  we	  add	  to	  this	  consideration	  the	  fact	  that,	  although	  rarely,	  vaccines	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  adverse	  events,	  and	  that	  the	  duration	  of	  HPV	  vaccine-­‐induced	   immunity	   is	   still	   not	   clear,	   we	   can	   say	   that	   there	   are	   reasons	   for	  respecting	  those	  who	  choose	  to	  tackle	  HPV-­‐related	  risks	  differently.	  	  
So	   far	   I	   have	   shown	   the	   ethically	   problematic	   issues	   as	   to	   what	   pertains	  compulsion	  with	  regards	  to	  HPV	  policies.	  In	  particular,	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  for	  respecting	  the	  morally	  grounded	  interests	  of	  parents.	  As	  to	  the	  positive	   aspect	   of	  mandates,	   however,	   it	   needs	   to	  be	  mentioned	   that	   they	  would	   fairly	  distribute	   the	  benefits	   and	  burdens	  of	   the	   intervention	   to	   all	   the	  socioeconomic	  strata.	  In	  contexts	  like	  the	  US,	  where	  a	  disproportionate	  burden	  of	  cervical	  cancers	  is	  observed	  in	  the	  disadvantaged	  strata	  of	  society,	  this	  aspect	  may	  function	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  the	  use	  of	  mandates.	  Clearly,	  other	  means	  can	  be	  adopted,	  besides	  mandates	  as	  to	  achieve	  this	  goal.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  will	  mention	  some	  of	  them	  that	  are	  able	  to	  both	  meet	  the	  interests	  of	  economically	  disadvantaged	   groups	   by	   making	   the	   intervention	   accessible	   as	   well	   as	  preserving	   the	   morally	   reasonable	   interests	   in	   parental	   autonomy.	   For	   the	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moment	   it	   suffices	   to	   say	   that	   considerations	   of	   justice	   are	   those	   that	   more	  forcefully	  support	  the	  use	  of	  state	  mandates.	  
As	  said	  in	  the	  sections	  presenting	  HPV	  vaccination	  policies,	  mandates	  are	  used	  only	  in	  some	  states	  of	  the	  US.	  In	  particular,	  of	  the	  24	  states	  that	  have	  introduced	  bills	   as	   to	   require	   vaccination	   to	   girls	   upon	   entrance	   to	   the	   sixth	   grade,	   only	  Virginia	   (October	   1,	   2008	   –	   Senate	   Bill	   1230)	   and	   the	   District	   of	   Columbia	  (January	  1,	  2009	  –	  Bill	  17-­‐0030)	  have	  enacted	  legislation.	  A	  look	  at	  those	  bills	  may	   be	   useful	   to	   understand	   how	   current	   mandatory	   policies	   try	   to	   balance	  interests	  to	  privacy	  with	  population	  goals	  in	  practice.	  Both	  states,	  indeed,	  grant	  broad	  exemption	  clauses	   to	  parents.	   In	   the	  District	  of	  Columbia’s	  bill	  B	  17-­‐30	  we	  can	  read:	  “	  The	  parent	  or	  legal	  guardian,	  at	  his	  or	  her	  discretion,	  has	  elected	  to	  opt	   out	   of	   the	  HPV	  vaccination	  program,	   for	   any	   reason,	   by	   signing	   a	   form	  prepared	   by	   the	   Department	   of	   Health	   that	   states	   that	   the	   parent	   or	   legal	  guardian	   has	   been	   informed	   on	   the	   HPV	   vaccination	   requirement	   and	   has	  elected	   not	   to	   participate”	   (District	   of	   Columbia	   2007,	   §	   5).	   	   Similarly,	   in	   the	  Virginia	  law	  parents	  are	  granted	  the	  right	  to	  opt-­‐out.	  As	  we	  read:	  “After	  having	  reviewed	  materials	  describing	  the	  link	  between	  the	  human	  papillomavirus	  and	  cervical	  cancer	  approved	  for	  such	  use	  by	  the	  Board,	  a	  parent	  or	  guardian	  may	  elect,	   on	   an	   appropriate	   form	   prescribed	   by	   the	   Board,	   for	   his	   child	   not	   to	  receive	   the	   human	   papillomavirus	   vaccine”	   (Virginia	   Acts	   of	   Assembly	   2008,	  §32.1–46	   D3).	   	   The	   possibility	   of	   exemption	   weakens	   the	   force	   of	   those	  arguments	   based	   on	   parental	   autonomy,	   but	   only	   up	   to	   a	   certain	   point.	   For	  instance,	  some	  differences	  can	  be	  noted	  between	  the	  two	  ways	  of	  conceiving	  the	  exemption	  clause.	  In	  the	  District	  of	  Columbia’s	  case,	  the	  opt-­‐out	  is	  granted	  but	  only	   limited	   education	   is	   provided	   to	   the	   parents.	   The	   parents	   are	   indeed	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informed	   only	   about	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   requirement,	   but	   not	   about	   the	   link	  between	  HPV	  and	  cervical	  cancer.	  Vaccination	  is	  thus	  presented,	  primarily,	  as	  a	  duty	   from	   which	   one	   can	   opt-­‐out	   if	   she	   so	   wishes.	   Instead,	   in	   the	   case	   of	  Virginia,	  we	  can	  more	  properly	  speak	  about	  an	  informed	  refusal.	  In	  this	  sense,	  where	  mandates	  are	  accompanied	  by	  educational	  tools	  to	  increase	  awareness	  of	  the	   risks	   connected	  with	   HPV	   the	   concerns	   for	   parental	   autonomy	   looks	   less	  powerful.	  Moreover,	   broad	  exemption	   clauses	   are	  present	   in	  most	   introduced	  legislations,	  but	  not	  in	  all.	  For	  instance,	  legislation	  introduced	  in	  West	  Virginia	  and	  Connecticut	  would	  grant	  exemptions	  -­‐	  should	  mandates	  will	  be	  approved	  -­‐	  only	  for	  medical	  reasons;	  in	  some	  (Georgia,	  Massachusetts,	  Missouri,	  and	  North	  Carolina)	   for	   medical	   and	   religious	   reasons;	   in	   all	   the	   other	   states,	   instead,	  exemptions	   would	   be	   granted	   for	   any	   reason	   (National	   Conference	   of	   State	  Legislatures)27.	   If	  we	   take	   into	   account	   this	   diversity	  we	   can	   speculate	   that	   a	  problem	  of	   fairness	  would	  be	  put	   in	  place	   should	   strict	   exemption	   clauses	  be	  allowed.	   In	   fact,	   one	  may	   ask	  whether	   it	   is	   right	   that	   some	  may	   exempt	   and	  others	  not.	  As	  I	  have	  shown	  above,	  indeed,	  reasons	  for	  not	  vaccinating	  girls	  may	  be	  equally	  justified	  from	  a	  non-­‐religious	  perspective.	  That	  is,	  some	  parents	  may	  put	  forward	  sound	  arguments	  as	  to	  non-­‐vaccinate	  their	  daughters	  without	  any	  specific	   religious	   motivation	   behind.	   Reasons	   for	   allowing	   vaccination	  exemptions	  to	  some	  groups	  only	  have	  been	  generally	  supported	  by	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  herd	  immunity	  -­‐	  thus	  reducing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  epidemic	  outbreaks	  -­‐	  and	   to	   respect	   religious	   minorities	   that	   reject	   vaccination	   tout	   court.	   Some	  states,	  moreover,	   confident	   of	   the	  widespread	   acceptance	   of	   vaccination	   as	   a	  social	   practice,	   have	   broadened	   the	   scope	   of	   exemptions	   as	   to	   include	   people	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Web	  page:	  http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14381	  (Last	  access:	  October	  30,	  2011)	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with	  mundane	   reasons	   for	   rejection.	   In	   the	   case	  of	  HPV,	   however,	   there	   is	   no	  herd	  immunity	  to	  be	  protected	  yet,	  nor	  is	  it	  clear	  whether	  it	  will	  be	  one	  of	  the	  objectives	   in	   the	   near	   future.	   In	   absence	   of	   a	   precise	   commitment	   to	   the	  elimination	   of	   virus	   circulation	   thus,	   limiting	   the	   possibility	   of	   exemptions	   to	  some	  appears	  to	  be	  unjustified.	  
As	  to	  what	  pertains	  the	  political	  context	  of	  the	  US,	  even	  when	  mandates	  include	  broad	  exemption	  clauses,	  as	  in	  the	  two	  cases	  just	  described,	  a	  general	  antipathy	  towards	   governmental	   coercion,	   may	   cause	   a	   public	   backlash	   in	   terms	   of	  reducing	   trust	   towards	   vaccination	   policies	   in	   general	   (Gostin	   and	   DeAngelis	  2007;	  Javitt,	  Berkowitz,	  and	  Gostin	  2008;	  Colgrove,	  Abiola,	  and	  Mello	  2010).	  In	  terms	  of	  my	  analysis,	  hence,	  the	  use	  of	  mandates	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  paradoxical	  effect	  of	  running	  contrary	  to	  population	  health	  interests	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  Clearly,	  the	   ‘public	  backlash’	  argument	   is	  not	   supported	  by	  evidence,	  and	  as	  such	   it	   is	  not	   conclusive.	  What	   these	   authors	   have	   in	  mind,	   however,	   is	   the	   idea	   of	   the	  ‘least	   coercive	   alternative’	   as	   an	   ethically	   preferable	   option	   for	   public	   health	  policies.	  To	   recall,	   the	   latter	   is	   an	   injunction	   for	  public	  health	  policy	   to	  prefer	  interventions	  that	  are	  not	  only	  effective	  but	  also	  the	  less	  intrusive	  as	  possible.	  It	  remains	   hence	   to	   see	   how	   the	   other,	   less	   intrusive,	   options	   perform.	   Before	  passing	   to	   the	  analysis	  of	   the	  other	  options,	  however,	   it	   is	  worth	  summing	  up	  the	  results	  of	  this	  section.	  	  
On	   the	   positive	   side,	   state	   mandates	   would	   ensure	   high	   uptakes	   and,	   as	   a	  consequence,	   would	   fairly	   distribute	   the	   benefits	   and	   the	   burdens	   of	   the	  intervention	  to	  all.	  In	  this	  respect,	  population	  health	  and	  justice	  would	  be	  well	  served.	  On	  the	  negative	  side	  instead,	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  weakly	  justifiable	  by	  an	  appeal	   to	   either	   the	   harm	  principle	   or	   ethically	   justifiable	   paternalism	   unless	  
	   136	  
vaccination	   is	  made	  mandatory	   for	   both	   genders.	   In	   this	   regard,	   they	   do	   not	  take	  sufficiently	   into	  account	  autonomy-­‐based	   interests.	  Having	  explored	  both	  the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  the	  mandatory	  model,	  let	  us	  now	  explore	  whether	  other	  models	  provide	  a	  better	  balance	  of	  the	  moral	  concerns	  at	  play	  in	  the	  HPV	  vaccination	  context.	  
4.	  The	  voluntary	  model	  
In	   the	  previous	   section	   I	  have	   shown	  what	  are	   the	  morally	   sensitive	   issues	   in	  the	  context	  of	  mandatory	  models.	   I	  have	  argued	  that	  while	   they	  are	  attractive	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  justice	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  population	  benefit	  they	  can	  bring	  about,	   they	  fall	  short	  of	  providing	  strong	  moral	   justifications	  for	  the	  means	   adopted.	   The	   fact	   that	   mandatory	   policies	   do	   not	   correctly	   address	  concerns	  for	  individual	  choice,	  however,	  does	  not	  imply,	  by	  itself,	  that	  they	  are	  not	  justifiable.	  If,	  for	  instance,	  we	  would	  be	  able	  to	  show	  that	  no	  less	  restrictive	  alternative	  is	  able	  to	  reach	  comparable	  results,	  then	  we	  would	  have	  reasons	  to	  consider	   the	   mandatory	   model	   promising.	   For	   instance,	   we	   may	   find	   that	  voluntary	  models	  fare	  too	  badly	  in	  addressing	  other	  important	  moral	  concerns	  and	  thus,	  on	  balance,	  they	  may	  look	  less	  attractive.	  To	  understand	  whether	  this	  is	  the	  case,	   I	  will	  now	  investigate	  more	  deeply	  what	  voluntary	  models	  have	  to	  offer.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   recall	   that	   I	   am	   here	   interested	   in	   those	   voluntary	  models	   in	  which,	  nonetheless,	   there	   is	   some	  kind	  of	   state	  action	   involved.	  My	  primary	   interest,	   indeed,	   is	   to	   scrutinize	   what	   are	   the	   ethical	   implications	   of	  HPV	   vaccination	   once	   states	   or	   governments	   decide	   to	   take	   specific	   public	  health	  policy	  action,	  and	  not	  to	  advocate	  for	  HPV	  vaccination	  programmes.	  The	  fact	  that	  in	  some	  contexts	  no	  policy	  action	  is	  taken	  with	  regards	  to	  HPV	  may	  be	  regrettable,	   but	   the	   job	   of	   showing	  why	   it	   is	   so	   is	   better	   left	   to	   public	   health	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advocates.	  Having	   these	  clarifications	  been	  made	   let	  us	  now	  proceed	  with	   the	  elucidation	  of	  the	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  the	  voluntary	  models.	  I	  will	  first	  outline	  those	  aspects	  in	  general	  terms.	  I	  will	  then	  discuss	  in	  some	  detail	  the	  different	  ways	   in	  which	  voluntary	  models	  have	  been	  implemented	  in	  different	  contexts.	  
Voluntary	   models	   are	   certainly	   attractive	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   parental	  autonomy.	  They	  do	  not	   force	  vaccination	  but	  only	  propose	   it.	  The	   idea	  behind	  these	  models	  is	  the	  potential	  overlap	  between	  private	  and	  public	  interests.	  That	  is,	   the	   realization	   that	   the	   public	   interest	   in	   reducing	   the	   number	   of	   cervical	  cancers	   can	   coincide	   with	   the	   private	   interest	   some	   women	   have	   in	   being	  protected	  by	  such	  a	  disease.	  The	  public	  interest	  in	  preventing	  cervical	  cancer	  is	  two-­‐fold.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  general	  moral	  motivation	  we	  have	  in	  promoting	  welfare	  and	   avoiding	   morbidities	   and	   premature	   deaths.	   Following	   mainstream	  bioethics	  and	  public	  health	  ethics,	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters	  I	  have	  identified	  this	  moral	   motivation	   as	   an	   obligation	   of	   beneficence.	   The	   second	   refers,	   more	  pragmatically,	  to	  the	  benefits	  that	  vaccination	  would	  bring	  about	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  prospective	   reduction	   of	   costs	   for	   the	   treatment	   of	   these	  morbidities.	   Several	  studies	   in	   health	   economics	   show	   that	   HPV	   vaccination,	   should	   it	   achieve	   a	  coverage	  of	  about	  75-­‐80%	  of	   the	   female	  population,	  would	  be	  a	   cost-­‐effective	  strategy.	   That	   is,	   the	   up-­‐front	   expenditure	   for	   vaccination	   would	   be	   entirely	  offset	   by	   costs	   averted	   through	   diseases	   prevention.	   	   This	   seems	   to	   be	   so,	   at	  least,	  in	  those	  countries	  that	  I	  will	  be	  concerned	  about,	  that	  is	  the	  US	  (Newall	  et	  al.	  2007;	  Kim	  and	  Goldie	  2008;	  Chesson	  2011),	  UK	  (Kulasingam	  et	  al.	  2008),	  and	  Italy	  (Mennini,	  Costa,	  et	  al.	  2009).	  The	  public	  interest,	  hence,	  is	  not	  only	  that	  of	  reducing	  the	  number	  of	  illnesses,	  but	  of	  doing	  that	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  cost-­‐saving.	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In	   other	   words,	   part	   of	   the	   public	   interest	   consists	   in	   involving	   in	   these	  programmes	  as	  many	  individuals	  as	  possible.	  	  
Women’s	   private	   interest	   in	   preventing	   cervical	   is	   also	  multifaceted.	   Cervical	  cancer	   indeed	   affects	   women	   in	   a	   two-­‐fold	   manner.	   First,	   as	   I	   have	   shown	  above,	  cervical	  cancer	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  common	  in	  women	  aged	  15-­‐44,	  that	  is	  in	  an	  age	   in	  which	  they	  are	  still	  working	  and	  raising	  a	   family.	  Second,	  cervical	  cancer	  affects	  women	  in	  their	  reproductive	  system,	  and	  almost	  certainly	  many	  women	  have	  a	  fundamental	  moral	  stake	  in	  reproduction	  as	  an	  important	  part	  of	  their	   biography.	   To	   let	   the	   overlap	   of	   interests	   emerge,	   the	   state	  may	   put	   in	  place	  a	  series	  of	  incentives,	  and	  the	  offer	  of	  the	  vaccine	  free	  of	  charge	  is	  one	  of	  them.	  In	  cases	  in	  which	  this	  occurs,	  voluntary	  models	  seemingly	  score	  well	  also	  from	   the	  perspective	  of	   justice.	   In	   fact,	  when	   financial	   incentives	   are	   in	  place,	  the	  vaccination	  offer	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  affluent	  strata	  of	  society	  but	  open,	  at	  least	  formally,	  to	  everyone.	  In	  the	  sense	  developed	  in	  the	  theoretical	  part	  of	  this	  work,	  these	  kinds	  of	  interventions	  serve	  to	  foster	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  as	  a	  protection	  of	  a	  normal	  opportunity	  range	  for	  all.	  	  	  
However,	   voluntary	  models	   also	   have	   problems.	   For	   instance,	   if	   the	   incentive	  system	   is	   not	   effective	   they	   may	   serve	   population	   health	   goals	   inadequately.	  These	   problems	   may	   bring	   about	   an	   odd	   distribution	   of	   the	   benefits	   of	   the	  intervention,	   with	   only	   the	   most	   affluent	   and	   cultivated	   strata	   of	   the	   society	  taking	   advantage	   of	   the	   offer.	   In	   contexts	   in	   which	   a	   disparity	   in	   the	  epidemiological	   burden	   of	   cervical	   cancer	   between	   the	   richest	   and	   poorest	  exists,	  voluntary	  policies	  may	  worsen	  existing	  inequalities	  thus	  failing	  to	  serve	  the	  negative	  aim	  of	  justice.	  To	  understand	  whether	  this	  is	  the	  case	  is	  necessary	  to	   assess	   whether	   in	   the	   contexts	   in	   which	   HPV	   vaccination	   intervenes	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inequalities	  are	  present.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  work	  I	  restrict	  my	  attention	  to	  health	  inequalities	  with	  regards	  to	  cancer,	  where	  available,	  and	  cervical	  cancer	  in	  particular.	  I	  will	  moreover	  indicate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  inequalities	  are	  present	  in	  each	  country	  object	  of	  this	  analysis.	  
4.1	  The	  voluntary	  model	  in	  the	  US	  	  
The	  moral	  advantages	  of	  the	  voluntary	  models	  in	  general	  terms	  are	  also	  present	  in	   the	  policies	   object	   of	  my	   comparison.	  As	   anticipated	   in	   the	  presentation	  of	  the	   policies,	   the	   US	   federal	   government	   de	   facto	   recommends	   the	   vaccine	  through	   the	  ACIP.	  When	   no	   specific	   legislature	   is	   introduced	   by	   single	   states,	  however,	  vaccine	  administration	  is	  left	  to	  the	  private	  initiatives	  of	  paediatrician	  proposing	   it	   to	   families	   that,	   in	   turn,	   can	   accept	   it	   or	   not.	   Arguably,	   in	   this	  context	   paediatrician	   will	   have	   to	   follow	   the	   ethical	   standard	   of	   informed	  consent.	   That	   is,	  while	   proposing	   it	   they	   have	   to	   explain	   the	   benefits	   and	   the	  risks	  connected	  to	  intervention,	  and	  then	  evaluate	  whether	  the	  receivers	  of	  the	  intervention	   understand	   the	   information	   and	   voluntary	   consent	   to	   the	  procedure.	   In	   this	   sense,	   it	   seems	   plausible	   to	   say	   that	   parental	   interests	   in	  making	   truly	   autonomous	   choices	   are	   respected.	   When	   ACIP	   recommends	   a	  vaccine,	   moreover,	   it	   then	   enters	   the	   VCFP,	   thus	   covering	   the	   costs	   for	  uninsured	  children.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  possibility	  of	  getting	  the	  vaccine	  is	  open	  to	  all.	  Whether	  this	  is	  sufficient	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  justice	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  To	  the	  exploration	  of	  this	  point	  I	  now	  turn.	  
Cancer	  related	  inequalities	  exist	  in	  the	  US	  along	  two	  axes.	  The	  first	  axis	  refers	  to	  disparities	   of	   cancer	   rates	   and	  mortality	   according	   to	   race	   and	   ethnicity.	   The	  second,	   instead,	   refers	   to	   disparities	   with	   regards	   to	   socioeconomic	   status.	  These	  axes	  operate	  in	  a	  concomitant	  manner	  both	  in	  the	  general	  case	  and	  with	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regards	   to	  cervical	   cancer	   in	  particular.	   It	   is	   thus	  worth	  exploring	   them.	   I	  will	  first	   give	   a	   sketch	  of	   the	  problem	  as	   it	   is	   present	  with	   cancer	   at	   all	   sites,	   and	  then	   proceed	  with	   the	   cervical	   cancer	   case.	   Cancer	   registries	   in	   the	   US	   show	  that	  African	  Americans	  have	  the	  highest	  death	  rate	   from	  all	  cancers	  combined	  and	  from	  specific	  sites	  (lung,	  colon,	  female	  breast,	  prostate,	  and	  cervix)	  of	  all	  the	  other	  ethnic	  groups	  in	  the	  same	  country.	  Moreover,	  the	  death	  rate	  from	  cancer	  among	   African	   American	  males	   is	   estimated	   to	   be	   1.4	   times	   higher	   than	   that	  among	   White	   males;	   for	   African	   American	   females,	   instead,	   the	   rate	   is	   1.2	  higher.	  From	  the	  inception	  of	  the	  ‘war	  on	  cancer’	  until	  the	  1990s	  the	  disparity	  in	  death	   rates	   between	   these	   two	   groups	  widened.	  Although	   this	   gap	   eventually	  narrowed,	   it	   still	   remains	   larger	   than	   it	   was	   in	   the	   1970s	   (Ward	   et	   al.	   2004;	  Byers	  2010).	  Similar	  trends	  of	  increased	  disparities	  between	  the	  1970s	  and	  the	  1990s	  can	  be	  observed	  also	  with	  respect	  to	  county	  poverty	  level.	  The	  death	  rate	  from	  all	  cancer	  sites	  in	  the	  1970s	  was	  2%	  higher	  among	  men	  in	  poorer	  counties	  compared	  with	  more	  affluent	  counties;	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s	  it	  increased	  to	  13%.	  Among	  women,	  instead,	  the	  death	  rate	  from	  all	  cancers	  combined	  was	  3%	  lower	  in	  poorer	  compared	  with	  more	  affluent	  counties	  in	  the	  1970s;	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s	  it	  was	  3%	  higher	  (Ward	  et	  al.	  2004).	  	  
These	   trends	  are	  also	  observed	  with	  specific	  regards	   to	  cervical	  cancer.	  While	  declines	  in	  incidence	  and	  mortality	  rates	  have	  been	  observed	  since	  the	  1970s	  -­‐	  thanks	   to	   the	  wide-­‐scale	   implementation	  of	  PAP	  screening	   -­‐	  across	  all	  groups,	  marked	  disparities	  still	  exist.	  As	  reported	  by	  the	  Surveillance	  Epidemiology	  End	  Results	   database	   (years	   2000-­‐2008),	   Hispanic	   women	   are	   diagnosed	   with	  cervical	  cancer	  almost	  1.9	  times	  as	  often,	  and	  African	  women	  1.5	  times	  as	  often,	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than	   non-­‐Hispanic	   white	   women	   (Howlader	   et	   al.	   2011)28.	   Differences	   exist	  regarding	  the	  stage	  of	  cancer	  at	  diagnosis	  among	  the	  various	  groups,	  with	  white	  women	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  diagnosed	  the	  earliest	  (Downs	  et	  al.	  2008).	  Speaking	  of	  disparities	  with	  regards	  to	  ethnic	  and	  racial	  groups,	  however,	  does	  not	  give	  a	  full	  account	  of	  how	  cervical	  cancer	  clusters	  with	  relation	  to	  a	  multidimensional	  pattern	  of	  determinants.	  A	  study	  conducted	  between	  2000	  and	  2004	  among	  48	  states	  of	  the	  US	  (Du	  et	  al.	  2010)	  shows	  a	  clustering	  of	  cervical	  cancer	  mortality	  in	  those	  areas	  where	  it	  is	  observed:	  a	  high	  proportion	  of	  black	  population,	  low	  socioeconomic	   status,	   low	   PAP	   test	   rate,	   low	   healthcare	   coverage.	   The	  major	  relevance	   of	   the	   socioeconomic	   determinant,	   rather	   than	   ethnicity	   only,	   is	  observed	  in	  the	  Appalachian	  area	  where	  cervical	  cancer	  mortality	  rates	  cluster	  only	   with	   high	   poverty	   rate,	   low	   education	   level,	   and	   limited	   access	   to	  healthcare	  resources.	  A	  further	  illustration	  of	  this	  fact	  can	  be	  given	  via	  the	  aid	  of	  the	   table	   below.	   The	   table	   –	   based	   on	   a	   study	   done	   on	   California’s	   cancer	  registries	  (Yin	  et	  al.	  2010)	  –	  shows	  a	  gradient	  in	  the	  incidence	  of	  cervical	  cancer	  operating	   almost	   consistently	   through	   the	  whole	   socioeconomic	   spectrum.	  As	  we	   can	   observe	   the	   incidence	   is	   highest	   in	   those	   groups	   with	   the	   lowest	  socioeconomic	   status	   and	   it	   decreases,	   step	   by	   step,	   until	   it	   reaches	   the	  minimum	  in	  those	  groups	  at	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  the	  socioeconomic	  ladder.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  The	  Surveillance	  Epidemiology	  End	  Results	  of	  the	  National	  Cancer	  Institut	  provides	  US	  related	  cancer	  statistics	  in	  form	  of	  reports	  and	  a	  web-­‐based	  serchable	  tool.	  The	  latter	  can	  be	  found	  at:	  http://seer.cancer.gov/csr/1975_2008/browse_csr.php	  Last	  access:	  November	  15th,	  2011.	  






















1	  (lowest)	   15.0	   14.9	   20.9	   15.1	  2	   10.9	   10.1	   16.2	   10.8	  3	   8.4	   8.7	   13.5	   9.8	  4	   6.8	   6.0	   12.1	   8.3	  5	  (highest)	   5.5	   8.1	   10.3	   7.1	  
Table	  2:	  Socioeconomic	  	  and	  ethnic	  gradient	  in	  the	  incidence	  of	  cervical	  cancer	  in	  the	  US.	  Adapted	  from	  (Yin	  et	  al.	  2010)	  	  
The	   inequalities	   so	   far	   presented	   precede	   the	   initiation	   of	   HPV	   vaccination	  programmes.	   Whatever	   one	   thinks	   about	   the	   justice	   of	   present	   inequalities,	  however,	   a	   question	   remains	   as	   to	   how	   the	   vaccine	   will	   impact	   on	   them.	   I	  identify	   three	   possible	   scenarios,	   and	   I	   illustrate	   them	  with	   visual	   aid	   of	   the	  diagram	   below.	   In	   the	   diagram	   we	   observe	   the	   incidence	   of	   HPV-­‐associated	  cancer	   in	   the	  prevaccination	  era.	  As	  we	  see,	   the	   incidence	  of	  cervical	  cancer	  –	  the	   only	   cancer	   for	   which	   a	   preventive	   strategy	   existed	   before	   vaccine	  introduction	  –	  in	  the	  most	  deprived	  areas	  (column	  in	  yellow)	  is	  almost	  twice	  as	  that	   in	   the	   richest	   areas	   (dark	   blue	   and	   light	   blue	   columns).	   If	   we	   move	   to	  observe	  the	  incidence	  of	  HPV-­‐associated	  at	  other	  cancer	  sites	  –	  those	  for	  which	  there	  is	  no	  alternative	  strategy	  other	  than	  the	  vaccine	  –	  nearly	  no	  inequality	  is	  observed.	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Graph	  1:	  from	  The	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  Prevention’s	  website:	  http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/hpv/statistics/poverty.htm	  
In	  the	  first	  scenario,	  more	  people	  in	  the	  light	  blue	  column	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  vaccine	  than	  people	  in	  the	  blue	  column	  that,	  in	  turn,	  take	  advantage	  of	  it	  more	  than	  people	  in	  the	  yellow	  column.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  every	  group	  will	  improve	  its	  condition,	  but	  those	  in	  the	  light	  blue	  column	  would	  improve	  it	  more.	  As	  a	  result,	  every	   group	   is	   better	   than	   it	   used	   to	   be	   prior	   to	   the	   intervention,	   but	  inequalities	  are	   increased.	   In	   the	  second	  scenario,	   instead,	  more	  people	   in	   the	  yellow	  column	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  intervention,	  resulting	  into	  a	  flattening	  of	  the	   inequalities.	   In	   the	   third	  scenario,	   finally,	  all	  groups	   take	  advantage	  of	   the	  vaccine	  equally.	  As	  a	  result,	  perhaps,	  the	  height	  of	  all	  the	  three	  columns	  would	  go	   down	   in	   a	   similar	   manner.	   Which	   scenario	   is	   preferable	   from	   a	   justice	  perspective?	  Let	  us	  consider	  them	  one	  by	  one.	  
In	   the	   first	   scenario,	   every	   group	   is	   better-­‐off	   after	   the	   intervention	   but	   the	  richest	   have	   benefited	   the	   most	   from	   it.	   This	   situation	   seems	   to	   contradict	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Rawls’	  claim	  that	  the	  difference	  principle	  –	  i.e.	  inequalities	  are	  permitted	  when	  they	  are	  to	  the	  most	  advantage	  of	  the	  worse	  off	  –	  should	  not	  be	   intended	  as	  a	  trickle	  down	  principle,	  but	  it	  demands	  instead	  a	  maximal	  flow	  of	  benefits	  to	  the	  worse-­‐off	   (Rawls	   (1971)	   calls	   this	   maximal	   flow	   chain-­‐connectedness).	  Moreover,	   this	   scenario	   would	   go	   against	   what	   I	   called	   the	   negative	   aim	   of	  justice.	   The	   negative	   aim	   of	   justice	   requires	   that	   those	   inequalities	   that	   are	  clustered	  in	  systematic	  patterns	  of	  disadvantage	  should	  not	  be	  worsened.	  As	  we	  saw,	  cervical	  cancer	  rates	  are	  highest	  among	  those	  groups	  that	  are	  the	  poorest,	  the	   least	   educated,	   and	   also	   belonging	   to	   racial	   and	   ethnic	   categories	   that,	   at	  least	  in	  the	  US	  context,	  have	  long	  been	  discriminated.	  The	  first	  scenario	  is	  thus	  not	   ideal	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   justice.	   Let	   us	   see	   now	   whether	   there	   are	  similar	  problems	  with	  the	  other	  scenarios.	  
In	  the	  second,	  equality	   is	   increased	  and	  the	  vaccination	  has	  served	  the	  worse-­‐off	  better	  than	  the	  other	  groups.	  Is	  this	  outcome	  desirable?	  I	  would	  propose	  that	  it	   depends	  on	  how	   it	   is	   achieved.	   For	   instance,	   one	   can	   think	  of	   this	   outcome	  arising	  only	   from	   the	  aggregate	  of	   completely	  voluntary	  choices	  of	   the	  people	  belonging	  to	  this	  group.	  In	  this	  case,	  I	  argue,	  although	  uptake	  would	  be	  unequal,	  the	   ensuing	   result	   would	   not	   be	   unjust.	   Nevertheless,	   this	   hypothesis	   is	  unrealistic	   in	   that	  we	  observe	   that	  poverty	  and	  education	  are	   correlated	  with	  less	  use	  of	  preventive	  services.	  Reasons	  for	  lack	  of	  access	  include:	  long	  waiting	  time	   at	   health	   clinics,	   lack	   of	   transportation,	   no	   family	   support,	   and	   lack	   of	  available	  child	  care	  (Downs	  et	  al.	  2008).	  To	  suppose	  that	  this	  would	  be	  the	  case	  in	  the	  HPV	  context	  is	  a	  wishful	  thinking	  with	  little	  evidentiary	  basis.	  More	  likely,	  this	   result	   could	   be	   achieved	   by	   devising	   a	   two-­‐tiered	   model	   for	   pushing	  vaccination	   among	   the	   high-­‐risk	   groups.	   Targeted	   policies,	   however,	   are	  
	   145	  
problematic	   from	   an	   ethical	   perspective.	   A	   targeted	   programme,	   indeed,	  may	  give	   rise	   to	   a	   climate	   of	   stigma	   and	   disrespect	   by	   fostering	   invidious	   social	  views	   about	   which	   communities,	   and	   which	   women,	   get	   HPV	   and	   cervical	  cancer.	   This	   point	   was	   already	   noted	   in	   the	   early	   days	   of	   the	   HIV	   epidemics	  when	   targeted	   screening	   was	   proposed	   for	   interrupting	   virus	   transmission	  from	  mother	  to	  baby	  (Faden,	  Geller,	  and	  Powers	  1991).	  As	  it	  turned	  out,	  those	  mothers	  were	   disproportionately	   poor	  women	   of	   colour	   already	   subjected	   to	  social	   stigma	   and	   discrimination	   and	   who	   frequently	   lacked	   strong	   social	  support	  and	  opportunities	  to	  lead	  self	  directing	  lives	  (Powers	  and	  Faden	  2006,	  viii).	   	   Also	   the	   second	   scenario	   is	   ethically	   dubious	   if	   it	   implies	   a	   diversity	   of	  treatment	  among	  groups.	  	  
The	  third	  scenario,	  instead,	  is	  one	  in	  which	  everyone	  benefits	  equally	  from	  the	  intervention.	  Some	  inequalities	  in	  cancer	  outcomes	  may	  persist	  but	  I	  argue	  this	  would	   not	   result	   necessarily	   in	   an	   injustice.	   Otherwise	   stated,	   the	   HPV	  vaccination	  is	  intervening	  in	  a	  context	  in	  which	  inequalities	  are	  already	  present,	  perhaps	   they	   derive	   from	   past	   injustices	   or	   perhaps	   they	   do	   not.	   The	   causal	  route	   that	   led	   to	   existing	   inequalities	   is	   very	   difficult	   to	   assess,	   for	   sure	   we	  observe	   that	   an	   increased	   risk	   of	   cervical	   cancer	   exists	   among	   differently	  situated	   groups,	   and	   that	   this	   heightened	   risk	   is	   clustered	   with	   other	  dimensions	   of	   disadvantage	   that	   when	   compound	   also	   lead	   to	   decreased	  opportunities	   for	   people	   belonging	   to	   that	   groups.	   Deciding	   whether	   those	  inequalities	  need	  to	  be	  completely	  redressed	  is	  not	  easy	  task.	  For	  sure	  it	  may	  be	  desirable,	   but	   perhaps	  may	   contrast	  with	   other	   priorities	   that	   are	   peculiar	   of	  each	  social	  context.	  To	  address	  this	  point,	  however,	  is	  not	  part	  of	  my	  concerns,	  in	  this	  chapter.	  What	  matters	  for	  my	  case,	  at	  the	  moment,	  is	  to	  conclude	  that	  as	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long	  as	  the	  negative	  aim	  of	  justice	  is	  served	  HPV	  policies	  cannot	  be	  blamed	  for	  being	  unfair.	   In	  other	  terms,	  the	  residual	   inequalities	  that	  may	  result	  after	  the	  vaccine	   is	   given	   equally	   to	   everyone	  may	   be	   unfortunate,	   but	   not	   necessarily	  unjust.	   The	   inequities	   of	   the	   distribution,	   in	   other	   words,	   would	   depend	   on	  other	  factors	  that	  determine	  the	  whole	  social	  arrangement.	  
The	   benefits	   of	   HPV	   vaccination	   programmes	   would	   be	   seen	   only	   in	   some	  decades	   from	  now.	   Cervical	   cancer	   takes	   long	   to	   develop	   after	  HPV	   infection,	  and	   the	   vaccination	   campaigns	   have	   just	   started.	   Some	   trends	   are,	   however,	  already	   observable.	   In	   the	   US,	   for	   instance,	   uptake	   in	   the	   target	   group	   is	   still	  low,	   around	   32%	   (Vicari	   et	   al.	   2011;	   Dorell	   et	   al.	   2011).	   Some	   data	   are	   also	  available	  with	  regards	   to	  vaccine	   initiation	  with	  reference	   to	  state	  and	  county	  poverty	   level.	   One	   study,	   in	   particular,	   notes	   geographic	   disparity	   in	   HPV	  vaccination	  associated	  with	  area	  poverty,	   that	   is,	   states	  with	  a	  higher	  poverty	  level	   show	   less	  vaccination	   coverage	   than	   those	  observed	   in	   the	   richest	   areas	  (Pruitt	   and	   Schootman	   2010).	   Other	   studies,	   instead,	   concentrate	   on	   the	  reasons	  that	  lead	  to	  a	  positive	  vaccination	  choice.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  noted	  that	  vaccine	   initiation	   depends	   on	   mothers’	   screening	   behaviour	   and	   previous	  experience	   with	   HPV	   infection	   or	   cervical	   cancer,	   and	   whether	   the	   family	  paediatrician	   has	   recommended	   it	   (Dempsey	   et	   al.	   2006;	   Chao	   et	   al.	   2010;	  Bartlett	  and	  Peterson	  2011).	  This	  means,	  in	  other	  words,	  that	  the	  girls	  who	  are	  more	  likely	  vaccinated	  are	  those	  who	  have	  mothers	  who	  attend	  screenings	  and	  who	   are	   regularly	   followed	   by	   a	   paediatrician.	   Similar	   considerations	   come	  from	   data	   about	   the	   completion	   rates	   of	   vaccination.	   To	   recall,	   the	   vaccine	   is	  administered	   in	   a	   three-­‐shot	   regime.	   Therefore,	   for	   full	   protection	   the	  completion	  of	  the	  series	  is	  needed.	  If	  we	  look	  at	  the	  few	  data	  existing	  on	  vaccine	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completion,	  we	  observe	  that	  adolescents	  living	  below	  the	  federal	  poverty	  level	  are	   less	   likely	   to	   complete	   the	   vaccination	   series	   than	   adolescents	   living	   in	  richer	  households	   (Niccolai,	  Mehta,	   and	  Hadler	  2011).	  These	  data,	   to	   be	   sure,	  are	   only	   beginning	   to	   emerge	   so	   we	   still	   do	   not	   know	   what	   of	   the	   three	  scenarios	  will	   result	   in	   the	   next	   decades.	   However,	   it	   is	   fair	   to	   conclude	   that	  these	   vaccination	   policies,	   so	   far,	   are	   targeting	  more	   those	   groups	   who	   have	  already	  the	  cultural	  and	  economic	  means	  to	  protect	  themselves	  against	  the	  risk	  of	  cervical	  cancer.	  If	  this	  trend	  continues	  it	  may	  exacerbate	  existing	  inequalities	  and	   thus	   going	   against	   the	   negative	   aim	   of	   justice	   indicated	   above.	   Besides	  consideration	   of	   justice,	   however,	   this	   approach	   may	   also	   have	   little	  epidemiological	   sense	   in	   terms	   of	   efficiency.	   Indeed,	   if	   this	   trend	  will	   persist,	  this	  approach	  potentially	  leaves	  out	  of	  focus	  those	  populations	  that	  are	  more	  at	  risk	   of	   persistent	   infections	   and,	   consequently,	   of	   cervical	   cancer.	   One	   could	  speculate	  that	  those	  girls	  who	  are	  receiving	  the	  vaccination	  right	  now	  are,	  in	  the	  vast	  majority,	  those	  girls	  that	  would	  have	  been	  anyway	  exposed	  to	  information	  about	   cervical	   cancer	   prevention,	   and	   that,	   perhaps	   would	   have	   undergone	  screening	  regularly.	  In	  very	  simple	  terms,	  if	  those	  who	  take	  the	  vaccine	  are	  also	  those	  that	  would	  have	  undergone	  screenings	  there	  is	  the	  risk	  that	  no	  reduction	  in	   incidence	   of	   cervical	   cancers	   will	   be	   observed	   in	   the	   future.	   An	   equitable	  distribution	  of	  the	  vaccine	  is	  thus	  worthwhile	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  epidemiological	  efficiency.	  
In	  summary,	  the	  positive	  aspects	  of	  the	  voluntary	  model,	  as	  adopted	  in	  the	  US,	  come	   from	   the	   recognition	   that	   individual	   choice	   in	   healthcare	   contexts	   is	  valuable	  and	  must	  be	  respected.	  Moreover,	  by	  providing	  federal	  funding	  to	  the	  uninsured,	   it	  also	  serves	  well	   justice,	  at	   least	   formally.	  Although	  the	  voluntary	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model	   just	  described	   respects	   free	   choices	   it	  does	   so	  at	   the	   risk	  of	  worsening	  disparities.	   These	   policies	   indeed	   do	   not	   reach	   all	   groups	   equally,	   thus	  spreading	  knowledge	  and	  information	  to	  everyone	  who	  may	  need	  it,	  but	  only	  to	  those	  groups	  that	  have	  a	  positional	  advantage	  in	  terms	  of	  education	  and	  use	  of	  healthcare	   and	   preventive	   services.	   The	   voluntary	   model,	   however,	   can	   be	  implemented	  in	  different	  ways.	  Thus,	  a	  more	  precise	  analysis	  of	  its	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages	  requires	  a	  prior	  understanding	  of	  the	  other	  options.	  	  
4.2	  The	  voluntary	  model	  in	  two	  European	  countries:	  the	  Italian	  and	  the	  
British	  case	  
Italy:	  recommending	  HPV	  vaccination.	  	  
Similarly	  in	  Italy,	  HPV	  vaccination	  is	  offered	  free	  of	  charge	  to	  the	  target	  group	  (11-­‐12	  year	  old	  girls).	  Differently	  from	  the	  US,	  however,	  the	  enrolment	  system	  is	   more	   centralized	   and	   direct.	   All	   the	   families	   with	   an	   eligible	   girl	   for	  vaccination,	   indeed,	   receive	   an	   invitation	   letter	   by	   the	   local	   health	   unit	   that	  explains	  the	  benefits	  and	  limitations	  of	  the	  intervention,	  and	  proposes	  to	  those	  interested	   to	   contact	   either	   their	   local	   health	   unit	   or	   their	   paediatrician	   for	  administration	  of	  the	  vaccine.	  In	  Italy	  the	  population	  ethnic	  background	  is	  more	  homogeneous	   than	   in	   the	   US,	   but	   inequalities	   have	   long	   existed	   among	   the	  different	  areas	  since	  national	  unification	  in	  1861,	  with	  the	  affluent	  north	  faring	  better	   than	   the	   south	   in	   several	   respects:	   economic,	   level	   of	   services,	  infrastructures,	  unemployment	  rates,	  and	  so	  on.	  As	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  racism	  in	   the	  US,	   a	   full	   description	   of	   the	   north-­‐south	   divide	   in	   Italy	  would	   take	   too	  long,	   and	  would	   deserve	   a	  monumental	   volume	   by	   itself.	   Nevertheless,	   a	   few	  words	  may	   be	   spent	   to	   frame	   the	   problem.	   Two	   thirds	   of	   the	   Italian	   families	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living	  under	   the	  poverty	   threshold	   reside	   in	   the	  southern	  regions.	  Of	   the	  20.7	  million	  people	   (36.1%	  of	   Italians)	   living	   in	  southern	   Italy,	  7.3	  million	  (35.4%)	  are	   poor.	   4.6	   million	   of	   these	   people	   live	   with	   less	   than	   €435	   per	   month	  (Vecchiato	   2004;	   Bonati	   and	   Campi	   2005).	   With	   regards	   to	   the	   correlation	  between	   socioeconomic	   status	   and	   cancer	   inequalities	   in	   Italy	   few	   data	   are	  available.	   This	   is	   due,	   in	   part,	   to	   a	   lack	   of	   a	   comprehensive	   cancer	   registry	  covering	   a	   representative	   sample	   of	   the	   population.	   In	   Italy,	   cancer	   registries	  cover	   only	   25%	   of	   the	   population	   with	   an	   uneven	   distribution	   between	  Northern	   (37%),	  Central	   (25%)	  and	  Southern	   Italy	   (11%)29.	   	  Although	   Italian	  data	   linking	   individual	   socioeconomic	   status	   and	   cervical	   cancer	   are	   not	  available,	   an	   international	   multicentric	   study	   including	   20,000	   women	  conducted	   by	   IARC,	   confirms	   that	   cervical	   cancer	   is	   associated	   with	   a	   low	  socioeconomic	  status	  –	  indicated	  by	  education	  and	  income	  level	  –	  and	  not	  solely	  by	  HPV	   prevalence	   (Franceschi	   et	   al.	   2009).	   In	   other	  words,	   although	  HPV	   is	  equally	   distributed	   across	   the	   socioeconomic	   spectrum,	   its	   disease	   outcomes	  are	  not.	  	  
Some	   more	   specific	   considerations	   can	   be	   done,	   however,	   about	   the	   use	   of	  cervical	  cancer	  screening	  in	  the	  different	  areas	  of	  the	  country.	  According	  to	  the	  
Osservatorio	   Nazionale	   Screening	   (ONS	   –	   The	   National	   Centre	   for	   Screening	  Monitoring)	   in	   2009	   only	   39.3%	   of	   the	   women	   invited	   to	   screening	   actually	  attended	  it	  (Osservatorio	  Nazionale	  Screening	  2011).	  The	  response,	  moreover,	  was	   unevenly	   distributed	   across	   the	   country,	   with	   women	   from	   northern	  regions	   much	   more	   likely	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   invitation	   than	   those	   from	   the	  south.	   Interestingly,	   basically	   all	   the	   southern	   regions	   are	   much	   below	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  The	  Italian	  cancer	  registry	  is	  serchable	  online	  at	  the	  Associazione	  Italiana	  Registro	  
Tumori’s	  web	  site.	  Available	  at:	  http://www.registri-­‐tumori.it/cms/.	  Last	  access:	  November	  15th	  2011.	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national	   average,	   all	   the	   northern	   regions	   being	   instead	   above	   (see	   graph	  below).	   If	  we	  couple	   international	  data	  about	  the	  correlation	  existing	  between	  socioeconomic	  disadvantage	  and	  rates	  of	  cervical	  cancers	  with	  low	  attendance	  to	   screenings	   in	   those	   Italian	   regions	  where	   poverty	   is	  more	   present,	  we	   can	  speculate	   that	   also	   in	   Italy	   there	   exists	   the	   potential	   for	   cervical	   cancer	  inequalities.	  	  
	  
Graph	  2:	  cervical	  screening	  uptake	  in	  all	  Italian	  regions.	  Drawn	  from	  (Osservatorio	  Nazionale	  Screening	  2011)	  Available	  data	  about	  vaccination	  coverage	   in	   Italy	   seem	   to	   confirm	   this	   trend.	  Since	   its	   national	   approval,	   in	   2008,	   all	   the	   Italian	   regions	   have	   activated	   the	  free	  offer	  of	  the	  vaccine	  following	  the	  modalities	  indicated	  above.	  First,	  it	  has	  to	  be	   noticed	   that	   overall	   vaccination	   coverage	   in	   the	   whole	   country	   is	   still	  suboptimal.	   It	   is	   suboptimal	  both	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  objective	   established	  by	  the	  Piano	  Nazionale	  Vaccinazioni	   (95%	  by	  2015),	   and	   also	   in	   epidemiological	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terms.	   As	   I	   have	   indicated	   above,	   in	   order	   to	   have	   a	   sensible	   reduction	   of	  cervical	   cancers	   at	   the	   population	   level	   it	   is	   needed	   that	   about	   75-­‐80%	   of	  individuals	  in	  the	  target	  group	  get	  vaccinated.	  Official	  data	  about	  the	  coverage	  achieved	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  years	  of	  vaccination	  show	  that	  only	  two	  regions	  approached	  that	  goal	  (Basilicata	  80.7%	  and	  Puglia	  80.1%),	  the	  national	  average	  being	  63.4%.	  Among	   the	   regions	   that	  perform	  worse	  we	   find	  Calabria	   (54.4%	  coverage),	   Campania	   (50.1%),	   and	   Sicily	   (41.4%),	   three	   regions	   that	   are	   also	  among	  the	  economically	  weakest	  of	  the	  entire	  country	  (Giambi	  2011).	  
Although	   results	   are	   suboptimal,	   and	   some	   disparities	   still	   persist	   among	  different	  areas,	  the	  Italian	  model	  seems	  to	  perform	  better	  than	  the	  US	  one.	  This	  is	   so	   in	   terms	  of	   overall	   coverage,	   that	  we	   saw	  being	   higher	   in	   Italy,	   but	   also	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   incentives	   given	   to	   overcome	   access	   barriers.	   In	   the	   US,	  indeed,	   we	   observed	   that	   motivation	   for	   initiating	   vaccination	   depended	   on	  recommendation	  by	  private	  paediatricians,	  or	  by	  the	  screening	  behaviour	  of	  the	  mother.	   That	   is,	   girls	   with	  mothers	   attending	   cervical	   cancer	   screening	   were	  more	  likely	  vaccinated	  than	  those	  who	  not	  presented	  this	  connection.	  Arguably,	  the	  preventive	  opportunity	  hence	  arrives	  only	  to	  those	  who	  are	  already	  within	  an	  established	  network	  of	  preventive	  practices.	  In	  the	  Italian	  case,	  instead,	  the	  recommendation	  and	   the	   relative	   information	  arrive	   to	  everyone,	   irrespective	  of	   the	  socioeconomic	  background.	   In	  this	  respect,	   it	   is	  an	   improvement	  on	  the	  US	  voluntary	  model.	  Yet,	  disparities	   in	  screening	  behaviour	  and	  in	  vaccination	  uptake	  existing	  between	  the	  more	  affluent	  and	  the	  most	  deprived	  regions	  need	  to	   be	   carefully	   monitored	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   negative	   aim	   of	   justice	   and	   to	  avoid	  that	  cervical	  cancer	  becomes	  a	  disease	  for	  the	  poorest.	  In	  summary	  hence,	  the	   Italian	   system	   accommodates	   parental	   autonomous	   choice	   by	   only	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suggesting	   vaccination	   and	   leaving	   then	  acceptance	   to	   the	  private	  negotiation	  between	  parents	  and	  their	  physicians.	  In	  this	  way	  parents	  can	  decide,	  under	  the	  supervision	   of	   a	  medical	   professional,	  whether	   the	   intervention	   is	   in	   the	   best	  medical	   interest	   of	   their	   daughter	   and	   give	   a	   truly	   voluntary	   and	   informed	  consent.	   The	   system,	   moreover,	   offers	   an	   incentive	   as	   to	   overcome	   financial	  barriers	   by	   fully	   covering	   the	   intervention	   for	   all.	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	  programme	   equally	   addresses	   all	   the	   population.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   access	  barriers	  that	  are	  present	  also	  with	  regards	  to	  cervical	  cancer	  screening	  are	  not	  completely	   eliminated,	  with	   suboptimal	   and	  unequal	  uptake.	  The	   latter,	  while	  contributing	   only	   partially	   to	   the	   population	   goals,	   risks	   creating	   patterns	   of	  inequalities.	  
United	  Kingdom:	  a	  school-­‐based	  approach.	  	  
In	   the	   UK,	   the	   third	   element	   of	   my	   comparison,	   the	   vaccine	   is	   administered	  through	  a	  school-­‐based	  programme.	  That	  is,	  vaccination	  is	  proposed	  in	  a	  school	  setting	   by	   school	   nurses	   to	   the	   parents	   of	   all	   eligible	   girls	   (12-­‐13	   year	   old)	  through	   a	   form	   that	   explains	   vaccination,	   its	   benefits	   and	   modality	   of	  intervention.	   As	   shown	   above,	   the	   vaccination	   is	   part	   of	   the	   NHS	   vaccination	  service	   and	   is	   thus	   offered	   free	   of	   charge	   to	   the	   target	   group.	  As	   in	   the	   other	  settings,	  also	  in	  UK	  the	  economic	  barrier	  to	  vaccination	  is	  overcome	  by	  financial	  incentives	  provided	  by	  the	  state.	  	  
Although	   in	   the	   UK	   the	   population	   ethnic	   background	   is	  more	  mixed	   than	   in	  Italy,	   also	   in	   this	   context	   there	  appears	   to	  be	  no	   identifiable	  pattern	  of	  health	  inequality	   travelling	   along	   this	   axis	   (Muennig	   and	   Murphy	   2011).	   In	   a	   study	  performed	  on	  all	  England	  cancer	  registries	  for	  cancer	  mortalities	  in	  1998-­‐2003,	  Shack	  et	  al.	   (2008)	  note	   that	   the	  highest	  cervical	  cancer	   incidence	  rates	  occur	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among	   the	  most	   socioeconomically	   deprived	   groups.	   They	   further	   notice	   that	  incidence	  decreased	  consistently	  with	  increasing	  affluence.	  They	  conclude	  that,	  if	   all	   groups	   had	   the	   same	   incidence	   rates	   of	   the	  most	   affluent,	   4,108	   (28%)	  fewer	  cervical	  cancer	  cases	  would	  have	  occurred	   in	   those	  years	  (ibid.	  271).	   In	  line	   with	   the	   IARC	   multicentric	   study	   presented	   above,	   an	   English	   research	  suggests	   that	   socioeconomic	   status	   is	   linked	   with	   higher	   rates	   of	   cervical	  cancers	   but	   not	  with	   higher	  HPV	  prevalence.	  Moreover,	   screening	   uptake	   has	  been	   reported	   to	  vary	  by	   socioeconomic	   status	  and	  be	   lower	   for	  women	  with	  low	   levels	   of	   education	   (Baker	   and	   Middleton	   2003;	   Sutton	   and	   Rutherford	  2005).	  ).	   In	  this	  respect,	  also	  in	  the	  UK	  is	  present	  a	  gradient	  in	  cervical	  cancer	  incidence	  as	  the	  one	  shown	  in	  the	  US.	  This	  data	  together	  show	  once	  again	  that	  although	  the	  initial	  trigger	  of	  cervical	  cancer,	  that	  is	  HPV,	  is	  widespread	  across	  all	   the	   societal	   strata,	   its	   disease	   related	   outcomes	   are	   not.	   In	   the	   concluding	  remarks	  of	   this	  chapter	  I	  will	  make	  some	  specific	  considerations	  as	  to	  why	  an	  equal	   distribution	   of	   the	   intervention	   is	   important	   also	   from	   the	  epidemiological	  point	  of	   view.	  For	   the	  moment,	  however,	   let	  us	   consider	  how	  the	   school-­‐based	   system	   fares	   with	   respect	   to	   parental	   autonomy	   and	   the	  negative	  aim	  of	  justice.	  	  
The	   school-­‐based	   system	   apparently	   scores	   better	   than	   the	   other	   voluntary	  models	  with	  regards	  to	  justice.	  As	  all	  of	  them	  it	  proposes	  financial	  incentives	  to	  all	  eligible	  individuals	  –	  12-­‐13	  year	  old	  girls	  –	  but	  differently	  from	  the	  others	  it	  also	  offers	  facilitations	  in	  accessing	  the	  intervention	  to	  all.	  In	  the	  US	  we	  saw	  that	  although	  the	  vaccine	  is	  free	  to	  uninsured	  children	  via	  the	  VFC,	  at	  the	  end	  those	  who	   access	   the	   intervention	   are	   those	   children	  who	   already	   have	   established	  contacts	  with	   their	  paediatricians,	   or	  who	  have	  mothers	   that	   regularly	   attend	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cervical	   cancer	   screenings.	   In	   Italy	   instead,	   although	   this	   initial	   access	   gap	   is	  closed	   by	   the	   active	   invitation	   to	   all	   by	   the	   invitation	   coming	   from	   the	   local	  health	  units,	  still	  some	  barriers	  with	  regard	  to	  access	  exist.	  Also	  in	  Italy,	  indeed,	  the	  disparities	  in	  screening	  attendance	  existing	  between	  the	  most	  and	  the	  least	  affluent	  regional	  areas	  seem	  to	  come	  up	  again,	  although	   in	  minor	   form,	   in	   the	  case	   of	   vaccination	   uptakes.	   In	   the	   UK,	   instead,	   the	   programme	   seeks	   to	  overcome	  not	  only	  the	  financial	  barriers,	  but	  it	  also	  provides	  a	  space	  that	  is	  de	  
facto	  easily	  accessible	  to	  all.	  Indeed,	  in	  UK	  education	  is	  compulsory	  until	  age	  16,	  thus	  a	  school	  based	  programme	  is	  able	  to	  track	  all	  individuals	  in	  an	  institutional	  space	   specifically	   devoted	   to	   the	   distribution	   of	   one	   of	   the	   most	   important	  public	   goods	   -­‐	   that	   is,	   public	   education.	   In	   practical	   terms,	   the	   school-­‐based	  programme	   facilitates	   uptake.	   Parents	   do	  not	   need	   to	   get	   prescriptions,	   leave	  work,	   or	   arrange	   to	   bring	   children	   to	   a	   clinic	   to	   receive	   the	   vaccine.	   The	  advantage	   of	   distributing	   vaccination	   in	   schools	   is,	  moreover,	   accentuated	   by	  the	   fact	   that	   the	   final	  users	  of	   the	   intervention	   -­‐12-­‐13	  year	  old	  girls	  and	   their	  families	   -­‐are	  most	   likely	  known	  by	   the	   institution	   in	   several	  ways.	   In	   schools,	  indeed,	  girls	  and	   their	   families	  are	  not	  merely	  a	  number	   in	   the	  registry	  of	   the	  local	  health	  unit	  but	  clearly	  identifiable	  individuals	  with	  specific	  socioeconomic	  backgrounds	  and	  family’s	  conditions.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  the	  school	  environment	  the	   users	   of	   the	   interventions	   are,	   at	   least	   ideally,	   extensively	   known	   in	   their	  biographies.	  Accordingly,	  it	  is	  easier,	  at	  least	  in	  theory,	  to	  make	  the	  vaccination	  offer	   really	   available	   to	   anyone,	   and	   to	   spot	   personal	   circumstances	   of	  systematic	  disadvantage	  more	  easily	  than	  in	  the	  other	  two	  models.	  Vaccination	  made	  routine	  in	  a	  school-­‐based	  setting	  appears	  to	  be	  also	  efficient	   in	  terms	  of	  the	   objectives	   needed	   to	   obtain	   population	   health	   goals.	   Official	   data	   by	   the	  Deparment	  of	  Health	  states	  that	   in	  2010	  77.5%	  of	   the	  UK	  12-­‐13	  year	  old	  girls	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received	  the	  vaccine	  (76.4%	  in	  England,	  86.9%	  in	  Scotland,	  77.3%	  in	  Wales,	  and	  83.4%	   in	   Northern	   Ireland),	   faring	   better	   than	   all	   European	   countries.	  Important	   for	  my	  purposes	  here,	   is	   that	  no	  disparities	   in	  uptake	  are	  observed	  between	   the	   most	   affluent	   and	   the	   most	   deprived	   areas	   of	   the	   country	  (Sheridan	   and	  White	   2010).	   Arguably,	   these	   data	   show	   that	   the	   school	   based	  system	  in	  being	  efficient	  also	  serves	  the	  negative	  aim	  of	  justice.	  	  
Some	   concerns	   with	   the	   school-­‐based	   model,	   however,	   may	   be	   raised	   with	  respect	   to	   the	   way	   it	   actually	   respects	   parental	   autonomy,	   and	   whether	  informed	  consent	  is	  achieved	  in	  practice.	  This	  point	  is	  raised	  by	  (Malmqvist	  et	  al.	   2011)	   who	   notes	   that	   the	   school	   setting	   is	   likely	   to	   convey	   the	   wrong	  impression	   that	   the	   vaccine	   is	   compulsory	   like	   many	   things	   happening	   in	  schools.	   Rather	   than	   facilitating	   comprehension	   and	   achieve	   voluntary	  adhesions,	  hence,	  the	  school-­‐based	  programme	  would	  look	  more	  like	  a	  kind	  of	  soft	  coercion.	  As	  they	  recognize,	  this	  problem	  could	  be	  avoided	  by	  if	  extensive	  information	  is	  given	  to	  parents,	  but	  the	  thight	  schedule	  of	  the	  administration	  (to	  recall,	   the	   vaccine	   is	   given	   in	   three	   shots	   over	   three	  months)	   would	  make	   it	  difficult	  to	  allow	  parents	  the	  desired	  time	  to	  reflect	  on	  it	  and	  decide	  only	  after	  they	  are	  genuinely	  convinced	  about	  their	  choice.	  In	  a	  same	  vein,	  they	  speculate	  that	  insisting	  too	  much	  on	  the	  voluntarity	  of	  the	  intervention	  may	  rise	  suspicion	  about	   the	   programme	   (ibid.	   24).	   The	   problem	   is	   certainly	   relevant	   and	   may	  make	  the	  achievement	  of	  informed	  consent	  a	  daunting	  task.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  the	  UK	   system	   specific	   evening	   meetings	   are	   devised	   in	   schools	   so	   to	   inform	  parents	   about	   the	   progamme	   and	   its	  meaning.	   This	   aspect	   partially	  mitigates	  these	   concerns.	   But,	   clearly,	   it	   very	   much	   depends	   on	   how	   they	   are	   actually	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performed.	   To	   understand	   this	   point	   is	   important	   to	   see	   how	   the	   informed	  consent	  process	  is	  mediated	  in	  practice.	  
	  Fundamental	  in	  this	  process	  are	  school	  nurses	  that:	  collect	  the	  consent	  forms,	  are	  open	  to	  answer	  questions	  by	  concerned	  parents	  and,	  finally	  administer	  the	  vaccination.	  In	  a	  very	  recent	  paper	  collecting	  nurses’	  views	  on	  the	  first	  year	  of	  the	  HPV	  vaccination	  programme	   in	   the	  UK	   (Hilton	   et	   al.	   2011),	   school	  nurses	  report	  four	  kind	  of	  parental	  attitudes	  towards	  HPV	  vaccination.	  The	  first	  was	  of	  active	  acceptance.	  That	   is,	   several	  parents	  were	  positively	  participating	   to	   the	  programme	   and	   contacting	   them	   for	   more	   information	   and	   reassurance.	   The	  second	  was	  passive	  acceptance.	  Many	  parents	  simply	  signed	  the	   form	  without	  much	   involvement	   and	   further	   questioning.	   The	   third	   typology	   of	   parental	  attitude	  was,	   instead,	  one	  of	  passive	  rejection.	   In	  some	  circumstances,	  parents	  did	  not	  sign	  the	  form	  out	  of	  apathy	  and	  not	  for	  specific	  concerns.	  It	  is	  reported	  that,	  in	  these	  circumstances,	  further	  efforts	  were	  spent	  to	  contact	  these	  parents,	  explain	   better	   the	   benefits	   of	   the	   vaccination,	   and	   ask	   reasons	   for	   refusal.	  Another	  attitude	  noticed	  was	  one	  of	  active	  rejection.	  Active	  rejectors	  were	  those	  parents	   that	   attended	   evening	   sessions	   dedicated	   to	   the	   explanation	   of	   the	  programme	  and	  challenged	  it	  alleging	  that	  their	  daughters	  were	  used	  as	  “guinea	  pigs”	   (ibid.	   226).	   This	   last	   point	   deserve	   some	   comment	   in	   line	   with	   some	  thoughts	  I	  have	  put	  forth	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  when	  I	  was	  speaking	  about	  civic	  membership.	  In	  these	  contexts	  indeed,	  parents	  are	  able	  to	  express	  their	  views,	  expose	  their	  concerns,	  and	  being	  heard	  by	  others	  that	  may	  have	  different	  views.	  What	   these	   spaces	   are	  offering,	   clearly,	   is	   not	   full	   politcal	   participation	   in	   the	  devise	   of	   the	   programme	   itself,	   nor	   do	   they	   necessary	   lead	   to	   a	   flattening	   of	  dissent.	   As	   one	   study	   shows	   (Stretch	   et	   al.	   2009),	   	   several	   parents	   attending	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these	  meeting	  went	  with	  a	  clear	  idea	  as	  to	  whether	  to	  allow	  their	  daughters	  to	  get	  the	  vaccine,	  and	  rarely	  changed	  it.	  Nevertheless,	  these	  spaces	  permit	  dissent	  to	   circulate	   in	   an	   informed	   institutional	   setting	   and,	   perhaps,	   also	   serve	   the	  scope	   to	  make	  more	   informed	  choice.	  More	  generally,	   these	  procedures	  allow	  the	  parents	  to	  enhance	  the	  informational	  base	  for	  an	  autonomous	  choice.	  	  
To	  summarize,	   the	  UK	  system	  appears	  as	   the	   least	  voluntary	  among	  the	   three	  programmes.	   Indeed,	   by	   organizing	   the	   whole	   programme	   in	   a	   routinized	  manner,	  some	  concerns	  may	  be	  raised	  as	  to	  whether	  parents	  are	  able	  to	  truly	  consent	   to	   the	   procedure.	   This	   is	   so	   because	   of	   the	   tight	   timing	   of	   the	  vaccination	   schedule	   and	   because	   schools	   may	   give	   the	   impression	   that	   the	  scheme	  is	  compulsory.	  Nevertheless,	  on	  the	  positive	  side,	  the	  programme	  better	  achieves	   the	   population	   goals	   than	   the	   others	   and	   does	   so	   in	   an	   equitable	  manner.	  Moreover,	  by	  providing	  an	   institutional	  space	   in	  which	  to	  discuss	  the	  programme	   and	   how	   it	   will	   affect	   them	   and	   their	   daughters,	   the	   programme	  seems	  to	  be	  better	  positioned	  than	  the	  others	  in	  letting	  information	  about	  HPV	  to	  circulate	  in	  an	  informed	  context	  and	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  all.	  	  
5.	  Concluding	  remarks	  
In	   this	   chapter	   I	   have	   provided	   a	   normative	   overview	   of	   the	   different	  approaches	   taken	   so	   far	   to	   control	  HPV	   infection	   and	   reduce	   the	   incidence	  of	  cervical	  cancer.	  I	  have	  done	  this	  by	  differentiating	  the	  models	  according	  to	  how	  they	   interfere	   with	   people’s	   autonomous	   choices	   and	   how	   they	   fare	   with	  respect	   to	   justice.	   I	   have	   shown	   that	   a	   purely	   mandatory	   model	   is	   hardly	  justified	  through	  the	  now	  classical	  tools	  of	  the	  harm	  principle,	  nor	  is	  it	  justified	  as	   a	   case	   of	   soft	   paternalism.	   In	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	   beneficence	  model	   of	   public	  health	   ethics,	   hence,	   I	   have	   tried	   to	   understand	   whether	   the	   least	   restrictive	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alternative	  was	   instead	  more	   easily	   justifiable.	   Among	   the	   options	   presented,	  the	  least	  restrictive	  alternative	  is	  by	  far	  the	  voluntary	  model	  as	  adopted	  in	  the	  US.	  This	  model,	  although	  attractive	  for	  the	  respect	  it	  pays	  to	  parental	  autonomy	  also	  has	  some	  drawbacks.	  In	  particular,	  I	  have	  identified	  as	  most	  relevant	  those	  pertaining	   to	   the	   negative	   aim	   of	   justice.	   Although	   the	   campaign	   is	   still	   in	   its	  infancy,	   the	   few	  available	  data	  we	  have	  about	  vaccination	  uptake	  suggest	   that	  those	  who	  are	   taking	  advantage	  of	   the	   intervention	  are	   those	  people	  who	  are	  already	   embedded	   in	   a	   network	   of	   preventive	   and	   medical	   relations.	   This	  model,	   hence,	   while	   preserving	   freedom	   of	   choice	   may	   run	   the	   risk	   of	  exacerbating	  existing	  inequalities	  and	  fall	  short	  of	  long	  term	  efficiency.	  Slightly	  more	   intrusive	  means,	   like	   in	   the	   Italian	  case,	  appear	   to	  score	  better	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	   justice	  while	  also	  preserving	  autonomous	  choice.	  This	  model	   is	  respectful	  of	  autonomous	  choice	  and,	  in	  a	  sense,	  it	  is	  also	  autonomy	  enhancing,	  in	  that	  it	  offers	  -­‐	  via	  a	  recommendation	  letter	  –	  to	  everyone	  the	  opportunity	  to	  know	  more	  about	  the	  preventive	  option.	  In	  its	  specific	  context,	  however,	  is	  still	  performing	   sub-­‐optimally	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   efficiency	   and	   the	  perspective	   of	   the	   negative	   aim	   of	   justice.	   All	   these	   problems	   seem	   to	   be	  overcome	  by	  rendering	  vaccination	  routine	  while	  still	  respecting	  the	  choices	  of	  individuals	  in	  the	  school-­‐based	  model.	  Although	  some	  remarks	  can	  be	  done	  also	  about	   the	   latter,	   especially	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   difficulty	   of	   obtaining	   valid	  informed	   consent,	   the	   school-­‐based	  model	   is	   able	   to	   create,	   at	   least	   ideally,	   a	  space	  for	  expanding	  the	  autonomy	  of	  all	  in	  an	  institutional	  setting.	  	  
These	   remarks,	  however,	   also	   show	  how	  an	   insistence	  on	   the	   least	   restrictive	  alternative	  may	  not	  be	  a	  sufficient	  ethical	  justification	  of	  public	  health	  policies.	  As	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	   US	   voluntary	   model	   is	   certainly	   the	   least	   restrictive	  
	   159	  
alternative	  among	  all	  the	  policy	  options	  presented.	  In	  these	  regards,	  one	  would	  be	   also	   tempted	   to	   conclude	   that	   is	   the	   one	   that	   allows	   more	   space	   for	   the	  exercise	  of	   free	  choices.	  Nevertheless,	   if	  we	  recall	  the	  concept	  of	   freedom	  as	  it	  stems	   out	   of	   the	   republican	   model,	   we	   realize	   that	   this	   conclusion	   does	   not	  necessarily	  hold	  as	  valid.	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  conceiving	  freedom	  as	  non-­‐interference	  only	  is	  not	  all	  there	  is	  to	  say	  about	  the	  concept.	  In	  a	  sense,	  all	  those	   families	  who	  are	  not	  reached	  by	   the	   intervention,	  perhaps	  because	   they	  are	   not	   into	   a	   network	   of	   established	   medical	   and	   preventive	   practices,	   are	  certainly	   free	   from	   any	   interference.	   Yet,	   I	  would	   resist	   concluding	   that	   their	  choice	   was	   effectively	   free	   in	   a	   non-­‐dominating	   sense.	   Indeed,	   conditions	   of	  socioeconomic	   disadvantage	   also	   imply	   barriers	   as	   to	   the	   access	   to	   adequate	  information	  and	  to	  those	  places	  in	  which	  information	  can	  be	  enacted	  in	  services	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  individuals	  so	  situated.	  Therefore,	  those	  programmes	  that	  try	  to	  reach	  all	  in	  a	  more	  intrusive	  way	  (i.e.	  the	  Italian	  and	  the	  UK	  models)	  are	  not	  doing	   it	   in	   an	   arbitrary	   way	   but,	   arguably,	   to	   track	   everyone’s	   avowable	  interests.	   It	   is	  only	  after	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  all	  have	  been	  tracked	  that	  choice	  becomes	  really	  autonomous	  and,	  as	  such,	  worthy	  of	  respect.	  The	  Italian	  an	  the	  UK	  model	   therefore	   appear	   as	   those	  who	  are	  better	   able	   to	   take	   into	   account	  those	   interests	   without	   the	   disvalue	   of	   coercion	   of	   a	   mandatory	   model	   with	  group-­‐specific	  exemptions.	  Although	  this	  similarity	  needs	  acknowledging	  I	  have	  also	  noticed	  that	  an	  invitation	  letter	  may	  be	  only	  formally	  just.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  school-­‐based	   model	   provides	   further	   warrant	   that	   all	   people	   have	   been	  adequately	   reached	   by	   the	   campaigns.	   In	   contexts	   in	  which	   large	   inequalities	  exist,	   hence,	   the	   school-­‐based	   model	   may	   be	   the	   most	   preferable	   option	   to	  choose.	  At	   least	   so	   if	  we	  admit,	   as	   I	   think	  we	  should,	   that	   concerns	   for	   justice	  need	  to	  inform	  public	  health	  policies.	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Chapter	  five:	  Should	  the	  HPV	  vaccine	  be	  
given	  to	  men?	  Gender	  equity	  vs.	  efficiency	  	  
1.	  The	  sex	  of	  cervical	  cancer	  
In	   the	  previous	  chapter	   I	  have	  explored	   the	  ethical	  dimension	  of	   the	  different	  policy	  means	  so	  far	  proposed	  to	  tackle	  HPV	  infections	  and	  reduce	  the	  incidence	  of	  cervical	  cancer.	  I	  have	  noticed	  that	  all	  the	  models	  identified	  differently	  put	  in	  balance	   the	  moral	   concerns	   at	   stake	   in	   the	   issue.	   In	  particular,	   I	   have	  noticed	  that	  an	   insistence	  on	   the	   least	   restrictive	  alternative	  alone	   leaves	  out	  of	   focus	  important	   concerns	   for	   social	   justice	   and	   the	   need	   to	   avoid	   the	  worsening	   of	  existing	  inequalities.	  Although	  the	  contextual	  aspects	  of	  any	  policy	  have,	  clearly,	  to	   be	   taken	   into	   account,	   the	   school	   based	   programme	   looked	   as	   the	   one	  allowing	   broader	   space	   for	   the	   recognition	   of	   all	   the	   interests	   at	   play.	   If	   one	  wants	   to	   draw	   a	   more	   general	   conclusion	   from	   the	   comparative	   exercise	  performed	   above	   is	   maybe	   that	   the	   morally	   preferable	   alternative	   is	   not	  necessarily	  the	  one	  that	  allows	  more	  space	  for	  non-­‐interfered	  choices,	  but	  one	  that,	  while	   allowing	   the	   free	   exercise	   of	   choice,	   also	   offers	   the	   opportunity	   to	  enlarge	   the	   informational	   basis	   on	   which	   individual	   choice	   is	   made	   and	   that	  does	   it	   in	   a	  way	   that	   is	   accessible	   to	   all.	   In	   other	   terms,	   not	   all	   individuals	   in	  society	   are	   equally	   placed	   with	   regards	   to	   the	   information	   available	   and,	  consequently,	  a	  policy	  that	  does	  not	  reach	  everyone,	  in	  some	  way,	  is	  not	  really	  providing	  the	  space	  for	  a	  truly	  autonomous	  choice.	   In	  this	  respect,	   the	  school-­‐based	  system	  seems	  to	  create	  the	  space	  for	  respecting	  choice	  and	  expanding	  the	  autonomy	  of	  all.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  also	  meets	  concerns	  for	  equity	  and	  justice.	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A	  common	  thread	  among	  these	  policies,	  however,	  is	  the	  group	  they	  identify	  as	  the	   privileged	   target	   of	   the	   intervention.	   All	   policies	   indeed	   pursue	   a	   gender-­‐based	   strategy.	   In	   its	   direct-­‐to-­‐consumer	   campaign	   Merck,	   the	   company	  producing	   Gardasil,	   addresses	   mothers	   and	   their	   daughters	   urging	   them	   to	  make	   the	   right	   choice:	   buy	   the	   vaccine	   and	   be	   ‘one	   less’	   cancer	   victim.	   Its	  marketing	  strategy,	  comprehensibly,	  was	  to	  catch	  the	  attention	  of	  middle	  class	  women	  who	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  risks	  of	  cervical	  cancer	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  had	   the	   economic	   means	   to	   afford	   such	   expensive	   vaccine.	   The	   whole	  advertisement	   campaign,	   indeed,	   was	   centered	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   emancipated	  mothers	   and	   daughters	   that	   were	   now	   provided	   with	   the	   tool	   for	   a	   full	  protection	   against	   the	  perils	   of	   sexually	   transmitted	   infections.	  An	   analysis	   of	  marketing	  strategies	   is	  not	  of	  my	  specific	  concern	  here	  (for	  an	  interesting	  one	  see:	  Mamo,	  Nelson,	  and	  Clark	  2010),	  but	  the	  idea	  that	  HPV	  and	  cervical	  cancer	  protection	   is,	   in	   essence,	   women’s	   business	   has	   permeated	   also	   scientific	  commentaries.	   In	   one	   passionate	   editorial	   appeared	   on	   HPV	   Today	   –	   a	  periodical	  newsletter	  for	  medical	  professionals	  –	  and	  tellingly	  titled	  ‘The	  sex	  of	  cervical	  cancer’,	  Xavier	  Bosch	  affirms:	  
HPV	   is	  a	  significant	  human	  carcinogen	   for	  both	  men	  and	  women.	  However,	  organ-­‐to-­‐organ	   susceptibility	   is	   strikingly	   diverse	   and	   the	   number	   of	   HPV-­‐related	   cancers	   is	  strongly	  skewed,	  with	  women	  carrying	  the	  heaviest	  burden.	  The	  central	  public	  health	  impact	   of	   HPV-­‐related	   cancers	   is	   thus	   first	   and	   foremost	   a	   woman’s	   issue	   (X.	   Bosch	  2009,	  2)	  
To	  be	  precise,	  Bosch	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  figures	  in	  HPV	  research	  and	  to	   him	   and	   his	   group	   of	   collaborators	   is	   due	   much	   of	   the	   epidemiological	  knowledge	  we	   now	   have	   about	   the	   virus.	   In	   this	   sense,	   his	   is	   not	   a	   claim	   for	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suggesting	  that	  HPV	  prevention	  is	  a	  private	  issue	  for	  women.	  Nevertheless,	  he	  takes	   policy	   actions	   aimed	   at	   the	   control	   of	   HPV	   as	   manifestations	   of	   the	  importance	   that	   women’s	   issues	   have	   now	   acquired	   in	   our	   societies.	   As	   he	  claims,	  this	  importance	  “also	  reflects	  the	  power	  and	  influence	  of	  women	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process”	  (ibid.).	  Although	  I	   largely	  share	  this	  view,	   it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  this	  acquired	  importance	  implies	  necessarily	  a	  gendering	  of	  the	  issue.	  As	  I	  have	  shown	  extensively	  throughout	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  not	  all	  women	   have	   the	   material	   and	   cultural	   resources	   to	   have	   full	   access	   to	   the	  benefits	  of	  the	  intervention.	  In	  other	  terms,	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  women’s	  health	  has	  acquired	  major	  importance	  in	  the	  current	  medical	  and	  preventive	  landscape,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  forgotten	  that	  women	  are	  not	  a	  homogeneous	  group,	  and	  not	  all	  of	   them	   are	   so	   empowered	   to	   face	   HPV	   risk	   properly.	   Framing	   the	   whole	  problem	  as	  a	  woman’s	  issue	  only	  may	  thus	  be	  limitative	  and	  can	  have	  the	  effect	  of	   obscuring	   the	  multifaceted	  dimension	   of	  HPV	  prevention.	   In	   the	   context	   of	  the	  comparative	  analysis,	  I	  insisted	  that	  concerns	  for	  socioeconomic	  status	  are	  as	   important	   as	   classical	   ethical	   concerns	   for	   respecting	   autonomy.	   In	   the	  present	  one,	  I	  would	  like	  instead	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  ethical	  implications	  of	  gender-­‐based	  programmes.	  
HPV	   infection,	   indeed,	   is	   sexually	   transmitted.	   As	   such,	   it	   is	   an	   issue	   for	  everyone,	   at	   the	   very	   least	   for	   everyone	  who	   is	   also	   sexually	   active.	   	   Thus	   a	  point	   can	   be	   raised	   as	   to	   whether	   it	   is	   right	   to	   include	   only	   girls	   into	   the	  programmes.	  This	  point	  can	  be	  put	   forward	  from	  two	  perspectives,	  one	  based	  on	  epidemiological	  reasons,	  and	  the	  other	  on	  grounds	  of	  gender	  equity.	  From	  an	  epidemiological	   perspective,	   in	   general,	   makes	   perfect	   sense	   to	   increase	   the	  population	  of	  the	  immune	  individuals	  so	  to	  reduce	  rates	  of	  contagion.	  After	  all,	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the	   vast	  majority	   of	   vaccination	   programmes	   devised	   in	   the	   history	   of	   public	  health	  followed	  this	  strategy.	  That	  is,	  vaccinating	  as	  many	  people	  as	  possible	  so	  that	  the	  likelihood	  of	  an	  epidemics	  falls	  down	  dramatically.	  The	  epidemiological	  reason,	   however,	   is	   supported	   by	   broader	   concerns	   about	   how	   such	   female	  specific	   endeavours	   impact	   on	  morally	   sensitive	   issues	   like	   relations	  between	  genders.	   In	  other	  words,	   it	   can	  be	   argued	   that,	   given	   the	   sexual	  nature	  of	   the	  infection,	  the	  burden	  of	  the	  preventive	  intervention	  should	  be	  shared	  between	  the	  female	  and	  male	  population.	  One	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  a	  woman,	  a	  feminist,	  or	  an	  epidemiologist	  (or	  possibly	  a	  combination	  the	  three)	  to	  understand	  that	  by	  concentrating	  our	  attention	  to	  women	  only	  part	  of	  the	  picture	  is	  still	  missing.	  Men,	  although	  suffer	  the	  ill	  effects	  of	  HPV	  less	  frequently	  than	  women,	  are	  still	  vectors	  of	   the	   infection,	  and	  so	   it	  makes	  sense	  to	   think	  that	   they	  should	  share	  part	  of	  the	  preventive	  responsibility.	  This	  option,	  however,	  proves	  problematic	  because	   the	   HPV-­‐associated	   burden	   of	   disease	   is	   heavier	   on	   women	   than	   in	  men.	   It	   would	   be	   unfair,	   one	   may	   think,	   to	   vaccinate	   males	   only	   for	   the	  epidemiological	  benefits	  this	  option	  would	  bring	  about	  to	  women.	   It	  would	  be	  so	   because	   they	   will	   not	   have	   much	   to	   gain	   and,	   perhaps	   more	   importantly,	  because	  this	  choice	  would	  divert	  energies	  and	  funds	  from	  attempts	  to	  reach	  all	  the	   girls	   that	  may	   benefit	   the	  most	   from	   the	   vaccine.	   This	   aspect	   gains	   even	  more	  argumentative	   force	  when	  we	  consider	   the	  high	   cost	  of	   the	  vaccine	  and	  the	   ensuing	   financial	   costs	   a	  more	   inclusive	   campaign	  would	   require.	   Several	  models	  developed	  to	  calculate	  the	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  profile	  of	  HPV	  vaccination	  have	   indeed	  underscored	  how	   such	   an	   inclusion	  may	  provide	   little	   additional	  benefits	  at	  a	  high	  cost	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  strategy	  of	  vaccinating	  a	  high	  number	  of	  women	  only.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  trade-­‐offs	  indicated	  in	  a	  previous	  chapter,	  hence,	  HPV-­‐related	  public	  policy	  finds	  itself	  confronted	  with	  a	  choice	  between	  issues	  of	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equity	   and	   efficiency.	   So	   far,	   the	   latter	   considerations	   seem	   to	  have	  prevailed	  and	   little	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	   to	  equity	  concerns.	   In	   this	  chapter	   I	  explore	  this	  trade-­‐off,	  specify	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  arises,	  and	  then	  assess	  what	  are	  the	  reasons	   in	   favour	   and	   against	   the	   inclusion	  of	  males	   into	   the	  programmes.	   In	  particular,	   I	   will	   assess	   whether	   these	   reasons	   are	   strong	   enough	   to	   hold	  notwithstanding	   their	   policy	   implications	   would	   have	   an	   alleged	   low	   cost-­‐effectiveness	  profile.	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  options	  and	  see	  whether	  there	  are	  moral	  reasons	  to	  extend	  the	  programmes	  to	  males	  too.	  Before	  doing	  that,	  however,	  it	  is	   important	   to	   see	  whether	   the	  HPV-­‐associated	  disease	  burden	   is	   a	  woman’s	  issue	  only.	  
2.	  HPV-­‐related	  cancers:	  A	  woman’s	  issue?	  Cervical	  cancer	  has	   long	  been	  a	  scourge	  for	  women’s	  health	  affecting	  their	   life	  and	   reproductive	   plans.	   Before	   the	   introduction	   of	   massive	   preventive	  campaigns	   through	   screening,	   this	   tumour	   affected	   women	   with	   a	   high	  incidence	  of	  about	  35	  per	  100,000.	  Although	  the	  incidence	  of	  cervical	  cancer	  is	  now	   reduced	   in	   all	   those	   countries	   in	  which	   organized	   preventive	   campaigns	  are	   present,	   it	   is	   still	   a	   major	   cause	   of	   mortality	   for	   women	   as	   a	   group.	  Knowledge	  about	  the	   link	  between	  this	  disease	  and	  its	  viral	  causative	  agent	   is	  relatively	   recent.	   Even	  more	   recent	   is	   the	   possibility	   of	   adopting	   vaccines	   as	  preventive	   tools.	   It	   is	   reasonable	   then	   that	   these	   vaccines	   have	   been	  immediately	   perceived	   as	   further	   elements	   for	   combatting	   this	   illness	   and,	  possibly,	   eliminating	   it.	   In	   this	   sense,	   HPV	   vaccination	   campaigns	   entered	   an	  already	   established	   network	   of	   preventive	   efforts,	   professional	   expertise	   and	  technological	   structures	   aimed	   at	   cervical	   cancer	   prevention.	   Tradition,	   we	  know,	   is	   very	   important	   for	   human	   activities.	   It	   determines	   practices,	   and	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suggests	  intervention	  criteria	  and	  plausible	  plans	  of	  action.	  When	  an	  innovation	  enters	   these	   patterns	   of	   established	   practices,	   however,	   it	   may	   restructure	  known	  categories	  and	   interpretative	  schemes.	  This	   is	  also	   true	   for	  biomedical	  innovations	  as	  they	  unravel	  the	  causal	  roots	  of	  diseases	  and	  offer	  new	  ways	  for	  their	  control.	  Besides	  being	  a	  relevant	  issue	  for	  biomedical	  practice,	  the	  latter,	  may	   also	   have	   ethical	   and	   social	   implications	   that	   need	   to	   be	   considered	  alongside.	  HPV	  offers	  a	  paradigmatic	  example	  of	  this	  dynamics	  as	  it	  asks	  us	  to	  enlarge	  our	   focus	   from	  disease,	   after	   it	   has	   occurred,	   to	   its	   causal	   roots.	  Now	  that	  this	  change	  in	  perspective	  has	  taken	  place,	  biomedical	  and	  epidemiological	  research	   is	   progressively	   ascertaining	   that	   HPV-­‐related	   disease	   outcomes	   are	  not	  only	  confined	  to	  the	  cervical	  site	  but	  affect,	  although	  to	  a	  minor	  extent,	  men	  too.	  HPV,	  in	  fact,	  plays	  causal	  role	  also	  in	  other	  tumours	  in	  the	  anogenital	  area	  (vulva,	  vagina,	  penis,	  anus)	  and	  in	  a	  subset	  of	  head	  and	  neck	  cancers.	  Let	  us	  thus	  understand	   better	   what	   is	   the	   HPV-­‐related	   disease	   burden	   for	   men	   and	   its	  weight.	   HPV	   associated	   head	   and	   neck	   cancers	   and	   anal	   cancers	   are	   of	  particular	  interest	  for	  this	  work.	  Therefore	  I	  will	  discuss	  them	  in	  order.	  
Head	   and	   neck	   cancer	   is	   a	   term	   that	   covers	   epithelial	   malignancies	   that	  originate	  in	  the	  nasal	  cavity,	  oral	  cavity,	  pharynx	  and	  larynx.	  It	  is	  the	  sixth	  most	  common	  cancer	  worldwide,	  and	  accounts	   for	  about	  650,000	  new	  cancer	  cases	  and	  350,000	  deaths	  every	  year	  (Argiris	  et	  al.	  2008).	  Known	  risk	  factors	  for	  head	  and	  neck	  cancer	  are	  cigarette	  smoking	  and	  high	  alcohol	  consumption.	  Although	  an	  overall	  marginal	  decline	   in	   the	   incidence	  of	  most	  head	  and	  neck	  cancers	   in	  recent	  years,	   the	   incidence	  of	  oropharyngeal	   cancers	  has	   increased,	  especially	  in	   the	   developed	   world.	   This	   increase	   has	   been	   observed	   despite	   a	   drastic	  overall	   reduction	   in	   cigarette	   smoking	   in	   those	   countries	   where	   anti-­‐tobacco	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campaigns	  have	  been	  conducted.	  Oropharyngeal	  cancers,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  reminded,	  are	  just	  a	  subset	  of	  all	  head	  and	  neck	  tumours,	  and	  they	  can	  be	  distinguished	  in	  HPV	  positive	  and	  HPV	  negative.	  Recent	  studies	  are	  ascertaining	  that	  while	  the	  latter	   are	   decreasing	   due	   to	   a	   reduction	   in	   cigarette	   smoking,	   the	   former	   are	  instead	   increasing	   at	   a	   rapid	   pace.	   The	   two	   tumours,	  moreover,	   appear	   to	   be	  distinct	   clinical	   entities	   in	   different	   respects.	   HPV	   negative	   oropharyngeal	  cancers	  tend	  to	  occur	  at	  an	  older	  age	  (around	  60	  year	  old)	  and	  affect	  individuals	  who	   present	   cigarette	   smoking	   or	   alcohol	   consumption	   as	   risk	   factors.	   HPV	  positive	  tumours,	  instead,	  tend	  to	  come	  about	  at	  a	  younger	  age	  (40-­‐50	  year	  old	  age	  group)	  and	  affect	  individuals	  who	  do	  not	  present	  standard	  risk	  factors,	  but	  young	  age	  at	  first	  sexual	  intercourse	  and	  4	  or	  more	  of	  lifetime	  oral	  sex	  partners.	  HPV,	   indeed,	   is	   thought	   to	   be	   transmitted	   also	   through	   the	   orogenital	   route.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  observed	  that	  HPV	  positive	  patients	  have	  better	  prognosis	  than	  HPV	  negative	  patients	  (Mehanna	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Chaturvedi	  et	  al.	  2011).	  	  The	  graph	  below	  shows	  well	  this	  trend.	  The	  dotted	  yellow	  line	  indicates	  the	  incidence	  rate	  of	  oropharyngeal	   cancers	  overall,	  whereas	   the	  blue	  and	  grey	   lines	   indicate,	   in	  turn,	  HPV	   positive	   and	  HPV	   negative	   oropharyngeal	   tumours.	   As	  we	   observe,	  while	  the	  overall	   incidence	  of	  these	  cancers	  has	  increased	  from	  the	  late	  1980s	  to	  the	  early	  2000s	  (from	  2.8	  per	  100,000	  per	  year	  to	  3.6	  per	  100,000	  per	  year),	  the	   incidence	   of	   those	   tumours	   linked	   with	   the	   ‘standard’	   risk	   factors	   has	  decreased	   in	   the	  same	   time	   frame	  (from	  2.0	  per	  100,000	   to	  1.0	  per	  100,000).	  HPV	   positive	   oropharyngeal	   tumours,	   instead,	   are	   sharply	   rising	   in	   incidence	  (from	  0.8	  per	  100,000	  to	  2.6	  per	  100,000).	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Graph	  3:	  Incidence	  trends	  of	  oropharyngeal	  cancers	  in	  the	  US.	  Drawn	  from:	  (Chaturvedi	  et	  al.	  2011)	  The	   study	   cited	  was	   based	   in	   the	  US,	   but	   similar	   trends	   are	   observed	   also	   in	  other	  countries.	  The	  UK,	  for	  instance,	  has	  seen	  a	  51%	  increase	  of	  HPV	  positive	  oropharyngeal	   cancers	   (Mehanna	   et	   al.	   2010).	   A	   recent	   retrospective	   study	  conducted	  in	  Sweden	  in	  showed	  a	  progressive	  increase	  in	  the	  detection	  of	  HPV	  in	  oropharyngeal	   cancers	  over	   the	  past	   three	  decades	   (23.3	   in	  1970s,	  29%	   in	  1980s,	   57%	   in	   1990s,	   68%	   in	   2002,	   77%	   between	   2003	   and	   2005,	   and	   93%	  between	  2006	  and	  2007)	  and	  led	  the	  authors	  to	  observe	  that	  we	  are	  probably	  experiencing	  an	  epidemics	  of	  viral-­‐induced	  oropharyngeal	  cancers	  (Näsman	  et	  al.	  2009).	  In	  an	  interview	  to	  Medscape	  Medical	  News	  Oncology,	  the	  authors	  of	  the	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US	   study	   speculate	   that	   this	   sharp	   increase	   of	   HPV	   positive	   oropharyngeal	  cancers	  may	  be	  a	  legacy,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  US,	  of	  the	  sexual	  revolution	  occurred	  in	  the	   1960s	   and	   1970s.	   As	   one	   of	   the	   authors	   told	   to	  Medscape	  Medical	   News	  
Oncology:	   “It	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   strongest	   behavioural	   risk	   for	   HPV-­‐related	  oropharyngeal	  cancer	  is	  the	  lifetime	  number	  of	  oral	  sex	  partners.	  Our	  own	  work	  shows	  a	  strong	  cohort	  effect,	  which	  means	   the	  greatest	  determinant	  of	  risk	   in	  any	  age	  group	  is	  the	  year	  that	  you	  were	  born.	  These	  cohort	  effects	  are	   largely	  driven	  by	  societal	  changes,	  and	  they	  tend	  to	  affect	  people	  first	  who	  are	  younger,	  because	   they	   are	   the	   people	   leading	   the	   behavioural	   changes”	   (quoted	   in:	  Chustecka	  2010,	  2).	  Reasonable	  speculations	  aside,	  what	  it	  is	  important	  to	  show	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  is	  that	  these	  HPV	  positive	  oropharyngeal	  cancers	  tend	   to	   affect	   men	  more	   than	  women.	   In	   the	   US,	   the	   only	   country	   for	   which	  absolute	  numbers	  are	  provided	  about	  HPV	  positive	  oropharyngeal	  cancers,	  the	  
Centers	   for	   Disease	   Control	   and	   Prevention	   calculate	   that	   every	   year	   10752	  people	  are	  diagnosed	  with	  HPV	  positive	  head	  and	  neck	  cancers	  (oropharyngeals	  being	  the	  vast	  majority)	  and	  8530	  of	  these	  occur	  in	  men30.	  These	  data	  already	  show	  that	  HPV	  prevention	  need	  not	  being	  a	  woman’s	  issue	  only.	  	  
Nevertheless,	   another	   set	   of	   HPV-­‐related	   tumours	   calls	   for	   our	   attention,	  perhaps	  even	  more.	  It	  is	  the	  case	  of	  HPV-­‐related	  anal	  cancers.	  According	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Data	  about	  currently	  available	  vaccines’	  ability	  to	  prevent	  also	  these	  cancers	  has	  not	  been	   confirmed	  yet	   through	   clinical	   trials.	  This	   fact	  notwithstanding,	   their	   efficacy	  at	  these	   sites	   is	   biologically	   plausible.	   In	   fact,	   the	   HPV	   vaccines	   are:	   a)	   equally	  immunogenic	  in	  boys	  and	  girls	  (Reisinger	  et	  al.	  2007),	  b)	  effective	  in	  both	  sexes	  against	  lesions	  at	  genital	  mucosal	  and	  cutaneous	  sites	  (Garland	  et	  al.	  2007;	  A.	  R.	  Giuliano	  et	  al.	  2011),	  c)	  able	  to	  foster	  systemic	  humoral	  immune	  response,	  that	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  important	   for	   protection	   (Stanley	   2006).	   Nevertheless,	   no	   data	   are	   available	   on	  anatomic	   site	   specificity	   of	   the	   vaccines.	   Definite	   proof	   about	   their	   efficacy	   at	   sites	  other	  than	  anogenital	  may	  come	  either	  directly,	  from	  clinical	  trials	  yet	  to	  be	  performed,	  or	  indirectly,	  by	  observing	  whether	  the	  number	  of	  HPV	  positive	  oropharingeal	  cancers	  will	  decrease	  in	  the	  next	  decades	  in	  vaccinated	  versus	  non	  vaccinated	  women/men.	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Centers	   for	   Disease	   Control	   and	   Prevention,	   in	   the	   US	   4403	   individuals	   are	  diagnosed	  with	  anal	  cancer	  and	  2842	  of	  them	  are	  found	  in	  women	  and	  the	  rest	  on	   men.	   Despite	   being	   very	   rare	   in	   the	   general	   population,	   about	   1.5	   per	  100,000	  every	  year,	   anal	   cancers	  are	   relatively	   frequent	   in	  homosexual	  males	  or,	  as	  this	  group	  is	  called	  in	  the	  medical	  literature,	  in	  the	  epidemiological	  class	  of	  males	  who	  have	   sex	  with	  males	   (MSM).	   It	   is	   estimated,	   indeed,	   that	   in	   this	  population	   the	   actual	   incidence	   of	   HPV	   positive	   anal	   cancers	   ranges	   between	  12.5	   and	   36.9	   per	   100,000	   per	   year	   (Daling	   et	   al.	   1982;	   Palefsky	   et	   al.	   1998;	  Daling	  et	  al.	  2004),	  roughly	  the	  same	  incidence	  rate	  observed	  for	  cervical	  cancer	  before	   industrialized	   societies	   took	   huge	   efforts	   to	   reduce	   the	   burden	   of	   that	  disease.	  These	  data	  suggest	  that	  also	  among	  men	  there	  is	  a	  subgroup	  of	  people	  that	  are	  at	  risk	  of	  suffering	  the	  ill	  effects	  of	  HPV	  infection	  and	  thus	  may	  benefit	  from	   the	   intervention	   should	   males	   be	   included	   in	   vaccination	   policies.	   The	  table	  below	  shows	  the	  overall	  HPV	  associated	  cancer	  burden	  in	  both	  genders	  in	  the	  US.	  
	  Table	  3.	  taken	  from	  the	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  Prevention’s	  website31	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  To	  be	  found	  at:	  http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/hpv/statistics/cases.htm	  (Last	  access:	  November	  15th,	  2011)	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As	  we	  see,	   the	  HPV-­‐related	  cancers	   in	  males	  represent	  nearly	  one	  third	  of	   the	  disease	  burden.	  Regrettably,	  such	  precise	  data	  are	  available	  for	  the	  US	  only	  and	  one	   can	   only	   speculate	   that	   in	   other	   countries	   the	   same	   proportions	   are	  observed.	  Nevertheless,	  we	  know	  that	  HPV	  infections	  are	  more	  or	   less	  equally	  present	  in	  all	  countries	  with	  similar	  cultural	  backgrounds	  and	  robust	  healthcare	  systems.	  It	  is	  not	  wild	  speculation,	  hence,	  to	  suppose	  that	  these	  data	  can	  also	  be	  representative	   of	   a	   general	   phenomenon,	   although	   imprecisely.	   The	   fact	   that	  these	  data	  are	  missing	  is	  though	  an	  indication	  that	  not	  enough	  attention	  is	  paid	  to	  the	  male	  issue	  when	  we	  think	  of	  HPV	  and	  cancer	  prevention.	  Indeed,	  while	  it	  seems	  that	  HPV	  infections	  and	  associated	  cancers	  cut	  across	  gender	  differences,	  preventive	  campaigns,	  as	  shown,	  do	  not.	  	  
Men	  are	  HPV	  vectors	  thus	  actively	  contribute	  to	  rates	  of	  infection	  and	  ensuing	  diseases	  in	  women.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  they	  also	  share,	  although	  to	  a	  minor	  extent,	  some	  ill	  effects	  of	  the	  infection.	  Accordingly,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  claim	  that	  men	  as	  a	  group	  have	  a	  moral	  responsibility	  and,	  at	  least	  prima	  facie,	  an	  interest	  in	  being	  vaccinated.	   Also	   women,	   moreover,	   may	   share	   these	   interests	   in	   that	   by	  vaccinating	  men	  it	  would	  be	  reduced	  for	  them	  the	   likelihood	  to	  be	  exposed	  to	  HPV.	  The	  question	  therefore	  becomes:	  should	  HPV	  vaccination	  policies	  include	  boys	  in	  their	  preventive	  strategies?	  To	  the	  analysis	  of	  this	  point	  I	  now	  turn.	  
3.	  Gender	  equity,	  cost-­‐effectiveness,	  and	  their	  moral	  
opportunity	  cost	  
Intuitively,	  gender-­‐based	  distinctions	  as	  to	  the	  access	  to	  benefits	  and	  burdens	  of	  medical	  resources	  are	  morally	  objectionable.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  assess	  whether	  this	  intuition	  applies	  to	  the	  HPV	  case	  too.	  In	  the	  previous	  section	  I	  have	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indicated	   that	   there	   are	   reasons	   for	   taking	   into	   account	   also	   males	   in	   the	  programmes.	  I	  did	  so	  by	  showing	  that	  there	  is,	  at	  least	  at	  first	  approximation,	  an	  interest	   in	   the	   male	   population	   in	   taking	   the	   benefits	   of	   the	   intervention.	  Expanding	   HPV	   vaccination	   campaigns	   to	   the	   whole	   population,	   thus	  abandoning	  current	  gender-­‐based	  approaches,	  would	  prove	  also	  beneficial	   for	  women	  as	  a	  group	  because	  it	  would	  greatly	  reduce	  the	  proportion	  of	  individuals	  who	  are	  vectors	  of	  the	  infection.	  In	  this	  sense,	  for	  any	  individual	  it	  would	  be	  far	  less	   likely	   to	   encounter	   the	   virus	   and,	   eventually,	   developing	   HPV-­‐related	  diseases.	   Expanding	   the	   programmes	   would	   thus	  maximize	   the	   public	   health	  impact	  of	  the	  intervention	  by	  bringing	  about	  herd	  immunity	  effects.	  As	  we	  saw	  along	   the	   lines	   of	   the	   first	   chapter,	   the	   creation	   of	   herd	   immunity	   is	   a	   public	  good,	   that	   is,	   a	   good	   that	   is	   open	   for	   all	   to	   enjoy.	   In	   public	   health	   ethics	   the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	   is	  what	  most	  clearly	   justifies	  public	  health	  activities	  (Verweij	   and	   Dawson	   2007;	   Anomaly	   2011).	   Nevertheless,	   this	   justification	  enters	   public	   health	   deliberation	   only	   in	   certain	   respects.	   Indeed,	   if	   it	   is	   true	  that	   the	  provision	  of	   a	   public	   good	   is	   one	  of	   the	   reasons	   that	   render	   a	   public	  health	   activity	  worthwhile,	   this	   does	   not	   imply	   that	   the	   very	   possibility	   of	   its	  introduction	   trumps	   all	   other	   considerations.	   As	   shown	   in	   the	   previous	  chapters,	   some	   of	   these	   considerations	   have	   to	   do	   with	   what	   are	   the	   right	  means	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  public	  good	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  also	  respectful	  of	  individual	  choices	  and	  that	  responds	  to	  demands	  of	  social	  justice.	  Here,	  instead,	  I	  address	  those	   considerations	   that	   may	   function	   as	   limits	   to	   the	   provision	   of	   public	  health	   goods	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   public	   health	   departments	   themselves.	  Indeed,	   healthcare	   and	   preventive	   goods	   competes	   for	   resources	   with	   other	  goods	  that	  can	  be	  provided	  at	  the	  societal	  level.	  The	  resources	  that	  are	  used	  in	  healthcare	   and	  preventive	   services	   are	   finite:	  more	   of	   these	   resources	   can	   be	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devoted	  to	  the	  production	  and	  delivery	  of	  preventive	  services	  only	  by	  diverting	  them	   from	   some	   other	   use,	   either	   outside	   or	   within	   the	   health	   budget.	   This	  suggests	   that	   choices	   have	   to	   be	   made	   and	   that	   few,	   if	   any,	   goods	   can	   be	  supplied	  with	  no	  restrictions.	  The	  nature	  of	  choice	  and	  the	  inevitable	  trade-­‐offs	  encountered	  in	  making	  these	  choices	  are	  captured	  in	  health	  economics	  by	  what	  is	   called	   opportunity	   cost,	   defined	   as:	   “The	   opportunity	   cost	   of	   committing	  resources	  to	  produce	  a	  good	  or	  service	  is	  the	  benefit	  forgone	  from	  those	  same	  resources	   not	   being	   used	   in	   the	   next	   best	   alternative”	   (Morris,	   Devlin,	   and	  Parkin	   2007,	   3).	   Opportunity	   cost	   of	   healthcare	   and	   preventive	   programmes,	  even	  included	  vaccinations	  hence,	  is	  generally	  calculated	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  cost-­‐effectiveness.	  Cost-­‐effectiveness	  of	  an	  intervention	  comes	  in	  degrees.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	   generally	  established	  a	   threshold	  of	  monetary	  value	   that	   is	  worth	   spending	  for	   any	   additional	   unit	   of	   health	   benefit	   brought	   about	   the	   intervention.	   An	  intervention	  that	  goes	  above	  that	  threshold	  is	  considered	  not	  cost-­‐effective,	  one	  that	   goes	   below	   that	   threshold	   is	   instead	   considered	   cost-­‐effective.	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   decision	   of	   whether	   a	   public	   health	   intervention	   is	   worthwhile	   is	  generally	  balanced	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  population	  health	  impact	  it	  may	  bring	  about	  and	   its	   opportunity	   cost	   in	   terms	   of	   cost-­‐effectiveness.	   The	   latter	   defined	   as:	  “the	   additional	   cost	   required	   per	   additional	   health	   benefit	   produced	   as	  compared	  with	  the	  next	  most	  effective	  alternative”	  (Kim	  2011,	  1760).	  
Models	   that	   have	   evaluated	   both	   the	   population	   health	   impact	   and	   the	  economic	  profile	  of	  different	  scenarios	  of	  intervention	  suggest	  that	  an	  inclusion	  of	   males	   into	   the	   programmes	   may	   not	   be	   cost-­‐effective	   as	   compared	   to	  programmes,	  such	  as	  those	  presented	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  that	  target	  only	  females.	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Let	  us	  see,	  then	  what	  are	  the	  different	  scenarios	  so	  far	  evaluated	  and	  what	  they	  request	  for	  a	  programme	  that	  is	  both	  epidemiologically	  sound	  and	  economically	  attractive.	   The	  models	   are	   mathematical	   simulations	   that	   tell	   us	   what	   would	  happen	  if	  certain	  conditions	  applied.	  In	  this	  sense,	  they	  are	  important	  guides	  for	  effective	  decision-­‐making.	   In	   particular,	   three	   scenarios	   seem	   to	   emerge	   from	  the	  studies	  conducted	  so	  far.	   I	  will	  discuss	  these	  three	  scenarios	  by	  discussing	  more	  in	  detail	  the	  way	  they	  emerge	  in	  one	  of	  these	  studies.	  
This	  study,	  published	  in	  the	  prestigious	  British	  Medical	  Journal	  (Kim	  and	  Goldie	  2009)	   has	   investigated	   the	   cost-­‐effectiveness	   of	   including	   boys	   into	   HPV	  programmes	   in	   the	   US	   under	   different	   scenarios.	   The	  model	   calculates,	  more	  specifically,	   incremental	   cost	   effectiveness	   (ICE)	   per	   QALY	   (Quality	   Adjusted	  Life	  Years)	  of	  hypothetical	  kinds	  of	  vaccination	  campaigns.	  QALYs	  are	  a	  health	  economic	   metrics	   attributing	   weights	   to	   life	   years	   brought	   about	   by	   an	  intervention.	  QALYs	  have	  a	  weight	  comprised	  between	  0	  and	  1	  (where	  1	  is	  the	  value	   given	   to	   full	   health	   and	   0	   to	   death).	   ICE	   -­‐	   a	   measure	   used	   in	   health	  economics	  to	  assess	  whether	  a	  strategy	  is	  cost-­‐effective	  -­‐	   is	  the	  ratio	  of	  (i)	  the	  difference	   between	   the	   cost	   of	   the	   strategy	   under	   analysis	   and	   the	   next	   less	  costly	  strategy	  to	  (ii)	   the	  additional	  health	  benefit	  measured	   in	  QALY.	  Various	  thresholds	  are	  used	   in	  different	  context	   to	  determine	  when	  an	   intervention	   is	  cost-­‐effective.	   In	   the	   context	   evaluated	   by	   the	   study	   interventions	  with	   ratios	  below	   $50,000	   or	   $100,000	   per	   QALY	   gained	   are	   considered	   good	   value	   for	  money.	  
The	   study,	   graphically	   summarized	   in	   the	   table	   below,	   shows	   various	   things.	  First,	  vaccinating	  75%	  of	  males	  and	  females	  in	  the	  age	  group	  11-­‐12	  (scenario	  A	  below)	  would	  always	  be	  less	  cost-­‐effective	  than	  vaccinating	  only	  girls.	  However,	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the	   option	   of	   including	   boys	   in	   the	   campaigns	   becomes	   progressively	   more	  attractive	   as	   coverage	  of	   girls	   is	   assumed	   to	  decrease,	   and	   all	  HPV-­‐16	   and	  18	  health	   outcomes	   (rather	   than	   just	   cervical	   cancers)	   are	   taken	   into	   account.	  Vaccinating	  both	  sexes	  with	  coverage	  of	  50%	  was	  found	  to	  have	  ICE	  per	  QALY	  gained	   of	   $	   62,070	   under	   the	   most	   favourable	   assumptions;	   namely,	   when	  vaccine	  efficacy	  for	  other	  HPV-­‐related	  outcomes	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  high	  and	  lifelong	   (scenario	   B).	   Interestingly,	   the	   ICE	   of	   including	   boys	   into	   the	  programmes	   becomes	   even	   more	   attractive	   when	   the	   price	   of	   the	   vaccine	   is	  slightly	  lowered.	  Under	  all	  circumstances,	  vaccinating	  75%	  of	  girls	  only	  is	  more	  cost-­‐effective	   in	   the	  model	   (scenario	   C).	   Other	   studies,	  moreover,	   tell	   us	   that	  while	  scenario	  A	  and	  B	  will	  bring	  about	  herd	   immunity	  effects	   in	   the	  short	  or	  mid-­‐term	   respectively	   (Lehtinen	   et	   al.	   2008),	   female	   only	   scenarios	   (like	   C	  below)	  may	  require	  increased	  coverage	  to	  85%	  to	  achieve	  herd	  immunity	  in	  the	  long-­‐term	   (60	   years)	   and	   assuming	   heterosexual	   patterns	   of	   behaviour	   only	  (Choi	  et	  al.	  2010).	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Table	  4.	  Data	  drawn	  from:	  (Kim	  and	  Goldie	  2009)	  
It	  must	  be	  noticed	  that	  the	  model	  presents	  us	  with	  hypothetical	  scenarios,	  and	  tells	   us	   what	  would	   happen	   if	   certain	   conditions	   applied.	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	  model	  does	  not	  represent	  an	  actual	  state	  of	  affairs.	  Although	  the	  study	   is	  very	  accurate	  at	  analysing	  different	  scenarios	  for	  which	  we	  still	  lack	  clear	  evidence,	  as	  for	  instance	  whether	  or	  not	  vaccine	  efficacy	  is	  life-­‐long,	  it	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  important	  aspects	   that	  might	  prove	  useful	   to	  direct	  policies.	  Among	   them,	   the	  model	  misses	  to	  take	  into	  account	  patterns	  of	  homosexual	  behaviour.	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limitation,	  however,	   is	  of	  no	  much	  ado	   for	  my	  purposes.	   I	  will	  assume,	   indeed	  that	  the	  three	  scenarios	  are	  plausible	  and	  ask	  a	  more	  general	  ethical	  question.	  The	   scenarios	   presented,	   indeed,	   although	   plausible	   will	   require	   decades	   of	  sustained	   immunization	   in	   the	  privileged	  target	  group	   in	  order	   to	  bring	  about	  the	   desired	   effects.	   All	   campaigns,	   however,	   are	   still	   in	   their	   infancy	   and	   the	  data	   about	   coverage	   presented	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   suggest	   that,	   perhaps	  with	   the	   exception	   of	   UK,	   uptake	   is	   still	   far	   from	   being	   as	   high	   as	   required.	  Moreover,	   the	  achievement	  of	  valid	  population	  health	  goals	   that	  are	  also	  cost-­‐effective	  requires	  constant	  efforts	  to	  sustain	  adequate	  coverage	  over	  the	  years.	  The	   ethical	   question,	   thus	   become:	   who	   should	   fill	   the	   gap	   to	   achieve	   public	  health	  goals?	  Should	  we	  adopt	  a	  fully	  utilitarian	  strategy	  and	  then	  going	  for	  the	  more	   cost-­‐effective	   solution?	   Or	   should	   we	   also	   value	   issues	   of	   equity	   thus	  opting	   for	  a	  gender-­‐neutral	   campaign?	  More	  precisely:	   should	  we	  put	   societal	  pressure	  on	  women	  so	  to	  reach	  and	  sustain	  high	  coverage	  on	  that	  population,	  or	  should	  we	  try	  to	  target,	  for	  instance,	  50%	  of	  both	  sexes?	  
In	  what	  follows	  I	  indicate	  what	  are	  the	  reasons	  for	  maximising	  inclusiveness	  in	  the	   male	   population	   too.	   In	   an	   attempt	   to	   answer	   this	   question	   it	   should	   be	  admitted	   from	   the	   start	   that	   the	   benefits	   the	   intervention	   may	   produce	   are	  greater	  for	  women	  as	  a	  group.	  Accordingly,	  they	  have	  more	  reasons	  than	  men	  in	  being	  vaccinated	  since	  it	  is	  in	  their	  best	  interest	  to	  do	  so.	  After	  all,	  the	  incidence	  of	   cervical	   cancer	   is	   higher	   than	   other	   HPV-­‐associated	   cancers	   affecting	  men	  too.	  A	  policy	  targeting	  only	  women,	  it	  can	  be	  argued,	  would	  be	  justified	  because	  it	   would	   be	   aimed	   at	   reaching	   those	   individuals	   that	   need	   it	   the	   more.	   A	  pragmatic	  issue,	  moreover,	  adds	  up	  to	  this	  motivation.	  As	  extensively	  shown	  in	  the	   previous	   chapter,	   in	  many	   contexts	   it	   has	   so	   far	   proven	   difficult	   to	   reach	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sufficiently	   large	  numbers	  of	  women.	  Therefore,	   trying	  to	  reach	  also	  men	  may	  result	  in	  a	  waste	  of	  efforts	  and	  material	  resources.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  resources	  needed	  to	  restructure	  current	  policies	  could	  be	  better	  employed	  as	  to	  improve	  uptake	   in	   the	   current	   target	   population.	   Nevertheless,	   if	   these	   attempts	   are	  based	  on	  the	  presupposition	  that	  it	  is	  in	  women’s	  best	  interest	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  programme	   then	   they	   run	   the	   risk	  of	  being	  unjustifiably	  paternalistic.	  That	   is,	  these	  attempts	  arbitrarily	  ascribes	  what	  are	   the	  right	  choices	  a	  person	  should	  be	  willing	  to	  make	  about	  her	  personal	  life	  and	  her	  future.	  Of	  course,	  one	  could	  agree	  with	   the	   idea	   that	   there	   are	   indeed	  good	   reasons	  why	  a	  woman	   should	  take	  personal	  advantage	  by	  immunising	  herself	  against	  HPV.	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	   it	   might	   be	   in	   the	   best	   interest	   of	   women	   to	   take	   the	   vaccine	   does	   not	  necessarily	   imply	   that	   public	   health	   officials	   are	   legitimated	   to	   put	   pressure	  only	  on	  this	  group	  to	  achieve	  cost-­‐effective	  public	  health	  goals.	  It	  should	  be	  also	  taken	  into	  account	  that,	  sometimes,	  there	  might	  also	  be	  strong	  reasons	  for	  some	  women	  or	  their	  families,	  not	  to	  join	  the	  campaigns	  and	  good	  reasons	  for	  some	  men	   to	   join.	   Gender-­‐based	   programmes,	   indeed,	  may	   be	  mistakenly	   based	   on	  the	  assumption	  that	  males,	  as	  a	  group,	  do	  not	  have	  other-­‐directed	  reasons	   for	  being	  vaccinated	  as	  a	  way	  of	  protection	  of	  the	  female	  population	  through	  herd	  effects.	  Although	  we	   live	   in	  an	  age	   in	  which	   individualized	  approaches	   to	  care	  and	   prevention	   are	   given,	   rightly,	  much	   attention,	  we	   should	   not	   exclude	   the	  possibility	   that	   some	   families	  may	   find	   it	   reasonable	   to	  vaccinate	   their	   sons	   if	  properly	   informed	  not	  only	  of	   the	  benefits	   the	   intervention	  may	  have	  also	   for	  males	  but	  also	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  males	  still	  remain	  vectors	  of	  the	  infection.	  A	  public	   policy	   aiming	   at	   population	   health	   cannot	   exclude,	   at	   the	   outset,	   that	  people’s	   action	   are	   never	   informed	   by	   altruistic	   motivations.	   Nor	   these	  motivations	  need	   to	  be	   fully	  altruistic.	  As	   shown,	   cervical	   cancer	   is	  one	  of	   the	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most	   frequent	   in	   young	  women	  aged	  15-­‐44.	  Premature	  death,	  disturbs	   family	  dynamics	  and,	  with	  it,	  the	  lives	  of	  husband,	  partners	  and	  children.	  	  
Anyway,	   even	   if	   we	   dismiss	   the	   charge	   of	   paternalism	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	  other-­‐directed	   interests	   males	   may	   have	   for	   joining	   the	   programmes	   as	  insignificant,	   the	   strategy	   of	   targeting	   girls	   only	   –	   although	   plausible	   –	   still	  would	  not	  come	  without	  costs,	  perhaps	  indirect.	  	  
Some	  commentators	  show	  how	  public	  policies,	  besides	  their	  primary	  objectives,	  carry	   with	   them	   also	   a	   set	   of	   cultural	   meanings	   and	   symbolism	   that,	  intentionally	  or	  not,	  can	  influence	  attitudes	  and	  behaviours	  of	  the	  public.	  Public	  policies,	   in	   other	   terms,	   have	   also	   an	   expressive	   function.	   As	   Pierce	   puts	   it:	  “policies	  may	  reinforce	  an	  existing	  norm	  or	  they	  may	  seek	  to	  refine,	  modify	  or	  create	  a	  norm”	  (Pierce	  2011,	  54).	  One	  example	  of	  this	  phenomenon,	  as	  reported	  by	  the	  legal	  scholar	  Cass	  Sunstein,	  is	  regulations	  against	  hate	  speech	  in	  the	  US.	  According	  to	  Sunstein,	  the	  central	  purpose	  of	  this	   law	  is	  not	  solely	  prohibiting	  hate	  speech	  as	  such,	  but	  also	  to	  convey	  the	  meaning	  that	  bigoted	  attitudes	  are	  unacceptable	   in	   a	   liberal	   society	   (Sunstein	   1995).	   Pierce,	   in	   the	   same	   vein,	  comments	   that	   public	   policy	   operates	   on	   many	   levels	   and	   “while	   aiming	   to	  achieve	   a	   particular	   objective	   or	   outcome,	   it	   can	   also	   be	   a	   valuable	   tool	   for	  achieving	   other	   important	   social	   goals”	   (ibid.	  53).	   To	   come	   back	   to	   our	   case,	  gender-­‐based	  HPV	  vaccination	  programmes	  may	  reinforce	  or	  create	   the	  social	  meaning	   that	   sexual	   health	   is	   a	   woman’s	   issue	   only	   thus	   incrementing	  infelicitous	   gender	   stereotypes.	   After	   all,	   as	   noticed	   by	   scholars	   of	   feminist	  orientation,	   women	   already	   shoulder	   a	   disproportionate	   burden	   in	   issues	  related	   to	   reproductive	   decision-­‐making	   (de	   Melo-­‐Martin	   2006).	   A	   gender-­‐based	   programme,	   therefore,	   may	   send	   the	   message	   to	   young	   people	   that	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women	  are	  responsible	  for	  managing	  sex	  and	  that	  men	  are	  allowed	  to	  take	  less	  responsibility	  on	  those	  issues.	  Some	  studies	  report,	  moreover,	  that	  HPV	  testing	  causes	   distress	   and	   psychological	   anxiety	   in	   many	   women.	   Because	   of	   its	  association	  with	  sexual	  intercourse,	  some	  women	  see	  HPV	  infection	  as	  a	  social	  stigma,	  especially	  if	  they	  live	  in	  a	  sexist	  familiar	  setting	  (McCaffery	  et	  al.	  2006).	  In	   this	   respect,	   including	   males	   into	   the	   programmes	   may	   have	   a	   positive	  expressive	   function.	   It	   would	   show,	   in	   other	   words,	   that	   issues	   related	   to	  sexually	  transmitted	  infections	  are	  a	  common	  responsibility	  and,	  as	  such,	  they	  need	   to	   be	   shared.	   This	  move	  would,	   perhaps,	   contribute	   to	   normalize	   issues	  related	  with	  sexual	  life	  and	  HPV	  contagion.	  	  	  
Cost-­‐effectiveness	  analysis	  cannot	  certainly	  incorporate	  such	  morally	  sensitive	  issues	   like	   the	   expressive	   role	   that	   a	   policy	  may	   have.	   It	   is	   not	   unreasonable	  though	   to	  propose	   that	   these	  considerations	  should	  also	  enter	  and	   inform	  the	  decisions	  of	  public	  health	  policy	  makers.	  	  
Nevertheless,	   there	   is	   still	   a	   strong	   intuition	  pointing	   towards	  a	  gender-­‐based	  campaign.	   In	   fact,	   why	   should	   society	   spend	   more	   resources	   for	   similar	  outcomes	  only	  for	  reasons	  of	  equality	  between	  sexes?	  After	  all,	  as	  I	  have	  shown,	  employing	  resources	  properly	   is	  not	  sheer	  manifestation	  of	  greed.	  That	  public	  health	   programmes	   are	   economically	   efficient	   is	   important	   in	   that	   each	  resource	   allocated	   in	   one	   place	   is	   a	   resource	   that	   is	   taken	   away	   from	  somewhere	   else.	   For	   every	   need	   that	   is	   met	   there	   is	   one	   that	   is	   not.	   In	   this	  sense,	   one	   may	   rule	   out	   the	   option	   of	   massively	   targeting	   boys	   and	   girls.	  However,	  there	  is	  still	  the	  middle-­‐way	  option	  of	  targeting	  around	  50%	  of	  both	  genders.	  As	  the	  models	  presented	  show,	  that	  option	  may	  still	  be	  cost-­‐effective	  although	   less	   than	   the	  option	   targeting	  girls	   only.	  The	  question	   thus	   remains:	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should	  society	  go	  for	  the	  most	  cost-­‐effective	  solution	  or	  issues	  of	  equity	  should	  be	  seriously	  taken	  into	  account?	  
The	   problem	   about	   equality,	   however,	   is	   even	   deeper	   than	   presented	   so	   far.	  Indeed,	   the	   issue	   is	   not	   only	   that	   adopting	   a	   gender-­‐based	   strategy	   would	  perhaps	  have	  an	  undesirable	  expressive	  function	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  attribution	  of	  responsibility	  between	  genders.	  Rather,	  it	  has	  also	  to	  do	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  by	  setting	  up	  a	  gender-­‐based	  campaign	  we	  are,	  more	  or	  less	  explicitly,	  overlooking	  the	   presence	   in	   our	   society	   of	   homosexual	   choices.	   As	   noticed	   above,	   the	  incidence	  of	  anal	  cancer	  in	  the	  group	  of	  men	  who	  have	  sex	  with	  men	  is	  higher	  than	  in	  the	  whole	  male	  population.	  The	  incidence	  of	  this	  cancer	  appears	  to	  be	  as	  high	  as	  it	  was	  the	  incidence	  of	  cervical	  cancer	  before	  society	  rightly	  took	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  it	  and	  save	  many	  women’s	   lives.	  Thus	  if	  men	  will	  not	  be	  included	  in	  the	   campaigns	   there	   will	   be	   a	   group,	   homosexual	   males,	   which	   will	   be	  systematically	  excluded	  from	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  preventive	  intervention.	  Surely,	  these	  cancers	  are,	  on	  aggregate,	  less	  burdensome	  for	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  invisible	  to	  many.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  individuals	  that	  will	  be	   affected	   by	   them,	   however,	   a	   justification	   in	   these	   terms	   may	   not	   be	  sufficient.	   People	   who	   will	   be	   affected	   in	   the	   future	   by	   anal	   cancer	   may	  complain	   that	   their	   interests	   were	   not	   taken	   into	   account	   in	   policy	   making	  because	  of	  their	  statistical	  irrelevance.	  Also	  in	  this	  case,	  hence,	  a	  gender-­‐based	  campaign	  may	   exacerbate	   social	   divisions	   and	   foster	   sentiments	   of	   exclusion.	  The	   same,	   however,	   can	  be	   said	   about	   all	   those	  people	   that	  will	   develop	  HPV	  positive	  oropharyngeal	  cancers	   in	  the	  future.	  It	  must	  be	  noticed	  that	  while	  for	  cervical	   cancer	   society	   has	   set	   up	  massive	   screening	   campaigns	   such	   as	   PAP	  smears	   or	   HPV	   testing,	   the	   same	   cannot	   be	   said	   for	   other	   anogenital	   or	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oropharyngeal	  cancers.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  at	  present	  there	  are	  no	  guidelines	  as	  to	   how	   such	   screening	   campaigns	   can	   be	   performed.	   Consequently,	   people	  belonging	  to	  high-­‐risk	  categories	   for	   these	  cancers	  would	  not	  have	  any	  means	  other	  than	  the	  vaccine	  to	  ensure	  themselves	  a	  life	  free	  from	  the	  threat	  of	  such	  diseases.	   The	   possibility	   of	   preventing	   via	   immunization	   also	   these	   kinds	   of	  tumours	  becomes	  then	  an	  option	  that	  deserves	  serious	  attention.	  
As	  a	  counter,	  it	  could	  be	  claimed	  that	  one	  thing	  is	  to	  set	  a	  vaccination	  strategy	  and	   thus	   indicating	   the	   target	   group	   of	   the	   intervention,	   quite	   another	   to	  exclude	   people	   from	   the	   very	   possibility	   of	   profiting	   from	   it.	   Now	   that	   the	  vaccine	   has	   been	   proved	   to	   be	   effective	   in	   males	   too,	   men	   would	   have	   the	  opportunity	  to	  buy	  and	  obtain	  the	  jab	  thus	  preventing,	  if	  they	  wish,	  HPV-­‐related	  morbidities.	   Of	   course,	   this	   is	   an	   opportunity	   that	   also	   homosexual	   people	  would	   have.	   Therefore,	   it	   can	   be	   claimed,	   there	   is	   nothing	   discriminatory	   in	  pursuing	   a	   gender-­‐based	   campaign.	   However,	   this	   kind	   of	   argument	   may	   be	  misleading.	  As	   I	  mentioned	  above,	   the	  vaccine	   is	  more	   likely	  efficacious	  when	  people	  have	  not	  already	  come	  in	  contact	  with	  the	  virus.	  Thus,	  the	  ideal	  solution	  is	   to	   target	   preadolescents	   before	   sexual	   debut.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   is	  reasonable	   to	   assume	   that	   prior	   to	   sexual	   debut,	   many	   pre-­‐adolescents	   boys	  and	   girls	   do	   not	   yet	   have	   a	   clear	   idea	   about	   sexual	   identity.	   Nor	   we	   can	  realistically	  expect	  their	  parents	  to	  have	  such	  knowledge.	  However,	  some	  pre-­‐adolescents	   will	   eventually	   choose	   not	   to	   pursue	   a	   heterosexual	   life.	   Those	  people	   would	   then	   be	   at	   risk	   of	   getting	   a	   cancer	   that	   we	   have	   the	  means	   to	  prevent.	   Given	   the	   age	   at	   which	   current	   strategies	   seek	   participation	   there	  seems	   to	   be	   no	   other	   way	   than	   extending	   the	   programmes	   to	   the	   male	  population	  too	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  also	  these	  interests.	  Therefore,	  if	  we	  want	  that	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also	   these	   interests	   get	   protected	   the	   strategy	   of	   devising	   gender-­‐neutral	  programmes	  becomes	  morally	  desirable.	  
Arguably,	  by	  failing	  to	  vaccinate	  males	  they	  will	  still	  be	  vectors,	  thus	  they	  could	  potentially	   infect	   non-­‐immunized	   women	   and	   men.	   Vaccinating	   also	   boys,	  instead,	   would	  more	   effectively	   reduce	   the	   transmission	   of	   the	   virus	   both	   in	  heterosexual	  and	  homosexual	  populations.	  In	  the	  short	  or	  mid-­‐term,	  this	  might	  result	  in	  herd	  immunity	  or,	  at	  least,	  in	  a	  drastic	  reduction	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  virus.	  This	  would	  prove	  beneficial	   also	   for	  a	  number	  of	  people	  who	  could	  not	  take	   advantage	   of	   HPV	   immunization	   for	   several	   reasons.	   In	   the	   previous	  chapter	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  among	  the	  people	  who	  do	  not	  get	   immunized	  most	  belong	   to	   groups	   already	   disadvantaged	   from	   a	   socioeconomic	   perspective.	  Striving	  for	  herd	  immunity,	  and	  hence	  including	  boys	  into	  the	  programmes,	  can	  thus	  serve	  as	  a	  protection	  for	  those	  girls	  belonging	  to	  vulnerable	  groups.	  	  
These	  considerations	  have	  been	  provided	   to	   show	   that	   there	  are	   indeed	  good	  moral	   reasons	   to	   abandon	   gender-­‐based	   programmes	   and	   include	  males	   into	  the	  campaigns.	  These	  reasons	  are	  even	  more	  important	  because,	  as	  it	  appears,	  the	  people	  that	  will	  be	  left	  out	  of	  the	  campaigns	  as	  they	  are	  currently	  performed	  are	  individuals	  coming	  from	  groups	  that	  already	  suffer	  forms	  of	  domination	  and	  disadvantage	   in	   our	   societies.	   People	   living	   in	   patterns	   of	   systematic	  disadvantage	  may	   feel	   excluded	   from	   the	  moral	   and	  political	   community	   thus	  creating	   a	   climate	   of	   resentment	   that	   can,	   in	   turn,	   foster	   social	   divisions.	   A	  policy	   that	   is	   as	   inclusive	   as	   possible,	   instead,	   shows	   how	   each	   and	   every	  individual	   is	   deserving	   of	   respect,	   at	   least	   shows	   this	   in	   the	   specific	   realm	   in	  which	   the	   policy	   intervenes.	   	   Showing	   that	   all	   the	   interests	   are	   taken	   into	  account	   with	   due	   respect,	   moreover,	   is	   a	   public	   manifestation	   that	   those	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interests,	   although	   hold	   by	   a	  minority,	   have	   equal	   civic	  membership	   of	   those	  hold	   by	   a	   statistical	  majority.	   As	   suggested	   by	   Steven	   Epstein:	   “in	   relation	   to	  HPV,	   gay	   men	   remain	   incomplete	   biomedical	   citizens	   -­‐	   benefiting,	   to	   some	  degree,	   from	   publicly	   funded	   research	   and	   from	   services	   provided	   at	   public	  clinics,	   but	   achieving	   only	   partial	   success	   in	   their	   demands	   that	   their	   health	  issues	  be	  placed	  on	   a	  par	  with	   those	  of	   other	   groups	   confronting	   comparable	  health	  threats”	  (Epstein	  2010,	  80).	  In	  this	  sense,	  providing	  herd	  immunity	  will	  not	  only	  be	  a	  public	  good	  but	  also	  a	  common	  good.	  That	   is,	  a	  good	  that	  arises	  from	  the	  public	  recognition	  of	  the	  moral	  worth	  of	  each	  interest	  and	  not	  merely	  a,	  still	  valuable,	  epidemiological	  phenomenon.	  
4.	  Concluding	  remarks	  	  The	   three	  scenarios	  outlined	  above	  presented	  us	  with	  different	  options.	  All	  of	  them	   possess	   features	   that	   are	   morally	   attractive,	   at	   least	   at	   first	  approximation.	   The	   scenario	  A,	   the	   one	   in	  which	  75%	  of	   girls	   and	  boys	  were	  vaccinated,	   is	  attractive	  because	   it	   can	   lead,	   if	  high	  coverage	  are	   then	  actually	  obtained,	   to	   a	   drastic	   reduction	   of	   the	   virus	  prevalence	   in	   a	   short	   term.	  Herd	  immunity	   provides	   benefits	   to	   all	   and,	   in	   this	   sense,	   is	   a	   public	   good	   worth	  pursuing.	  This	  scenario,	  however,	  despite	  attractive	   for	   the	  reasons	  explained,	  may	  come	  at	  a	  high	  opportunity	  cost	  and,	  perhaps,	  the	  resources	  employed	  for	  achieving	   that	   goal	   could	  be	  better	   employed	   to	  bring	  about	  other	  benefits	   in	  other	   medical	   and	   preventive	   contexts.	   The	   scenario	   C,	   the	   one	   that	   current	  policies	   pursue,	   promises	   less	   in	   terms	   of	   epidemiological	   benefits	   for	   all.	  Nonetheless,	   if	   large	   uptakes	   are	   obtained	   and	   maintained	   in	   the	   female	  population	  for	  a	  long	  time	  frame,	  it	  would	  bring	  about	  a	  drastic	  reduction	  in	  the	  incidence	  of	  cervical	  cancer	  cases	  and,	  possibly,	  also	  a	  decreased	  prevalence	  of	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the	   virus	   in	   the	   population	   as	   a	   whole.	   Moreover,	   current	   cost-­‐effectiveness	  models	   show	   that	   this	   scenario	   is	   the	   one	   with	   the	   most	   attractive	   cost-­‐effectiveness	  profile	  among	  all	   those	  considered.	  Finally,	   the	  scenario	  B,	  more	  modestly,	  finds	  a	  middle	  ground	  between	  the	  two	  and	  suggests	  that	  with	  a	  50%	  coverage	  between	  the	  two	  sexes	  herd	  effects	  would	  also	  accrue	  but	  in	  a	  slightly	  less	   cost-­‐effective	   way.	   Clearly,	   all	   the	   models	   presented	   are	   hypothetical	  scenarios,	   telling	  us	  what	  would	  happen	   if	   certain	   conditions	  would	  be	  put	   in	  place.	   HPV	   vaccination	   campaigns,	   however,	   are	   still	   in	   their	   infancy	   and	  therefore	  all	  the	  options	  are	  still	  viable.	  What	  I	   let	  emerge	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  three	  models	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  choices	  come	  not	  only	  with	  an	  opportunity	  cost,	  as	  defined	  in	  health	  economics,	  but	  with	  a	  moral	  cost	  too.	  Striving	  for	  the	  most	   cost-­‐effective	   solution	  may	   be	   justified	   but	   this	   choice	   would	   not	   come	  without	   ethical	   implications	   that,	   I	   submit,	   should	   be	   taken	   seriously	   into	  account	   in	   deliberating	   about	   these	   issues.	   In	   particular,	   I	   have	   identified	   as	  morally	   dubious	   the	   expressive	   function	   that	   a	   choice	   of	   this	   kind	  may	   have.	  Insisting	   on	   a	   gender	   only,	   in	   other	   words,	   may	   foster	   the	   idea	   that	   issue	  regarding	   sexual	   health	   and	   prevention	   pertain	   exclusively	   to	   women	   as	   a	  group.	   A	   society	   that	   values	   issues	   of	   equality	   between	   genders	   -­‐	   and	  democratic	  societies	  should	  value	  these	  issues	  –	  may	  want	  to	  take	  into	  account	  whether	   a	   gender-­‐based	   programme	   is	   actually	   conveying	   this	   message.	   The	  importance	   of	   attending	   to	   the	   expressive	   function	   of	   a	   policy	   is	   particularly	  relevant	   in	  the	  context	  of	  HPV	  because	  the	  final	   ‘users’	  of	   the	   intervention	  are	  individuals	  who	   are	   about	   to	   form	   their	   identities,	   even	   included	   their	   sexual	  identities.	   A	   gender-­‐neutral	   policy	   could,	   if	   properly	   performed,	   promote	   the	  idea	  that	  men	  and	  women	  have	  equal	  responsibilities	  in	  avoiding	  the	  spread	  of	  sexually	  transmitted	  infections.	  An	  increased	  awareness	  of	  these	  issues	  in	  both	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sexes,	  moreover,	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  beneficial	  both	  for	  the	  health	  of	  individuals	  and,	  ultimately,	  for	  population	  health.	  Attending	  to	  the	  expressive	  function	  of	  a	  policy	   is	   certainly	   important	   but	   this	   is	   not	   the	   only	   reason	   that	   calls	   for	   a	  gender-­‐neutral	  HPV	  vaccination	  campaign.	  Further	  support	  for	  the	  extension	  of	  those	   programmes	   to	   the	  male	   population	   too	   comes	   from	  a	   consideration	   of	  the	  actual	  health	  consequences	  a	  gender-­‐based	  programme	  would	  have.	   If	   the	  data	   on	   the	   incidence	   of	   anal	   cancers	   in	   homosexual	   males	   are	   confirmed	   it	  would	  be	  disdainful	  to	  think	  of	  a	  campaign	  that	  reduces	  risk	  of	  HPV-­‐associated	  cancers	   to	   all	   but	   for	   a	   group	   of	   individuals.	   In	   other	   words,	   if	   the	   aim	   of	  vaccination	   campaigns	   is	   to	   reduce	   risk	   of	   infections	   at	   the	   individual	   and	  population	  level,	  then	  identifying	  the	  category	  of	  at	  risk	  individuals	  on	  the	  base	  of	  gender	  alone	  is	  morally	  arbitrary.	  Some	  men	  may	  be	  more	  at	  risk	  than	  some	  women.	   If	   this	  were	   correct	   then	   excluding	   them	   from	   the	   very	   possibility	   of	  profiting	   from	   the	   intervention	  would	  be	   regretful.	   Clearly	   these	   interests	   are	  only	   so	   in	   a	   perspective	   sense.	   HPV	   vaccination,	   like	   any	   other	   immunization	  strategy,	   works	   only	   when	   the	   target	   group	   has	   not	   been	   exposed	   to	   the	  infective	   agent.	   In	   our	   case,	   boys	   and	   girls	   are	   targeted	   when	   they,	   perhaps,	  have	  not	  yet	   fully	  developed	   their	  sexual	   identity	  and,	  hence,	  cannot	  correctly	  anticipate	  their	  risk	  profile.	  	  Exactly	  for	  this	  reason,	  however,	  these	  perspective	  interests	   need	   to	   be	   taken	   more	   seriously	   into	   account	   and	   protected.	  Moreover,	   has	   I	   have	   shown,	   also	   the	  male	  population	   in	   general	  may	  benefit	  from	  the	  intervention	  both	  directly,	  in	  terms	  of	  reduction	  of	  males-­‐specific	  HPV-­‐associated	  morbidities,	   and	   indirectly,	   in	   terms	   of	   premature	   death	   of	   future	  wives	  and	  partners.	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In	   this	  chapter	   I	  have	  shown	  that	   the	  possibility	  of	  striving	   for	  achieving	  herd	  effects	   is	   supported	   by	   strong	  moral	   reasons.	  What	   should	  we	   then	   conclude	  about	   the	   three	   scenarios	   presented	   above?	   Should	   then	   considerations	  pertaining	   cost-­‐effectiveness	   or	   economic	   feasibility	   be	   left	   out	   from	   public	  decisions?	   I	   would	   argue	   that,	   clearly,	   they	   should	   not.	   As	   I	   have	   shown,	   in	  contexts	  of	  finite	  resources	  the	  effective	  allocation	  of	  goods	  is	  important,	  and	  it	  is	  so	  in	  a	  morally	  relevant	  way.	  The	  balancing	  is	  difficult	  and	  I	  have	  only	  shown	  my	   preference	   towards	   a	   more	   inclusive	   approach.	   Reasonable	   people	   may	  perhaps	   disagree.	  How	   could	  we	   then	   solve	   such	   a	   trade-­‐off?	   Three	   solutions	  can	  be	  envisaged.	  First,	  we	   could	  devise	  methods	   to	   incorporate	   social	   values	  into	  cost-­‐effectiveness	  analysis.	  These	  attempts	  are	  currently	  pursued	  by	  some	  scholars	   who	   are	   trying	   to	   ‘empiricize’	   issues	   of	   equity	   by	   converting	   these	  concerns	   into	  data	  about	  public’s	  distributive	  preferences	  (Menzel	  et	  al.	  1999;	  Nord,	   Daniels,	   and	   Kamlet	   2009).	   One	   could,	   hence,	   try	   to	   see	   if	   these	  approaches	  are	  able	  to	  tell	  us	  something	  in	  the	  HPV	  context.	  A	  second	  strategy	  would	   instead	   indicate	  a	  procedural	   approach	   to	   the	   issue	  by	  designing	   a	   fair	  deliberative	  process	   to	  cope	  with	  moral	  disagreement	  as	   it	  arises	   in	   this	  case.	  The	   ‘accountability	   for	   reasonableness’	   approach	   developed	   by	   Daniels	   and	  Sabin	   is	  one	  of	   the	  most	  prominent	  attempts	  that	  go	   in	   this	  direction	  (Daniels	  and	   Sabin	   2002).	   Instead,	   I	  would	   follow	   a	   third	   strategy	   and	   indicate,	   in	   the	  next	  chapter,	  that	  the	  present	  trade-­‐off	  is	  better	  framed,	  and	  eventually	  solved,	  by	  specifying	  further	  the	  kinds	  of	  goods	  HPV	  policies	  should	  aim	  at	  promoting	  and	  distributing.	  To	  this	  last	  point	  I	  now	  turn.	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Chapter	  6:	  Case	  study	  conclusion.	  From	  
resources	  to	  capabilities:	  A	  modest	  proposal	  
for	  reframing	  HPV	  policies	  	  
	  
1.	  Public	  health	  ethics	  between	  resources	  and	  outcomes	  
Having	  discussed	  the	  importance	  of	  health	  inequalities,	  and	  clarified	  that	  public	  health	  policies	  are,	  at	  least,	  required	  not	  to	  worsen	  those	  inequalities,	  it	  is	  now	  time	  to	  further	  specify	  what	  the	  relevant	  objects	  of	  distribution	  of	  social	  policies,	   in	   general,	   and	   public	   health	   policies,	   in	   particular	   should	   be.	   As	  exemplified	   in	   the	   first	  part	  of	   the	   thesis,	   the	  beneficence	  model	  encompasses	  concerns	   for	   distributive	   justice	   as	   an	   important	   part	   of	   what	   public	   health	  ethics	   is	   supposed	   to	   scrutinize.	   At	   first	   approximation,	   the	   idea	   that	   a	   fair	  distribution	   of	   the	   medical	   intervention	   itself	   should	   be	   the	   focus	   of	   ethical	  analysis	   tracks	   on	   the	   right	   intuition.	   A	   well-­‐designed	   public	   health	   policy,	  indeed,	   should	   not	   exclude	   anyone	   from	   the	   benefits	   it	   provides	   on	   arbitrary	  basis	  like,	  for	  instance,	  morally	  dubious	  categories	  such	  as	  gender,	  ethnicity,	  or	  sexual	   preferences.	   A	   policy	   that	   would	   exclude,	   let	   us	   say,	   Afro-­‐American	  individuals	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   category	   belonging,	   would	   certainly	   be	  disgraceful.	  	  Further	  kinds	  of	  exclusion	  can,	  however,	  take	  place.	  Public	  policies	  can,	   sometimes,	   be	   unable	   to	   reach	   all	   people	   equally	   because	   of	   obstacles	  impeding	  full	  societal	  awareness	  of	  the	  policy.	  For	  instance,	  it	  has	  been	  noticed	  how	   less	   cultivated	   or	   economically	   disadvantaged	   people	   tend	   to	   take	   less	  advantage	   of	   medical	   services	   than	   people	   belonging	   to	   different	   social	   and	  cultural	  strata	  of	  society.	  As	  noticed	  above,	  different	  policies	  strategy	  can	  be	  put	  in	  place	  as	  to	  diminish	  the	  deleterious	  consequences	  of	  such	  impediments.	  Local	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policy	  makers	  can,	  for	  instance,	  device	  information	  and	  educational	  campaigns	  specifically	   designed	   to	   reach	   particular	   communities.	   In	   other	   ways,	   public	  policies	   can	   exclude	   from	   their	   purview	   some	   publicly	   relevant	   interests	  because	   they	   are	   hold	   by	   a	   minority.	   The	   latter	   needs	   not	   being	   a	   form	   of	  intentional	   exclusion	  but,	   as	  Pettit	   calls	   it,	   a	   false	  negative	  danger	   inherent	   in	  public	  policies.	  A	  false	  negative	  occurs	  when	  a	  public	  policy,	  originally	  designed	  to	  track	  common	  shared	  interests,	   fails	  to	   identify	  and	  empower	  all	   the	  public	  stakeholders.	   This	   can	   be	   so,	   according	   to	   Pettit,	   either	   because	   there	   are	  publicly	   admissible	   reasons	   that	   have	   not	   surfaced	   in	   the	   public	   debate,	   or	  because	   not	   all	   feasible	   policy	   alternatives	   have	   been	   seriously	   taken	   into	  consideration	  (2004,	  166).	  The	  discussion	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  false	  negative.	  Gender-­‐based	  HPV	  vaccination	  programmes,	  indeed,	  have	  so	  far	   failed	  to	  address	  the	  preventive	  needs	  that	  a	  gender-­‐neutral	   immunization	  campaign	  would	   have	   also	   in	   a	   subset	   of	   the	   population.	   In	   the	   previous	   two	  chapters	   I	   have	   shown	   how	   these	   interests	   are	   morally	   important,	   and	   why	  there	   are	   strong	  moral	   reasons	   to	   take	   them	   into	   account	   properly.	   The	  way	  those	  interests	  can	  be	  taken	  into	  account,	  however,	  varies	  and,	  I	  argue,	  one	  way	  to	  meet	   them	  would	   consist	   in	   expanding	   our	   view	   on	  what	   are	   the	  morally	  relevant	  ends	  public	  health	  policies	  should	  strive	  for.	  
In	   the	  standard	  view	   in	  public	  health	  ethics	  –	  one	   that	   I	  have	  criticised	   for	   its	  limits,	  but	  also	  endorsed	  where	  appropriate	   -­‐	   the	  main	  objects	  of	  distribution	  are	   medical	   resources.	   Clearly,	   one	   can	   have	   different	   intuitions	   or	   even	  theories	   as	   to	   how	   a	   distribution	   of	   those	   resources	   should	   take	   place.	   For	  instance,	   one	   can	   think	   that	   the	   distributive	   principle	   should	   be	   such	   to	   give	  equal	  resources	  to	  all	  who	  need	  them.	  Another,	  perhaps,	  would	  argue	  that	  the	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best	  way	  to	  go,	  especially	  when	  those	  resources	  are	  scarce,	  is	  by	  giving	  priority	  to	  those	  who	  need	  it	  more.	  Still	  another	  one	  can	  support	  distributive	  principles	  that	   privilege	   those	   individuals	   that	   can	   profit	   more	   from	   this	   intervention.	  These	  problems	  are	  all	  too	  familiar	  in	  medical	  ethics,	  and	  are	  ready	  available	  in	  any	  major	  textbook	  in	  the	  field.	  What	  it	   is	   important	  for	  my	  work,	  however,	   is	  not	  to	  highlight	  their	  differences,	  but	  rather	  what	  are	  their	  similarities.	  And	  the	  main	   feature	   that	   all	   these	   approaches	   have	   in	   common	   is	   to	   conceive	   of	  medical	  resources	  as	   the	  right	   things	  to	   look	  at	  when	  thinking	  about	   issues	  of	  justice	   in	   medical	   settings.	   This	   way	   of	   understanding	   issues	   of	   distributive	  justice	   in	  bioethics	   is	   fine	  as	   far	  as	   it	  goes,	  but	  only	  as	   far	  as	   this.	  Below	  I	  will	  show	   in	   what	   sense	   resources	   should	   not	   be	   the	   main	   or	   only	   focus	   of	   our	  distributional	   concerns.	   Before	   doing	   that,	   however	   another	   set	   of	   problems	  that	   will	   also	   be	   important	   for	   answering	   the	   question	   informing	   this	   final	  chapter	  needs	  to	  be	  put	  forth	  
Suppose	  that	  we	  are	  asked	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  a	  given	  public	  health	  policy	  was	  successful	  and	  whether	  it	  was	  implemented	  in	  an	  ethical	  way.	  Suppose	  further	  that	  we	  are	  asked	  to	  do	  the	  job	  with	  the	  tools	  the	  beneficence	  model	  provides	  us	  with.	   To	   recall,	   the	   beneficence	   model	   conceives	   of	   ethical	   analysis	   of	   public	  health	   policies	   as	   an	   act	   of	   balancing	   among	   general	  moral	   considerations	   in	  case	   they	  conflict.	  To	  give	  an	  example,	   sometimes	  demands	   for	   increasing	   the	  effectiveness	   of	   the	   intervention	   may	   conflict	   with	   issues	   of	   autonomy	   –	   if	  people	  are	   forced	   to	  undergo	  a	  given	   intervention	  –	  or	  confidentiality	  –	  when	  the	   public	   health	   objective	   requires	   the	   state	   to	   collect	   and	   record	   personal	  information	   in	   disease	   registries.	   Otherwise	   stated,	   sometimes	   the	   general	  moral	   considerations	   that	   instantiates	   the	   goals	   of	   public	   health	   	   -­‐	   producing	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benefits,	   preventing	   harm,	   and	  maximizing	   utility	   –	   can	   come	   in	   conflict	  with	  other	   values	   like	   those	   listed	   above.	   In	   these	   cases,	   the	   beneficence	   model	  would	  tell	  us	  to	  put	  in	  place	  a	  balancing	  of	  the	  different	  values	  at	  play	  by	  means	  of	  the	  limiting	  conditions	  discussed	  in	  previous	  chapters.	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  would	   follow	   as	   to	   establish	  whether	   the	   achievements	   of	   public	   health	   goals	  warrants	  overriding	  values	  like	  liberty,	  confidentiality	  or	  justice	  (Childress	  et	  al.	  2002,	  172).	  As	  I	  have	  discussed	  throughout	  the	  first	  chapter,	  this	  is	  undoubtedly	  an	   important	   part	   of	   how	   an	   ethical	   analysis	   of	   public	   health	   policies	   should	  proceed.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  this	  analysis	  is	  silent	  on	  other	  respects.	  Indeed,	  the	  tools	  provided	  by	  the	  beneficence	  model	  are	  only	  relevant	  insofar	  as	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  ethical	  analysis	  of	  the	  means	  of	  the	  policy,	  but	  they	  remain	  wanting	  as	  to	  their	  
ends.	   So,	   if	  we	   take	   the	   first	  part	  of	   the	  question	   this	  paragraph	  began	  with	  –	  namely,	   how	   to	   assess	   whether	   a	   policy	   was	   successful	   -­‐	   we	   should	   rely	   on	  something	  else,	   something	   residing	  outside	   the	  boundaries	  of	   the	  beneficence	  model.	  Most	   likely	   then,	   the	  only	  way	  we	  have	   to	  evaluate	  a	  given	  policy	   is	   to	  count	   on	   those	  measures	   that	   are	   typical	   of	   public	   health	   policy	   itself	   as,	   for	  instance,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   a	   given	   intervention	   was	   able	   to	   maximize	  expected	   utility,	   both	   in	   epidemiological	   and	   economic	   terms.	   There	   are	   a	  plethora	   of	   health	   economics	   tools	   that	   have	   been	  devised	   as	   to	   perform	   this	  role.	   QALY	   and	   cost-­‐effectiveness	   analysis	   are	   some	   of	   them,	   and	   I	   have	  provided	  an	  account	  of	  what	  they	  imply	  in	  our	  context	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  use	  of	  these	  metrics	  does	  not	  go	  without	  critiques.	  For	  instance,	  some	   have	   raised	   concerns	   about	   the	   potential	   discriminatory	   effects	   that	  QALYs	   and	   cost-­‐effectiveness	   analysis	   may	   have	   against	   the	   elderly	   (Harris	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1987),	   or	   people	   with	   disabilities	   (Brock	   2009).	   Even	   when	   these	   tools	   are	  subjected	  to	  ethical	  scrutiny,	  however,	  quite	  rarely	  the	  critiques	  are	  also	  based	  on	   a	   different	   positive	   conception	   of	   what	   public	   health	   policies	   should	   be	  aiming	  at.	  Again,	  ethical	  analysis	  is	  by	  and	  large	  concerned	  about	  the	  means	  of	  the	  intervention,	  but	  not	  about	  its	  ends.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  recalling,	  once	  more,	  that	  I	  am	  not	  criticizing	  this	  approach	  tout	  court.	   In	  many	  respects	  I	  think	  this	  is	  the	  way	  one	  should	  go,	  and	  in	  several	  parts	  of	  this	  work	  I	  endorsed	  and	  used	  this	  strategy.	   I	   would	   also	   argue,	   however,	   that	   if	   ends	   are	   not	   also	   taken	   into	  account	  by	  applied	  moral	  and	  political	  philosophers,	  then	  the	  only	  way	  that	  we	  are	  left	  with	  to	  assess	  the	  successfulness	  of	  a	  policy	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  outcomes	  as	  stated	  by	  public	  health	  institutions.	  	  
	  In	  other	  words,	   if	  we	  are	  not	  able	   to	   spell	  out	  arguments	  as	   to	  what	  a	  policy	   should	   aim	  at,	   then	  we	   are	   left	  with	   the,	   still	   plausible,	   intuition	   that	   a	  policy	   is	   successful	   if	   it	   achieves	   its	   goals	   as	   defined	   by	   public	   health	  departments,	   and	   that	   it	   is	   ethical	   if	   the	   means	   adopted	   were	   acceptable	  according	   to	  previously	  established	  ethical	   standards.	  To	  make	   this	  point	   less	  abstract,	  if	  a	  public	  health	  policy	  is	  devised	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  incidence	  of,	  say,	  breast	   cancer,	   then	   the	  policy	   is	   successful	  when	  enough	   tumours	  at	   that	  site	   are	   prevented	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   intervention.	   In	   the	   case	   that	   has	  occupied	   large	  part	  of	   this	  work,	  moreover,	  one	  could	  be	  tempted	  to	  conclude	  that	  a	  given	  policy	  is	  successful	  if	  enough	  vaccines	  have	  been	  distributed	  so	  to	  achieve,	   perhaps	   in	   a	   cost-­‐effective	   manner,	   population	   health	   goals.	   In	   both	  cases,	  moreover,	  the	  policies	  would	  be	  ethically	  justified	  if	  the	  least	  restrictive	  means	  were	  adopted	  and	   if	   the	  resources	  were	   fairly	  distributed.	  Examples	  of	  this	  kind	  can	  be	  produced	  at	  will	  and,	  I	  assume,	  everyone	  agrees	  that	  this	  is	  an	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important	  feature	  of	  successful	  public	  health	  programmes	  that	  are	  also	  ethically	  justifiable.	  	  
This	  dynamics	  is	  certainly	  fine	  and,	  arguably,	  an	  important	  part	  of	  what	  public	  health	  ethics	  should	  be	  concerned	  about.	  However,	  these	  are	  not	  the	  only	  problems	  that	  deserve	  careful	  scrutiny.	  As	  anticipated	  in	  the	  second	  chapter,	  a	  complete	  ethical	   evaluation	  of	  public	  health	  policy	   should	  also	  elucidate	  what	  are	  the	  goods	  the	  policy	  is	  distributing.	  My	  aim	  is	  to	  show	  how	  the	  distribution	  of	   medical	   resources	   alone,	   is	   not	   the	   right	   focus	   for	   public	   health	   policy	  evaluation,	  and	  that	   their	  success	  should	  not	  be	  solely	  understood	   in	   terms	  of	  how	  those	  resources	  helped	  positively	  changing	  the	  epidemiological	  profile	  of	  a	  given	  disease.	  
2.	  Towards	  capabilities:	  the	  individual	  case	  	  If	   not	   resources	   then,	   what	   else?	   In	   the	   following	   sections	   I	   want	   to	  elaborate	  on	  the	  weaknesses	  of	  these	  approaches	  by	  the	  means	  of	  the	  capability	  approach	  and	  show	  its	  relevance	  also	  with	  regards	  to	  HPV	  programmes.	  To	  fully	  understand	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   capability	   approach	   for	   discussion	   in	   the	  ethics	   of	   public	   health	   policies,	   some	   of	   its	   core	   ideas	   and	   the	   specific	  terminology	  need	  further	  specification	  (see	  also	  infra	  chapter	  2).	  
Capability	   is	   the	   central	   notion	   of	   Sen’s	   approach	   and	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   “a	  person	  ability	  to	  do	  valuable	  acts	  or	  reach	  valuable	  states	  of	  being;	  it	  represents	  the	  alternative	  combinations	  of	  things	  a	  person	  is	  able	  to	  do	  or	  be”	  (Sen	  1993,	  30).	   In	   other	   terms,	   capabilities	   are	   effective	   freedoms	   to	   achieve	   what	   an	  individual	   would	   consider	   valuable	   upon	   reflection.	   Capabilities,	   in	   this	  approach,	   need	   to	   be	   distinguished	   from	   functionings.	  While	   functionings	   are	  achieved	  outcomes,	   capabilities	  are	   the	  potential	   to	  achieve	   those	  outcomes	   if	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one	   so	  wishes.	   To	  make	   one	   example,	   ‘being	   healthy’	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   functioning	  people	  may	  or	  may	  not	  posses.	  In	  this	  respect,	  we	  can	  find	  adequate	  metrics,	  for	  instance	  relying	  on	  biomedical	   sciences,	   for	  claiming	  when	  one	   is	  healthy	  and	  when	   one	   is	   not.	   The	   same	   can	   be	   said	   about	   other	   functionings	   like	   ‘being	  adequately	  nourished’.	  The	  problem	  that	  initially	  prompted	  Sen’s	  analysis	  was	  the	   adequacy	   of	   functionings	   to	   describe	   individual	   well-­‐being	   and,	  consequently,	   to	  use	   it	   as	  a	  metrics	   to	  assess	  public	  policies.	   Sen	   realizes	   that	  considering	   functionings	   to	   evaluate	   public	   policies	   and	   as	   measures	   of	  individual	   well-­‐being	   is	   insufficient.	   In	   fact,	   he	   notices,	   people	   may	   have	   the	  same	  functioning	  and	  still	  have	  different	  levels	  of	  well-­‐being.	  	  
In	  a	  now	  canonical	  example,	  Sen	  urges	  us	  to	  think	  about	  the	  differences	  existing	  between	   someone	   who	   is	   fasting	   for	   religious	   reasons	   and	   someone	   who	   is	  starving	   (1992,	   52).	   Both	   have	   the	   same	   functioning	   (i.e.	   they	   are	   not	   well	  nourished),	   but	   they	   dramatically	   differ	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   capabilities	   they	  possess.	   One	   individual	   has	   the	   capability	   to	   be	   well	   nourished	   but	   he	   is	  choosing	  not	  to	  exercise	  it,	  while	  the	  other	  has	  not	  such	  capability.	  The	  upshot	  of	   this	   example	   is	   that	   an	   exclusive	   insistence	   on	   functionings,	   achieved	  outcomes,	  or	  resources	  people	  are	  provided	  with	  is	  insufficient	  as	  a	  sole	  guide	  for	  public	  policy.	  What	   triggers	  our	  moral	   sensitivity,	   and	  should	  also	  prompt	  adequate	  policy	  action,	  is	  what	  –	  beyond	  food	  	  -­‐	  the	  starving	  person	  lacks:	  that	  is	   the	   capability	   to	  achieve	  one	  valuable	  desired	   functioning.	  Approaching	   the	  problem	   from	   a	   capability	   perspective	   enriches	   the	   landscape	   of	   moral	  evaluation	  and	  better	  accounts	  for	  human	  diversity.	  Saying	  this,	  however,	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  reject	  the	  importance	  resources	  may	  have	  in	  achieving	  valuable	  capabilities.	   In	   some	   instances,	   indeed,	   resources	  are	  necessary	   for	  expanding	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capabilities.	  A	  person	  with	  motor	  disability,	   in	   other	  words,	   certainly	  needs	   a	  wheelchair	   to	  move	   around	  with	   expanded	   independence.	  Nevertheless,	  what	  makes	  resources	   functional	   to	   the	  scope	  depends	  on	  what	  are	   the	   factors	   that	  would	   allow	   individuals	   to	   exploit	   those	   resources	  properly.	   For	   example,	  we	  can	  provide	  two	  people	  with	  similar	  bikes,	  and	  yet	  what	  we	  achieve	  may	  not	  be	  the	  same	  result.	  One	  person	  may	  convert	  the	  resource	  into	  a	  valuable	  outcome,	  for	   instance	   if	   she	  was	   taught	   how	   to	  drive	   a	   bike,	  while	   another	  may	  not	   be	  able	  to	  do	  that,	   for	  example	  because	  she	  is	  physically	  impaired	  or	  because	  her	  city	   is	   not	   provided	   with	   adequate	   cycling	   lanes	   (Robeyns	   2011,	   13).	   In	   the	  capability	   approach,	   the	   latter	   are	   called	   ‘conversion	   factors’	   and	   can	   be	   of	  various	  nature.	  They	  can	  be	  ‘personal’,	  thus	  depending	  on	  the	  particular	  natural	  endowment	   of	   the	   person	   under	   consideration.	   They	   can	   be	   ‘social’,	   thus	  depending	   on	   the	   kind	   of	   society	   one	   lives	   in,	   whether	   there	   are	   in	   place	  discriminatory	  practice,	  strong	  social	  hierarchies,	  or	  power	  relations	  related	  to	  gender,	  class,	  or	  ethnicity.	  Finally,	  they	  can	  also	  be	  environmental,	  having	  thus	  to	  do	  with	  the	  physical	  environment	  a	  person	  happens	  to	  live	  in	  (Robeyns	  2005,	  99).	   	   The	   problem	   of	   conversion	   factors	   is	   also	   apparent	   in	   the	   case	   of	   HPV	  policies.	  Provided	  that	  giving	  the	  vaccination	  to	  girls	  before	  they	  initiate	  sexual	  activity	   really	  protects	   them	  against	   the	   relevant	  HPV	   types,	   it	   alone	  does	  not	  permit	   to	   judge	  how	  much	   their	  capabilities	  have	  been	  actually	  enhanced.	  We	  can	   imagine	   different	   situations	   all	   related	   to	   the	   different	   conversion	   factors	  different	  individuals	  have	  at	  their	  disposal.	  	  
Mary,	  for	  instance,	  comes	  from	  an	  affluent	  neighbourhood.	  Her	  parents	  provide	  her	   with	   all	   the	   material	   and	   cultural	   tools	   for	   a	   correct	   development.	   After	  consulting	   each	   other,	   the	   parents	   decide	   to	   immunise	   Mary	   against	   HPV	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because	   they	   think	   she	   could	   profit	   immensely	   from	   the	   vaccine.	   Arguably,	  these	  parents	  will	  explain	  to	  Mary	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  vaccine,	  what	  it	  means	  for	  her	   future	   sexual	   encounters,	   and	  what	   kind	   of	   preventive	  measures	   she	  will	  need	  to	  take	  still	  for	  avoiding	  sexually	  transmitted	  infections.	  Moreover,	  Mary’s	  parents	   could	   also	   teach	   to	   her,	  when	   they	   feel	   appropriate	   and	   according	   to	  their	  educational	  style,	  that	  the	  vaccine	  she	  has	  had	  when	  she	  was	  12	  only	  gave	  her	   a	   shield	   against	   HPV	   infection.	   Still,	   she	   needs	   to	   perform	   regularly,	   and	  when	   appropriate,	   the	  PAP	   test	   for	   screening	   cervical	   abnormalities	   that	  may	  lead	   to	   the	   development	   of	   cervical	   cancer.	   The	   girl	   of	   our	   example	   is	   an	  individual	  provided	  with	  the	  right	  capability	  to	  health,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  context	  of	  HPV	  and	  other	  sexually	  transmitted	  infections.	  After	  having	  been	  provided	  with	  the	   capability,	  Mary	   can	  decide	  whether	   to	   exercise	   it	   or	   not.	   In	   other	  words,	  Mary	  has	  been	  provided	  not	  only	  with	  a	  resource	  (i.e.	  vaccine)	  and	  the	  relative	  functioning	   (i.e.	   immunity	   against	  HPV)	  but	   also	  of	   the	   adequate	   capability	   to	  exploit	  a	  whole	  set	  of	  health-­‐related	  resources,	  should	  she	  decide	  to	  do	  so.	  	  
Let	  us	  imagine	  now	  another	  girl	  and	  call	  her	  Francine.	  Francine’s	  parents	  do	  not	  take	  much	  care	  of	  her.	  This	  may	  be	  so	  for	  different	  reasons.	  She	  may	  come	  from	  a	   poor	   background	   and	   her	   parents	   have	   simply	   no	   time	   to	   consider	   all	   her	  medical	  needs.	  They	  are	  not	  necessarily	  bad	  parents,	  but	  probably	  the	  lack	  the	  appropriate	   knowledge	   to	   give	   to	   her	   an	   adequate	   preventive	   education.	  Despite	   this	   fact,	   Francine’s	   parents	   receive	   a	   letter	   from	   the	   local	   clinic	  suggesting	   their	   daughter	   may	   be	   immunized	   against	   HPV.	   They	   may	   decide	  that	  vaccination,	  after	  all,	  is	  good	  and	  let	  her	  to	  take	  the	  jab.	  The	  jab,	  at	  least	  in	  this	   example,	   is	   not	   accompanied	   by	   any	   kind	   of	   information	   about	   its	  significance,	   and	   what	   further	   steps	   need	   to	   be	   taken	   for	   correct	   preventive	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practice.	   Francine	   would	   not	   know	   what	   HPV	   is,	   what	   its	   link	   with	   cervical	  cancer,	  and	  what	  are	  the	  other	  preventive	  strategies	  she	  would	  need	  to	  perform	  in	  the	  future.	  	  Clearly,	  our	  girl	  is	  now	  protected	  from	  HPV,	  and	  she	  is	  objectively	  protected	   from	   the	  most	  dangerous	  strains.	  Francine,	  however,	  does	  not	  have	  the	   capability	   for	   fully	   take	   advantage	   of	   the	   opportunity.	   Francine	   may	  eventually	   come	   to	   know	   anyway	   of	   the	   necessity	   of	   undergoing	   PAP	   smears	  once	  she	  becomes	  sexually	  active,	  or	  she	  may	  not.	  What	  it	  is	  important	  for	  the	  sake	   of	   this	   argument	   is	   that	   Francine	   has	   not	   been	   provided	   with	   the	  capability,	  but	  only	  with	  the	  functioning.	  	  
Margaret,	   instead,	   comes	   from	   a	   middle	   class,	   warmly	   religious	   family.	  Margaret’s	   parents	   provide	   her	   with	   all	   she	   needs,	   and	   take	   care	   of	   her	  adequately.	  Margaret’s	  parents	  receive	  a	  letter	  of	  invitation	  from	  the	  local	  clinic	  offering	   HPV	   immunization.	   They	   read	   carefully	   the	   information,	   and	   decide	  that	   they	   will	   not	   give	   the	   vaccine	   to	   their	   daughter.	   They	   decide	   so	   maybe	  because	   they	   read	   that	   there	   are	   still	   uncertainties	   about	   the	   duration	   of	   the	  immunity,	  or	  probably	  because	  they	  have	  heard	  that	  the	  PAP	  test	  will	  need	  to	  be	   performed	   anyway.	   Perhaps	   they	   do	   so	   because	   they	   would	   prefer	   to	  introduce	  Margaret	  to	  sexual	  education	  gradually	  and	  according	  to	  their	  values,	  which	   include	   abstinence	   before	  marriage.	   They	   sincerely	   do	   not	   believe	   that	  the	  vaccine	  is	  an	  incentive	  for	  sexual	  promiscuity,	  but	  for	  the	  reasons	  explained	  they	   decide	   not	   to	   give	   her	   the	   jab.	   However,	   they	  will	   certainly	   provide	   her	  with	   sexual	   education	   and	   inform	   her	   about	   the	   risks	   of	   unsafe	   sex.	   With	  regards	   to	   cervical	   cancer,	   moreover,	   they	   will	   explain	   the	   risks	   and	   the	  importance	   of	   performing	   screenings	   for	   a	   correct	   preventive	   practice.	  Margaret,	  differently	  from	  Mary	  and	  Francine,	  has	  not	  been	  provided	  with	  the	  
	   199	  
functioning.	  Therefore,	  she	  is	  in	  a	  sense	  more	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  infected	  from	  HPV.	  Margaret’s	   capability	   to	   health,	   however,	   has	   been	   expanded	   and	   she	   would	  then	   decide	   whether	   to	   exercise	   it	   or	   not	   so	   to	   achieve	   the	   functionings	   she	  considers	  valuable.	  	  
Sophie	  comes	  from	  the	  outskirts	  of	  a	  big	  city.	  She	  is	  13	  and	  she	  is	  the	  oldest	  of	  four	  children.	  She	  has	  no	  father	  and	  her	  mom,	  who	  shoulders	  alone	  the	  burden	  of	   raising	   the	   family,	   has	   to	   commute	  more	   than	   2	   hours	   every	   day	   to	  work.	  Sophie’s	  mom	  cannot	  afford	  baby	  sitting,	  and	  so	  it	  is	  Sophie	  that	  has	  to	  take	  care	  of	   the	   three	   little	  kids	  every	  afternoon.	  Sophie	   is	  more	  mature	  of	  many	  of	  her	  peers	  at	  school;	  indeed	  she	  has	  more	  responsibilities	  than	  other	  girls	  and	  boys	  at	  her	  age.	  Sophie	  thinks	  she	  is	  already	  a	  woman	  and,	  perhaps	  for	  this	  reason,	  she	   has	   already	   had	   her	   sexual	   debut.	   Sophie’s	   mom	   has	   never	   performed	  cervical	   cancer	   screening	   and	   she	   is	   not	   aware	   of	   HPV	   and	   its	   risks.	   As	   a	  consequence	  of	  that,	  Sophie	  will	  not	  get	  the	  vaccine	  nor	  anyone	  will	  explain	  to	  her	  what	  is	  HPV,	  what	  is	  cervical	  cancer	  and,	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  what	  it	  means	   to	   conduct	   a	   responsible	   sexual	   life	   if	   one	   wants	   to	   avoid	   sexually	  transmitted	   infections	  and	  diseases.	   Sophie	   -­‐	  who	  will	  perhaps	   come	   to	  know	  these	   things	   through	   magazines	   or	   peers	   -­‐	   has	   not	   been	   provided	   with	   the	  functioning	  and	  her	  capability	  has	  not	  been	  expanded.	  In	  a	  sense,	  she	  is	  also	  the	  one	  more	  at	  risk	  of	  infection	  among	  the	  four	  girls.	  
Then	  we	  have	  Bob.	  We	  do	  not	  know	  anything	  in	  particular	  about	  him.	  He	  may	  come	  from	  an	  affluent	  background	  or	  not.	  His	  parents	  may	  provide	  him	  with	  all	  that	   it	   is	  necessary	   for	   the	   full	  development	  of	  his	  capacities	  or	   they	  may	  not.	  What	   we	   know	   about	   Bob,	   however,	   is	   that	   nobody	   has	   ever	   told	   him	   about	  HPV,	  what	  are	  the	  risks	  for	  males,	  how	  men	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  transmission	  of	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the	   virus,	   and	   why	   it	   is	   important	   to	   conduct	   a	   responsible	   sexual	   life	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   personal	   prevention	   and	   for	   the	   other-­‐regarding	   outcomes	   his	  behaviour	  may	  cause.	  Bob,	  perhaps,	  attends	  a	  school	  in	  which	  girls	  are	  routinely	  immunized	  against	  HPV.	  He	  sees	  his	  girl	   classmates	  queuing	  out	  of	   the	  school	  nurse’s	   office	   awaiting	   immunization.	   Some	   of	   them	   are	   scared	   by	   needles	  others	   just	  do	  not	   care.	   Some	  of	  Bob’s	  boy	  classmates	  make	   fun	  of	   the	   scared	  girls,	   others	   just	   pass	   by	   and	  watch	  without	   understanding	  what	   is	   going	   on	  there.	   Bob	   one	   day	   will	   become	   sexually	   active,	   he	   will	   most	   likely	   have	   a	  heterosexual	  identity	  but	  perhaps	  he	  won’t.	  He	  will	  very	  likely	  be	  infected	  with	  HPV	  and,	   in	   turn,	   he	  will	   infect	   his	   sexual	   partners.	  With	   a	  high	   likelihood	  he	  will	   not	   develop	   any	   HPV-­‐associated	   cancer,	   or	   perhaps	   he	   will.	   This	   will	  depend,	   clearly,	   on	   a	   complex	   interaction	   of	   factors.	   Complexities	  notwithstanding,	  however,	  we	  know	   that	  Bob	  has	  been	  provided	  neither	  with	  the	   resource	   nor	  with	   the	   capability.	   Therefore,	   he	   has	   been	   prevented	   from	  developing	  an	  awareness	  of	  his	  role	  as	  a	  vector	  in	  the	  chain	  of	  infections.	  	  
How	   to	   evaluate	   these	   imaginary,	   yet	   realistic,	   examples	   in	   terms	   of	  comparative	   advantages	   given	   to	   the	   individuals	  who	  were	   asked	   to	   undergo	  the	   intervention?	   The	   case	   of	   Bob	  will	   become	   important	   below	  where	   I	  will	  explain	  why	  a	   focus	  on	  capability	   is	  also	  functional	  to	  shed	  more	   lights	  on	  the	  issues	   of	   gender	   equity	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter.	   For	   the	   moment,	  however,	   let	   us	   concentrate	   on	   the	   cases	   of	   Mary,	   Francine,	   Margaret	   and	  Sophie	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   simplicity.	   If	   we	   look	   at	   resources	   and	   achieved	  functionings	   alone,	   then	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   establish	   who	   is	   better	   off	   and	   who	   is	  worse	  off	   in	   the	   examples	  provided.	   	  Mary	   and	  Francine	  both	   got	   the	   vaccine	  and	  so	  they	  have	  achieved,	  thanks	  to	  the	  resource	  provided,	  equal	   functioning	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(i.e.	   they	   are	   immune	   against	  HPV).	   	  Margaret	   and	   Sophie	   instead,	   since	   they	  were	  not	  provided	  with	  the	  resource,	  are	  both	  lacking	  the	  relevant	  functioning.	  	  
By	  looking	  at	  resources	  and	  achieved	  functioning	  alone	  we	  can	  readily	  establish	  a	  ranking	  of	  the	  cases	  at	  hand.	  The	  latter	  would	  look	  as	  follows:	  
	  Table	  5.	  Ranking	  of	  the	  individuals	  with	  regards	  to	  achieved	  functioning	  	  
In	  other	  words,	  functioning	  in	  this	  case	  is	  a	  binary	  condition:	  either	  you	  have	  it	  or	   not.	   In	   this	   sense,	  Mary	   and	   Francine	   are	   better	   off	   after	   the	   intervention,	  whereas	   Margaret	   and	   Sophie’s	   conditions	   have	   not	   improved.	   If	   we	   look	   at	  functionings	  only	  we	  have	  no	  way	  to	  tell	  whether	  there	  are	  differences	  among	  the	  four	  cases.	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capabilities	  together	  with	   functioning,	   indeed,	  we	  can	  make	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  analysis	   and	   distinguish	   among	   the	   cases.	   From	   the	   capability	   perspective,	  indeed,	   Margaret	   and	   Mary	   have	   had	   their	   capabilities	   expanded,	   whereas	  Francine,	   although	   she	   has	   been	   immunized,	   is	   in	   a	   position	   of	   relative	  disadvantage.	  She	  will	  probably	  not	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  what	  she	  can	  do	  and	  what	  she	  cannot	  do	  with	  the	  resource	  she	  was	  provided	  with.	  HPV	  vaccination,	  in	   fact,	   is	   only	   a	   bit	   of	   the	   whole	   set	   of	   measures	   that	   can	   lead	   to	   improved	  functioning	   with	   respect	   to	   cancer	   and	   sexually	   transmitted	   diseases.	   In	   the	  same	   way	   Sophie,	   although	   she	   and	   her	   family	   were	   not	   interfered	   by	   the	  gender-­‐based	   campaign,	   did	   not	   have	   her	   capability	   to	   health	   expanded.	   The	  graph	   below	   summarizes	   in	   what	   sense	   a	   ranking	   of	   individual	   advantages	  based	   only	   on	   achieved	   functioning	   misses	   to	   take	   into	   account	   diversities	  existing	  among	  the	  cases	  presented.	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As	   we	   can	   see	   the	   introduction	   of	   capability	   adds	   a	   further	   dimension	   of	  analysis,	  and	  permits	  us	  to	  make	  more	  specific	  considerations	  about	  the	  cases	  at	   hand.	   We	   can	   imagine	   that,	   prior	   to	   the	   educational	   and	   preventive	  interventions,	  all	  the	  individuals	  of	  our	  example	  were	  in	  the	  position	  of	  Sophie.	  They	  had	  no	  achieved	  functioning	  with	  respect	  to	  HPV	  and	  related	  cancers,	  or	  the	  capability	  to	  achieve	  those	  functionings.	  After	  these	  interventions	  –	  directed	  by	  the	  families	  -­‐	  we	  see	  that	  Mary	  has	  moved	  from	  the	  left-­‐lower	  to	  the	  right-­‐upper	  quadrant	  of	   the	  graph.	  Now	  Mary	   is	   effectively	  protected	   from	  HPV	   (at	  least	   the	   types	   covered	   by	   the	   vaccine),	   but	   she	   is	   also	   able	   –	   since	   we	   are	  assuming	  she	  received	  an	  adequate	  preventive	  education	  about	  sexual	  health	  –	  to	   achieve	   a	   broader	   set	   of	   related	   functionings	   if	   she	   so	  wishes.	   Indeed,	   the	  capability	   she	   has	   been	   provided	   with	   would	   allow	   Mary	   to	   protect	   herself	  against	  other	  sexually	  transmitted	  infections,	  unwanted	  pregnancies,	  or	  cervical	  cancer	   caused	   by	   other	   HPV	   types,	   if	   she	   so	   wishes.	   Francine,	   instead,	   has	  moved	   to	   the	   left-­‐upper	   quadrant	   of	   the	   graph.	   Now	   she	   possesses	   full	  functioning	  against	  HPV	  (i.e.	  she	  is	  immunized)	  but	  –	  since	  we	  are	  assuming	  she	  was	  not	  provided	  with	  the	  capability	  –	  she	  is	  not	  able	  to	  protect	  herself	  against	  other	   sexually	   transmitted	  diseases.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	  package	  of	   functionings	  that	   is	   open	   to	   her	   is	   smaller	   than	   Mary’s.	   Margaret	   –	   the	   girl	   that	   in	   our	  example	  was	   fully	   educated	   but	   not	   immunized	   –	   possesses	   the	   capability	   to	  function,	   but	   not	   the	   functioning	   itself	   (i.e.	   immunization).	   This	   marks	   a	  difference	  between	  her	  and	  Francine	  and,	  in	  a	  sense,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  latter	  is	   advantaged	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   other.	   Nevertheless	   Margaret,	   like	   Mary,	  possesses	   a	   capability	   that	   would	   permit	   her	   –	   at	   least	   in	   our	   example	   –	   to	  achieve	  a	  larger	  set	  of	  functionings	  than	  Francine,	  if	  she	  so	  wishes.	  As	  I	  said,	  she	  could	  autonomously	  decide	  what	  risks	  to	  take,	  how	  to	  take	  them,	  and	  what	  kind	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of	   protection	   she	   desires.	   Sophie,	   the	   last	   girl	   of	   the	   example,	   is	   the	   only	   one	  who	   has	   not	   moved	   from	   the	   left-­‐lower	   quadrant	   of	   the	   paragraph:	   her	  capability	  has	  not	  been	  expanded,	  nor	  she	  improved	  in	  terms	  of	  functioning.	  She	  is	  the	  worst	  off	  in	  our	  graph.	  Sophie,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  recalled,	  was	  also	  the	  worst	  off	  in	  the	  ranking	  of	  individual	  advantages	  taking	  only	  achieved	  functioning	  into	  account.	  In	  that	  context,	  however,	  the	  differences	  between	  Sophie	  and	  Margaret	  were	   invisible.	   To	   understand	   this	   point	   better	   let	   us	   recall	   Sen’s	   example	  concerning	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  man	  who	   is	   fasting	  and	  the	  one	  who	   is	  starving	  and	  see	  how	  it	  maps	  onto	  our	  distinctions.	  Margaret	  (and	  her	  family)	  is,	  all	  other	  things	  being	  equal,	  in	  the	  position	  of	  the	  man	  who	  fasts.	  Sophie	  (and	  her	  mom)	  has	  not	  the	  capability	  to	  choose	  whether	  to	  fast	  or	  not.	  Therefore,	  she	  is	  metaphorically	  starving.	  The	  one-­‐dimensional	  character	  of	   the	   ‘functionings	  model’	   flattens	   the	   differences,	   also	   those	   that	   appear	   to	   be	  morally	   relevant,	  like	  the	  one	  between	  who	  fasts	  and	  who	  starves.	  
From	  an	   individual	  perspective,	   to	  conclude,	  we	  can	  say	   that	  what	   fosters	  our	  moral	   scrutiny	   more	   is	   Sophie’s	   case	   rather	   than	   Margaret’s.	   In	   this	   sense,	   I	  would	  argue,	  everyone	  would	  prefer	  to	  be	  –	  all	  other	  things	  being	  equal	  –	  in	  the	  position	   of	   Margaret	   rather	   than	   in	   the	   position	   of	   Sophie.	   This	   simple	   yet	  powerful	   shift	   in	   perception,	   I	   would	   moreover	   argue,	   is	   made	   possible	   by	  expanding	   our	   evaluative	   gaze	   from	   functionings	   to	   capabilities.	   If	   the	  arguments	   presented	   are	   correct,	   hence,	   capabilities	   are	   morally	   important	  goods	  to	  distribute	  along	  with	  functionings.	  	  
What	  said	  so	   far	  applies	  at	   the	   individual	   level.	   It	   remains,	  however,	   to	  assess	  what	  the	  capability	  perspective	  tells	  us	  at	  the	  population	  level.	  To	  the	  analysis	  of	  this	  next	  point	  I	  now	  turn.	  
	   205	  
3.	  HPV	  vaccination	  policies	  and	  capabilities:	  the	  population	  
case	  
	  In	  the	  previous	  section	  I	  have	  assessed	  in	  what	  sense	  the	  capability	  approach,	  applied	   to	   the	   HPV	   case,	   enlarges	   the	   scope	   of	   our	   evaluative	   exercises.	   The	  capability	  approach	  adds	  up	  a	  second	  interpretative	  dimension	  to	  an	  evaluation	  based	  only	  on	  the	  functionings	  achieved	  after	  resources	  have	  been	  distributed.	  The	  comparisons	  made,	  it	  must	  be	  admitted,	  were	  based	  on	  fictional	  examples.	  Real	  life	  situations	  are	  certainly	  more	  nuanced	  and	  it	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  make	  clear-­‐cut	   distinctions.	   For	   instance,	   we	   cannot	   always	   claim	   in	   a	   straightforward	  manner	   whether	   actual	   Margarets	   are	   always	   better	   than	   Francines,	   or	   vice	  versa.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   reflecting	   on	   what	   people	   can	   do	   and	   be	  certainly	  broadens	  the	  thickness	  of	  our	  observations	  and,	  I	  would	  argue,	  also	  of	  our	  moral	   sensitivity.	  What	  we	   think	   is	  morally	   relevant	   concerning	  Sophie	   is	  not	  only	  that	  she	  lacks	  the	  functioning	  but	  also,	  and	  perhaps	  more,	  that	  she	  has	  not	  even	  the	  same	  capability	  of	  Margaret.	  	  
In	   a	   similar	   manner,	   we	   could	   use	   the	   capability	   approach	   to	   assess	   how	  populations	  are	  faring	  with	  respect	  to	  one	  another	  or	  establishing,	  accordingly,	  how	  we	  would	  like	  a	  given	  population	  to	  improve	  its	  present	  conditions.	  	  
As	  noticed	  above,	  if	  we	  evaluate	  a	  policy	  only	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  functioning	  it	  provides,	  then	  it	  is	  readily	  understandable	  who	  is	  faring	  well	  and	  who	  is	  not	  (at	  least	  according	  to	  the	  policy	  objectives	  themselves).	  Indeed,	  this	  calculation	  can	  be	  done	  by	  simply	  summing	  up	  the	  numbers	  of	  immunized	  individuals	  and	  the	  numbers	   of	   the	   individuals	   who	   are	   still	   susceptible	   to	   the	   infection.	  Accordingly,	   those	  who	  are	   immunized	  are	   faring	  well	  whereas	  the	  others	  are	  not.	  Clearly	  -­‐	  and	  more	  importantly	  given	  the	  population	  focus	  of	  this	  section	  -­‐	  if	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the	  number	  of	   immunized	   individuals	   is	  high	  enough	  as	   to	   sustain	  population	  health	  goals	   established	  by	  public	  health	  departments	   then	  we	   can	  also	   claim	  that	   the	   policy	   was	   successful.	   If	   to	   this	   perspective,	   however,	   we	   add	  capabilities	  as	  a	  further	  element	  of	  assessment,	  then	  also	  in	  the	  population	  case	  different	   scenarios	   would	   open	   up	   to	   our	   scrutiny.	   Otherwise	   stated,	  capabilities	   can	   tell	   us	   how	   to	   better	   evaluate	   current	   situations	   as	   well	   as	  suggesting	  what	  ought	  to	  be	  distributed	  along	  with	  functionings.	  
Suppose,	  for	  the	  moment,	  that	  we	  had	  measures	  to	  calculate,	  in	  a	  more	  or	  less	  precise	  manner,	   capabilities	   along	  with	   functionings.	   Suppose	   further	   that	  we	  want	  to	  assess	  how	  four	  HPV	  policies	  fared	  with	  respect	  to	  both	  the	  dimensions	  some	  years	  after	  they	  were	  initiated.	  We	  would	  observe	  –	  like	  in	  the	  individual	  case	  –	  how	  the	  relevant	  populations	  (call	   them	  A,	  B,	  C,	  and	  D)	   improved	  their	  baselines	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  intervention.	  In	  the	  graph	  below	  we	  see	  the	   positions	   of	   populationA-­‐B-­‐C-­‐D	   with	   respect	   to	   functioning	   and	   capability	  before	  the	  campaigns	  start,	  let	  us	  call	  it	  time0.	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  Graph	  5.	  Populations’	  positions	  at	  time0	  After	   the	   campaigns	   start	   populationA-­‐B-­‐C-­‐D	   will	   move	   somewhat.	   Let	   us	   think	  first	  at	  the	  extreme	  situations.	  	  
At	  time0	  the	  HPV	  campaign	  for	  populationA	  starts.	  It	  is	  a	  very	  bad	  campaign.	  The	  public	  health	  department	  in	  that	  area	  does	  not	  have	  enough	  funds	  for	  buying	  all	  the	  vaccines,	  nor	  the	  professional	  expertise	  to	  devise	  an	  efficient	  plan	  of	  action	  for	   its	   delivery.	  Moreover,	   no	   educational	   campaign	   is	  made	   so	   to	   inform	   the	  public	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  intervention	  or	  to	  make	  people	  aware	  of	  the	  connections	  between	  HPV	  and	  cancer.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  at	   time1	  populationA	  remains	   still	   in	   the	   left-­‐lower	   quadrant	   of	   the	   graph.	   No	   one	   was	   endowed	  either	  with	  the	  functioning	  or	  the	  capability.	  We	  would	  say,	  in	  this	  case,	  that	  the	  campaign	  was	  certainly	  unsuccessful.	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stated	  objective	  is	  to	  perform	  a	  campaign	  as	  efficient	  as	  possible	  and	  to	  achieve	  significant	   population	   goals	   in	   the	   short-­‐term.	   Perhaps	   the	   campaign	   is	  mandatory,	  allowing	  very	  little	  space	  for	  individual	  exemptions.	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  primary	   aim	   of	   the	   campaign	   is	   to	   maximize	   functioning	   and	   no	   educational	  initiatives	  are	  devised	  as	  to	  increase	  awareness	  of	  HPV	  as	  a	  cancer	  risk	  factor	  in	  the	   population.	   At	   time1,	   hence,	   populationB	   is	   fully	   functioning	   (i.e.	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	   the	   individuals	   are	   immunized)	   but	   all	   individuals	   within	   the	  population	  lack	  the	  correspondent	  capabilities.	  According	  to	  functioning	  alone,	  the	  HPV	  policy	  for	  populationB	  was	  certainly	  successful.	  	  
The	   case	   of	   populationC	   is	   a	   peculiar	   one.	   The	   state,	   like	   in	   the	   previous	  situation,	  promotes	  a	  mass	  vaccination	  campaign	  against	  HPV.	  The	  incidence	  of	  cervical	   cancer	   in	   that	   area	   is	   consistent,	   but	   not	   too	   high.	   The	   public	   health	  department,	   therefore,	   launches	   a	   robust	   educational	   campaign	   aimed	   at	  achieving	   vast	   awareness	   about	   HPV,	   cervical	   cancer,	   and	   other	   sexually	  transmitted	   infections.	   It	  moreover	   offers	   the	   possibility	   to	   prevent	   HPV	   and	  associated	  diseases	  by	   the	  available	  preventive	   tools	   (i.e.	  vaccination	  and	  PAP	  test).	  The	  educational	  campaign	  is	  addressed	  to	  families,	  their	  pre-­‐adolescents	  children,	  nurses,	  physicians	  and	  all	  professional	  operators	   in	  public	  health.	   In	  the	   context	   of	   these	   information	   campaigns	   the	   HPV	   vaccine	   is	   offered	   to	   all	  those	  who	  want	  to	  take	  the	  opportunity	  and	  who	  can	  benefit	  from	  it.	  For	  some	  reason,	   at	   time1	   almost	   nobody	   gets	   immunized,	   but	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	   the	  population	  understood	  the	  risks	  and	  will	  modulate	   its	  behaviours	  accordingly.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  at	  time1	  populationc	  is	  faring	  badly	  in	  terms	  of	  HPV-­‐specific	  functioning	  (i.e.	  few	  people	  are	  immunized)	  but,	  we	  suppose,	  it	  is	  faring	  well	  in	  terms	  of	  capabilities	  to	  function.	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The	   last	   extreme	   case	   in	   our	   model	   is	   that	   of	   populationD.	   PopulationD	   is	   in	  many	  respects	   similar	   to	  populationC.	  Both	  populations	  have	  more	  or	   less	   the	  same	   demographic	   and	   age	   structure,	   the	   patterns	   of	   sexual	   behaviours	   are	  alike	  and	  so	  are	  the	  rates	  of	  HPV	  infections	  and	  related	  cancers.	  Similar,	  in	  our	  model,	   are	   also	   the	   campaigns	   enacted	   by	   the	   respective	   public	   health	  departments.	  Also	  in	  the	  case	  of	  populationD,	  that	  is,	  the	  offer	  of	  the	  vaccine	  is	  accompanied	   by	   intensive	   educational	   campaigns	   to	   the	   population.	   One	  relevant	   difference	   exists,	   however,	   between	   populationD	   and	   populationC.	   At	  time1,	   indeed,	  almost	  all	   individuals	  within	  populationD,	   take	  advantage	  of	   the	  vaccination	  offer	  and	  immunize	  themselves	  against	  HPV.	  PopulationD	  possesses	  now	  the	  functioning	  against	  HPV	  and	  all	  individuals	  are	  endowed	  with	  relevant	  capabilities.	  
It	   should	  be	  clear,	  by	  now,	   that	   there	  are	   relevant	  differences	  among	   the	   four	  extreme	  cases	  presented.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  completeness,	  however,	  let	  us	  see	  how	  would	   we	   evaluate	   them	   if	   we	   were	   only	   concerned	   about	   achieved	  functionings.	  They	  would	  rank	  as	  follows:	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  Table	  6.	  Populations’	  ranking	  according	  to	  achieved	  functioning	  	  
As	   we	   saw	   above	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   individual	   cases,	   a	   look	   only	   at	  functioning	  does	  not	  allow	  us	   to	  appreciate	  properly	  what	  are	   the	  differences	  among	   the	   cases.	   In	   other	  words,	   our	   evaluative	   gaze	   is	   compressed	   into	   one	  single	   dimension:	   some	   people	   are	   immunized	  whereas	   others	   are	   not;	   some	  systems	  are	  efficient	  whereas	  others	  are	  not.	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  Graph	  6:	  Populations	  (A-­‐B-­‐C-­‐D)	  at	  time1	  The	   new	   dimension	   offered	   by	   a	   concern	  with	   capability	   permits	   us	   to	  make	  more	  detailed	  comparisons	  among	  the	  populations.	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PopulationC,	   to	   continue	   with	   our	   comparison,	   is	   certainly	   different	   from	  populationB.	  The	  latter	  has	  moved,	  after	  the	  intervention,	  from	  the	  left-­‐lower	  to	  the	  left-­‐upper	  quadrant	  of	  the	  graph.	  In	  this	  sense,	  populationB	  is	  now	  provided	  with	  the	  functioning	  but	  not	  with	  the	  capability.	  Who	  is	  better	  off	  between	  the	  two	  populations?	   In	   a	   sense	   -­‐	   in	   parallel	  with	   the	   considerations	  made	   in	   the	  context	  of	  the	  individual	  case	  –	  populationB	  is	  objectively	  more	  protected	  from	  HPV	   16	   and	   18	   than	   populationC.	   Nevertheless,	   populationC	   has	   still	   the	  potential	   to	  achieve	  the	  same	  functioning	  with	  regards	  to	  cervical	  cancer	  than	  populationB.	   Moreover,	   individuals	   in	   populationC	   have	   at	   their	   disposal	   a	  capability	  that	  would	  allow	  them	  to	  achieve	  a	  larger	  set	  of	  functionings.	  In	  other	  words,	   they	   can	   now	   decide	   what	   kind	   of	   preventive	   practices	   to	   adopt	   and	  what	   kind	   of	   risks	   to	   take	   in	   a	   conscious	  manner.	  While	   I	  was	   discussing	   the	  analogous	   individual	   case	   –	   i.e.	   Francine	   and	  Margaret	   –	   I	   said	   that	   there	   is	   a	  sense	   in	  which	  we	   are	   not	   able	   to	   assess	  who	   is	   better	   off	   between	   the	   two.	  Perhaps,	   this	   consideration	   holds	   also	   in	   this	   case.	   In	   at	   least	   some	   respects,	  however,	  populationB	   is	  worse	  off	   than	  populationC.	   In	   the	   former,	   indeed,	  we	  have	   assumed	   that	   individuals	   were	   not	   free	   to	   choose	   the	   level	   of	   their	  functionings.	   That	   level,	   indeed,	   was	   imposed	   from	   above.	   In	   this	   regard,	  populationB	  possesses	  only	   the	   relevant	   functioning	  of	   immunization,	  but	   it	   is	  not	  fully	  free	  to	  achieve	  other	  similar	  functionings	  related	  to	  sexual	  health	  in	  an	  independent	  manner,	  even	  included	  non	  HPV	  16	  and	  18	  related	  cancers.	  	  
This	  consideration	  marks	  also	  the	  difference	  existing	  between	  populationB	  and	  populationD.	   In	   populationD,	   indeed,	   the	   level	   of	   functioning	   achieved	   is	   the	  result	   of	   free	   choices	   made	   by	   individuals	   who	   were	   first	   provided	   with	   the	  capability	   to	   function.	   In	   this	   respect,	   populationD	   can	   also	   achieve	   other	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valuable	   functionings	  without	   the	  need	  of	   coercive	  measures.	  PopulationC	  and	  populationD	  are	  –	  at	   least	   in	  the	  model	  –	  effectively	  free	  to	  reason	  responsibly	  about	   the	   value	   to	   attribute	   to	   sexual	   health	   and	   prevention	   and	   to	   act	  accordingly.	  Moreover,	   the	   capability	   they	  now	  possess	   is	   fully	   theirs	   like	   the	  functioning	   they	   have	   or	   have	   not.	   Differently	   from	   functioning,	   moreover,	  capabilities	  can	  be	  transmitted	  to	  the	  future	  generations	  through	  dialogue	  and	  education,	  while	  functioning	  (at	  least	  in	  the	  form	  of	  immunity)	  cannot.	  We	  can	  thus	  imagine	  that	  individuals	  in	  populationD	  will	  be	  in	  the	  future	  more	  likely	  to	  provide	  also	  their	  daughters	  with	  the	  capability	  to	  health	  and	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  are	  the	  preventive	  steps	  one	  needs	  to	  take	  to	  achieve	  functioning.	  
So	  far	  I	  have	  only	  discussed	  four	  fictional	  scenarios.	  In	  reality	  there	  will	  be	  no	  population	  with	  the	  exact	  features	  of	  those	  presented	  in	  the	  model.	  More	  likely,	  individuals	   in	   various	   populations	   will	   be	   distributed	   throughout	   the	   graph,	  with	   some	   density	   in	   each	   quadrant.	   Some	   people	   will	   be	   positioned	   in	   the	  right-­‐upper	  quadrant,	  some	  others	  will	  move	  to	  the	  right	  lower	  and	  so	  forth.	  If	  we	  accept,	  however,	  that	  conditions	  such	  as	  those	  in	  the	  left-­‐lower	  quadrant	  of	  the	   graph	   (no	   capability	   and	   no	   functioning)	   are	   morally	   unsatisfactory,	   and	  situations	   like	   those	   in	   the	   left-­‐upper	   quadrant	   are,	   at	   least	   not	   optimal,	   then	  ideal	   distributions	  would	   be	   those	   that	   allow	  moving	   as	  many	   individuals	   as	  possible	  to	  the	  right	  part	  of	   the	  graph.	   If	   these	  arguments	  are	  valid,	   therefore,	  we	   should	   conceive	   of	   capabilities	   as	   ‘objects’	   to	   be	   distributed	   along	   with	  functionings	  and,	  perhaps,	  as	  a	  further	  measure	  of	  success	  of	  HPV	  public	  health	  policies.	  Clearly,	   the	  optimal	  solution,	  namely	   the	  whole	  population	  moving	  to	  the	  right-­‐upper	  quadrant,	  will	  be	  difficult	   to	  achieve.	   It,	  however,	  can	  function	  as	  a	  compass	  for	  directing	  policy	  action.	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In	   the	   present	   and	   in	   the	   previous	   sections	   I	   have	   shown	   that	   enlarging	   our	  focus	   to	   capabilities	   	   will	   enrich	   ethical	   analysis	   and,	   if	   my	   arguments	   are	  correct,	  also	  the	  kinds	  of	  aims	  public	  health	  policies	  should	  have.	  Nevertheless,	  before	   proceeding	   to	   assess	   how	   capabilities	   can	   be	   distributed	   in	   our	   case,	  some	  complications	  need	  acknowledging	  with	  regards	  to	  evaluation	  of	  policies	  at	  a	  given	  time	  point.	  
In	   the	   model	   I	   have	   presented,	   capability	   is	   conceived,	   like	   functioning,	   as	   a	  discrete	  condition:	  either	  you	  have	  it	  or	  not.	  In	  actual	  cases,	  instead,	  capability	  is	  better	  conceived	  as	  a	  continuum	  rather	  than	  a	  yes	  or	  no	  condition.	   In	  other	  words,	  one	   individual’s	  capability	  can	  be	  more	  expanded	  than	  that	  of	  another,	  and	  this	  along	  a	  gradient	  of	  personal	  variations.	  Given	  this	  variation,	  hence,	  one	  could	  ask	  where	  we	  should	  set	  the	  threshold	  of	  achieved	  capability	  in	  the	  graph.	  If	  we	  set	  it	  too	  much	  to	  the	  right,	  then	  very	  few	  people	  will	  have	  an	  acceptable	  level	  of	  capability,	  and	  so	  no	  policy	  could	  possibly	  be	  ethically	  acceptable.	  If	  we	  set	  it	  too	  much	  to	  the	  left,	  instead,	  there	  will	  be	  virtually	  no	  difference	  between	  a	  functioning-­‐based	  evaluation	  method	  and	  a	  capability-­‐based	  one.	  How	  to	  set	  this	   threshold,	  hence,	   is	  not	  easy	   task	  and	   I	  am	  not	  aware	  of	  anyone	  who	  has	  ever	   managed,	   or	   even	   attempted,	   to	   set	   it	   precisely.	   For	   instance	   Martha	  Nussbaum	  (2006),	  when	  she	  discusses	  the	  importance	  of	  capabilities	  in	  general,	  adds	   only	   that	   every	   individual	   needs	   to	   have	   a	   sufficient	   level	   of	   them.	   This	  threshold,	   hence,	   is	   not	   easily	   established	   in	   general,	   nor	   the	   situation	   is	   less	  complex	   in	   the	  specific	   case	  of	  HPV.	  Despite	  difficulties,	  however,	   I	  would	  say	  that	   we	   should	   not	   be	   too	   much	   worried;	   at	   least	   not	   in	   the	   context	   of	   my	  proposal.	   Indeed,	   no	  matter	  where	  we	   set	   the	   threshold,	  we	   can	   agree	   that	   a	  necessary	  element	  for	  achieving	  capability	  is	  –	  at	  a	  minimum	  –	  awareness	  of	  the	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very	  existence	  of	   the	  problem	  and	  what	   it	   implies.	   If	  we	   look	  at	   this	  primary,	  necessary	   feature,	  we	  observe	   that	  general	  awareness	  at	  a	  population	   level	  of	  HPV	  as	  a	  cancer	  risk	  factor	  is	  lacking.	  For	  instance,	  a	  report	  published	  in	  2009	  by	   the	   University	   College	   of	   London	   provides	   the	   results	   from	   two	   national	  surveys	  conducted	  in	  the	  UK	  employing	  a	  sociological	  tool	  for	  assessing	  current	  levels	  of	  cancer	  awareness	  on	  a	  national	  basis.	  Among	  other	  things,	  the	  survey	  shows	   that	   public	   recollection	   of	   HPV	   infection,	   as	   a	   risk	   factor	   for	   cancer,	   is	  nearly	  absent	  (see	  graph	  below).	  	  That	  is,	  almost	  nobody,	  when	  asked	  to	  recall	  risk	  factors	  for	  cancer,	  listed	  HPV	  as	  one	  of	  them.	  
	  Graph	  7.	  Recollection	  of	  risk	  factors	  in	  UK.	  Drawn	  from	  (University	  College	  London	  2009,	  24)	  	  Moreover,	   when	   asked	   to	   recognize	   cancer	   risk	   factors	   within	   a	   list	   of	  candidates,	   respondents	   showed	   a	   general	   poor	   level	   of	   awareness	   of	   HPV	  infection.	  Such	  awareness	  was,	  additionally,	  clustered	  along	  the	  socioeconomic	  spectrum,	  as	  we	  see	  further	  in	  the	  graph	  below.	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  Graph	  8.	  Recognition	  of	  cancer	  risk	  factors	  by	  SES	  in	  UK.	  Drawn	  by:	  (University	  College	  London	  2009,	  23)	  	  These	  data	  provide	  support	  to	  the	  idea	  that,	  at	  least	  at	  the	  population	  level,	  we	  are	   currently	   far	   from	   achieving	   a	   sufficient	   degree	   of	   HPV-­‐related	   health	  capabilities.	  If	  the	  problem	  of	  how	  to	  formally	  evaluate	  policy	  performance	  also	  from	   the	   capability	   perspective	   is	   not	   yet	   solved,	   it	   remains,	   however,	   the	  inspirational	  focus	  of	  capabilities	  and	  the	  need	  to	  conceive	  of	  them	  as	  a	  good	  of	  distribution	  worth	  expanding	  along	  with	  functionings.	  
4.	  Distributing	  gender-­‐neutral	  capabilities	  	  If	  we	  admit	  that	  the	  focus	  of	  our	  moral	  concerns	  with	  respect	  to	  public	  health	  policy	   should	   be	   enlarged	  not	   only	   to	   the	   level	   of	   functioning	   they	   distribute,	  but	   also	   the	   capabilities	   they	   provide	   and	   to	   whom,	   then	   also	   our	   gaze	   with	  regards	   to	  HPV	  policies	   should	   change.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   aim	   of	  HPV	   policies	  should	  be	   that	  of	  moving	  away	   from	  the	   left-­‐lower	  quadrant	  of	   the	  graph,	   the	  most	  morally	  worrisome	  one,	  as	  many	  Sophies	  as	  possible.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	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inspirational	   goal	   of	   HPV	   public	   policies	   should	   be	   –	   at	   a	   minimum	   -­‐	   that	   of	  expanding	   capabilities	   for	   all.	   The	   data	   provided	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   previous	  section	  tell	  us	  that	  there	  is	  still	  something	  to	  do	  to	  achieve	  this	  goal.	  How	  could	  then	   a	   policy	   provide	   the	   relevant	   conversion	   factors	   to	   all	   Sophies?	   In	   the	  fictional	   scenario	   provided	   in	   this	   chapter,	   Sophie	   comes	   from	   a	   particularly	  disadvantaged	   background.	   This	   feature,	   however,	   is	   not	   only	   the	   outcome	   of	  mere	  imagination,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  supported	  by	  the	  data	  presented	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	   fourth	   chapter,	   where	   I	   have	   shown	   that	   reasons	   for	   non	   vaccination	  depend	   also	   on	   the	   network	   of	   familial	   preventive	   practices	   girls	   find	  themselves	   into	   (i.e.	   the	   girl’s	   likelihood	   to	  be	   exposed	   to	   relevant	  preventive	  practices	   depends	   on	   the	  mother’s	   disposition	   towards	   those	  practices).	   	   It	   is	  not	  my	  intention	  here	  to	  make	  a	  full	  proposal	  for	  policy	  implementation	  but,	  as	  the	  title	  of	  this	  chapter	  reads,	  only	  a	  modest	  one.	   In	  particular,	   I	  would	  like	  to	  sketch	  what	  a	  policy	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  capability	  would	  imply	  and	  why,	  after	  this	  perspective	  is	  endorsed,	  it	  would	  shed	  new	  lights	  also	  on	  the	  trade-­‐off	  that	  has	   occupied	   the	   previous	   chapter.	   To	   recall:	   individual	   choice	   vs.	   population	  health;	  individual	  choice	  vs.	  justice;	  justice	  vs.	  efficiency.	  	  
A	  reasonable	  way	  to	  start	  in	  the	  attempt	  to	  provide	  some	  features	  of	  capability-­‐based	  policy	  options	  is	  by	  rehearsing	  how	  current	  policy	  models	  fare	  under	  this	  new	  lens.	  Let	  us	  start	  from	  the	  mandatory	  model	  as	  performed	  in	  the	  US.	  I	  have	  already	  provided	  independent	  arguments	  as	  to	  why	  a	  mandatory	  model	   is	  not	  ethically	   justifiable	   in	   the	   HPV	   context.	   Do	   considerations	   about	   capabilities	  change	  my	  evaluation	  of	  that	  model?	  I	  would	  say	  they	  do	  not,	  at	  least	  as	  they	  are	  currently	  performed.	   In	   the	  mandatory	  model,	   indeed,	  we	  see	   that	   the	  central	  objective	  of	  the	  policy	  is	  to	  achieve	  functioning	  by	  conditioning	  school	  entrance	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upon	   vaccination.	   As	   I	   have	   shown,	   information	   about	  HPV	   and	   its	   links	  with	  cancer	  were	  provided	  to	  objectors	  after	  reviewing	  not	  better-­‐specified	  material	  describing	   those	   links.	   Therefore,	   the	   main	   objective	   of	   those	   policies	   is	   to	  create	   a	   population	   like	   B	   above	   and	   not	   one	   like	   D.	   In	   other	   terms,	   the	  mandatory	  US	  models	  starts	  from	  functionings	  and	  resources	  rather	  than	  with	  capabilities	   and,	   only	   later,	   functionings.	   What	   about,	   instead,	   the	   voluntary	  models?	  Those	  cases,	   as	  we	  saw,	  were	  heterogeneous	  but,	   to	   simplify,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  voluntary	  models	   in	  US	  and	  in	  Italy,	  although	  to	  different	  extents,	  do	  not	  ensure	  that	  most	  individuals	  move,	  at	  least,	  to	  the	  right-­‐lower	  quadrant	  of	   the	  graph.	   In	   the	  UK	  case,	   instead,	  we	  see	   that	  many	   individuals	   (see	   infra:	  chapter	  4)	  achieve	   functioning	   (i.e.	   they	  get	   the	  vaccine).	  Do	   these	   individuals	  also	   have	   their	   capabilities	   expanded?	  The	   evening	   information	   sessions	  with	  parents	   seem	   to	   suggest	   that	   in	   a	   sense,	   they	   do.	  More	   informed	   parents,	  we	  may	  speculate,	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  educate	  their	  daughters	  properly	  so	  to	  allow	  them	   to	   leave	   the	   left-­‐lower	   quadrant	   of	   the	   graph.	   The	   school-­‐based	   model	  hence	   allows	   me	   to	   provide	   a	   general	   policy	   recommendation:	   schools	   are	  suitable	  places	  where	  to	  perform	  capability-­‐based	  HPV	  policies.	  	  
As	   I	   have	   shown	   throughout	   this	   chapter,	  what	  makes	   Sophies	  disadvantaged	  with	  respect	  to	  vaccination	  and	  cervical	  cancer	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  not	  willing	  to	  take	  the	  vaccine,	  but	  that	  they	  lack	  relevant	  conversion	  factors	  to	  expand	  their	  capabilities	  and	  achieve	  valuable	   functionings,	   if	   they	  so	  wish.	  Schools,	   in	   this	   respect,	   can	   function	   as	   places	   where	   relevant	   conversion	  factors	   are	   provided.	   School	   in	   our	   societies	   is	   the	   institution	   traditionally	  devoted	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  a	  host	  of	  capabilities	  and	  opportunities	  to	  all	   its	  future	   citizens.	   Moreover,	   schools	   are	   among	   those	   few	   institutional	   places	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where	   individuals	   from	   the	   whole	   socioeconomic	   spectrum	   convene.	   In	   this	  sense,	   it	   can	   be	   also	   a	   place	   in	   which	   educational	   tools	   regarding	   disease	  prevention	  and	  sexual	  health	  can	  be	  conveyed,	  and	  as	  many	  Sophies	  as	  possible	  be	  reached.	  	  
Clearly,	  I	  am	  not	  necessarily	  suggesting	  that	  the	  school	  should	  be	  also	  the	  place	  of	   vaccine	   administration,	   but	   it	   can	   certainly	   be	   the	   place	   in	  which	   relevant	  capabilities	   are	   distributed,	   both	   to	   parents	   and	   their	   children.	   Following	   the	  example	  of	   the	  UK,	  one	  can	   imagine	   that	  educational	   sessions	  are	  provided	   in	  afternoon	   meetings	   to	   parents.	   These	   meetings	   could	   be	   conceived	   as	   an	  opportunity	   for	  groups	  of	  parents	   to	  encounter	  paediatricians	  explaining	  HPV	  as	  a	  sexually	  transmitted	  infection,	  its	  link	  with	  cancer,	  what	  are	  the	  steps	  that	  need	   to	   be	   taken	   for	   correct	   prevention,	   and	   discuss	   the	   opportunity	   of	  vaccination.	  Moreover,	   in	  this	  setting	  one	  can	   imagine	  parents	  participating	   in	  deliberations	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  their	  sons	  and	  daughters	  will	  be	  exposed	  to	  the	  information.	  
If	   we	   conceive	   of	   capabilities	   as	   the	   ‘object’	   of	   distribution,	   rather	   than	  resources	  and	  functioning	  alone,	  then	  it	  becomes	  feasible	  also	  to	  provide	  these	  capabilities	   to	   boys.	   In	   section	   2	   of	   this	   chapter	   I	   have	   illustrated	   the	   case	   of	  Bob.	   Bob,	   like	   Sophie,	   is	   not	   provided	   by	   current	   policies	   neither	   with	   the	  capability	   to	   function	   or	   with	   the	   functioning	   itself.	   This	   aspect	   is	   morally	  worrisome	  in	  that	  it	  may	  foster	  –	  as	  I	  said	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  –	  the	  idea	  that	  responsibilities	   as	   to	   issues	  pertaining	   to	   sexual	  prevention	  are	   a	   female	  only	  problem.	   The	   deficiency	   in	   current	   policies,	   I	   argue,	   derives	   from	   a	   focus	   too	  much	   flattened	   on	   issues	   of	   resources	   and	   achieved	   functionings	   alone.	   As	   I	  have	  shown	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  we	  have	  strong	  moral	  reasons	  in	  the	  HPV	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context	   for	  choosing	  a	  policy	  plan	   that,	  despite	  not	  optimal	   from	  an	  economic	  perspective,	  would	   include	  also	   the	  male	  population.	  Nevertheless,	   even	   if	  my	  arguments	   are	   not	   accepted	   as	   sufficient	   for	   expanding	   the	   target	   group	   of	  vaccination	   itself,	  moral	  reasons	  still	  support	   the	  necessity	  of	  expanding	  boys’	  capabilities.	   	  Providing	   the	  capability	   to	  boys	  and	   their	   families	   too,	   indeed,	   is	  important	  to	  allow	  them	  to	  understand	  better	  their	  role	  as	  potential	  victims	  and	  vectors	  of	  the	  infections.	  This	  understanding	  may	  prove	  important	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  future	  functionings	  of	  the	  population	  as	  a	  whole,	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  population	  that	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  risks	  it	  faces.	  Last	  October,	  ACIP	  recommended	  the	  HPV	  vaccine	  also	  for	  boys.	  Although	  this	  recommendation	  has	  not	  been	  ratified	  yet,	  we	  can	  suppose	  it	  will	  be	  soon,	  and	  that	  other	  countries	  will	  also	  consider	  this	  option.	  One	   may	   think	   that	   such	   a	   recommendation	   jeopardizes	   my	   proposal,	   but	   I	  think	   it	  does	  not.	   Indeed,	  recommendations	   in	  ACIP	   language	  means	  only	   that	  paediatricians	  are	  asked	  to	  propose	  the	  intervention	  in	  a	  routine	  manner.	  I	  have	  already	   shown,	   in	   chapter	   four,	   that	   this	   strategy	   runs	   the	   risk	   not	   to	   bring	  about	  good	  results	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  functionings	  and,	  with	  the	  language	  of	  the	  present	  chapter,	  in	  terms	  of	  capabilities.	  Therefore,	  my	  suggestion	  would	  build	  upon	   also	   this	   kind	   of	   extension.	   	   In	   the	   last	   section	   of	   the	   previous	   chapter,	  moreover,	   I	  have	  alluded	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  by	  concentrating	  on	  capabilities	  as	  a	  further	   ‘object’	  of	  distribution	  would	   shed	  new	   light	  on	   the	   trade-­‐off	  between	  justice	  in	  terms	  of	  gender	  equity	  and	  efficiency	  in	  terms	  of	  cost-­‐effectiveness.	  In	  that	  chapter	  I	  have	  provided	  moral	  grounds	  to	  tell	  that	  the	  scenario	  that	  is	  more	  inclusive	   while	   being	   not	   the	   most	   cost-­‐effective	   alternative,	   is	   the	   one	   that	  should	  be	  preferred.	  In	  this	  respect,	  that	  still	  is	  the	  way	  I	  would	  solve	  the	  trade-­‐off.	   No	   matter	   what	   of	   the	   three	   scenarios	   presented	   in	   that	   chapter	   public	  health	   authorities	  would	   end	  up	   choosing,	   the	  distribution	  of	   capabilities	   in	   a	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gender	   neutral	  manner	   remains	   essential	   and	   comes	   at	   no	   cost	   if	   not	   a	   good	  deal	  of	  social	  and	  political	  imaginary.	  
5.	  Concluding	  remarks	  I	   have	   only	   sketched	   the	   place	   in	  which	   the	   distribution	   of	   capabilities	   could	  occur.	   Arguably,	   a	   detailed	   description	   of	   how	   the	   provision	   of	   capabilities	  should	  take	  place	  goes	  beyond	  my	  specific	  competences	  and,	  in	  any	  case,	  would	  require	   another	   work.	   Nevertheless,	   I	   have	   shown	   that	   by	   focusing	   on	  capabilities	   rather	   than	  achieved	   functionings	  alone	  permits	  us	   to	  understand	  what	  are	  those	  conditions	  that	  are	  morally	  puzzling	  and,	  consequently,	  what	  are	  the	  policy	  priorities	   that	  need	   to	  be	  addressed	   if	   this	  perspective	   is	  endorsed.	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  school-­‐based	  programme	  can	  be	  performed	  varies,	  clearly,	  from	   context	   to	   context.	   It	   requires,	   indeed,	   a	   host	   of	   institutional	   and	  professional	  cooperations	  that	  vary	  from	  system	  to	  system.	  My	  general	  analysis,	  in	   this	   respect,	   cannot	   give	  precise	  details	   about	  what	   to	  do	   in	   specific	   policy	  contexts.	   Nevertheless	   the	   idea	   of	   expanding	   capabilities	   prompts	   an	   overall	  framework	  that	  seems	  able	  to	  take	  into	  account	  so	  far	  neglected	  dimensions	  of	  systematic	  disadvantage.	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Conclusions	  	  	  
The	  main	  focus	  of	  this	  work	  has	  been	  the	  exploration	  of	  ethically	  relevant	  issues	  in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   case	   study.	   Licensed	   between	   2006	   and	   2007	   by	   several	  regulatory	  agencies,	  and	  promptly	  endorsed	  by	  several	  public	  health	  systems	  in	  developed	  countries,	   the	  HPV	  vaccines	  reopened,	   in	  both	  old	  and	  novel	   forms,	  concerns	   that	   have	   accompanied	   the	   institution	   of	   mass	   immunization	  campaigns	  throughout	  their	  successful,	  yet	  contested,	  history.	  HPV	  vaccination,	  perhaps	  more	   than	  other	  public	  health	  measures,	  embodies	  much	  of	   the	  most	  significant	   ethical	   dilemmas	   that	   public	   health	   has	   to	   face	   in	   our	   times.	  With	  three	  shots	  to	  be	  administered	  over	  six	  month,	  HPV	  vaccines	  confers	  immunity	  against	   those	   sexually	   transmitted	   infections	   that	   are	   now	   known	   to	   be	   the	  necessary,	   still	   not	   sufficient,	   cause	   of	   cervical	   cancer.	   Like	   any	   other	   vaccine	  against	   a	   contagious	   agent,	   HPV	   vaccines	   would	   confer	   maximum	   benefits	   if	  administered	  on	  a	  population	  scale	  so	   to	  decrease	   the	  prevalence	  of	   the	  virus	  and,	   consequently,	   the	   incidence	   of	   related	   morbidities.	   The	   way	   for	   its	   full	  benefits	  to	  become	  reality,	  however,	  is	  not	  devoid	  of	  ethical	  complexities.	  What	  are	   the	   right	   means	   for	   maximizing	   population	   benefits	   while	   respecting	  individual	  choice,	  how	  to	  do	  this	  in	  the	  face	  of	  existing	  inequalities	  with	  regards	  to	   cervical	   cancer,	   and	   in	   a	   way	   that	   also	   preserves	   economic	   efficiency,	   are	  some	  of	   the	  questions	  comprising	  what	   I	  called	  the	  ethical	  dimensions	  of	  HPV	  vaccination	   policies.	   Policy	   proposals	   to	   make	   vaccination	   mandatory	   for	  preadolescent	  girls	  entering	  sixth	  grade	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  the	  gender-­‐based	  nature	  of	  how	  current	  policies	  deal	  with	  such	  a	  sexually	  transmitted	  infection,	  render	  HPV	  vaccination	  even	  more	  problematic	  from	  an	  ethics	  perspective.	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In	  order	  to	  make	  my	  exploration	  analytically	  robust	  I	  have	  structured	  this	  work	  in	   two	   parts:	   a	   first	   part	   dedicated	   to	   the	   provision	   of	   a	   suitable	   theoretical	  background	   for	   the	  analysis	  of	   the	  case	  study;	  and	  a	  second	  part	  dedicated	   to	  the	  ethical	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  itself.	  	  
In	   the	   first	   chapter,	   I	   started	   from	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   received	   view	   in	   public	  health	  ethics,	  what	   I	   called	   the	  beneficence	  model	  of	  public	  health	  ethics.	  The	  beneficence	  model	  seeks	  to	  establish	  those	  conditions	  that	  should	  regulate	  the	  ethical	   implementation	  of	   public	   health	  policies.	   It	   recognizes	   that	   population	  health	   is	   important	   but,	   nonetheless,	   it	   also	   acknowledges	   that	   sometimes	  public	  health	  activities	  may	  contrast	  with	  other	  important	  values	  like	  individual	  freedom,	   understood	   in	   this	   model	   mostly	   in	   its	   canonical	   non-­‐interference	  form.	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	   beneficence	   model	   provides	   us	   with	   a	   number	   of	  limiting	  conditions	  that	  should	  ensure	  that	  the	  invasion	  of	  the	  individual	  sphere	  by	  public	  health	  institutions	  is	  kept	  to	  a	  minimum.	  In	  the	  same	  chapter	  I	  have,	  then,	  contrasted	  the	  beneficence	  model,	  that	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  revised	  liberal	  framework	   suitable	   for	   public	   health,	   with	   intuitions	   coming	   from	   another	  school	   in	   political	   philosophy,	   namely	   republicanism.	   I	   have	   noticed	   that	  republicanism	  rightly	   tells	  us	   that	   interference	   is	  morally	  dubious	  not	  as	  such	  but	  when	  it	  is	  arbitrary	  and	  does	  not	  track	  common	  recognizable	  interests	  that	  individuals	   have	   qua	   citizens.	   I	   have,	   however,	   also	   concluded	   that	   the	   latter	  idea	   should	   not	   be	   acritically	   conflated	   with	   an	   overarching	   notion	   of	  population	   health	   that	   should	   prevail	   over	   individuals,	   presumably	   narrow,	  interests.	   I	   have,	   instead,	   emphasized	   that	   a	   public	   health	   policy	   is	   for	   the	  common	   good	   when	   it	   is	   able	   to	   let	   emerge	   all	   health	   shared	   interests,	   also	  those	  who	  are	  hold	  by	  minority	  groups.	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In	  the	  second	  chapter,	  instead,	  I	  have	  elaborated	  on	  the	  ways	  one	  can	  conceive	  of	  justice	  in	  public	  health.	  After	  having	  specified	  how	  I	  intended	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  increased	   recognition	   of	   health	   inequalities	   and	   their	   socially	   determined	  nature,	  I	  concluded	  by	  showing	  that	  justice	  in	  public	  health	  requires	  two	  things.	  The	   first	   requirement	   is	   a	  minimal	   injunction	   for	  public	  health	  policies	  not	   to	  worsen	   existing	   inequalities,	   what	   I	   called	   the	   negative	   aim	   of	   justice.	   The	  second	  requirement,	  instead,	  stems	  from	  Sen’s	  capability	  approach	  and	  tells	  us	  that	   central	   focus	   of	   distribution	   in	   public	   health	   policies	   should	   not	   only	   be	  resources,	  but	  also	  capabilities	  to	  function.	  
The	   theoretical	   analysis	   of	   part	   1	   of	   the	   thesis	   allowed	  me	   to	   assess	  whether	  current	  policies	  make	  a	  correct	  balance	  of	  the	  three	  ethical	  trade-­‐offs	  that	  I	  have	  identified	   emerging	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   third	   chapter.	   These	   trade-­‐offs	   are	  those	   between	   individual	   choice	   v.	   population	   health,	   individual	   choice	   v.	  justice,	  and	  justice	  v.	  efficiency.	  As	  I	  have	  shown,	  all	  the	  three	  values	  part	  of	  the	  trade-­‐offs	   have	   prima	   facie	   validity.	   Hence	   I	   have	   tried	   to	   understand,	   in	   the	  remaining	   part	   of	   the	   thesis,	   how	   current	   policies	   are	   facing	   with	   respect	   to	  them,	  and	  what	  values	  they	  give	  priority	  to.	  	  
In	  the	  fourth	  chapter	  I	  have	  explored	  the	  policy	  means	  adopted	  in	  the	  US,	  Italy	  and	  UK	  to	  control	  HPV	  infections	  and	  reduce	  the	  incidence	  of	  cervical	  cancer.	  I	  have	  noticed	  that	  all	  the	  models	  identified	  differently	  put	  in	  balance	  the	  moral	  concerns	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  issue.	  In	  particular,	  I	  have	  noticed	  that	  an	  insistence	  on	  the	  least	  restrictive	  alternative	  alone	  leaves	  out	  of	  focus	  important	  concerns	  for	  social	   justice	   and	   the	   need	   to	   avoid	   the	   worsening	   of	   existing	   inequalities.	  Although	   the	   contextual	   aspects	   of	   any	   policy	   have,	   clearly,	   to	   be	   taken	   into	  account,	  the	  school	  based	  programme	  looked	  as	  the	  one	  allowing	  broader	  space	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for	   the	   recognition	   of	   all	   the	   interests	   at	   play.	   The	   general	   conclusion	   I	   drew	  from	  the	  comparison	  runs	  against	  one	  tenet	  of	  the	  beneficence	  model.	  Indeed,	  I	  have	   shown	   that	   the	  morally	   preferable	   policy	   alternative	   is	   not	   the	   one	   that	  enlarges	  the	  space	  for	  non-­‐interfered	  choices	  -­‐	   like	  the	  voluntary	  model	  in	  the	  US	   -­‐	  but	   the	  one	   that,	  while	   still	   leaving	  vaccination	  voluntary,	   also	  offers	   the	  opportunity	  to	  enlarge	  the	  informational	  basis	  on	  which	  vaccination	  choices	  are	  made	  and	  that	  does	  it	  in	  a	  way	  that	  does	  not	  worsen	  existing	  inequalities.	  In	  this	  sense,	  I	  have	  specified	  that	  the	  school-­‐based	  system	  –	  as	  performed	  in	  the	  UK	  -­‐creates	  the	  space	  for	  respecting	  choice	  while	  effectively	  offering	  the	  vaccination	  opportunity	  to	  all	  individuals.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  school-­‐based	  model	  also	  meets	  concerns	  for	  the	  negative	  aim	  of	  justice	  presented	  in	  the	  second	  chapter.	  
Although	   things	   are	   perhaps	   slowly	   changing	   as	   I	  write,	   HPV	   vaccination	   has	  long	   been	   framed	   as	   a	   woman’s	   issue	   only.	   The	   reasons	   of	   this	   framing	   are	  partially	  due	  to	  historical	  contingencies	  –	  i.e.	  HPV	  control	  has	  been	  embedded	  in	  an	  established	  network	  of	  healthcare	  services	  in	  the	  context	  of	  cervical	  cancer	  prevention	   –	   and	   partially	   to	   the	   opportunity	   cost	   that	   extending	   the	  programmes	  to	  the	  male	  population	  would	  have.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  chapter	  five	  I	  have	   shown	   that	   basing	   public	   health	   policy	   decisions	   on	   issues	   of	   economic	  efficiency	  alone	  may	  come	  at	  a	  moral	  opportunity	  cost.	   I	  have	   illustrated	  how	  public	  health	  policies,	  besides	   their	  officially	  stated	  objective,	  carry	  with	   them	  also	   meanings	   that	   we	   may	   find	   morally	   undesirable.	   A	   female-­‐only	   policy,	   I	  have	  argued,	   foster	   the	   invidious	  gender	   stereotype	   that	  women	  alone	  should	  take	  the	  burden	  of	  issues	  related	  to	  sexual	  health	  and	  prevention.	  Extending	  the	  programmes	   to	   the	  male	  population	   too,	   however,	   is	   not	   only	   justified	  by	   the	  expressive	  function	  of	  the	  policy.	  Including	  males	  into	  the	  programmes,	  indeed,	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would	  allow	   the	  establishment	  of	  herd	   immunity	  effects	   to	   the	  benefit	   also	  of	  the	   people	   that	   for	   various	   reasons	   –	   often	   of	   socioeconomic	   disadvantage	  though	  –	  could	  not	  be	  immunized.	  Moreover,	  a	  gender-­‐based	  campaign	  neglects	  the	   presence	   in	   our	   societies	   of	   homosexual	   choices	   and,	   given	   the	   data	  presented,	   that	   there	   may	   be	   high-­‐risk	   groups	   also	   among	   males.	   A	   gender-­‐based	   campaign	   risks	   to	   systematically	   disadvantaging	   a	   minority	   group	   of	  people	   only	   because	   their	   conditions	   are	   rare.	   I	   have	   thus	   concluded	   chapter	  five	  by	  claiming	  that	  strong	  moral	  reasons	  would	  support	  the	  creation	  of	  herd	  immunity	   in	   the	  HPV	   context.	   Indeed,	   a	   gender-­‐neutral	   policy	   is	   the	   one	   that,	  among	  feasible	  alternatives,	  better	  meets	  the	  needs	  of	  all.	  	  
In	  the	  final	  chapter	  of	  the	  thesis	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  reframe	  the	  moral	  focus	  that	  we	  should	  have	  on	  public	  health	  policies,	  in	  general,	  and	  HPV	  policies,	  in	  particular.	  More	   specifically,	   I	   have	   criticized	   common	   views	   in	   public	   health	   ethics	   that	  see	   the	   discipline	   as	   merely	   investigating	   the	   means	   of	   policies,	   and	   never	  interrogating	  their	  ends.	  This	  deficiency,	  hence,	  obscures	  the	  moral	  salience	  of	  human	   diversity	   and	   why	   certain	   conditions	   are	   morally	   worrisome.	   In	  particular,	   I	   have	   argued,	   we	   should	   shift	   our	   moral	   and	   policy	   focus	   from	  resources	  and	  functionings	  to	  capabilities	  to	  function;	  that	   is,	  what	  people	  can	  do	  and	  be	  with	  the	  resources	  they	  are	  provided	  with.	  Capabilities	  are	  effective	  freedoms	  to	  achieve	  valuable	  functioning,	  if	  one	  so	  wishes.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  if	  we	   expand	   our	   moral	   evaluative	   gaze	   to	   capabilities,	   then	   we	   add	   a	   second	  dimension	   for	   making	   fruitful	   comparisons	   both	   at	   the	   individual	   and	  population	   level,	   thus	  understanding	  which	  conditions	  are	  morally	  worrisome	  and	  which	  are	  not.	  By	  showing	  what	   this	  conception	  would	   imply,	  both	  at	   the	  individual	  and	  population	  level,	  I	  argued	  that	  HPV	  policies	  should	  primarily	  aim	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at	  distributing	  and	  maximizing	  relevant	  capabilities,	  especially	  where	  those	  are	  lacking.	   In	  practical	   terms,	  this	  would	  imply	  –	  at	  a	  minimum	  –	  increasing	  HPV	  and	  cancer	   related	  preventive	  awareness.	  As	  a	  way	  of	  pragmatic	   conclusion,	   I	  have	  suggested	   that	  one	  way	   to	  maximize	  capabilities	  expansion	   for	  all	   in	   the	  HPV	   context	   is	   by	   considering	   school	   as	   appropriate	   places	   of	   capabilities	  distribution.	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